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Abstract 
This exploratory, qualitative study utilises 30 elite interviews with highly experienced 
chairpersons and CEOs of large UK listed companies to explore how individuals 
holding these roles respond to strategic tensions in contexts of far-reaching change and 
resource scarcity. The thematic analysis undertaken in this study using the Demands–
Constraints–Choices (DCC) model of roles identifies the role complexities, 
constraints, tensions and choices that chairpersons and CEOs face while performing 
their roles. This thesis’s findings advance knowledge of how chairpersons and CEOs 
respond to strategic tensions while enacting their roles, making important 
contributions to both role theory and paradox and tensions literature. The findings 
reveal the importance of the interdependence of chairperson and CEO roles, 
identifying the chairperson’s buffering role, relationships and dyadic work as critical 
for both CEOs and chairpersons in handling strategic tensions. Moreover, this thesis 
finds no empirical support for the idea that CEOs and chairpersons frame competing 
strategic demands and tensions as paradoxical. Instead, evidence suggests that tensions 
emerge from and are responded to within social interaction processes, where 
chairperson buffering and dyadic work appear to be critical. This gives partial support 
to emerging constitutive and processual views of paradox and tension. Finally, this 
thesis contributes to the debate between contingency and strategic choice and paradox 
perspectives on tensions, by showing that a contingency mind-set – rather than a 
paradoxical mind-set – predominates in chairperson and CEO behaviour and practice. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This chapter introduces the thesis, which seeks to explore how chairpersons and CEOs of 
large UK listed companies respond to strategic tensions arising in contexts of far-reaching 
change. 
The chapter starts with a discussion of the research rationale, emphasising both the 
theoretical and practical reasons that have motivated this research effort. The subsequent 
sections introduce the reader to the main research question that this work seeks to answer, 
as well as to the research’s aims and associated objectives. The chapter proceeds with a 
brief outline of the key contributions this thesis makes to both theory and practice and 
then closes by providing the reader with an outline of the thesis structure. 
1.2 Research rationale 
In this thesis strategic tensions are broadly defined as firm-level competing demands that 
are handled at the highest levels of organisations and have strategic consequences for the 
organisation as a whole.  Strategic tensions confront and are handled by CEOs and 
chairpersons on a continual basis – it is probably the essence of their roles’ purpose. But 
what is less well understood is how CEOs and chairpersons individually respond to 
strategic tensions in their roles, as well as how they influence each other in so doing and 
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what this means for governance and organisations. When strategic tensions are handled 
badly, the consequences can be dire for the organisation’s stakeholders. It may lead to 
vicious circles, strategic persistence, escalating commitment, or simply poor strategy 
execution and performance. Ultimately, poorly handled strategic tensions mean 
maladaptation and the demise of entire firms. 
The rationale for this thesis emerged from personal, practical and theoretical 
motives. From a personal perspective, the work of top corporate officers has always 
intrigued me. Often portrayed as highly capable, almost blessed with superpowers and a 
mystical aura, CEOs and chairpersons are, of course, only humans, but whose roles 
embody an enormous potential to impact, either positively or negatively, thousands if not 
millions of ordinary people. Having held managerial positions and an executive 
directorship, I have experienced numerous such tensions myself. In all honesty, I have 
had more failure than success in handling them. So, in this sense, the topic of this thesis 
is motivated my own failures as a manager. 
This thesis is also motivated by concerns of a more practical nature. Most CEOs 
and chairpersons report facing tensions on a continual basis. A December 2016 article 
from the prestigious Harvard Business Review aimed at practitioners and academics was 
titled: “How can CEOs manage strategic tensions?” (Goddard and Pierre, 2016). In the 
article, most of the strategic tensions, including those that are role-based, that this thesis 
identifies are also captured, albeit under different labels. But considerations on how to 
handle them differ somewhat. Practising CEOs and chairpersons have a critical interest 
in understanding how to handle strategic tensions, because they are aware that this is 
effectively the crux of their respective roles. It is crucial for the companies they serve as 
well as for their own professional success and reputation. Thus, any research that can aid 
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them in becoming more effective in handling strategic tensions – i.e. regarding the nature 
of tensions and how to address them – is potentially of value. 
Lastly, this thesis is motivated by a theoretical imperative. Research on the actual 
role behaviour of CEOs and chairpersons is growing, but remains relatively scarce – and 
in many cases amounts to little more than a list of desirable attributes and skills related to 
effective role fulfilment. Despite widespread recognition of its centrality to board 
effectiveness and company performance, even less research has been done on the 
interaction between chairperson and CEO roles. And even less research has considered 
CEO and chairperson roles and their interaction in contexts marked by far-reaching and 
disruptive change and resource scarcity – contexts that engender strategic tensions that 
need to be handled at the very top of an organisation. In an era where change and 
disruption for businesses is more frequent than ever – because of the volatility of global 
integrated economies, recurrent financial and economic crisis or the unprecedented pace 
of technological innovation – the potential for strategic tensions to emerge at the top of 
organisations has grown immensely. It is therefore important to understand their nature, 
how CEOs and chairpersons perceive and handle them, and how they interact to devise 
strategic outcomes. This thesis addresses exactly this problematic. The focus of this study 
is of considerable interest to academics who wish to understand the unique role 
contributions of chairpersons and CEOs, and critically how governance and leadership 
interact to produce responses to often insurmountable strategic tensions which are of great 
consequence for an organisation. 
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1.3 Research scope, aims and objectives 
The aim of this study is to explore the nature of chairperson and CEO responses to 
strategic tensions. The study is positioned within the growing concern with governance 
and board directors’ effectiveness in governing and leading large organisations, which, 
despite successive regulatory change, continues to attract criticism, with many examples 
of failure to be observed. It is also founded on growing calls for research on what board 
directors – such as CEOs and chairpersons – actually do, as well as calls for more research 
that takes context seriously. With this in mind, this study pursues the following objectives: 
a) To determine the nature of the business contexts within which chairpersons and 
CEOs perceive and face strategic tensions; 
b) To explore the nature of strategic tensions faced by chairpersons and CEOs while 
enacting their roles; 
c) To explore the demands, constraints, supports and choices faced by chairpersons 
and CEOs while enacting their roles; 
d) To explore chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses to strategic tensions; 
e) To propose a model of chairperson and CEO responses to strategic tensions. 
The overarching research question that arose after careful review of the relevant 
literatures is: “How do chairperson and CEO roles respond to strategic tensions?” 
1.4 Research contributions 
This study makes contributions to role theory and paradox and tensions theory and 
research; it also serves as a resource for practising and aspiring CEOs, chairpersons and 
regulators. 
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The next two sections provide a summary of these contributions, which are then 
further detailed and discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.6. 
1.4.1 Contribution to theory 
This study first of all contributes to role theory, particularly studies that examine CEOs’ 
and chairpersons’ behaviour and interaction. The thesis confirms previous research that 
demonstrates a high degree of interdependence between chairperson and CEO roles, as 
well as the qualities and attributes of the relationship that influence this interaction. 
Furthermore, this study identifies important dynamics in role boundary delineation 
between these critical roles, suggesting that normative role boundary delineation is 
accountability-focused, whereas boundary delineation based on each role incumbent’s 
contribution of skills, experience and relationships is problem-solving-focused. The 
former is found to sometimes impede joint stewardship and separation of efforts to work 
through strategic tensions, whereas the latter provides the clarity required for handling 
tensions via meaningful accountability and joint stewardship. A critical contribution to 
the application of role theory, particularly the Demands–Constraints–Choices model of 
roles (Stewart, 1967, 1982), is the identification of a critical buffering role performed by 
the chairperson in relation to the CEO. This role – often invisible to many governance 
researchers – includes processes of insulation and regulation whereby the chairperson 
shields the CEO from particular expectations arising from powerful stakeholders such as 
non-executives, shareholders and analysts, while also regulating the CEO’s emotion, 
cognition and behaviour that form part of his/he responses to those expectations. The 
buffering role thus helps the CEO to handle a multitude of often contradictory 
expectations, and critically determines important strategic outcomes such as the relative 
balance between short- and long-term performance, risk-taking and pace, scale and 
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direction of strategic change. Finally, this study contributes to role theory by emphasising 
the importance of relationships and dyadic work for CEOs (between CEO and 
chairperson, CEO and CFO, or even CEO and COO) in handling competing strategic 
demands. 
The contributions made to role theory critically link to contributions to paradox and 
tensions theory. The buffering role of the chairperson in relation to the CEO, and the 
importance of relationships and dyadic work and practice, reveal the nature of strategic 
tensions as socially constructed, while finding no empirical support for tensions being 
perceived or framed as paradoxical by chairpersons and CEOs. In so doing, this thesis 
contributes to emerging research that sees paradox as an elusive concept, while pointing 
in the direction of new approaches to paradox and tension that only now begin to 
appreciate “discourses, social interaction processes, practices and ongoing organisation 
activities” (Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016:67) as sources of tension as well as the 
mechanisms to handle and work through tensions. Social interactions, dyadic work and 
practices are also found to be contingent on CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perceptions of 
environmental challenges. Contrary to some paradox scholars who have quickly 
dismissed contingency theory as outdated and unable to deal with paradox, this thesis 
finds not only that paradox is not perceived and framed by CEOs and chairpersons, but 
also that in handling tensions a contingency perspective remains important in explaining 
choice of practice and behaviour. 
1.4.2 Contribution to practice 
This study contributes to practice by clarifying the nature of chairperson and CEO role 
behaviour as well as of their interaction in contexts of far-reaching change and poor 
performance. Specifically, the study finds that chairperson–CEO role boundaries and the 
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division of tasks and responsibilities between them need to be applied in a circumstantial 
manner, focusing on how each role incumbent (irrespective of normative roles) can 
contribute skills, experience and relationships to help address challenges and strategic 
tensions confronting the company. A focus on prescribed rigid arrangements, this study 
finds, may serve as a defence mechanism by which role incumbents avoid meaningful 
accountability and joint stewardship of the company and it may lead to an inability to find 
the necessary resources for problem resolution. This should be a point of reflection and 
debate for regulators and boards. 
This study also advances understanding of the chairperson role in relation to the 
CEO. It identifies a critical buffering role exercised by the chairperson that insulates the 
CEO from certain expectations and pressures from powerful stakeholders, as well as 
regulating the CEO’s responses to strategic tensions. Chairpersons are encouraged to 
appreciate the importance of buffering and how it continually impacts important strategic 
outcomes such as long- and short-term performance balance, risk-taking, and the pace, 
scale and direction of change. In addition, this thesis uncovers a number of chairperson 
practices that may increase their effectiveness in creating a context for the effective 
handling of strategic tensions by the CEO and the board. Furthermore, this thesis places 
an emphasis on contingency, dyadic interactions and relationships and practice. 
Chairpersons need to constantly reflect on how practice helps to both address and generate 
strategic tensions, and how dyadic interactions and other social exchanges impact on 
raising, debating and finding appropriate responses to tensions. 
Practising and aspiring CEOs may also benefit from the findings and insights 
contained in this thesis. It identifies a number of practices that CEOs often use in contexts 
of far-reaching change – contexts that present them with strategic tensions. These 
practices include: building the top team and considering questions of composition, size 
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and relationships, including delegation of decision-making and the CEO–CFO 
relationship and dyadic work; strategy formulation, including considerations on whether 
to establish a new corporate purpose, where the company competitive advantage lies, and 
what the firm’s unique capabilities are; organisational structure redesign; and strategy 
communication and alignment. Critically, CEOs are called on to recognise how each 
practice may support the handling of ongoing tensions, as well as the practice potentially 
being the source of new tensions which can develop both intentionally or unintentionally. 
In summary, this thesis provides practising chairpersons and CEOs with an 
opportunity to reflect on their roles in particular contexts, contributing to leadership 
development and effectiveness. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 offers a critical literature review and 
discussion of paradox and tensions theory and research. It provides a logical progression 
tracing paradox back to early writers in organisation and management theory. It discusses 
the basic tenets of paradox theory with reference to contingency theory, and addresses 
important ontological questions with regard to this literature. It continues with an 
exploration of the concept of paradox and tension, showing how the concept has evolved 
as well as the types of paradox and tension to which literature and research has been 
devoting the most attention. This is followed by a section on the leadership qualities that 
research has associated with the effective handling of paradox, as well as the defensive 
and strategic responses often displayed by individuals faced with paradox and tension. 
The second part of Chapter 2 discusses corporate governance literature, particularly on 
boards of directors. It starts with a broad discussion of the role of the board of directors, 
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then focuses on UK boards’ structure, composition and practice from regulatory and 
research perspectives. The discussion then drills down to focus on extant research that 
examines the individual roles of CEO and chairperson, and their complexities, tensions, 
demands and constraints. It also provides a brief overview of the criticality of the 
relationship between these key roles for the effectiveness of corporate governance. The 
chapter closes with the articulation of the research opportunity, research questions and a 
discussion of the theoretical framework selected to guide the research effort.  
Chapter 3 details the research methodology used in conducting the study, including 
the philosophical foundations, study approach, inquiry logic, guiding theory, research 
context, level and unit of analysis, time horizon, sample selection, methods for data 
collection and analysis, pilot study, and ethical considerations. 
Chapter 4 combines both research results and discussion. It lays out the research 
findings, which are organised into four overarching themes, and discusses them in relation 
to extant literature and research. 
The fifth and final chapter summarises the discussion of findings and proposes a 
model that encapsulates the key relationships that emerged, offering new propositions for 
future testing. It proceeds with an evaluation of the study’s research quality and discusses 
how well the study’s aims, objectives and research question have been met. It then 
outlines the study’s contribution to both theory and practice. The chapter ends by 
acknowledging the study’s limitations, suggesting future research avenues and offering a 
personal reflection about the doctoral journey. 
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1.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has introduced the thesis by outlining the research rationale, research 
questions and the aims and objectives of the research. It has also provided a brief, 
condensed overview of the contributions made by this study to both theory and practice. 
The next chapter provides the reader with a review of the literature on paradox, tension 
and board directors (with an emphasis on CEO and chairperson roles) and articulates the 
research opportunity and the guiding framework of the Demands–Constraints–Choices 
(DCC) model (Stewart, 1967, 1982) selected for this study. 
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Chapter 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically reviews two streams of literature: research and theory on (1) 
paradox and tension, and (2) board of directors, chairperson and chief executive officer 
(CEO) roles. 
The literature on paradox and tension is reviewed with regard to the nature of 
paradox and tension, the types and categories of paradox and the different approaches in 
responding to paradox and tension. Particular attention is paid to studies that examine 
paradox and tension at the organisational level (often called strategic paradoxes or 
tensions), but also of interest is how paradoxes and tensions are handled at the individual, 
top management team (TMT) and board levels. Particular emphasis is given to the 
leadership qualities, behaviours and practices that are associated with effective handling 
of paradoxes and tensions. 
The second part of this literature review discusses the role of the board of directors, 
highlighting particular tensions among seemingly competing roles. It then focuses on the 
role of the board in the context of United Kingdom (UK) listed companies, highlighting 
the typical structure, key individual roles and dynamics. The review continues by 
considering in more depth the roles of chairperson and CEO, building on research that 
discusses the distinct contributions of these roles, but also areas of complementarity, 
ambiguity and tension. Figure 1 depicts the structure of this chapter. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the literature review chapter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This examination of the two streams of literature leads into the following section, 
which articulates the research opportunity presented and the research questions pursued 
by this thesis. Next, role theory is discussed as the theoretical framework underpinning 
this study, highlighting its value and appropriateness as a lens through which to explore 
how chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions. The chapter closes with a 
summary. 
2.2 The origins of paradox theory 
Paradox theory is gradually demanding a position in its own right as a frame to examine 
organisational phenomena. Early proponents of paradox theory posited that paradox may 
be both an object of study as well as a powerful lens through which to study disruptive 
and divergent organisational phenomena (Cameron and Quinn, 1988; Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989). A number of early studies depicted the organisational system and the work 
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performed by its members as inherently paradoxical and riddled with contradictions (e.g. 
Rothenberg, 1979; Cameron, 1986). The ability of individuals to work through paradoxes 
and contradictions was found to be predicated on creative breakthroughs (Rothenberg, 
1979) and organisational effectiveness (Cameron, 1986). These early theorists saw the 
ability of organisations to find a balance between opposing attributes (i.e. tight and loose, 
role specialisation and integration, continuity and change) to be a fundamental 
requirement in resisting or adapting to environmental disruptions (Cameron, 1986; 
Cameron and Quinn, 1988). Paradox theorists drew from ancient philosophy as well as 
psychology and psychoanalysis. One such influence was Bateson (1935, 1936), whose 
term “schismogenesis” refers to a process of self-reinforcement where one attribute 
perpetuates itself until it becomes extreme and therefore dysfunctional leading to a system 
breakdown (Cameron, 1986:546). But, unlike “schismogenesis”, paradox implies 
mutually exclusive opposites which co-exist both dependently and independently in 
organisations (Cameron, 1986). Thus, paradox is simultaneously dependent on, and 
constructed by, individual cognition and social interaction, yet independent from the 
individual because paradoxes are inherent in complex, dynamic and ambiguous 
organisational systems (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
The mere presence of paradox and the ability to find a workable balance between 
opposites has always been associated with excellence, peak performance and 
sustainability (e.g. Peters and Waterman, 1982; Rothenberg, 1979; Smith and Berg, 
1987). An early example is Cameron’s (1986) paper discussing the relationship between 
paradox and organisational effectiveness. In this paper, Cameron specifies three 
principles of paradox that still permeate current literature. First, extremity in any criterion 
of effectiveness creates linearity and dysfunction: therefore organisational effectiveness 
criteria should “include a balance in opposing indicators” (Cameron, 1986:549). Second, 
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he argues that synthesis is not a sine qua non for organisational effectiveness. Resolution 
of paradox may prematurely eliminate the creative tension arising from it, such tension 
being deemed the true source of effectiveness. Last, Cameron argues that paradoxes are 
themselves “paradoxical” since they are confusing and understandable, common and 
surprising (1986:549). A recent paper poignantly observed the paradoxical nature of 
paradox: “Paradox is a mental construction and therefore can be mentally dissolved and 
paradox is inherent in all social life and therefore cannot be dissolved – just lived” 
(Lüscher, Lewis and Ingram, 2006:499). The critical underlying argument is that, to 
sustain peak performance, organisations must simultaneously embrace paradox and 
tension, moving from “either–or” to “both–and” solutions (Cameron and Quinn, 1988; 
Smith and Berg, 1987). 
These and other early paradox scholars laid the foundations of paradox theory. 
However, it wasn’t until the turn of the millennium that paradox theories became more 
systematised, re-emerging with Lewis’s (2000) theoretical paper that brought needed 
additional clarity about the concept and the fundamentals of the theory. It was followed 
by a surge of paradox studies. Smith and Lewis (2011) documented that publications 
about paradox grew at an average of 10 per cent a year between 1998 and 2008, and 
probably at an even higher rate subsequently. Yet much of this work is still rather 
theoretical and thus far has failed to garner the strong and unified support needed for the 
theory to become well established in organisation and management science (Lewis and 
Smith, 2014:128). Nonetheless, paradox scholars have claimed that paradox theory 
“enable(s) the next generation of organising and management theory … heading in an 
era beyond contingency theory” (Lewis and Smith, 2014:140-141). Several theoretical 
papers have attempted to show how paradox theory is a post-contingentialist alternative 
and more suitable lens through which to study organisational phenomena (e.g. Lewis and 
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Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Table 1 summarises the key points in comparing 
paradox theory to contingency theory. 
Table 1: Contingency theory and paradox theory  
Key tenets  Contingency  Paradox  
Nature of 
tensions  
 Tensions are organisational 
problems in need of a solution. 
 Tensions are ubiquitous and 
persistent, and challenge and fuel 
long-term success. 
Core 
premise  
 Fit between managerial decisions 
(e.g. elements of organisational 
design) and contingencies (e.g. 
environment, strategy and task) 
which lead to positive 
organisational performance. 
 Co-existence. Acceptance and 
engagement enables actors to live 
with and thrive under tensions. 
Key 
question  
 Under what conditions should 
managers emphasise either A or 
B? 
 How to engage both A and B 
simultaneously? 
Type of 
logic  
 Formal logic enabling rational 
decision-making, “if–then” 
problems.  
 Paradoxical thinking; holistic and 
dynamic decision-making, “both–
and” approach. 
Context   Choices between A and B are 
driven by the needs of the current 
context, and the option offering 
greatest fit. 
 Doesn’t matter, as tensions are 
persistent and therefore any 
context will face the same tensions 
over and over. 
Role of 
senior 
leadership 
 To choose the best fit, and 
vigorously implement a 
combination of structure–strategy–
systems. 
 Senior leaders enable the interplay 
between differentiated efforts and 
seek more holistic synergies 
between strategies. 
 Dynamic capabilities seek 
ongoing engagement of opposites 
via fluid organisational routines. 
 Senior leadership efforts and 
leadership cognitions. 
Inquiry 
methods  
 Favours explanatory methods 
stressing cause-and-effect 
relationships among selected 
variables. 
 Contextualised and process-
oriented methodologies which 
include more discursive and 
systemic methods.  
Source: Compiled from Smith and Lewis (2011) and Lewis and Smith (2014) 
 
Contingency theory supported by an “if–then” logic is believed to be useful in 
explaining dilemmas, conflicts, dialectics and trade-offs (i.e. non-paradoxical tensions) 
but is not supposed to be helpful when considering paradoxical tensions (Lewis and 
Smith, 2014). More recent theoretical work, however, has come to recognise the value of 
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contingency theory in paradox research. Li (2016) finds that trade-off and synergy are 
inherent in paradox. Cunha and Clegg (forthcoming) argue for an “either–or” logic 
integrating both contingency and paradox approaches. Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart 
(2016) show how responses to paradox are contingent on power distribution and sense-
making. Schad et al. summarise the most recent views on this debate: 
… even paradox scholars are challenged to think ever more paradoxically, 
as these dynamics may require both paradox theory and contingency theory 
approaches. While the paradox lens clarifies tensions and their ongoing 
management, contingency theory may contribute insights into shifts between 
the poles or between different strategies, clarifying conditions that might 
drive such moves. (2016:47) 
It is nevertheless important to distinguish paradoxical from non-paradoxical 
tensions. 
2.2.1 What is paradox? 
Early scholars have identified characteristics that seem to be present in paradox, 
indicating the simultaneous presence of oppositional tendencies or elements, and an 
interplay and persistence over time (e.g. Putnam, 1986; Smith and Berg, 1987). Such 
characteristics may include self-referential loops or double binds, mixed messages and 
system contradictions (Putnam, 1986). Self-referential loops refer to contradictory 
outcomes as a result of a specific action. Mixed messages include contradictions between 
statement and actions, reinforced through discourse or language. Systems contradictions 
describe opposition and contradiction between different subsystems which pursue 
divergent goals and have different temporal and cognitive orientations (Putnam, 1986; 
Smith and Berg, 1987; Vince and Broussine, 1996). 
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However, what failed to emerge from these characteristics was a unified definition 
of paradox that could set it aside from other similar phenomena such as dilemmas, trade-
offs and dialectics. The first attempt to provide conceptual clarity was made by Lewis 
(2000). Paradoxical tensions “are perceptual – that is, cognitively or socially constructed 
polarities that mask the simultaneity of conflicting truths” (Lewis, 2000:761) and are 
distinct from other, non-paradoxical tensions. Unlike dilemmas, trade-offs and dialectics, 
paradoxes are “two faces of the same coin” (p. 761). However, it wasn’t until Smith and 
Lewis’s (2011) paper that distinctions from non-paradoxical tensions such as dilemmas, 
dialectics and dualities were made clearer. Dilemmas denote a tension between two clear 
competing alternatives, each of which has advantages and disadvantages, and may 
become paradoxical “when options are contradictory and interrelated such that any 
choice between them is temporary and tension will resurface” (Smith and Lewis, 
2011:387). In turn, dialectic represents “contradictory elements (thesis and antithesis) 
resolved through integration (synthesis), which, over time, will confront new opposition” 
(Smith and Lewis, 2011:387). Dialectics, too, may become paradoxical when the 
elements are both contradictory and interrelated, and synthesis emphasises commonalities 
over differences, making integration temporary (Smith and Lewis, 2011). More recent 
work has sought to further develop different definitions (for a review, see Putman, 
Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016). In working through differences between non-paradoxical 
tensions and paradox, a definition of paradox has emerged which is now conventionally 
accepted in the literature. Paradoxes are defined as: 
… contradictory yet interrelated elements that exist simultaneously and 
persist over time. (Smith and Lewis, 2011: 382) 
Yet, because paradox is constructed by individual cognition and social interaction, 
it depends critically on individual perception and interpretation: it still little understood 
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whether and under which circumstances individuals frame tensions as opposing and 
interrelated polarities existing simultaneously and over time. It is recognised that “what 
creates a paradox to one person may suggest straight logic to another” (Lüscher, Lewis 
and Ingram, 2006:499). On the other hand, tensions are said to be inherent in complex 
organisational systems, and exacerbated by ambiguity that results from individuals’ 
limited understanding of the totality of the system and its interacting components (i.e. 
subsystems) (Merton and Barber, 1976) and by decision-makers’ bounded rationality 
(March and Olsen, 1976). This suggests that individuals who sit at the apex of the 
organisational system (i.e. CEOs, chairpersons) are in a unique position (and are 
expected) to understand the totality of the system and its complex interrelations. 
Moreover, albeit bounded-rational, chairpersons, CEOs and their top teams will normally 
have, both as individuals and collectively, superior information-processing capabilities. 
It would thus be expected that, for example, CEOs would frame organisational tensions 
as paradoxical. However, recent studies (i.e. Fredberg, 2014), and even practitioners and 
consultants working with tensions/polarities for over 40 years (Johnson, 2014), do not 
find the concept useful, or indeed often hear it brought up by CEOs in the manner 
described by theory. 
Thus far the concept of paradox has been defined and problematised in relation to 
other non-paradoxical tensions. The nature of paradox as both inherent in complex 
systems and constructed by individual cognition and social interaction has also been 
debated. The next section will proceed with a discussion of the types and categories of 
paradoxes and tensions, focusing in particular on studies that have explored this at CEO 
and similar organisational levels. 
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2.2.2 Categories and types of paradox and tension 
The simultaneous presence of contradictory and interrelated elements in organisations has 
been brought up by numerous management and organisation studies, without really 
referring to the concept of paradox. Early contingency theorists suggested that high, 
sustained company performance depends on the ability to achieve simultaneously high 
levels of structural differentiation and integration within the company (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). Other organisation theorists (Morgan, 1981) described a 
similar organisational duality by showing how organisations could benefit from 
simultaneously engaging tight–loose coupling, centralisation and control and 
decentralisation and delegation (Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003), and efficiency and 
flexibility (Adler, Goldoftas and Levine, 1999). Such tensions have been conceptualised 
by Smith and Lewis (2011) as paradoxes of organising, as they revolve around tensions 
between control and flexibility expressed in aspects of performance, empowerment and 
formalisation. 
Other tensions have been described as performing paradoxes. Such paradoxes arise 
when the organisation is confronted with a plurality of stakeholders which have different, 
competing goals and seek divergent measures of success (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Many 
studies point to the competing demands often faced by business leaders of economic 
shareholder value maximisation and corporate social responsibility (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Smith, Gonin and Besharov, 2013), global coordination 
and local adaptation (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2002; Fredberg, 2014), retrenchment and 
recovery (Schmitt and Raisch, 2008), and exploitation and exploration (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996), among others. 
These competing demands are defined as strategic paradoxes because they are firm-level 
performing tensions arising from competing strategies and goals (Smith, Binns and 
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Tushman, 2010; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Strategic paradoxes are seen as “particularly 
prevalent, challenging, and consequential to an organization’s fate” (Smith, 
2014:1,593). Such paradoxes and tensions are therefore expected to be perceived and 
handled at the highest levels of the organisation, i.e. by CEOs, chairpersons and other top 
directors. 
Smith and Lewis (2011) identify two further core paradoxes: the paradox of 
learning and the paradox of belonging. The paradox of learning depicts “efforts to adjust, 
renew, change, and innovate [which] foster tensions between building upon and 
destroying the past to create the future” (Smith and Lewis, 2011:383). Learning 
paradoxes are triggered, for example, by exploitation–exploration tensions (Andriopoulos 
and Lewis, 2009; Jarzabkowski, Lê and Van de Ven, 2013) or even retrenchment–
recovery tensions (Schmitt and Raisch, 2008). In both cases, business leaders are faced 
with the tension of learning from the past and existing products while also developing 
capabilities for future products, or by retrenching the existing organisation to be able to 
recover and build new capabilities (Schmitt and Raisch, 2013). 
Paradoxes of belonging occur at the meso level (Jarzabkowski, Lê and Van de Ven, 
2013) and foster tensions between competing values, roles and memberships of an 
individual’s immediate reference group and other groups or the wider organisation (Smith 
and Lewis, 2011). Studies supporting identity (Stryker and Serpe, 1982) and social 
identity theories (Ashforth and Mael, 1989), point to tensions of belonging in the 
boardroom such as the emergence of a “them-versus-us culture” between executive and 
non-executive directors as a result of increased control, which impacts on the quality of 
directors’ discretionary behaviour (Knapp, Dalziel and Lewis, 2011). Other studies, point 
to socio-demographic faultlines as a source of in/out board social categorisations (Tuggle, 
Schnatterly and Johnson, 2010). Hillman, Nicholson and Shropshire (2008) theorise 
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about the relationship between directors’ strength of identification with multiple identities 
(CEO, shareholders, company) and the extent to which they engage in control and 
resource provision tasks (i.e. how they perform their role). 
Smith and Lewis’s (2011) categorisation of paradoxes gives the false impression 
that such paradoxes are experienced in isolation. Research has shown, however, that 
paradoxes are associated with one another and co-evolve (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; 
Smith and Lewis, 2011), but so far the recursive relationship between paradoxes remains 
“a conundrum” (Jarzabkowski, Lê and Van de Ven, 2013). 
Recent research has identified further paradoxes that CEOs of large multinational 
companies confront in their leadership practice. For example, Fredberg’s (2014) 
interview-based study of 20 global CEOs identified seven distinct paradoxes: of location, 
change, creativity, diversity, direction, innovation and globalisation. The paradox of 
location refers to the requirement for the CEO to be simultaneously omnipresent and yet 
keep away (i.e. need for empowerment). The paradox of change refers to a feeling CEOs 
get that the more that change initiatives are implemented, the less seems to happen. 
Similarly, the paradox of creativity refers to a feeling that the more ideas are launched the 
fewer seem to succeed. The paradox of direction refers to the conflicting demands of 
stimulating activity towards defined goals yet allowing for independent action. The 
paradox of innovation reflects what has been described by ambidexterity scholars (e.g. 
Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) as a requirement to ensure both operational excellence 
(i.e. current operations, products and markets) and simultaneously ensure long-term 
innovation and entrepreneurial activity. Finally, the paradox of globalisation describes 
the requirement to be both locally adaptable and globally consistent (Fredberg, 2014). 
Fredberg’s study proposes that paradoxical tensions reside in competing ways of 
performing the CEO role. This is in line with research that sees paradox as inherent in 
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leadership practice (Waldman and Bowen, 2016) and that a synthesis of opposing poles 
is “a result of action, enacted, not designed” (Clegg, Cunha and Cunha, 2002:497). These 
studies, which see paradox as produced and reproduced by practice, have identified 
further paradoxes faced by corporate leaders. For example, Waldman and Bowmen 
(2016) identify the paradoxes of “leaders’ strong sense of self combined with humility” 
and of “maintaining control while letting go of control” as stemming from a fundamental 
tension between agency and communion (i.e. asserting one’s identity, goals and interests 
while simultaneously deferring to collective needs and interests). Furthermore, the 
fundamental tension between “now and next” (i.e. being reactive in attending to today’s 
demands yet proactive in identifying and pursuing more fundamental change for the 
future) is expressed in paradoxes of simultaneously “maintaining continuity and pursuing 
change” and of “pursuing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) for profits and 
maintaining moral purposes” (Waldman and Bowmen, 2016). 
As the paradox perspective gains popularity, a growing number of studies – most 
of which theoretical – have emerged, identifying tensions and paradoxes that pervade 
organisations and present challenges to corporate leaders. 
2.2.3 Leadership qualities and capabilities in handling paradox and tension 
From its inception, paradox literature has devoted attention to the leadership qualities and 
capabilities required to effectively engage with paradox and tension. Such qualities and 
capabilities are behavioural, cognitive and emotional in nature. 
Leaders require cognitive complexity (Bartunek, Gordon and Weathersby, 1983; 
Smith and Lewis, 2012; Weick, 1979) or what Rothenberg (1979) called Janusian 
thinking in order to handle paradox and tension effectively. Cognitive complexity can be 
defined as the ability and degree to which an individual perceives and differentiates 
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several dimensions of an issue and the ability and degree to which he or she can connect 
or integrate those dimensions (Bartunek, Gordon and Weathersby, 1983). These early 
concepts around cognitive complexity are called “paradoxical thinking” by some 
contemporary paradox proponents, and are shown to be relevant for CEOs and their top 
teams in managing strategic contradictions (Gilbert, 2006; Miron-Spektor, Gino and 
Argote, 2011; Smith and Tushman, 2005). Recent research on Chinese middle managers 
provided support for holistic thinking and integrative complexity as significant predictors 
of paradoxical leader behaviour in people management (Zhang et al., 2015). Whereas the 
concept of integrative complexity receives a similar definition as cognitive complexity, 
holistic thinking refers to an ability to “attend to relationships between the focal object 
and the field and explaining and predicting events on the basis of such relationships 
where the locus of attention is the whole rather than its parts” (Nisbett et al., 2001:293; 
see also Choi, Koo and Choi, 2007). However, exhibiting cognitive complexity alone 
does not imply effective handling of paradox and tension. As Denison, Hooijberg and 
Quinn (1995) point out, “leadership must inevitably be performed through action, not 
cognition” (p. 524), hence “although cognitive complexity is a necessary condition for 
effective leadership, behavioural complexity which connotes both action and cognition is 
its sufficient condition” (p. 525). 
Building on Quinn’s (1984, 1988) model of leadership roles and on Ashby’s (1952) 
ideas of requisite variety, Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn (1995) tested Quinn’s (1984) 
model by suggesting that highly effective leaders exhibited higher behavioural 
complexity. Such leaders could more clearly exhibit all the eight leadership roles of 
Quinn’s framework in a differentiated manner, yet simultaneously integrate those roles 
into a coherent whole (Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn, 1995; Hart and Banbury, 1994; 
Hart and Quinn, 1993). For Denison and colleagues, effective leadership was defined in 
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terms of behavioural complexity as “the ability to perform the multiple roles and 
behaviors that circumscribe the requisite variety implied by an organisational or 
environmental context” (p. 526). The concept of behavioural complexity has been 
described as an essential leadership quality for effective handling of paradox ever since 
the Denison, Hooijberg and Quinn (1995) study (e.g. Smith and Lewis, 2011; Waldman 
and Bowen, 2016). 
In addition to cognitive and behavioural qualities, emotional equanimity and 
emotional self-regulation have been identified as critical leadership qualities in handling 
paradox and tension. Paradox and tension raise individual defences, produce anxiety and 
may be hard to endure (Vince and Broussine, 1996; Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Emotional equanimity is defined by Smitn and Lewis (2011) as “an emotional calm and 
evenness” and helps leaders to avoid defensive responses to paradox and reduce anxiety, 
thereby avoiding vicious circles. The ability to regulate emotions, which entails 
“modulating emotional experience to attain desired affective states and adaptive 
outcomes” (Lopes et al., 2005:113), has been described as an important attribute in 
effective handling of paradox and tension (Waldman and Bowen, 2016). 
Although cognitive and behavioural complexity, emotional equanimity and 
regulation are the most often referenced leadership capabilities for effective handling of 
paradox and tension, Smith and Lewis (2012) summarised three other necessary 
skills/qualities: a) confidence; a) communication; and c) conflict management. 
Confidence is said to stand in contrast to the feeling of “stuckness” and allows leaders to 
accept the inherent difficulties of paradox and tension while still moving forward. 
Conflict management skill is required, as the confrontation with paradox and tension by 
other managers and divisions requires leaders that are able to defuse emotional situations 
and elicit synergies. Communication is indicated as a critical leadership skill in 
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harnessing paradoxical tensions (Smith and Lewis, 2012), often manifested in the ability 
of leaders to craft and communicate an “overarching organisational identity” (Smith and 
Tushman, 2005) or a “both–and” vision (Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith, 2014), or 
simply reinforce paradoxical messages, all with the intention of ensuring that the 
organisation excels in addressing competing yet interrelated demands. 
Waldman and Bowen (2016) argue – in contrast with some other authors – that 
leaders are (still) being selected on the basis of qualities such as strong sense of self, high 
degrees of confidence and boldness, cautioning that such characteristics may not provide 
a basis for effective handling of paradox and tension. 
Thus far, the leadership qualities, capabilities and skills that underpin an ability to 
engage with paradox have been discussed. The next two sections will deal with general 
defensive and proactive responses to paradox and tension, and with paradox responses as 
inherent in everyday (leadership) practice. 
2.2.4 Defensive and strategic responses to paradoxical tensions 
Responses to paradox and tension are generally classified into two types: i) defensive and 
ii) strategic or reconciliatory (Lewis, 2000; Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 
2011). Defensive responses have received the least attention in the literature, which has 
largely concentrated on identifying responses that could effectively engage with paradox 
and tension. 
2.2.4.1 Defensive responses and vicious cycles 
In environments characterised by change, plurality and scarcity, individuals grappling 
with competing demands often exhibit a cognitive and behavioural drive for consistency 
along with emotional anxiety and defensiveness, as well as being subject to organisational 
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inertial forces (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). This propels individuals 
and organisations into vicious negative reinforcing cycles and triggers defensive 
responses, such as splitting (accentuating differences), projection (transferring the 
negative attributes to someone or somewhere else), repression (denying the paradox), 
regression (insisting on using past, successful understandings to deal with paradox), 
reaction formation (expressing in an excessive way something opposite to the paradoxical 
tension) and ambivalence (initiating action that lacks strength because it is too much of a 
compromise) (Lewis, 2000; Vince and Broussine, 1996). Individuals may also avoid risk 
and conflict, and drive towards consistent and simplistic behaviours when faced with 
paradox (Lewis and Smith, 2014). Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) showed how vicious 
circles might emerge, and used the governance control–collaboration tensions often 
experienced in corporate boards as an illustrative example. During high-performing 
cycles, an excessive focus on collaboration between the board and the executive would 
foster “groupthink” and a vicious circle of consensus-seeking, complacency and 
entrenchment which would lead to faulty attribution errors and strategic persistence. 
Through time, strategic persistence would propel the company into a low-performing 
cycle, where continued faulty attribution would then lead to threat-rigidity, escalating 
commitment and, ultimately, failure (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Similarly, too 
much emphasis on control during high-performing cycles would create board–
management polarisation, increased distrust and myopic behaviour, again leading to 
strategic persistence. As strategic persistence would push the firm into a low-performing 
cycle, continued emphasis on control would trigger impression management along with 
factionalising turf-wars, and again ultimately lead to failure (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 
2003). 
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However, aside from this theoretical illustration, there has been little consideration 
in the literature towards exploring defensive responses, and an omission to provide 
evidence to support the fact that failure and poor performance could be the result of a 
vicious cycle. Instead, researchers have concentrated on how to engage paradox for 
superior performance and how to promote virtuous cycles. 
2.2.4.2 Strategic responses to paradox 
Responses that seek to use paradox as a source of organisational advantage have been 
described as proactive (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), reconciliatory (Smith and 
Lewis, 2011) and strategic (Lewis and Smith, 2014). The term “strategic” seems to better 
capture the different approaches found in the literature for handling paradox, as this term 
does not imply resolution. Strategic responses are used to break or prevent vicious cycles 
and develop virtuous ones (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). However, the solution for 
dealing with paradox and tension varies fundamentally in relation to the approach to 
paradox. 
Clegg, Cunha and Cunha (2002) identify two distinct approaches to paradox in 
management and organisation literature. A first approach – rooted in contingency theories 
– argues that the two poles of a paradoxical tension are extremes of a continuum, and that 
the role of the manager is to strike a balance according to the internal and external 
contingencies of the firm (Clegg, Cunha and Cunha, 2002). Internal and external 
contingencies determine whether to pursue more of A or more of B, and the relative 
balance is assessed as circumstances change. This approach has been criticised by many 
(e.g. Lewis, 2000; Smith and Lewis, 2011) because it leads to simplicity of choice, false 
compromises and synthesis, depicting the relationship between poles as unidirectional 
(Clegg, Cunha and Cunha, 2002). Such an approach is exemplified by Porter’s (1980, 
 
 
 28 
1985) ideas that managers should not attempt to enact dual strategies of cost advantage 
and differentiation, otherwise they risk being “stuck in the middle”. Instead, they should 
choose either one or the other. However, there are illustrations of how managerial 
practices can engage both cost advantage and differentiation simultaneously to achieve 
hard-to-imitate competitive advantage (e.g. Heracleous and Wirtz, 2014). 
A second approach attempts to accept and solve tensions by integrating them into a 
synthesis – a new understanding that, at least temporarily, eliminates or relieves the 
anxiety that paradox brings (e.g. Clegg, Cunha and Cunha, 2002; Lewis, 2000; Smith and 
Lewis, 2011). This approach includes strategies of accepting, accommodating and 
differentiating/integrating (Smith and Lewis, 2011; Smith, 2014). 
Accepting (Lewis, 2000; Lüscher and Lewis, 2008; Schneider, 1990; Smith and 
Berg, 1987; Vince and Broussine, 1996) requires “learning to live with paradox” (Lewis, 
2000:764) by holding the paradox and appreciating differences and commonalities 
between its two poles so as to stimulate thinking and novel solutions. Accepting does not 
imply resolution, but an appreciation that contradictions and paradoxes exist and are of 
value to the organisation. It is about purposefully seeking and valuing paradox (Lewis, 
Andriopoulos and Smith, 2014). It may also include developing a “workable certainty” 
derived from a negotiated understanding that permits a moving-forward (Lüscher and 
Lewis, 2008), or humour (Hatch and Erhlich, 1993) and communication (Jarzabkowski 
and Sillince, 2007) to embrace paradox. Acceptance approaches do not imply resolution 
of paradox. But most scholars who advocate acceptance as a strategy for handling paradox 
do so as a first step towards employing other strategies for resolution, often suggesting 
sequential approaches of acceptance–confrontation–transcendence (Lewis, 2000) or 
iterative responses of confrontation–differentiation–integration (Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
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Accommodating responses make use of paradoxical frames to find innovative 
synergies between the two poles of a paradox – a synthesis that can address both poles 
simultaneously (Lewis, 2000; Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Such synthesis 
brings in new terms or practices that enable the solving of paradoxes (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989), at least temporarily (Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Poole and Van de Ven (1989) have proposed strategies of opposition, spatial 
separation, temporal separation and synthesis as ways to handle paradox. Spatial 
separation requires an understanding that the two poles of a given paradox operate in “one 
physical or social locus, while the other operates in a different locus” (Poole and Van de 
Ven, 1989:566), whereas temporal separation requires an understanding of how the two 
poles might relate to each other on a time basis. One pole might influence the conditions 
under which the other pole will operate, create the conditions necessary for its existence, 
or there may be a dynamic mutual influence over time between the two poles (Poole and 
Van de Ven, 1989). Spatial separation and temporal separation have subsequently been 
labelled as differentiation strategies, and synthesis as an integrating strategy. The use of 
differentiating and integrating strategies has been demonstrated in studies looking at 
strategic innovation (Tse, 2013), exploration and exploitation (e.g. Papachroni, 
Heracleous and Paroutis, 2016; Smith, 2014; Smith and Tushman, 2005; Tushman, Smith 
and Binns, 2011), strategic agility (Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith, 2014), retrenchment 
and recovery (Schmitt and Raisch, 2013), sustainability (e.g. Hahn et al., 2015), and 
governance (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003), among others. When organisations 
engage in virtuous circles, paradox is likely to be resolved via “iterating responses of 
splitting and integrating” enabling learning and creativity, and fostering flexibility, 
resilience and effectiveness (Smith and Lewis, 2011:389). Table 2 provides an overview 
of general strategic responses to paradox. 
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Table 2: Strategic responses to paradox  
Types of 
response 
Responses  
Accepting and 
embracing  
 Negotiate a workable certainty 
 Use of humour 
 Use of communication and rhetoric 
 Proactively seek and value tensions as a source of value  
Differentiating 
and integrating 
strategies (both 
structural and 
contextual)  
Examples of differentiating strategies: 
 Structurally split exploitation and exploration units holding them to different 
standards (spatial differentiation) 
 Temporally split both poles of the paradox sequentially and iteratively (e.g. 
address first exploitation and then exploration) 
 Allocate domain-specific roles in the TMT and beyond 
 Encourage discussions between domain-specific roles to raise novel distinctions 
 Allow/encourage senior leaders to seek independent information about other 
domains 
Examples of integrating strategies: 
 Define and communicate an “overarching identity”, a “both–and” vision 
 Stress overarching goals that require the contribution of both sides of a tension 
 Allocate integrative roles across business units 
 Promote TMT behavioural integration and complexity (i.e. either leader-centric or 
team-centric) 
 Encourage joint problem-solving of tensions 
Paradoxes as 
constitutive and 
processual 
Paradoxes are handled, produced, transformed, obscured and reproduced by both 
purposeful and unplanned/unconscious everyday practice and relationships. Suggested 
responses to paradox include: 
 “Either–and” responses (as opposed to “both–and”), recognising that both 
trade-off and synergy are constitutive of paradox 
 Moving forward 
 Reflexivity and awareness (i.e. both discursive consciousness and recognition 
of actions/interactions that generate tension) 
 Understanding of situational triggers 
Responses to paradox are contingent on the distribution of systemic power and mode of 
sense-making. Four responses are proposed: 
 Paradoxical management 
 Dialectics (conflict and transformation) 
 Assimilation 
 Mutual adjustment 
Source: compiled by the author from: Hargrave and Van de Ven (2016); Hatch and Erhlich 
(1993); Jarzabkowski and Sillince (2007); Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith (2014); 
Lüscher and Lewis (2008); Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart (2016); Schad et al. (2016); 
Smith (2014); Smith and Lewis (2011); Tushman, Smith and Binns (2011). 
 
The most researched paradoxical tension by far is that of exploitation–exploration. 
Following the early writings of March (1991), Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) formulated 
the concept of ambidexterity to depict the ability to both exploit existing product markets 
and capabilities as well as explore new opportunities, products and ways of doing 
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business. It is a paradox because the ability to exploit both facilitates and hinders the 
ability to explore, and vice versa (Piao and Zajac, 2016). Ambidexterity scholars have 
benefited from the parallel resurgence and development of paradox theory which became 
a means of proposing adequate responses to the exploitation–exploration paradox. Two 
main approaches can be distinguished in the literature. The first proposes that contextual 
ambidexterity, rooted in each individual purposeful action, should be developed as a 
meta-capability, which is of key assistance to leaders in managing and transcending 
“tensions, balances and equilibriums” in complex business environments (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Leaders should create a culture that allows individuals to focus on 
both exploiting and exploring activities within the same unit (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004; Heracleous and Wirtz, 2014; Mom, Van Den Bosch and Volberda, 2009). 
The second approach, structural ambidexterity, can be subdivided into the two 
responses of spatial and temporal splitting. Spatial splitting allocates exploitation and 
exploration demands to different units within the company, to hold them to different 
standards and to reap the benefits of specialism and focus. Units devoted to exploitation 
are generally larger, more centralised, have well-defined processes and are more 
disciplined than units that concentrate on exploration, which are typically of smaller size, 
and enjoy greater flexibility and decentralisation (e.g. Benner and Tushman, 2003; 
Christensen, 1998; Gilbert, 2005). Temporal splitting requires each demand to be 
addressed sequentially or iteratively in turn (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Tse, 2013). 
The integration of exploitation–exploration demands occurs at the top via the CEO or the 
top management team (TMT), bringing together structural and contextual approaches to 
exploitation–exploration tensions (e.g. Carmeli and Halevi, 2009; Gilbert, 2006; Jansen 
et al., 2009; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008; Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011). Smith and 
Tushman (2005) and Tushman, Smith and Binns (2011) have proposed paradoxical 
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cognition as a means of enabling the integration of paradoxical demands in TMTs through 
leadership-centric or team-centric models. For example, at Analog Devices the CEO 
acted as a central hub for the other executives (“hub and spoke” model), whereas in Cray 
Computers decisions were made collectively on how to trade off between past and present 
(“ring team” model) (Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011). Such models of TMT 
functioning allow tensions to be “held at the top” and to be integrated, instead of pushed 
down to lower levels, often jeopardising innovation efforts (Tushman, Smith and Binns, 
2011). Across the 12 top teams examined, those leaders who were able to develop an 
overarching identity (i.e. normally expressed as mission statements), hold tensions at the 
top between old and new, and embrace inconsistency were successful at managing 
innovation while maintaining the core business (Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011). 
Similar findings by O’Reilly and Tushman (2008) showed that structural ambidexterity 
and senior team cognitive and behavioural flexibility are critical in managing exploration 
and exploitation effectively. Carmeli and Halevi (2009) found that top team behavioural 
integration and complexity were critical ingredients in succeeding at integrating 
exploration and exploitation in a synergistic, sustainable manner. Jansen et al. (2009) 
found that TMT social integration and cross-functional interfaces play a fundamental role 
in the integration of exploration and exploitation demands split into different 
organisational units. Lubatkin et al. (2006) found TMT behavioural integration to be 
associated with greater organisational ambidexterity in small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and found that CEOs are uniquely positioned to foster such integration. 
Smith (2014) examined differentiating and integrating practices in three TMTs 
pursuing exploitation and exploration simultaneously. Differentiating practices included 
creating domain-specific senior leadership roles (i.e. allocating exploration and 
exploitation to different senior roles, facilitating focus and commitment on one agenda), 
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discussions among senior executives to compare domains and raise novel distinctions, 
and individual executives seeking independent information about each domain (using 
varied means such as small-group discussions with lower-level managers or offsite 
conferences). Integrative practices included the allocation of integrative roles (i.e. general 
managers with a responsibility for the overarching business plan), placing emphasis on 
overarching goals that depend on a contribution by both existing and new products, and 
an encouragement of joint problem-solving of exploration–exploitation issues by 
allocating formal meeting time to address overarching topics (Smith, 2014). Interestingly, 
these practices were employed regardless of whether the tensions were paradoxical or 
“either–or” dilemmas (Smith, 2014). Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith (2014) identify five 
paradoxical leadership practices that enhance a company’s strategic agility. Paradoxical 
leadership values paradoxical tensions as critical for high performance, identifies and 
raises tensions proactively and purposefully, avoids the traps of anxiety and 
defensiveness, consistently communicates a “both–and” vision and separates efforts in 
order to focus on both sides of a paradox (Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith, 2014). 
Schmitt and Raisch (2013) provide insights on how to manage complementarities 
of learning, organising and performing, which stem from retrenchment–recovery tensions 
inherent in organisational turnarounds. Managing learning complementarities includes 
employing both focus and experimentation strategies; organising complementarities 
require both formalisation and participation; and performing complementarities require a 
combination of profit and breakthrough strategies (Schmitt and Raisch, 2013). 
Other researchers look at paradox in terms of corporate sustainability and the 
tensions between complex economic, environmental and social issues (Hahn et al., 2014; 
Hahn et al., 2015). Hahn et al. (2014) theorised about the usefulness of managerial 
paradoxical frames for addressing sustainability tensions in comparison with “business 
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frames”. Hahn et al. (2015) further elaborated on accepting, differentiating and 
integrating strategies to handle corporate sustainability tensions such as corporate short-
term and long-term orientations, personal versus organisational sustainability agendas, 
isomorphism versus structural and technological change, and efficiency versus resilience 
of socio-economic systems. 
Paradoxical logic has also been applied to the tension of control–collaboration often 
present in corporate boards. Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) proposed “self-correcting 
cycles” encompassing both differentiating and integrating practices. On the one hand, 
boards should embrace trust and conflict as sources of value, by building a strong, 
trustworthy and respectful chairperson–CEO relationship and, more generally, board–
management relations, encouraging cognitive conflict in the boardroom. On the other 
hand, self-correcting cycles involving a promotion of diversity and shared understanding 
are also proposed. The required ability for a board to embrace diversity of perspectives 
(which facilitates cognitive conflict), while being able to find common understanding by 
establishing cooperative strategic decision-making and improved informal and formal 
interactions, is critical in allowing control and collaboration to co-exist in a fruitful 
manner (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). 
Most approaches to paradox seem to imply that responses can be pre-designed once 
the paradox has been identified and accepted. Leaders appear to be able to engineer 
appropriate responses (i.e. by cleverly designing differentiating and integrating 
mechanisms) to discrete paradoxes and tensions, in order to at least temporarily resolve 
the paradox. 
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2.2.4.3 Responses to paradox: the constitutive and process approaches 
A third approach to paradox argues that paradoxes are not solvable (Clegg, Cunha and 
Cunha, 2002), and a contradiction is observed between the definition of paradox as 
“persisting over time” (Smith and Lewis, 2011) and approaches that seek to resolve 
paradox (Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). Instead, these scholars argue that paradoxes 
cannot be wished away by management; they can only be sustained (Clegg, Cunha and 
Cunha, 2002). For example, to bridge the paradox of formal planning and emergent, 
situated action, improvisation can be used to allow “pre-existing plans and resources to 
adapt to changing circumstances” (p. 491). But, while the practice of improvisation (i.e. 
synthesis) brings both poles closer together, it replaces neither: that is, it “does not create 
a new entity replacing and incorporating the two opposites that ground it” (p. 495). This 
relational synthesis is situated, not designed, and therefore cannot be forecast or 
preconceived but rather emerges through action (Clegg, Cunha and Cunha, 2002). In the 
example of the paradox of planning and action, the structuring pole (action) is enacted 
locally as individuals are confronted with novel and unpredictable situations that require 
deviations from the structural pole (planning), changing it through practice (Clegg, Cunha 
and Cunha, 2002). Approaching paradox as “making explicit choices in response to 
individual issues” (Smith, 2014:1,616) and as “solvable” denies its persistent and 
processual nature (Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). 
This approach contrasts with those that, although recognising that paradox can only 
be temporarily solved (e.g. Smith and Lewis, 2011), propose responses that imply a more 
permanent resolution, and suggest that responses to paradox can be designed a priori once 
the paradox is recognised and accepted. Such approaches reject trade-off and embrace 
synthesis as a means of coping with paradox (Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). However, 
as Li (2016) notes, trade-off and synergy are both present in paradox. As such, an “either–
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and” instead of a “both–and” logic is required (Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). The 
“either” represents the presence of tension and trade-off and the “and” captures 
complementarity and synergy, both co-existing in a state of relationality (Li, 2016; Clegg, 
Cunha and Cunha, 2002). Balancing the poles of a paradox thus requires partial trade-
offs and partial synthesis (Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). This approach to paradox 
defends paradox as unsolvable, permanent or recursive and as something that emerges 
and re-emerges as individuals make sense and (re)engage with the organisational totality 
(Benson, 1977; Cunha and Clegg, forthcoming). In many ways, paradoxes are handled, 
produced, transformed, obscured and reproduced by both purposeful and 
unplanned/unconscious everyday practice through time. 
Recently, a number of scholars have begun to recognise the limitations and rigidity 
of previous approaches to paradox and tension, and have proposed constitutive and 
processual approaches (e.g. Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016; Schad et al., 2016; 
Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2016). In a review of published articles on contradictions, 
dialectics and paradoxes between 1975 and 2015, Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart (2016) 
found that most research on paradox to date tended to pay substantial attention to large 
systems and individual cognition as the locus of paradox, but very little to “discourses, 
social interaction processes, practices, and ongoing organisational activities” (p. 67). 
Moving beyond Hegelian dialectics (Hegel, 1807/1977), they propose a constitutive 
approach characterised by: a recognition of paradox as emerging through the use of 
language in oral and written discourse; the recognition that tensions emerge, evolve and 
transform across time and space in dynamic organisational processes; the idea that socio-
historical conditions must be considered in understanding the formation and 
transformation of tensions as well as associated responses; the recognition that multiple 
tensions co-exist across multiple levels, emerge from multiple sources and are handled in 
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multiple ways (the presence of multiples); and, finally, the recognition that every response 
to tension is rooted in praxis, where individuals “make choices about engaging and 
responding to them as well as how to move forward amid complex circumstances” 
(Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016: 80). Such an approach to paradox requires 
responses that emphasise moving forward, reflexivity and awareness (i.e. both discursive 
consciousness and recognition of actions/interactions that generate tension) as well as an 
understanding of situational triggers (Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016). Schad et al. 
(2016) undertook a review of paradox research in management science, finding that extant 
literature has been focusing too much on types of paradoxes and collective approaches 
and outcomes (i.e. organisational, group) at the expense of focusing on relationships 
between types of paradox, individual approaches and dynamics. They reinforce a view of 
paradox as rooted in praxis evolving through time and space, and indicate the strategy-
as-practice literature as an exemplar of the use of combined insights of dialectical and 
structuration theories that bring together “both strategy and strategizing within an 
iterative, discursive process” (Schad et al., 2016:46). 
In keeping with this line of research, Hargrave and Van de Ven (2016) integrate 
Hegelian dialectics and the paradox perspective to propose a typology and process model 
of responses to paradox, contingent on the distribution of systemic power and sense-
making approaches. When the sense-making mode accepts paradox and the distribution 
of power is stable and symmetrical, paradoxical management focused on synergy is most 
effective. When paradox is accepted but power distribution is unstable and/or 
asymmetrical, effective responses take the form of assimilation, which refers to the 
incorporation of practices and arrangements of the subordinate element into the dominant 
element (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2016). Conversely, if sense-making is adversarial, 
and the distribution of systemic power is stable and symmetrical, mutual adjustment 
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responses are likely to be the most effective and “involve a range of negotiating tactics 
including bargaining, partisan discussion, compensation and reciprocity” (Lindblom, 
1963, cited in Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2016:13). Finally, when sense-making is 
adversarial and power is unstable and/or asymmetrical, effective responses take the form 
of dialectics through conflict and transformation, where a new entity is created that allows 
moving forward while maintaining the tension that engendered it (Hargrave and Van de 
Ven, 2016). 
This emergent stream of paradox literature is so far predominately theoretical and 
to date lacks empirical investigation to support, augment or transform the proposed 
models. 
2.2.4.4 Summary of paradox and tension literature 
In the preceding sections the literature on paradox and tension has been reviewed and 
discussed. The nature and types of paradox, the different approaches to the handling of 
paradoxes and associated responses have been examined. In the next section, this review 
will extend to corporate governance literature, particularly boards of directors and the 
roles of CEO and chairperson. 
2.3 Corporate governance: board roles, and chairperson and 
CEO role behaviour 
This section of the literature review focuses on corporate governance, particularly the 
roles played by the board of directors. It then provides an overview of boards of directors 
in the context of listed companies in the UK, which includes typical structure, 
composition and dynamics. The review then moves to consider research on the roles of 
 
 
 39 
CEO and chairperson of the board, emphasising role demands and incumbents’ 
behaviour, as well as both the tensions and complexities typical of each role, and the 
relationship between them. 
2.3.1 Board roles: an overview 
The contemporary board’s role as a critical external governance mechanism was 
established by the work of Berle and Means (1932) which epitomised the separation 
between ownership and control. This early approach, known as “managerialism”, 
highlighted the fact that the increased dispersion of ownership in American corporations 
was leaving de facto control of corporate affairs in the hands of an emerging powerful 
elite of top managers. These findings raised concerns about managerial entrenchment and 
all forms of power abuse from managers, which could engage in self-serving behaviour 
if not properly and closely monitored (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). This view of human nature as self-serving and individualistic led to a 
determination to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests and gave rise to the 
formulation of different classes of agency costs (La Porta et al., 2001; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993). In turn, this led to the corresponding development of 
agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983), prescribing a number of remedies in the form of 
internal and external controls (La Porta et al., 1997), of which the board of directors is 
seen as a critical one. During this time, alternative and quite opposing conceptualisations 
of the board’s role emerged. Prime among these is stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971), which views managers as good stewards of the 
corporation who require not control, monitoring and disciplining from the board of 
directors, but rather collaboration and support (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Boards and 
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managers are thus equal and joint stewards of the corporation whose interests are naturally 
aligned (Davis, Schrooman and Donaldson, 1997). 
Both theories, over time, were adopted differently in different countries, giving rise 
to a variety of prescriptions in terms of the best way to design boards with regard to 
structure, roles and composition, as a means of furthering the corporation’s success. For 
example, Continental European countries such as Germany have adopted governance 
structures closer to stewardship and, more generally, stakeholder theories of the board 
(Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1984) by establishing two-
tier boards. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries such as the US and the UK have adopted 
a one-tier board in line with agency prescriptions (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). 
While there are suggestions that the prevalent Anglo-Saxon style of globalisation 
has given the edge to agency principles in practice (Clarke, 2010), the theoretical debate 
about the superiority of agency or stewardship theory has never been resolved (Albanese, 
Dacin and Harris, 1997). The tensions between these theories are more widely referred to 
as the debate between shareholder and stakeholder governance models (Letza, Sun and 
Kirkbride, 2004). Some attempts have been made to reconcile the two positions. For 
example, Albanese, Dacin and Harris (1997:610) put forward the idea that board directors 
act as both agents and stewards according to circumstances and over time. They call for 
the use of “a theory that focuses more upon the task performed than the relationship 
established at the time of hire”, so as to accommodate and allow the co-existence of both 
principle–agent and principle–steward relationships. 
Such an attempt was undertaken on a theoretical basis by Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003), who elaborated on paradox theory to provide a framework that highlights the need 
of boards to be both monitors and stewards of the corporation. According to this model, 
excessive emphasis on either control or collaboration would ultimately result in vicious 
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circles leading to poor performance and ultimately corporate failure. It proposes that 
boards engage in self-correcting cycles enabling the shift between control and 
collaboration as required. 
Other theories of the board have developed, such as the resource-dependence 
theory, which portrays boards as boundary spanners and resource providers, including 
legitimacy (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The board provides important 
links, networks and resources, and maintain relationships with other critical stakeholders. 
In addition, under this theory, the board brings an external perspective along with critical 
skills and experience that facilitate their monitoring of the executive (Pfeffer, 1992; 
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1979; Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). While agency and 
stewardship theories have always been presented as being opposed to one another, 
interesting work on the integration of agency and resource provision theories has 
developed which considers the roles to be compatible and complementary (Dalziel, 
Gentry and Bowerman, 2011; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Pugliese, Minichilli and 
Zattoni, 2014). Other less popular theories see boards as institutions (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977) or teams (Blair and Stout, 2001; Kaufman and 
Englander, 2005), each emphasising different aspects of the board’s role. Despite the fact 
that all these theories have made useful contributions to the study of boards and board 
directors’ work, it is agency, stewardship and resource-dependence theories that have 
largely determined the majority of the developments in theory and practice. 
2.3.2 UK boards: an overview of theory and practice 
In the UK, the development of corporate governance has historically been rooted in 
agency theory principles. From its inception (Cadbury Committee Report, 1992) the 
requirement for independence between the board and the management has been a key 
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aspect of the UK governance regime which has driven the board’s role, composition and 
structure, including also the constellation of individual director roles and expectations of 
behaviour. The quest for independence of the board from the executive as a critical 
component of effective monitoring and control led to successive regulatory changes, 
which resulted in: a greater, even dominating, proportion of external, independent non-
executive directors in relation to executives; the separation of CEO and chairperson 
positions; an increased use of committees staffed by external, independent non-executive 
directors; and other measures. As a response to the Robert Maxwell case and Blue Arrow 
affair in the early 1990s, the Cadbury Report (1992) set the stage for good governance 
principles on a “comply or explain” basis; and from then on successive regulatory 
innovations emerged. The Greenbury Report (Greenbury Committee, 1995) tackled 
concerns about directors’ remuneration practices and disclosure. The Hampel Committee 
was subsequently set up to re-examine Cadbury and Greenbury recommendations on 
corporate governance and the extent to which they were being implemented. Together, 
these three reports ultimately formed the Combined Code of the London Stock Exchange. 
This was followed by the Turnbull Report in 1999, which provided guidance for listed 
companies on the disclosure of, and compliance with, internal control policies and 
regulations. The next set of self-regulatory measures was brought in following the Higgs 
Report (Higgs, 2003), which built on previous reviews including the Myners (2000) 
review of the relationship between corporations and institutional investors. In addition to 
the separation of chairperson and CEO roles, a majority of outsider, independent non-
executive board members and the setup of auditing, nomination and remuneration 
committees staffed by a majority of independent non-executives, the Higgs review 
brought greater clarity about non-executive and chairperson roles, and introduced the 
senior independent director (SID) role. Whereas previous reviews observed an inherent 
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tension in non-executive director (NED) work, the Higgs review suggested that the 
NEDs’ responsibilities of “monitoring executive activity and contributing to the 
development of strategy” could co-exist provided that a “a spirit of partnership and 
mutual respect” (Higgs, 2003:27) existed in the unitary board. In addition to contributing 
to strategy development and monitoring executive performance, NEDs are also expected 
to satisfy themselves that the appropriate risk framework and controls are in place as well 
as ensuring that important and sensible people-related arrangements are considered, such 
as executive remuneration and succession planning. The SID role was introduced as an 
independent senior NED, to be used as a communication channel for major shareholders 
who may not be confident about chairperson actions, to act as an intermediary for 
ineffective chairperson–CEO relations, as well as to replace the chairperson in his/her 
absence. Figure 2 illustrates the typical structure of a UK unitary board. 
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Figure 2: Typical structure of a UK unitary board of directors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the author. 
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a board, the support given to and by the CEO, and the frankness and openness of mind 
with which issues are discussed and tackled by all directors” (p. 2). In conjunction with 
a revision of the code in 2010, the Financial Reporting Council (2011) issued further 
recommendations on board effectiveness, emphasising and clarifying the responsibilities 
and contributions of individual roles inside the board (i.e. chairperson, SID, NEDs, 
executive directors and company secretaries) and providing guidance on effective 
decision-making processes. These, along with further refinements to the code in 2014 and 
2016, affirm the roles of chairperson and CEO as pivotal to the board’s effectiveness. The 
clarification provided by the FRC on board effectiveness also recognises the often 
tension-generating relationship between the chairperson and the CEO which is pivotal to 
the effectiveness of the board as a whole, laying down a requirement that the “chairman 
and the CEO roles should be set out in writing and agreed by the board” and “particular 
attention [should be] paid to areas of potential overlap” (Financial Reporting Council, 
2011:7). 
The progress of regulation – which has gone from a structuralist approach to board 
governance focusing on independence and compliance to one that emphasises role 
behaviour – has been paralleled and often informed by research that indicated an 
insufficiency of structural and compositional considerations. As long ago as the 1970s, 
Argenti (1976) identified instances of “one-man rule”, combined chairman and chief 
executive roles, a non-participative board, an unbalanced top management team, a lack 
of management depth and weak financial function as the six principal symptoms of 
corporate collapse. Subsequent studies have supported some of these aspects. Role duality 
leads to unfettered CEO power, which combined with lack of monitoring often leads to 
corporate failure (Daily and Dalton, 1993) or weakened company performance (e.g. 
Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Others found a positive 
 
 
 46 
correlation between role separation and corporate performance (Donaldson and Davies, 
1991; Slatter and Lovett, 1999). But other researchers reached contradictory results even 
when introducing contingency factors. Boyd (1995) found role duality leads to better 
return on investment (ROI) in companies that are resource-constrained or have higher 
complexity. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found that role duality was associated with 
worse performance in firms experiencing turbulent environments. 
Similar inconclusive findings were found for board composition measured as the 
proportion of external independent directors on the board. Many studies in US and UK 
contexts showed a positive correlation between higher percentages of external 
independent directors on the board and firm performance (e.g. Dahya and McConnell, 
2007; Daily and Dalton, 1993; Pearce and Zahra, 1992), while many others found a 
negative or no correlation (e.g. Bhagat and Black, 1999, 2002; Daily and Johnson, 1997; 
Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004). Finkelstein and Mooney (2003) pointed to the fact that 
large corporates such as Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Qwest Communications 
largely complied with CEO–chairperson role separation and a dominant percentage of 
external directors on board (in addition to appropriate considerations of board size and 
directors’ shareholdings), but this did not prevent their collapse. 
It is within this context that more attention has begun to be paid to board process 
and director behaviour, particularly how individual board roles contribute to effective 
governance (e.g. Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Letendre, 2004; Pettigrew, 
1992; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts, McNulty and 
Stiles, 2005; Van Ees, Gabrielsson and Huse, 2009). The roles that have the highest power 
and influence in the boardroom and which are likely to be of consequence for governance 
outcomes are those of the chairperson of the board and the CEO (e.g. Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007a,b, 2008; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Roberts, 2002). The next sections 
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discuss key studies on chairperson and CEO roles as well as studies looking at their 
interplay. 
2.3.3 Chairperson and CEO roles 
In order for the board to effectively fulfil its duties of control and monitoring, stewardship 
and resource provision, a number of distinctive roles have been developed for individual 
directors. Normative role descriptions, enshrined in the governance codes discussed in 
the preceding section, set out the responsibilities, demands and behaviours that are 
generally expected from each role incumbent, forming the consensual view of effective 
role fulfilment. Yet how these roles are enacted in practice varies greatly from board to 
board, subject to individual differences and relationships, as well as the (often changing) 
context and circumstances facing role incumbents. The following sections provide a 
discussion of the two most influential roles in the boardroom: chairperson and CEO. The 
discussion locates the roles inside the board and stresses the demands, constraints, 
supports, tensions and complexities facing them, as well as the interaction between them. 
2.3.3.1 The chairperson role 
The chairperson role is often seen as a non-executive one, charged with leading the board 
of directors in the pursuit of their legal and regulatory duties. This, however, varies 
according to the country and corresponding regulatory environment. In the US Standard 
& Poor’s 500, for example, chairperson and CEO roles are held separate in 46% of 
companies, but only 28% of chairpersons are truly independent (Spencer Stuart, 2014), 
whereas in the UK role separation has been embraced by about 96.4% of FTSE 350 
companies (Grant Thornton, 2014). 
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In the UK, the old adage that a board is only as good as its next chairperson is in 
fact increasingly true, since the role has become greater in respect to both time and 
responsibility (Boyden, 2014). In fact, the “return of the chairperson” has been heralded 
for quite some time now (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007a). 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) stresses 
the importance of the chairperson leading the board of directors effectively by ensuring 
that agenda items reflect the totality of NED concerns, that time allocated to discussion 
is sufficient, and that management proposals are aired openly and met with sufficient and 
constructive challenge. It is also the chairperson’s duty to ensure that NEDs receive 
adequate, independent and timely information both from internal and external sources, 
that they sufficiently engaged with the business, and that board members’ induction, 
evaluation and development is carried out effectively. 
A number of leadership studies have been developed to determine what exactly 
constitutes the chairperson’s role and what are the required leadership traits and 
competencies to carry it out effectively (Kakabadse et al., 2001; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2008; Roberts, 2002). Some studies assert that effective boardroom dynamics 
can be achieved through chairpersons’ social and political skills in managing often 
sensitive relationships and individual egos, and by their being able to mitigate and avoid 
interpersonal collision in a complex and subtle way (Kakabadse et al., 2001). Ultimately, 
the chairperson’s job is to manage processes of accountability (Robert, 2002; Roberts, 
McNulty, and Stiles, 2005), described as “a processes of learning, which acknowledges 
the inevitable incompleteness of individual thought, and through which strategy emerges 
as the synergistic outcome of board discussion” (Robert, 2002:515). The chairperson 
needs to create “positive dynamics of accountability” by supporting a culture of challenge 
and support, setting the behavioural standards expected and managing the agenda and 
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information flows in ways that facilitate NED involvement and contribution while 
retaining independence of mind. Hence, the chairperson plays an important role in 
ensuring quality of debate so that “the interplay of different skills and perspectives 
amongst different members of the board can itself produce new perspectives that offer 
creative solutions to particular dilemmas” (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005:S16). 
Recognising the importance of board leadership, Kakabadse et al. (2001) conducted 
one of the first in-depth interview studies of UK FTSE 100 company directors. It was 
found that the high-performing chairperson exhibited maturity, relational skills, high 
political and social competence, meeting skills and coaching capabilities, all of use in 
managing boardroom dynamics, with boardroom politics and social dimensions being 
key. Leblanc and Gillies (2005) go as far as to view the leadership qualities of the chair 
(and its relationship with the CEO) as the single most important factor impacting board 
effectiveness. It has been proposed that the three most important tasks of the chairperson 
are i) assessment of, and relationship with, the CEO; ii) preventing board denial; and iii) 
dealing with non-performing directors (Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). 
An in-depth study conducted by Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor (2007) as a part of the 
2006 UK Non-Executive of the Year Awards indicated that the outstanding chairperson 
exhibits high ethical standards; provides a lead on corporate governance matters; 
promotes investor confidence; mentors, develops and advises colleagues; is a team 
builder; is empathetic and effectively encourages contributions; achieves consensus; 
challenges and probes executives; and displays highly developed critical thinking 
(Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007). Out of 13 top-rated high-level behavioural dimensions 
of the outstanding chair, “encourages contributions and achieves consensus” was rated 
only 9th with a score of 31%. This dimension includes aspects such as “ability to reconcile 
differences, reconcile parties to a common cause and negotiate final decisions”, “skilled 
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at getting executives and non-executives to agree”, “ensures executives and non-
executives can air their views”, “encourages debate and challenge, facilitates discussions 
and always moves to an agreed, clear decision” and manages shareholders’ and 
management’s opposing views by “re-focusing the company with a new vision and get 
both parties to agree to a common strategy without either losing face” (Dulewicz, Gay 
and Taylor, 2007:1,061). The paper shows that the chair plays an essential role in 
reconciling conflicting agendas. Acknowledging and valuing differences, yet finding 
underlying complementarities, common views and causes, is at the heart of chairperson 
leadership as well as boardroom effectiveness (e.g. Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Roberts, 
2002). Still elusive, however, is an insight into how the chairperson perceives emerging 
tensions and how exactly differences and common causes surface and are identified. 
More recent studies, such as the one by Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2008), identify 
six disciplines that a world-class chairperson needs to master in order to lead for 
boardroom effectiveness: i) delineating boundaries (between chairperson and CEO roles, 
distinct from board and management roles); ii) sense-making (concerning the mission, 
vision and values in the boardroom and the organisation); iii) interrogating the argument 
(questioning policy and strategy); iv) influencing outcomes; v) living the values (based 
on trust and integrity and paying attention to the imbalances between espoused values and 
practised values); and vi) developing the board (which includes board evaluation, 
selection, development, coaching, etc.) (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008). Yet 
chairpersons’ leadership behaviours and styles vary according to board and corporate 
context. For example, Levrau and Van den Berghe (2013) interviewed company 
secretaries from 39 large companies in the BEL 20 and BEL MID (33 of which had 
separate chairperson and CEO roles) and found that chairpersons exhibited highly 
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heterogeneous leadership styles which impacted on the quality of the decisions made and 
on the group’s commitment to those decisions. It is argued that the chairperson should be 
able to transform the boardroom into an effective collective decision-making body, by 
removing “negative group dynamics” (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013). This requires 
a chairperson to have particular specific personal competencies and attributes that go 
beyond the structural aspects of board leadership, and which include creativity, criticality, 
preparedness and commitment (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013). 
Table 3 attempts to summarise the most significant research findings on the role, 
skills and capabilities of the board chairperson. 
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Table 3: Key studies on the chairperson role and skill set (2001–2013) 
Study methodology  Key findings  Author(s) 
95 (35 in-depth, semi-
structured interviews 
and three focus group of 
20 NEDs/ 
chairpersons/CEOs) – 
FTSE 100, UK 
Capabilities/qualities: 
 Maturity 
 Relational skills 
 High political and social competence 
 Meeting skills 
 Coaching capabilities 
 Managing boardroom dynamics 
Kakabadse et 
al. (2001) 
35 interviews with 
chairpersons, CEOs and 
NEDs, UK 
 Without ambition for executive power 
 Complementary to CEO (i.e. supporting role of executive) 
in: skills, experience, knowledge, temperament, business 
focus and values 
 Chairing meetings (e.g. focusing, stimulating discussion, 
openness, trust) 
 Replacing CEO 
Roberts 
(2002) 
40 in-depth interviews, 
UK (commissioned for 
the Higgs Report) 
Create “positive dynamics of accountability” by: 
 Encouraging a culture of challenge and support 
 Setting the behavioural standards expected 
 Managing the agenda and information flows 
 Facilitating NED involvement and contribution while 
retaining independence of mind 
Robert, 
McNulty and 
Stiles (2005) 
39 boards observed and 
194 directors 
interviewed over a 
period of 5 years, 
Canada and US 
Three main chairperson competencies: 
 Assessment of, and relationship with the CEO 
 Preventing board denial 
 Dealing with non-performing directors 
Leblanc and 
Gillies 
(2005) 
Survey of UK board 
members for 2006 UK 
NED of the Year 
Awards 
Skills and competencies of the outstanding chairperson: 
 Exhibits high ethical standards 
 Provides a lead on corporate governance matters 
 Promotes investor confidence 
 Mentors, develops and advises colleagues 
 Team builder, empathetic, effectively encouraging 
contributions 
 Achieves consensus, challenges and probes executives and 
displays highly developed critical thinking 
Dulewicz, 
Gay and 
Taylor 
(2007) 
900 interviews with 
board members 
worldwide 
Six discipline of chairperson: 
 Setting boundaries 
 Sense-making 
 Interrogating the argument 
 Influencing outcomes 
 Lives the values 
 Developing the board 
Kakabadse 
and 
Kakabadse 
(2008) 
 
Interviews with 
Company Secretaries 
from 39 large companies 
of the BEL20 and BEL 
mid (Belgium) 
 
Transform the boardroom into an effective collective 
decision-making body, by removing “negative group 
dynamics”. 
Skills/capabilities: 
 Creativity 
 Criticality 
 Preparedness 
 Commitment 
Levrau and 
van den 
Berghe 
(2013) 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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There is a growing stream of literature focusing on the chairperson’s role, skills and 
contribution (Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008; Levrau 
and van den Berghe, 2013), and the relationship between the chair and CEO (Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Roberts, 2002) 
as central to board effectiveness. This literature converges on the idea that the chairperson 
is a “bridge”, playing a role in balancing different interests, skills and perspectives inside 
and around the boardroom: the crucial person who is charged with transforming the board 
into an effective collective decision-making group (Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013). 
Tensions are likely to emerge from the confrontation of these different interests, skills 
and perspectives, but how the chairperson handles them remains elusive. 
2.3.3.2  CEO role 
Traditional approaches to managerial roles have emphasised rationality, predictability 
and control (Fayol, 1949), but subsequent research began to uncover their multifaceted, 
complex, relational and idiosyncratic nature (e.g. Hales, 1986; Kotter, 1982; Luthans, 
Rosenkrantz and Hennessey, 1985; Mintzberg, 1971; Stewart, 1967, 1976, 1982). Among 
these early studies, Mintzberg’s (1971, 1973) structured observational study of CEO roles 
over time resulted in the identification of ten distinct roles that CEOs play. These roles 
were grouped according their nature: interpersonal, informational and decisional. 
Interpersonal roles include those of figurehead, liaison and leader. The figurehead role 
depicted the CEO as the “legal authority” and as a “symbol” which requires role 
incumbents to perform a variety of ceremonial activities such as signing legal documents 
and representing the firm on official occasions. The liaison role highlights a CEO’s 
networking activity, securing favour and resources from external and internal contacts. 
Finally, as a leader, the CEO is seen to be engaging in a variety of staffing and motivation 
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activities which are typical for most CEOs. The informational role includes the CEO 
acting as a “nerve centre” – an informational generalist where all the available 
information converges, placing the role incumbent in a unique position to gain a superior 
understanding of the total organisation (Mintzberg, 1971, 1973). The informational role 
also includes the CEO acting as a disseminator and spokesperson. In such a capacity, 
CEOs disseminate important information to their subordinates about relevant external 
events and demands, as well as conveying the “organisational position” to important and 
influential external parties. A final cluster of roles – decisional roles – include an 
entrepreneurial one, a role as disturbance handler and one as resource allocator. The 
entrepreneurial role sees the CEO as the initiator of changes in the organisation according 
to his/her perception of threats and opportunities. Closely related, as a “disturbance 
handler” the CEO supports the organisation in coping with new stimuli that “disturb” 
existing routines by introducing small improvements or structural change (Mintzberg, 
1971, 1973). Through their resource-allocator role CEOs control the efficient and 
effective use of resources, including their own time, and they do this via organisational 
structure design and the approval of significant decisions (Mintzberg, 1971, 1973). In this 
early work Mintzberg also identified contingency factors (i.e. environmental, 
organisational, situational and individual) that could influence CEOs’ behaviour 
(Mintzberg, 1973). CEOs play all ten roles simultaneously, which form an integrated 
whole (Mintzberg, 1975). Subsequent work placed the task of strategy formulation and 
implementation almost as a core defining task of the CEO, around which interpersonal, 
informational and decisional roles were performed (e.g. Mintzberg, 1989). Tsui (1984) 
proposed a greater integration of Mintzberg’s roles, reducing them to six: leader, 
spokesperson, resource allocator, entrepreneur, environmental monitor and liaison. More 
recently, Tengblad’s (2006) study of Swedish CEOs confirmed that – apart from his 
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findings that CEOs prefer brevity and interruption and that managerial work is 
fragmented – Mintzberg’s propositions are fundamentally still valid. But Mintzberg’s 
work has been criticised for being too prescriptive, and not really accounting for the 
unique ways role incumbents can interpret the role given particular contextual demands 
and constraints (Stewart, 1982). Others found that the proposed roles were hardly 
distinguishable when observing discrete managerial activities (McCall and Segrist, 1980; 
Kurke and Aldrich, 1983). Importantly, Mintzberg produced a list of roles rather than a 
general theory of role-making that could have allowed a common frame with which to 
view managerial roles in different contexts. 
Kotter (1982) identified two general problems which, taken together, define the 
critical roles a CEO must play. The first problem is to determine a course of action for 
the organisation in face of uncertainty, diversity and potentially relevant available 
information; the second problem is the requirement to ensure that such a course of action 
is implemented throughout a large and diverse organisation of people over whom the 
CEO has little direct control (Kotter, 1982). Given these fundamental managerial 
problems (which could be described as strategy formulation and implementation), the 
CEO performs three critical roles of agenda-setting, network building (i.e. of a web of 
cooperative relationships inside and outside the organisation) and one of mobilising such 
networks to implement the agenda (Kotter, 1982). Other studies around that time provided 
further evidence that network building was associated with managerial success, but 
indicated that the role of network builder decreases in importance as the manager ascends 
to the top, with decisional and informational roles becoming more important (Luthans, 
Rosenkrantz and Hennessey, 1985). Around this time, scholars (Donaldson and Lorsch, 
1983) began to acknowledge the competing demands that top management is exposed to. 
The work of Jonas, Fry and Srivastva (1990), inspired by the work of Kotter (1982), 
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interviewed 24 CEOs to determine what constituted “the CEO agenda”. They found that 
this agenda included the creation of a “context for change”, the “building of commitment 
and ownership” throughout the organisation to implement change, and the balancing of 
stability and innovation through “simultaneously embody[ing] the status quo and … 
question[ing] it”, revealing how the role can grapple with competing and seemingly 
contradictory demands (Jonas, Fry and Srivastva, 1990:40). The emphasis on competing 
demands that CEOs have to address was further evidenced by Hart and Quinn (1993). 
This study proposed four competing roles that CEOs play: dynamic vision setter, 
motivator, analyser and task master (Hart and Quinn, 1993). Such roles differ from each 
other with regard to internal/external focus and the level of flexibility/predictability 
involved, yet CEOs often have to perform them simultaneously. According to Hart and 
Quinn (1983), this exposes the paradoxical nature of executive leadership work, which 
requires CEOs to exhibit high levels of behavioural complexity. 
In parallel with this early work on the CEO role, a variety of research emerged 
providing a number of more general role theories capable of explaining general features 
of managerial roles, role-making and enactment as well as the behavioural variability of 
role incumbents across contexts (Fondas and Stewart, 1990, 1994; Graen, 1969, 1976; 
Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Stewart, 1967, 1976, 1982). A variety of role 
models were developed placing different emphasis on role incumbents’ proactive 
behaviour in shaping their role in context. Among those models that allow for role 
incumbents’ behavioural choice is the Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) model 
(Stewart, 1982) and the expectations enactment model of managerial role formation 
(Fondas and Stewart, 1990, 1994). The expectations enactment model views the 
individual as not merely reacting to expectations, but effectively shaping his/her 
environment, contributing to a definition of role expectations and behaviour. Individuals 
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proactively and intentionally seek out opportunities to shape expectations, which are 
adjusted in the course of interaction and negotiated in a continuous manner (Fondas and 
Stewart, 1994). However, this model focused too much on expectation modification, and 
did not capture the greater complexity and dynamism of high-discretion roles where 
choice is a fundamental characteristic (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009; 
Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). The earlier DCC 
model (Stewart, 1982) appears less prescriptive, allowing for both expectations 
modification and choice from the role incumbent. Role incumbents’ choices include 
where to spend time, which activities to prioritise, as well as boundary management 
activities (Stewart, 1982). Such choices about how to carry out role demands are subject 
to constraints which may lie within the role incumbent (experience, perception, mind-set, 
background) or in the environment (physical buildings, significant others’ expectations 
of behaviour, cultural and social norms, institutional pressures) (Stewart, 1982). The 
space for choice (i.e. the extent to which the role incumbent has freedom to shape his/her 
role as she/he sees fit) therefore varies according to the formative context within which 
the role is enacted (Stewart, 1982). The concept of choice in role theory has subsequently 
emerged in the upper echelons literature under the concept of discretion (i.e. latitude of 
action) (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987) and has led to important research. CEOs’ 
discretion (i.e. the latitude of managerial action) in fulfilling their role varies widely 
according to internal and external constraints (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011). UK CEOs 
are among those with the highest discretion, surpassed only by US CEOs (Crossland and 
Hambrick, 2011). Studies have found a positive correlation between CEO discretion and 
company performance (Crossland and Hambrick, 2011; Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998). 
Studies have also investigated the constraints that may impact on CEO discretionary 
behaviour. These include task environment constraints (i.e. market growth, product 
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differentiation, quasi-legal constraints, etc.), internal organisational constraints (e.g. 
inertial forces such as organisation size, age, culture, resource availability and powerful 
inside forces), and managerial characteristics (e.g. level of aspiration, commitment to 
status quo, cognitive complexity, tolerance for ambiguity) (Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2009). Quigley and Hambrick (2012) found that former CEOs who remain on 
the board as chairperson exert a constraining effect on the new CEO, reducing the 
newcomer’s discretion about his/her strategic choices and the level of strategic change 
possible to effect. 
In addition to the studies around CEO role demands, tensions, constraints, choices 
and level of discretion, another stream of leadership research has focused on determining 
the capabilities and skills exhibited by successful CEO role incumbents. For example, 
Cox and Cooper (1989) interviewed CEOs of 45 large British companies and identified 
three groups of skills associated with success: i) decision-making and analytical skills 
(ability to dissect a problem in a logical and scientific way, to focus on key elements of a 
problem and make tough but necessary decisions); ii) interpersonal skills 
(communication, ability to establish good relationships and persuasiveness); and iii) 
leadership skills (vision, projecting the future, and communicating the strategy). These 
CEOs tended to be assertive and outgoing (Cox and Cooper, 1989). In addition to these 
CEO characteristics, skills and competencies, Dulewicz and Herbert (1999) identified 
strategic perspective, interpersonal sensitivity, analysis and judgement, and energy and 
intuition. Around the same time, Kakabadse and Kakabadse’s (1999) large study of 
executives across 16 countries further identified i) strength to surface sentiments; ii) 
wisdom to find pathways through paradox; iii) an aptitude for engaging through dialogue; 
and iv) an ability to persevere, and stay in power. These three studies taken together show 
an interesting pattern. From viewing the demands faced by the CEO as being resolved in 
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“a logical and scientific way” (Cox and Cooper, 1989), they move to a recognition of the 
value of judgement and intuition (Dulewicz and Herbert, 1999) and thence to a 
requirement for wisdom to find pathways through paradox (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
1999). A more recent study consisted of specialised assessments of over 200 CEOs hired 
(or maintained) during private equity buyouts or venture capitalist investments (Kaplan, 
Klebanov and Sorensen, 2012). The study investigated 30 CEO skills/characteristics and 
matched them against subsequent success in the role. Three characteristics emerged as 
variables for CEO success: execution capabilities, resoluteness, and over-confidence. 
These were found to be more important than interpersonal skills such as empathy and 
communication (Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen, 2012). 
CEO literature is highly fragmented across a range of theoretical and 
methodological approaches, sometimes looking at the role as a position (i.e. the structure 
and content of the role), as a person (i.e. the skills, capabilities and personality traits 
required by the role), or else focusing on the environmental contingencies affecting how 
role incumbents make choices (Busenbark et al., 2015). 
In the previous two sections, the roles and attributes of chairperson and CEO have 
been discussed. The next section briefly discusses the interplay and relationship between 
these two roles. 
2.3.4  Chairperson and CEO roles: relationship and interdependence 
As discussed in preceding sections, considerations about the duality of the CEO role has 
failed to provide conclusive evidence of boardroom leadership (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein 
and Mooney, 2003; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Taken together with the general 
preference of UK regulators for separating the roles of chairperson and CEO, this has led 
researchers to focus on the quality of the relationship between the two roles (Pye, 2005; 
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Roberts and Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010). 
In regimes with role separation, the centrality of the chairperson–CEO relationship 
for boardroom effectiveness and the long-term sustainability of the corporation is a 
conclusion that has perhaps achieved most consensus. This relationship is often described 
as pivotal and sacred (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2008; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013), or the 
“fulcrum around which directing is levered”, and it is described as being highly 
contextual in nature (Pye, 2005). 
The study of how role arrangements are formed and how they impact each other 
was first developed by Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik (1965) in a pioneering study of 
three executives’ “role constellations”. Hodgson and his colleagues referred to a process 
of “emotional division of labor” and specialisation of function by each role-holder, so that 
they become complementary and form a balanced “integrated whole” (Hodgson, 
Levinson and Zaleznik, 1965: xxi). Referring to pairs as a stable and effective “role 
constellation”, Hodgson explained how some pairs were found to specialise in internal 
demands and external, boundary-spanning activities (Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik, 
1965). Chitayat’s study (1984), which investigated the working relationships between 
Israeli CEOs and chairmen, found that, while there was a great variation in the relative 
functions depending on a firm’s structure and the incumbent’s personality, the role of the 
chair as consulting and coaching the CEO emerged as the most important. 
Stewart’s longitudinal study (1991) of 20 relationships between chairmen and their 
general managers found that the chairperson and CEO roles (when separated) are 
impacted by organisational structure, personality, and the time that the chairperson 
devotes to the role. The study identifies and describes five chairperson roles in relation to 
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the CEO: partner; executive; mentor; consultant; and distant (Stewart, 1991). Stewart 
concluded that the roles of chairpersons and general managers are highly interdependent, 
and that this mutual dependence is highly contextual in nature (Stewart, 1991). Since 
these early studies, evidence has emerged to show that the relationship patterns have 
changed. Pye (2000:344) observes that the relationship between the chairperson and CEO 
has moved from a “distanced approach” to one that is more “interdependent and 
dynamic”, characterised by a sense of “partnership, mutual respect, understanding and 
trust”, where issues are brought to the board only when the chairperson and CEO have 
previously agreed to do so. Further, the role of the chairperson was often viewed by NEDs 
interviewed as “potentially major value adders or destroyers” in relation to both NEDs’ 
and CEOs’ effectiveness (Pye, 2000:345). 
More recent studies indicate that a complementary relationship between the 
chairperson and CEO provides “a context in which the CEO can think provisionally in a 
way that acknowledges the ambiguity and uncertainty that is the ground of decision-
making” (Roberts, 2002:504). “Building the basis for trust” between the two roles by 
enabling open communication of concerns avoids misunderstandings about each other’s 
intentions and requires a “high level of routine contact between the two” (Roberts, 
2002:502). Pye (2005) has shown that, in the UK context, the time the chairperson devotes 
to company affairs is irrelevant as a proxy for involvement; the key was the quality of 
relationship with the CEO, which, if poor, can create “a lot of bad behavior on both sides 
(board and management)” which has implications for relationships with external 
stakeholders such as investors (Pye, 2005:77). It is argued that this relationship is the 
building block of boardroom culture, determining how board members behave and 
contribute, as well as the quality of board–management relationships (Pye, 2005; Roberts, 
2002; Roberts and Stiles, 1999). 
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A further study by Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt (2006) referred to role 
delineation as the critical element, and as such conferred a distinct advantage on UK 
leadership structure compared to that of the US. Hence, “tensions between the two could 
be attributed both to the idiosyncrasies of their personal interaction and also to poorly 
delineated, peripheral responsibilities” (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006:142). 
The relationship between chairperson and CEO was seen as comprising two key qualities: 
having “personal chemistry” and an “ability to interpret information and events in a 
mutually synergistic manner” (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006:144). Similarly, 
in a subsequent study based on 900 interviews with board members, these critical qualities 
have been reconceptualised as “shared sensemaking” and “affective philos” – two 
essential preconditions for the effectiveness of a chairperson–CEO relationship 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008). 
Studies on the interplay between the chairperson and CEO reveal role-delineation 
tensions as well as strategic issue-based tensions to be inherent in relationship dynamics, 
and to have a consequence for board effectiveness and company performance. Yet it 
remains relatively unexplored how role occupants perceive and handle such tensions, and 
how they do so within the attendant constraints and opportunities. 
The next section brings together the literature on paradox and tensions and 
literature on governance (particularly chairperson and CEO roles) and identifies the 
research opportunity that is pursued in this thesis. 
2.3.5 Summary of board, chairperson and CEO roles 
The previous sections have reviewed relevant literature on board directors and 
particularly the chairperson and CEO roles and their interaction. The focus has been on 
studies and evidence primarily derived from the UK corporate governance regime, which 
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is the focus of this study. The review has covered the complexities, competing demands, 
constraints and tensions that both roles are subjected to, as well as the significance and 
difficulties of the interaction between chairperson and CEO. 
The next section brings together both the literature on paradox and tension, and that 
of the role behaviour of board directors, chairpersons and CEOs, in order to articulate the 
research opportunity pursued in this thesis. 
2.4 Research opportunity 
Recent reviews have highlighted the failure within paradox and tension research to 
explore individual responses to paradox (e.g. Schad et al., 2016); the review of the 
literature undertaken in this chapter confirms this shortfall. Of the relatively few studies 
that have addressed individual approaches, only a small percentage of those investigate 
how senior leaders such as CEOs perceive and handle tensions (e.g. Denison, Hooijberg 
and Quinn, 1995; Smith et al., 2012; Fredberg, 2014; Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith, 
2014; Smith, 2014; Smith and Tushman, 2005). Research examining corporate 
governance from a paradox perspective is even scarcer, with only one theoretical paper 
having been published some 13 years ago (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). Board 
directors’ governance deals with a fundamental tension between control and collaboration 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003) between non-executives and executives and between 
the CEO and chairperson of the board. Research on these roles has highlighted their 
mutual interdependence (Stewart, 1991; Roberts, 2002) – their relationship may be 
construed as paradoxical as it includes the co-existence of contradictory yet 
interdependent behaviours such as control versus collaboration, and support versus 
challenge (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). While the two roles are clearly different 
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(each comprises its own set of specific demands, constraints and choices), they are also 
potentially highly interdependent (Stewart, 1991; Roberts, 2002). I say “potentially”, 
because the degree to which the roles are interdependent and different (or how the 
separation of roles is arrived at) depends critically on how role incumbents enact their 
roles, their preferences, working styles, personality, skills, experience and so on (Roberts, 
2002). Yet the literature is unanimous that this relationship is critical for board 
effectiveness and company performance. CEOs and chairpersons, it is asserted, require a 
shared sense-making, complementary styles (Roberts, 2002) and affective philos, along 
with shared analytical interpretive capacity (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010) 
(or “chemistry”); these underpin their joint ability to integrate disparate views and 
demands, while simultaneously playing distinct roles as non-executive and executive. 
Furthermore, literature on the chairperson role consistently highlights the necessity to 
value differences of contribution, while promoting a common purpose and joint decision-
making (e.g. Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b; 
Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010). Equally, studies on the role of the CEO 
recognise the persistent presence of competing, even paradoxical, demands (e.g. 
Donaldson and Lorsch, 1983; Jonas, Fry and Srivastva, 1990; Hart and Quinn, 1993). But 
how role incumbents actually respond to these competing demands and tensions has been 
largely ignored by this literature, and research on skills, capabilities and attributes does 
not always fit well with literature on paradox and tension. 
As paradoxes and strategic tensions are likely to become salient in environments of 
high uncertainty, change and poor performance (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and 
Lewis, 2011), and, given the strategic, distinctive and interdependent nature of 
chairperson and CEO roles, it is important to explore their responses. Still poorly 
understood is how a unique set of constraints, demands and supports for the two roles, as 
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well as their interdependence, shapes responses to fundamental strategic tensions. Do the 
roles use differentiation and integration tactics to handle tensions, as proposed by paradox 
theory? Do they make use of reflexivity and dialogue? Is there evidence of paradoxical 
cognition? Such language is absent from studies of governance, particularly with regard 
to the boardroom and the chairperson and CEO roles. 
The next sections articulate the research question(s) arising from the review of the 
extant literature, and propose the theoretical framework that underpins this thesis. 
2.5 Research questions 
The literature review undertaken in this chapter has revealed a research opportunity 
calling for the exploration of chairpersons’ and CEOs’ response to strategic tensions. The 
pivotal question in this research is, therefore: 
How do chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions? 
In order to address this fundamental question, four additional sub-questions are 
considered: 
 What are the nature of the business contexts within which tensions are perceived 
by chairpersons and CEOs? 
 What are the demands, constraints, choices and supports available to chairpersons 
and CEOs in fulfilling their distinct roles? 
 What are the nature of the strategic tensions as perceived by chairpersons and 
CEOs? 
 What are the chairpersons’ and CEOs’ behavioural choices (i.e. the response) in 
the face of their attendant demands, constraints and supports? 
 
 
 66 
So, in broad terms, this study seeks to explore the nature of the strategic tensions 
facing UK listed-company chairpersons and CEOs and how they respond to them. 
2.6 Theoretical framework: role theory 
The precursors of role theory were studies by US and European psychologists and 
sociologists (e.g. Binet, 1900; Durkheim, 1893; James, 1890), but the most influential 
contributions and early “role” concepts have been attributed to Mead (1934), Moreno 
(1934) and Linton (1936); as a result, the language of “roles” was widely diffused from 
the 1940s onwards (Thomas and Biddle, 1966:3-19). 
Role theory often uses a “theatre” analogy, where an actor’s behaviour is 
determined by the constraints and demands presented by a number of contextual and 
situational elements such as the script, other actors, the director’s guidelines, the public, 
and the actor’s own characteristics (Thomas and Biddle, 1966). It posits that 
“organizational members accomplish their work through roles”, which “are sets of 
behaviors that persons expect of occupants of a position” (Graen, 1976:1,201). This 
reflects two important aspects of role theory. The first is that it places the role as the link 
between the individual and the wider social world (Linton, 1936; Mead, 1934; Thomas 
and Biddle, 1966), thus capturing the relations between different levels of analysis. As 
such, an overarching classification of role-making system determinants (demands and 
constraints) includes several levels such as i) physical-technological systems (constraints 
and demands that are imposed by accepted beliefs about those systems); ii) social-cultural 
systems (legal, ethical and social norms); and iii) person systems (beliefs about the role 
incumbent) (Graen, 1976). 
 
 
 67 
In effect, constraints on and demands of role behaviour referred to in the literature 
include personal (i.e. type of personality of role incumbent), social or role set demands 
(other role incumbents with vested interests in another’s role behaviour, including 
leadership), and situational and organisational constraints (i.e. those arising from what is 
formally expected and enforced by means of training, reward, etc.) (Graen, 1976). 
A number of role-based models have been developed. Some, such as the fixed-job 
model (e.g. Dawis and Lofquist, 1969), view both the role and the incumbent as static and 
complete, while the interpersonal role model (e.g. Kahn et al., 1964) sees role behaviour 
as a dynamic contingent of organisational, interpersonal and personality (of leader or 
member) factors. However, both of these models define the role incumbent as passive. 
More enlightened models, such as the interdependent role systems models (e.g. Katz and 
Kahn, 1966), allow the role incumbent to be active in adjusting his/her personal belief 
systems in relation to those of the organisation. The “theory of instrumentality” (e.g. 
Graen, 1969) allows the role incumbent (rational) choice about which role model (e.g. 
leader or interested peers) to follow, according to the perceived relative utility which the 
incumbent can rationally expect. (“Relative utility” is here defined as the difference 
between the expected utility derived from following the leader’s expectations minus the 
expected utility derived from following that of peers, plus the rewards and punishments 
likely to occur as a result of following one and not the other, and the incumbent’s 
preferences.) Along the same line, the “effective performance model” posits that role 
behaviour is a function of the degree to which the role incumbent believes that a link 
exists between high role performance and desired payouts, and, conversely, that there is 
no link between poor performance and high payouts (Graen, 1976). In any case, these two 
models emphasise the contribution of reward systems in enforcing organisationally 
desired role behaviour. 
 
 
 68 
Subsequent models of roles have recognised role incumbents’ proactivity in both 
modifying expectations (e.g. Fondas and Stewart, 1990, 1994) and in choosing how to 
enact their role (i.e. behavioural choices), given the contextual and individual constraints 
and opportunities presented (Stewart, 1967, 1976, 1982). Among these models, the work 
of Professor Rosemary Stewart has been recognised as perhaps the least prescriptive 
framework of role, and has been popular as a basis for studies looking at CEO and 
chairperson roles as well as their interaction. The Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) 
model of roles is presented next as the chosen theoretical framework for this thesis. 
2.6.1 Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) model of roles 
Role theory has been variously applied in studies of managerial jobs (Haga, Graen and 
Dansereau, 1974; Stewart, 1967, 1982). Prominent among these is the work of Professor 
Rosemary Stewart (e.g. Lowe, 2003). Stewart’s celebrated Demands–Constraints–-
Choices (DCC) model has become established as the main explanatory theory of role, 
accounting for variabilities in both jobs and role incumbent behaviour (Stewart, 1982). In 
short, the DCC model posits that managers’ available choices or opportunities within the 
role are dynamically influenced by role demands (i.e. what is expected of any incumbent 
in terms of task and output in order to stay in the job) and internal and external constraints, 
which can be personal (e.g. own preferences) or organisational (e.g. reward systems, 
training), or they can be of physical (e.g. resources) or social and cultural natures (e.g. 
legal norms, peer attitudes, leadership) (Stewart, 1982, 2003). The nature of demands and 
constraints is situational, so the available behavioural choices change accordingly 
(Stewart, 2003). Choices are enacted in three domains: i) the aspects of the role to which 
the incumbent chooses to devote more time and commitment of resources; ii) the tasks 
that are delegated; iii) boundary management (Stewart, 1982). The DCC model is 
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consistent with observations by Hales (1986), as it allows for variation and contingency, 
choice and negotiation, pressure and conflict, and reaction and non-reflection, stressing 
that managerial (and, for that matter, directors’) activities “may be competing, even 
contradictory” (Hales, 1996:102). Figure 3 provides an overview of Stewart’s model of 
role. 
Figure 3: Stewart’s Demands–Constraints–Choices model of role  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on Stewart (1982) 
 
The DCC model is considered adequate to guide present research on how do 
chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions? since its simplicity provides the 
necessary flexibility to explore the demands, constraints, choices and supports of each 
role, their interplay, as well as how tensions are perceived, constructed and responded to. 
In addition to its simplicity and dynamic nature, the model offers the opportunity to locate 
and explore strategic tensions inside the boardroom and at different levels of analysis, by 
examining the nature of demands, constraints and opportunities. 
Furthermore, role theory, and particularly the work of Rosemary Stewart, has been 
widely recognised for its contribution to qualitative methodologies (Parry, 2003), often 
seen as “exemplars of the argument for qualitative reasoning rather than quantitative 
analysis for studying a complex and weakly understood phenomena” (Kroeck, 2003:204). 
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A number of previous studies have successfully used role theory to examine 
boardroom dynamics: for example, the chairperson–CEO relationship (Stewart, 1991; 
Roberts and Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006) as well as the 
chairperson role and skill-set (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b). 
Stewart’s examination of the chairperson–CEO relationship in the UK National 
Health Service (NHS) using her own DCC model was able not only to examine the 
dependent nature of this relationship but, importantly, how the degree of this dependence 
was contextually determined (Stewart, 1991). For Roberts and Stiles (1999), role theory 
is useful in examining the interpersonal nature of roles, and the expectations formed and 
negotiated within a particular boardroom formative context, stressing the importance of 
bringing together process and contextual research perspectives. Other authors 
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006) have used role theory as a lens through which 
to examine the chair–CEO relationship in context and to emphasise the relational 
dimensions of effective performance, and also to “gain consistency across interviews” 
while examining the role and contribution of 103 UK, US and Australian chairpersons 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007b). 
In conclusion, role theory – particularly the DCC model of role – fits both the 
exploratory nature of research as well as the question it seeks to answer. 
2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed and discussed the literature on paradox and tension as well as 
literature on company boards, with particular reference to the roles of chairperson and 
CEO. In bringing this literature into focus, a fundamental research gap has been identified 
along with associated research questions. How do chairpersons and CEOs respond to 
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strategic tensions? This question is central to this thesis. This chapter has also identified 
and discussed role theory, particularly the DCC model of role (Stewart, 1982), as a lens 
through which to investigate the research question. 
The next chapter will specify and discuss the methodological apparatus used in this 
research. 
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Chapter 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter introduces social constructivism as the philosophical foundation for 
this study. It starts by outlining the research questions and the aims and objectives of the 
study. There then follow considerations about the research ontology and epistemology 
underpinning the study. From these considerations the research design is laid out and 
methodological choices are discussed regarding: the study approach, inquiry logic, 
guiding theory, research context, level and unit of analysis, time horizon, sample 
selection, methods of data collection and analysis, researcher involvement and ethical 
approach. The pilot study is presented together with the key findings and learnings that 
informed the main study. In the main study section, the full sample is presented and the 
procedures for data collection and analysis are further laid out, along with other important 
considerations. The chapter closes with a summary and briefly introduces the next 
chapter.  
3.2 Research questions 
The literature review undertaken in the preceding chapter revealed a research opportunity 
calling for the exploration of chairperson and CEO responses to strategic tensions. The 
pivotal question in this research is, therefore:  
How do chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions?  
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In order to address this fundamental question, four additional sub-questions are 
considered: 
 What is the nature of the business contexts within which tensions are perceived 
by chairpersons and CEOs? 
 What are the demands, constraints, choices and supports available to chairpersons 
and CEOs in fulfilling their distinct roles?  
 What is the nature of the strategic (or other) tensions as perceived by chairpersons 
and CEOs? 
 What are chairpersons’ and CEOs’ behavioural choices (i.e. their responses) in 
the face of demands, constraints and supports presented to them in fulfilling their 
distinct roles? 
In broad terms, this study seeks to explore the nature of the strategic tensions and 
the responses given by UK-listed-company chairpersons and CEOs in handling them.  
3.3 Philosophical perspective 
The philosophical foundation of the present study is imbedded in the ontological and 
epistemological positions of constructivism and interpretivism. The following two 
sections briefly outline the reasons for taking this particular philosophical approach.  
3.3.1 Ontology and epistemology 
While a number of ontological positions exist, two positions are often described as being 
at opposing poles. Positivism, also called naturalism, is prevalent in the natural sciences 
and conceives of reality as something observable, independent of human action (Crotty, 
1998). The alternative position, constructivism, posits that reality is a product of human 
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action that gives meaning to things (Guba and Lincoln, 2005). Between these opposing 
philosophical positions is a spectrum along which a plethora of other intermediate 
ontological positions can be found. Even the extremes of this ontological spectrum are 
subject to debate. For example, Burrell and Morgan (1979) speak of external observable 
reality on the one extreme and the product of individual consciousness on the other, while 
Blaikie (1993) speaks of realism and constructivism.  
Positivist ontology rests on the belief that reality exists externally from and 
independently of the individual (Crotty, 1998). The role of the social scientist is therefore 
to identify and measure an objective reality. According to this position, there exists a 
reality outside the individual which possesses recognisable and regular properties and 
which can be identified and measured. In opposition to positivism, social constructionists 
argue that reality is subjective, the product of how individuals interpret and construct it 
in their specific contexts (Crotty, 1998). If reality is subjective and socially constructed, 
the emphasis of the social scientist must be on how social actors define their situations, 
interpret events and recognise social actions in specific circumstances (Schwandt, 1997). 
Such a point is made very clearly by Blaikie (1993:176), who argues that “for 
interpretivism, the social world is the world perceived and experienced by its members 
from the inside, and the task of the social scientist is to discover and describe this insider 
view, not to impose an outsider view on it”.  
This study adopts an ontological stance consistent with social constructivism. 
Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ roles are seen as subjective entities uniquely enacted by each 
incumbent in his/her specific context. As such, roles are given meaning and made real by 
role incumbents’ interpretations of what the role is and what it is not. Such interpretations 
are influenced by others’ expectations of what the role should be, and by a variety of other 
contextual factors, including location and spatial considerations. Such a view is consistent 
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with early role theorists who consider the individual as active in shaping the content and 
meaning of his/her role (Graen, 1969; Katz and Kahn, 1966; Stewart, 1967). 
The focus of this study is on exploring chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses to 
strategic tensions in context. It therefore invites an examination of the individuals’ 
interpretation of their roles and of the specific contexts and situations in which they find 
themselves. CEOs’ and chairpersons’ lived experiences of their roles provide a unique 
opportunity to explore the perceived role demands, constraints and supports and to begin 
to understand the nature of tensions that emerge. In addition to role theorists’ view that 
roles are socially constructed and that individual interpretation is fundamental for role 
enactment, literature dealing with paradox and tension – discussed in Chapter 1 – speaks 
of tensions as socially constructed. For example, Ford and Backoff (1988:89) define 
paradox as a “‘thing’ that is constructed by individuals … through reflexion or 
interaction”, and others define paradoxical tensions as perceptual “cognitive or socially 
constructed polarities” (Lewis, 2000:761). These and other authors (e.g. Smith and 
Tushman, 2005) assert that latent tensions are constructed as paradoxical via the 
individuals’ cognitive frames, and argue that to conceive organisations as inherently 
paradoxical is to obscure the importance of the individual’s interpretation and action. 
Later work from Smith and Lewis (2011), however, acknowledges an ontological 
contradiction in paradox and tension literature between those who consider tensions and 
contradictions to exist objectively in the environment irrespective of individual 
interpretation and interaction, and those who argue that tensions are social constructions 
of lived experience (Ashcraft, Kuhn and Cooren, 2009). In this study the view that 
tensions are social constructed is favoured by the researcher, in that tensions are believed 
to be constructed and reconstructed through the lived experiences of individuals 
occupying particular roles (i.e. chairpersons and CEOs).  
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In line with the above discussion this study selects an “interpretivist” 
epistemological approach which posits that “we are in a continual process of interpreting 
the social world around us in that we interpret the actions of others with whom we interact 
and this interpretation leads to adjustment of our own meanings and actions” (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2009:116). As such, this research will focus on subjective meanings 
and social phenomena attaching importance to the formative context and individual 
behaviours within that context and in specific situations (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 
2009). 
Next, the research design choices that follow from the ontological and 
epistemological considerations are presented and discussed. 
3.4 Research design  
The following sections outline the decisions about research design that follow from the 
ontological and epistemological considerations discussed in the preceding sections. They 
explain the main methodological options considered for this study as well as presenting 
a justification for why other options were not pursued. Discussed next are considerations 
about the study approach, inquiry logic, guiding theory, research context, level and unit 
of analysis, time horizon, sample selection, methods of data collection and analysis, 
researcher involvement and ethical approach.  
3.4.1 Research approach  
An exploratory type of study is proposed. This research approach is suitable for answering 
what question about social phenomena (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Silverman, 
 
 
 77 
2013): that is, what strategic tensions are perceived and what responses to those tensions 
are given by chairpersons and CEOs while fulfilling their roles.  
Because the phenomena are unknown to the researcher, an explanatory study 
approach is not suitable, since this approach is useful only for phenomena of which there 
is sustained prior knowledge of its interacting components. As such, an exploratory type 
of approach has been chosen since the phenomenon is yet to be characterised before it 
can be explained (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Silverman, 2013).  
3.4.2 Inquiry logic  
An exploratory nature calls for an inductive, data-driven inquiry logic (Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2009). If the substantive nature of chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses to 
strategic tensions are unknown to the researcher, a priori formulation of a research 
hypothesis based on existing theories is wholly inadequate. The inquiry thus starts from 
a set of observations and then moves from those particular experiences to a more general 
set of propositions about those experiences: that is, from data to theory and from the 
specific to the more general. Many authors (Bryman, 1988; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Silverman, 2013) have argued that deductive inquiry logics do not fit qualitative analysis. 
As Bryman observes: 
The prior specification of a theory tends to be disfavoured because of the 
possibility of introducing a premature closure on the issues to be investigated, 
as well as the possibility of the theoretical constructs departing excessively 
from the views of participants in a social setting. (Bryman, 1988:81) 
Positivistic deductive inquiry logics miss the important formative context within 
which chairperson and CEO roles are enacted, tensions emerge and responses are formed. 
In contrast, an inductive inquiry logic will be able to generate data-driven theoretical 
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propositions about the phenomena, which may be tested later in subsequent studies. Thus 
the methods proposed for this study seek to generate new propositions about the 
phenomena under study, rather than taking a testable hypothesis as the point of departure 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). As a consequence, the research follows a more grounded 
approach, in a progressive focusing style (Haynes, 2013; Holloway and Todres, 2003), 
allowing for emerging issues to arise from the fieldwork. This approach implies data 
collection should be “open-ended beyond a general direction – breadth and depth at 
different phases … in which the questions may change at different stages depending on 
the data that is emerging and clues from the literature” (Holloway and Todres, 2003:348). 
This does not mean that the study is atheoretical. In focusing on how particular 
chairpersons and CEOs carry out their roles and respond to strategic tensions, a theoretical 
lens is required that permits observation of the roles in order to support and inform the 
research inquiry and ensure consistency in data analysis procedures.  
3.4.3 Guiding theory  
This study uses role theory (e.g. Stewart, 1982) as a theoretical framework to guide data 
collection and analysis. This process is outlined in Section 3.7.4 – Data analysis. 
Role theory has its roots in symbolic interactionism (e.g. Mead, 1934) and lends 
itself to supporting qualitative inquiry (Stewart, 1991. Role analysis (e.g. Graen, 1976; 
Stewart, 1982) is used as part of the study methodology enabling an examination of the 
supports, constraints, complexities, challenges and choices that chairpersons and CEOs 
face in enacting their roles. In turn, this allowed the researcher to identify the perceived 
tensions and responses to tensions produced by role incumbents in their particular 
contexts. Stewart’s role model has been used in similar previous studies as a means of 
ensuring consistency of inquiry and analysis across interviews (e.g. Kakabadse and 
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Kakabadse, 2007). Previous studies also emphasise the powerful impact of context (Pye, 
2000; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005), where examples of board directors’ dysfunctional 
behaviour have been observed. Role theory allows context to be taken account of, by 
identifying, for example, constraints arising from the context in which the role is enacted, 
including the physical spaces within which the incumbent operates, as well and social and 
cultural norms. As discussed in Chapter 1, role theory has been recognised for its 
contribution to qualitative methodologies (Parry, 2003), allowing for “variation and 
contingency, choice and negotiation, pressure and conflict, and reaction and non-
reflection”, emphasising managerial activities that are “often competitive, even 
contradictory” (Hales, 1996:102).  
The next sections proceed with considerations about the research context of the 
study.  
3.4.4 Research context  
This cross-sectional study was conducted with chairpersons and CEOs from UK listed 
companies in a variety of sectors. The UK took the lead on corporate governance reform 
with the publication of the Cadbury Committee Report (1992). Since then, a plethora of 
other regulations have come into force (e.g. Greenbury Committee Report, 1995; Hampel, 
1998; Turnbull, 1999). A new set of self-regulatory measures were introduced by the 
Higgs Report (2003), which recommended, among other things: the application of the 
combined code of conduct, greater interaction between executives and non-executives on 
key business areas, information sharing about companies’ activities, more regular 
committee meetings, as well as greater board diversity and independence, director 
training and shareholders’ access to boards. More recently, other recommendations have 
focused much more explicitly on providing guidance on boardroom effectiveness 
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(Financial Reporting Council, 2011), covering aspects such as the role of the board and 
of individual board directors (e.g. chairperson, CEO, non-executive director [NED], 
senior independent director [SID]), the decision-making process and board performance 
evaluation. Furthermore, the separation of chairperson and CEO roles has been embraced 
by about 96.4% of FTSE 350 companies (Grant Thornton, 2014). The UK Corporate 
Governance Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2016) stresses the importance of 
effective leadership of the board of directors by the chairperson, leaving executive 
responsibility entirely to the CEO. This feature of the UK corporate governance regime 
makes the investigation of how chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions more 
meaningful and relevant than in regimes where combined roles predominate.  
The UK is thus a vibrant, dynamic place in which to explore chairpersons’ and 
CEOs’ responses to strategic tensions. 
3.4.4.1 The broader context  
The research was conducted with chairpersons and CEOs from UK listed companies 
operating in a variety of industries. Listed companies are subject to wider public and 
regulatory scrutiny and board roles have a strong normative component. In addition, 
public companies are normally large complex multinationals, which often implies a 
plurality of interests and complexities to be faced by top roles inside and outside the 
boardroom. Moreover, different industries may differ in the nature and complexity of 
challenges, which can be reflected in differing tensions faced by chairpersons and CEOs. 
The sample selection criteria are outlined in Section 3.4.8 – Sample.  
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3.4.5 Level of analysis 
This study is interested in exploring the nature of perceived strategic tensions and 
associated responses given by board directors while enacting particular roles. The level 
of analysis for the study (Yurdusev, 1993) is board directors, focusing on two particular 
board director roles.  
3.4.6 Unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis of this study is an individual occupying a board director’s role either 
of chairperson or CEO (undergoing distinct demands, constraints, choices and supports). 
By exploring how chairpersons and CEOs perceive and enact their roles in context, one 
can begin to identify the nature of tensions experienced as well as the responses to those 
tensions that are given by role incumbents.  
3.4.7 Time horizon 
This research takes the form of a cross-sectional study, in that chairpersons’ and CEOs’ 
experiences, feelings, perceptions and meanings are captured at a particular point in time 
(i.e. during interviews) and, as such, role demands, constraints and choices (Stewart, 
1982) can only be captured in hindsight, and not tracked in “real time”.  
Although the researcher recognises that the nature of the phenomenon could benefit 
from a longitudinal design, difficulties in getting access to chairpersons’ and CEOs’ over 
time, and the time limitations of the research itself, mitigate against attempting to embark 
on such an unrealistic, albeit exciting, endeavour.  
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3.4.8 Sample selection  
The study uses a non-probability, purposive sampling where selection criteria are derived 
primarily from the research question and study scope and constraints of time and 
resources, since it is not the study’s aim to generalise findings to a population (Patton, 
2002). As a general guide, Creswell (2007) recommends 25–30 interviews be undertaken 
for a general qualitative study. In a recent review of qualitative work in management 
studies, Saunders and Townsend (2016) find a range of between 15 and 60 interviews 
acceptable, subject to the nature of the research question and conventions in the area of 
study. Prior studies examining the roles of CEO and/or chairpersons have used similar 
sample sizes (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1995; Kakabadse et al., 2001).  
In line with general recommendation for qualitative research and past studies in the 
field, the initial sample size envisaged was 20 individuals with significant experience as 
CEO and/or chairperson. Data saturation (i.e. the point in data collection where no new 
data emerges that modifies existing conceptual categories or creates new ones) (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967) was reached at interview 15. However, to strengthen the validity of 
the themes’ content and to take advantage of the unique access obtained to interview 
board directors, the researcher continued to gather additional interviews, which served to 
confirm the themes that were emerging (Francis et al., 2010). The final sample size was 
30 board directors. The opportunity also arose to interview two chief financial officers 
(CFOs) as significant others, with the objective of confirming some of the  categories 
emerging from interviews with CEOs and chairpersons.  
Table 4 provides an overview of sample selection criteria and justification. 
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Table 4: Sample selection criteria 
Criteria  Description  Justification  
Roles  Sample must have a balanced 
representation of individuals 
with substantial CEO and 
chairperson experience.  
Role-based research which attempts to 
capture the role demands, constraints, 
supports, tensions and choices of 
chairpersons and CEOs while fulfilling 
their distinct roles. Each role may pose 
different demands, constraints and 
choices – hence it is important to account 
for this variability. 
Experience  Participants should have 
substantial experience as 
CEOs and chairpersons so as 
to provide a richness of 
different perspectives of role 
fulfilment.  
Experienced chairpersons and CEOs 
give the researcher greater assurance 
and confidence in gathering depth and 
breadth of role experiences. Also, 
experienced chairpersons’ and CEOs’ 
profiles are usually in the public domain 
and it is easier to prepare for interviews 
with material on their past experiences 
publicly available.  
Multiple board 
experience  
Participants should have had 
experience on more than one 
board.  
Single-board experiences are less likely 
to give the research the depth and 
breadth of information required.   
Geography UK-based chairpersons and 
CEOs. 
The research is being undertaken in UK 
listed companies. The UK is arguably 
the most sophisticated corporate 
governance regime and leads the debate 
on innovation in governance practice. 
Furthermore, it is easier in terms of time 
and cost to schedule face-to-face 
interviews in the UK. 
Industry  Sample should cover as wide 
a range of industries as 
possible. 
While chairpersons’ and CEOs’ 
normative roles are applicable to all 
industries, it may be that certain roles 
have particular dominance in some 
industries or that some industries may 
impose particular pressures on these 
roles.  
Type of company  Only CEOs’ and 
chairpersons’ experiences in 
UK listed companies were 
considered.  
Listed companies have a particular set 
of roles which are mandated by 
regulation.  
 
In order to guarantee sufficient representation of roles and perspectives, the final 
sample was negotiated to include a balanced number of chairperson and CEO roles, with 
significant experience in UK publicly listed companies from a variety of sectors. Details 
of the final sample are further presented in Section 3.7.2. 
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3.4.9 Methods for data collection  
A number of studies have shown that research that relies on agency theory and on 
structural and compositional aspects of the board, and so uses quantitative methodologies 
to link input and output proxies, has led to inconsistent and inconclusive results (Daily, 
Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Finegold, Benson and Hecht, 2007; Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Johnson, Ellstrand and Daily, 1996; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). As Pettigrew 
poignantly observes:  
[…] before tenuous links can be made between independent variables and 
dependent variables, perhaps we need to know more about the substance we 
are seeking to link with other phenomena. (Pettigrew, 1992:173) 
The failure by the “hard governance tradition” in reaching a consensus has led some 
researchers to consider alternative approaches to studying the board (both as a body and 
as individual roles) as the prime institution of corporate governance, where via board 
decision-making the direction and fate of the firm is determined (Clarke, 1998; 
Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Hambrick, van Werder and Zajac, 2008; Huse, 1998; Huse 
et al., 2011; Leblanc, 2004; Leblanc and Schwartz; 2007; Pettigrew, 1992; Pye, 2005). 
Most studies to date, examining either board directors’ behaviour (e.g. Huse, 1998; 
Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Smara-Fredericks, 2000a, 2000b) or paradox and tension (e.g. 
Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011; Jarzabkowski, Lê and van de Ven, 2013) have drawn 
heavily on qualitative methodologies, particularly in-depth, semi-structured interviews 
and other qualitative techniques, despite the enormous barriers faced by governance 
researchers in gaining access to board directors (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). 
Trying to make sense of disparate initiatives to move the corporate governance 
research agenda away from the “black box” approach (i.e. one that uses board 
demographics as input proxies to infer board behaviour and outcomes), a number of 
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reviews have been carried out in the last decade or so (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004; Pye, 
2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Hambrick, van Werder and Zajac, 2008; Huse et al., 
2011). 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2004) identified four boardroom research streams: i) 
contingency; ii) behavioural; iii) evolutionary; and iv) input–output or “black box” 
studies, showing that a very limited number of studies (28) have addressed boards in 
context or through a behavioural lens. The behavioural perspective is rooted in 
psychological and sociological studies and is concerned with processes, actors, decision-
making and social dynamics (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). Contextual and evolutionist 
studies (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004) argue that boards are best studied with both time 
and contextual perspectives taken into account, highlighting the dynamic and 
idiosyncratic character of boardrooms and the powerful effect that “outer context” 
stakeholders such as activist shareholders, the financial press or lobby groups exert (Pye, 
2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). Other reviews using different classification criteria 
identified “behavioural processes” as an emerging area of study in the boardroom, 
stemming from social psychology and symbolic management traditions (Hambric, van 
Werder and Zajac, 2008).  
This study explores CEOs’ and chairpersons’ responses to strategic tensions. As 
such, it positions itself within the behavioural and contextual perspectives of boardroom 
study (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004), aiming to examine chairperson and CEO behaviour 
in role and in context (Hambrick, van Werder and Zajac, 2008). Consequently, 
quantitative methodologies have been discounted on the grounds that they are not suitable 
for answering the research question, in that they fail to adequately capture behavioural 
variability in context; nor do they serve the exploratory nature of the study.  
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Given the obstacles in accessing the “black box” (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007), 
interview techniques have been selected by researchers as the primary tool with which to 
examine the behaviour of firms’ top decision-making role incumbents (e.g. Kakabadse et 
al., 2001; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Levrau and van den Berghe, 2013). In line with past 
research, this study employs in-depth elite interview techniques to gather the role 
experiences and the demands, constraints, supports, tensions and choices perceived by 
highly experienced CEOs and chairpersons of UK listed companies. The use of elite 
interviews is recommended when participants have elite status (e.g. Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002; Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012). The term “elite” has been defined as 
“a short-hand term for those actors who are perceived as more powerful or privileged 
than some undefined group” (Woods, 1998:2001). In this study participants meet the 
definition of elite, as they were all, without exception, current or former directors of multi-
billion-pound companies; some have held important roles in the UK government and 
others held honorary titles such as Lord or OBE (Order of the British Empire), clearly 
signalling high status, power and influence. Elite interviews differ from non-elite 
techniques in terms of difficulty of access and mode of access, interview style, sampling 
method, ethical safeguards, usefulness of interview protocol, and a number of aspects of 
the relationship between interviewer and interviewee (relating to knowledge and power) 
(Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012). These differences have been systematised by 
Kakabadse and Louchart (2012), and are shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Non-elite and elite interview characteristics  
Characteristics Non-elite interviews Elite interview 
Access  Relatively easy  
 Negotiated through formal 
channels 
 Difficult  
 Negotiated through networks 
Common interview style  Structured or standardised 
open-ended questions 
 Semi-structured or guided 
interview 
 In-depth informal 
conversation and/or life 
histories 
 Open or unstructured 
conversation 
 Semi-structured or guided 
interview 
Sampling method Convenience, quota, 
theoretical, non-probability 
Opportunistic, snowballing, 
non-probability 
Ethical safeguards Explicit responsibility of 
inquirer 
Implicit process based on 
inquirer’s credibility 
Interview protocol Important – use of interviewing 
guides 
Less important – may or may 
not be used, but useful for 
inexperienced researchers 
Interviewer’s initial 
knowledge about 
interviewee and vice versa 
Minimal Considerable, including 
professional and personal 
information 
Expert knowledge (i.e. 
balance of power) with … 
Interviewer Interviewee 
Scrutiny/selection of 
participation rests with … 
Interviewer Interviewee 
Source: Kakabadse and Louchart (2012) 
 
 The use of elite interviews is further discussed in Section 3.7.3 – Main study: elite 
interviewing) 
Other qualitative data collection methods were considered as either a complement 
or an alternative; however, they were disregarded for several reasons. The use of focus 
groups has been ruled out because boardroom members are likely to become inhibited 
about sharing deep experiences in a group setting, as the information may be too sensitive. 
Furthermore, focus groups would need to assemble different elite individuals (who are as 
a rule extremely busy) in the same room at a given date and time, which could prove to 
be very difficult. Ethnographic observation has been used to study board directors’ and 
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CEOs’ roles in the past (e.g. Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008; Huse, 1998; Leblanc and 
Gillies, 2005; Mintzberg, 1971; Smara-Fredericks, 2000a, 2000b; Tengblad, 2006). This 
method is likely to entail different data-gathering techniques (Silverman, 2013), and 
provides a closer look into the everyday life of directors, allowing a more fine-grained 
analysis (Clarke, 1998; Pettigrew, 1992) of role behaviours, and tracking of them over 
time. However, this method has some important disadvantages. First, gaining access to 
“live boards” has been reported as extremely difficult and time-consuming (Leblanc and 
Schwartz, 2007). Second, studies that were able to use ethnographic methods on boards 
have reported that the presence of the researcher can alter board member behaviour (e.g. 
Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008). Data collection itself is likely to take several years, and as 
such it is not practicable for timely completion of a doctoral programme (Smith, 1991). 
The next section briefly explains the choices made in relation to the data analysis 
techniques employed in the study.  
3.4.10 Methods for data analysis  
This study uses thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009; Silverman, 2013), whereby categories are developed and matched to 
units of data which are coded and analysed so as to identify themes, and reveal patterns 
and relationships. The application of thematic analysis in the main study will be discussed 
in Section 3.7.4 – Data analysis. Thematic analysis is often referred to as the primary, 
foundational method for qualitative analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006). 
This is a flexible analytical method as it can be applied across different theoretical and 
epistemological approaches, while being compatible with constructivism (Braun and 
Clarke, 2006). Thematic analysis will thus be applied to the dataset collected from 
interviews with chairpersons and CEOs, and semantic and latent patterns or themes will 
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be inductively identified (Braun and Clarke, 2006; Patton, 2002). The thematic analysis 
includes six different broad phases: i) immersion in the data (including transcribing, 
producing and reading “verbatim”); ii) generating initial coding; iii) searching for themes 
(i.e. how different codes combine to form a theme); iv) refining the themes (ensuring 
consistency within and across themes); v) defining and naming the themes; and vi) 
producing an analytical report of the analysis (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  
The use of thematic analysis has been referred to as yielding greater advantages 
when compared to other data-driven or bottom-up analysis techniques. For example, it is 
not as time-consuming nor as prescriptive in terms of data collection procedures as 
grounded theory and interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA), and can more 
comfortably handle bigger sets of data (anything between 15 and 30 interviews) (King, 
2013). Moreover, thematic analysis attempts to inductively derive codes and themes from 
data as they emerge, and does not attempt to develop a priori themes as do content 
analysis (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009) and template analysis (King, 2013) which 
may distort and limit the depth and breadth of analysis. This more grounded approach 
(i.e. not grounded theory) combines the advantages of both more grounded analysis and 
template analysis. Thematic analysis will be guided by role theory (Stewart, 1982) as 
outlined in Section 3.6.4 and further developed in Section 3.7.4.  
The software package NVivo 10 was used to input and analyse data. The use of 
Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis software (CAQDAS) has clear advantages 
for the research, such as providing greater legitimacy and rigour to the analytical process 
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2013): for example, by 
documenting “the iterative process of going forwards and backwards between theory and 
the field” (Sinkovics and Alfoldi, 2013:114). The results are expected to adhere to the 
assessment criteria of credibility, dependability, confirmability, ecological validity and 
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transferability/logical inference that are used to assess qualitative research carried out 
under interpretivist epistemology (Symon and Cassell, 2013). 
3.4.11 Researcher involvement  
As explained in Section 3.3.1, the positivist perspective requires that the researcher be 
completely independent of research results to guarantee their validity. However, the 
interpretivist position assumed in this study views the researcher’s involvement in 
interpreting the phenomena as part of the process of knowing; and this needs to be 
explicitly acknowledged (Altheide and Johnson, 2013:404). Hence, in this study it is 
believed that the researcher’s partial involvement in the research process and result 
interpretation – such as his thoughts, intuitions, preferences and emotions – require 
consideration but remain an integral part of the process of interpretation (Hatch, 1993). 
With the aim of minimising the researcher’s bias in the process of interpretation, 
extensive use was made of: reflexivity (a process of gaining awareness of one’s own bias 
and preferences); thick descriptions (i.e. interpreting social actions “by recording the 
circumstances, meanings, intentions, strategies, motivations, and so on that characterise 
a particular episode” (Schwandt, 2001:255); and discussions with supervisors about the 
emerging findings at different stages of the interpretation process (Creswell and Miller, 
2000). This important aspect is discussed further in Section 3.7.4.3. 
3.4.12 Ethical issues 
Owing to the elite status of the participants, the nature of the information collected in this 
study is highly sensitive and, in some cases, if disclosed in a manner that allows its source 
to be identified, could potentially cause reputational and commercial harm to both the 
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companies and the individual participants (Leblanc and Schwartz; 2007; Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill, 2009). 
This research adheres to the highest ethical standards as set out by the University 
of Reading Ethics Committee (2012) to ensure confidentiality, anonymity and good use 
of the research data (Bell and Bryman, 2007; Wiles et al., 2008). The following steps 
were undertaken: 
 Participants were fully briefed as to the aims and objectives of the research and 
the participants’ consent was obtained; 
 The location of the interviews was negotiated with each participant to ensure that 
the interviewee’s right for privacy and anonymity were safeguarded; 
 Tape recordings of the interviews were kept under lock and key; 
 Transcriptions of the recordings were attributed with a code (i.e. an identifying 
number rather than the participant’s name), so as to mask the identity of the 
participant; 
 In writing up results, presentation and analysis, the researcher took due care in 
ensuring that individuals and companies that were alluded to in interviews were 
kept anonymous and unidentifiable by any third party.  
These principles were also adhered to when discussing sample composition and, 
importantly, when writing research analysis and the discussion in Chapter 4. 
3.5 Summary of research design  
Table 6 provides a brief summary of the proposed research design, choices and core 
justifications, showing how the different choices integrate to form a coherent whole.  
 
 
 92 
Table 6: Research design overview 
 Design  Choice  Justification 
1. Philosophical 
perspective  
1.1 Ontology Social 
constructivism  
Roles and tensions are meaningfully constructed 
by an actor’s actions. 
1.2 
Epistemology  
Interpretivism  The research seeks to understand the meanings 
chairpersons and CEOs attach to certain events 
while enacting their roles.  
2. Research 
approach 
2.1 Approach  Exploratory  The nature of the phenomenon is 
unknown/undetermined. 
2.2 Inquiry 
logic  
Inductive  Allows one to explore and gain an 
understanding of the subjective meanings 
chairpersons and CEOs attach to events in 
enacting their respective roles, as well as a 
closer understanding of the research context. 
2.3 Guiding 
theory 
Role theory Is founded on the symbolic interactionism 
tradition and allows for characterisation of the 
work of chairpersons and CEOs in context, 
providing consistency to the interview process.  
3. Research 
context  
3.1 Broader 
context  
UK listed 
companies 
(various sectors) 
Opportunity presented to study listed companies 
in the UK. The UK is perhaps the leading 
country in governance research and regulatory 
innovation.  
3. 2 Level of 
analysis 
Board directors The study seeks to explore the nature of and 
responses to tensions as perceived and 
experienced by individuals in their roles. 
33. Unit of 
analysis 
 Individual The interest is in the roles of chairperson and 
CEO which are presented with demands, 
constraints, choices and supports.  
3.4 Time 
horizon 
Cross-sectional  It is hard to observe/gain access to CEOs and 
chairpersons over time; and with the time 
constraints inherent to a PhD. 
3.5 Sample  Non-probabilistic, 
purposeful sample 
Pilot study to fine-tune methodology and 
anticipate issues. Final sample to be a balanced 
representation of chairperson and CEO roles 
across industries.  
4. Methods for 
data collection 
4. 1 Data 
collection 
technique 
In-depth elite 
interviews  
Allows for a rich description of context and 
action and the meanings attached to them by the 
actors. The focus is on open-ended questions 
and on the participant as the narrator of his/her 
own role experience.  
5. Methods for 
data analysis  
5.1 Data 
analysis 
techniques  
Thematic data 
analysis (NVivo 
10 software) 
Foundational and flexible qualitative data 
analysis technique that is less prescriptive and 
time-consuming than other techniques. Can 
handle large quantities of data and is compatible 
with constructivism.  
 
The next section presents the application of the research design to the pilot study in 
order to test its robustness. Also presented are key pilot-study findings and learning points 
that informed the research in the main study.  
 
 
 93 
3.6 Pilot study  
The pilot study provided the researcher with great insight into chairperson and CEO role-
based experiences and potential areas of inquiry going forward: exploring the nature of, 
and responses to, perceived tensions by chairpersons and CEOs of UK listed companies.  
The next sections outline the pilot-study purpose, sample, data access, data 
collection and data analysis procedures. Findings from the pilot study are presented and 
implications for the main study are discussed.  
3.6.1 Purpose of the pilot study  
The aim of the pilot study was to assess whether the methods proposed for the final study 
were appropriate, as well as to determine the viability of the research question (Gillham, 
2005; Huberman and Miles, 1994).  
The lessons drawn from the pilot study were used to calibrate the methods and areas 
of inquiry pursued in the main study.  
3.6.2 Pilot-study sample  
Pilot-study participants held various positions on different boards. All interviewees were 
UK-based directors with significant experience within different large UK companies 
throughout their careers, where they held chairperson and/or CEO roles. In total the four 
individuals discussed six role experiences (four as CEO and two as chairperson). The 
experiences related to five different industries. Table 7 provides some detail on the pilot-
study sample demographics. 
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Table 7: Pilot-study sample  
Participant Gender Age Ethnicity Roles Sector 
Participant 1 Male 58 White 
British 
CEO 1 Defence and aerospace 
Participant 2 Male 57 White 
British 
CEO 2 
Chairperson 
1 
Broadcasting  
Entertainment  
Participant 3 Male 64 White 
British 
Chairperson 
2 
Manufacturing  
Participant 4 Female 53 White 
British 
CEO 3 
CEO 4 
Manufacturing  
Hospitality & travel 
 
The pilot-study sample comprises three male directors and one female director; 
their age varied between 53 and 64, with an average of 58. All participants had over seven 
years’ experience as CEO and/or chairperson in UK publicly listed companies. 
3.6.3 Pilot-study data collection  
Participants were first contacted by the researcher’s supervisors followed by a letter 
outlining briefly the aims, objectives and scope of the study and assurance of 
confidentiality. 
Data was collected using in-depth elite interview techniques, which took place at 
each participant’s office in London. Interviews had a planned duration of 60 minutes but 
some participants ended up offering 90 minutes of their time, while one lasted only 45 
minutes.  
The individuals interviewed had elite status, and this required a great deal of 
preparation from the researcher in order to prevent the interview being driven by the 
interviewee (Zuckerman, 2003) and to establish trust and respect (Ostrander, 2003) by 
having a high-level, well-informed discussion about their experiences. As argued by 
Chase (2005:203), interviews require a great deal of preparation so as to know “what is 
story-worthy in the narrator’s social setting” (Chase, 2005:661). Hence the researcher 
collected significant data on past and current companies in which the interviewee held 
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CEO and chairperson roles. This was done using publicly available company reports and 
accounts, company information gathered from the specialist database 
Amadeus.bvdinfo.com (available at the University of Reading), as well as newspaper 
articles carrying important stories about the companies in which participants served, 
which could be used as starting points for discussion.  
Informed consent was obtained from the participants prior to the interviews and the 
researcher started the interviews by providing reassurance with regard to data 
confidentiality and anonymity. Notes were taken during the interviews on the 
interviewee’s general behaviour (openness, defensiveness, honesty, reactions to specific 
questions, etc.). 
The five pilot-study interviews focused on elements that might assist in responding 
to the research questions. The following themes guided the inquiry process during the 
interviews: 
 The general and specific contexts in which chairpersons and CEOs enact their 
roles;  
 The nature of tensions perceived and faced by chairpersons and CEOs while 
fulfilling their roles; 
 The constraints, opportunities and choices available and perceived by 
chairpersons and CEOs in such contexts while fulfilling their roles;  
 The expectations of the roles and social dynamics experienced by chairpersons 
and CEOs inside and around the boardroom; 
 The nature of the interplay between CEOs’ and chairpersons’ roles; 
 Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses (behavioural, emotional or otherwise) in 
dealing with tensions. 
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The interviews were conducted in a manner that allowed participants to speak freely 
about their personal experiences as chairpersons/CEOs, thus enabling exploration of their 
stories, rather than imposing predetermined questions that could prematurely close the 
inquiry process. The interviewer steered the conversation as appropriate in line with the 
overarching themes of the interview with a view to progressively gaining the participant’s 
trust. For example, interviews started with some general questions about the participant’s 
career and went on to become more intimate in terms of more particular experiences, 
relationships, situations, feelings and decisions as chairpersons and/or CEOs.  
All five participants appeared fairly open throughout the interview in discussing 
their role experiences, although, at times, the researcher felt that the interviewee held back 
on certain subjects, for commercial or reputational reasons. All interviews were tape-
recorded for accuracy and subsequently transcribed.  
The more particular issues relating to the conduct of elite interviews with relevance 
for the main study will be fully explored in Section 3.7.3.  
3.6.4 Pilot-study data analysis  
The researcher initiated an immersion into the data by reading the transcripts several times 
and becoming familiar with the dataset.  
The transcripts were uploaded into NVivo 10 software and an initial thematic 
analysis was performed. Coding was developed in a bottom-up, data-driven, inductive 
manner. Preceding the coding were the study research questions as well as the guiding 
theory (i.e. role theory) and the initial literature review. Data analysis comprised a number 
of phases:  
i) Immersion in the data, including reading the transcripts several times and 
developing summaries of each interview by role;  
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ii) First-order coding guided by the Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) model 
of roles (Stewart, 1982). The initial coding included both open coding and theoretical 
coding (Glaser, 1978, 1992). The use of Stewart’s (1982) model of role demands, 
constraints and choices ensured consistency of analysis at the initial stage (Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2007), and coding was performed so as to assign relevant data to each of 
these three theoretical categories for each role (chairperson and CEO). In this sense the 
coding was theory-driven (Glaser, 1992). Simultaneously, first-order coding allowed for 
other categories outside Stewart’s framework to emerge freely from the data for each of 
the roles of chairperson and CEO. For example, the category of “support” was added by 
the researcher to capture data that didn’t fit with Stewart’s (1982) model. Another 
example was the coding for competing demands, tensions and contradictions experienced 
while in role. Glaser (1978:56) defines open coding as a process that facilitates the 
generation of “an emergent set of categories and their properties”. These categories are 
emergent because they are not pre-established by the researcher before the analysis 
(Glaser, 1978).  
iii) Second-order coding used selective coding (Glaser, 1978) to aggregate 
identified constraints, demands, choices, supports, tensions and other codes, within and 
between roles, into higher-level sub-themes. This process is also described as theme 
formation (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun and Clarke, 2006). For example, both CEOs and 
chairpersons referred to the relationship between them as both a demand, a constraint, a 
choice and a support. Data was thus rearranged to reflect this as higher-level categories 
or sub-themes (in the example, chairperson–CEO relationship qualities, boundary 
delineation, and chairperson roles in relation to the CEO). This process is exemplified 
later in this chapter (see Figure 5).  
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iv) Sub-themes were grouped by noting similarities and differences, and themes 
were subsequently named. In the main study, a fifth step included an analysis of the 
relationship between themes, development of propositions and construction of the 
emergent model.  
These analytical procedures were replicated in the main study and are discussed 
further in Section 3.7.4.2.  
3.6.5 Pilot-study findings  
The coding process supported by Stewart’s (1982) Demands–Constraints–Choices 
(DCC) model of roles identified a number of codes distributed across demands, 
constraints, choices and supports for both chairperson and CEO roles. These codes were 
aggregated to form sub-themes, which ultimately formed four emerging themes: i) CEOs’ 
and chairpersons’ perceptions of the business environment; ii) the CEO’s role in strategy 
development, implementation and communication; iii) the interdependence of the 
chairperson and the CEO roles; and iv) the role of the chairperson as “expectations setter” 
and manager of board tensions. The participants generally found the questions and the 
interview process interesting, and engaged in in-depth discussions about the complexities 
of their roles, often disclosing highly sensitive information about their experiences as 
chairpersons and/or CEOs. This allowed a tentative identification of promising areas of 
further inquiry into the experience of tensions and associated responses. Next we briefly 
discuss the themes that emerged from the pilot study, supported by interview evidence.  
3.6.5.1 CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perceptions of the business environment  
The first aspect that consistently emerged from participants’ accounts was their need to 
begin by conveying their perceptions of the business environment they faced. This 
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established their roles in a wider business context, which in all cases was characterised 
by uncertainty triggered by events such as far-reaching regulatory change, technology 
change and economic recession. Often these events would be mixed.  
Regulation, coupled with a lot of technology changes in digital. (CEO 2) 
The idea that perceived changes in the external environment affect strategic choices 
was a salient aspect of CEO accounts. 
The economic recession certainly affected the strategy; it certainly affected 
performance and review. And for a while your strategic transformational 
work to digital was masked while you resized the business to cope with the 
constrictions that existed across the economy – so it was a major disruptive. 
(CEO 3) 
Chairpersons also began their accounts by conveying their perceptions about 
external environmental events that impacted on the company: 
From my perspective as chairman of [company name] then we were facing 
massive both technological and business-model issues which was/is 
somewhat insolvent. (Chairperson 1) 
Tensions between long-term, transformational objectives and short-term 
restructuring emerged from the accounts as a potential aspect for exploration going 
forward into the main study.  
These insights were very useful in validating the researcher’s inquiry strategy, an 
intention of which was to concentrate on participants’ experiences in contexts of change 
and uncertainty, in the hope of yielding useful data to answer the study’s research 
question. 
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 3.6.5.2 CEO role: strategy development, implementation and communication 
Participants discussing their role as CEO focused their attention primarily on their 
demands and choices with relation to strategic aspects such as strategy formulation, 
implementation and communication.  
CEOs emphasised a requirement to develop a clear rationale for the business, 
formulate a strategy and then clearly communicate it to shareholders and investors. 
Getting shareholders and investors to buy in to the strategic plan emerged as an important 
factor in raising funds for strategy implementation, and, hence, CEO success. This idea 
was well expressed by one CEO: 
Determine the top 15 decisions that we needed to make in order to, if you like, 
develop the psychology of the business and then to address the physiology 
elements and processes. So we went to the city once we had a clear idea of 
how we should profitably grow. (CEO 4) 
Another participant further emphasised the need to communicate, internally and 
externally, a clear plan for the company: something that is seen as the core demand of the 
CEO role: 
We then went out to the organisation and said exactly the same thing, and 
said we have a plan A, and then get out to the shareholders, get out to the 
communities and keep on communicating it. (CEO 1) 
Other accounts stressed the importance of implementing strategy that is supported 
by continuous and strong internal and external communication.  
Yeah, communication is the most important thing. I, a couple of things that I 
would typically do: you need to over-communicate in that period. If you’re 
communicating once a day, you’d do it once an hour, and just bin the, you 
really – and organisations don’t communicate enough. I always give a change 
programme a brand, and that brand is a disposable brand, so – and we’ll call 
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it something positive, but it will really be seen as a negative, so, and they call 
it – this change programme which 600 people are going – is called “Fit for 
the Future”. It has a beginning, middle and an end, and it has a short time-
frame. (CEO 2) 
Very much so. I’m a pretty voracious communicator anyway, but I thought it 
was essential internally, externally, customers, suppliers, investors, to drive 
that very hard. (CEO 4) 
This emphasis on strategy formulation and implementation as well as 
communication with internal and external stakeholders emerged as a central demand for 
CEOs, in which they enjoy significant control over the way the tasks are carried out. 
3.6.5.3 Chairperson and CEO role interdependence  
The importance of the interdependence of chairperson and CEO roles emerged from the 
pilot data. Two fundamental aspects were salient: a) delineation of the chairperson’s and 
CEO’s role; and b) the chairperson’s role as a support to the CEO. These elements entail 
constraints and supports, as well as some degree of choice. These are discussed briefly 
next.  
3.6.5.3.1 Chairperson and CEO role delineation  
The extent to which the chairperson can step into CEO executive territory without it being 
perceived as a usurpation of functions or as disrespect has been mentioned as a critical 
zone that needs to be demarcated, as it can otherwise become a constraint on the CEO’s 
role. One participant explained: 
And there’s this: it’s just a balance, isn’t it, between how far does that 
individual go before he starts taking away the, or taking on the responsibility 
for being the CEO because he’s stepping too far over the line? (CEO 1) 
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Yet, for others, there is more to the interplay between the two roles than role 
boundaries. In some circumstances, it appears to be important to define the relationship 
based on the distinct capabilities each role incumbent can contribute to problem resolution 
rather than on normative role boundaries. 
He’d be dealing with things that I should have been dealing with and I was 
dealing with a lot of things which, in the truth, he should have been dealing 
with. But because I had personal relationships with, or, it just didn’t work 
that way. (CEO 1) 
Role boundary delineation emerged as both a constraint and a support for CEOs, in 
handling challenges of the role.  
3.6.5.3.2 The chairperson as a CEO support  
The chairperson–CEO relationship has emerged as a strong source of support for the CEO 
role. 
Pilot-study findings suggest that a relationship based on teamwork, challenge and 
support of the CEO by the chairperson, and one that is based on respect and trust, is 
fundamental for the CEO in overcoming constraints and discussing choices with regards 
to role demands.  
Chairmen often use details to procrastinate when they’re not sure or at least 
to give their CEOs extra time to make sure they’re sure. And [name of 
chairperson] and I were very honest with each other … It had to be a much 
more equal relationship than that, and we were able to be very honest with 
other, him to give me very direct feedback, and me to do the same. So, I think 
we always had very, very strong trust. The CEO in my opinion needs to know 
that the chairman is rooting for her, that challenge, question … the challenge 
and questioning and rigour, but that really believe and help you be successful. 
(CEO 3) 
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The issue of quality of relationship, and particularly the level of trust between the 
two roles, emerged as important in ensuring appropriate responses to difficult problems 
faced by the CEO.  
3.6.5.4 The chairperson as “expectations setter” and manager of board tensions  
Chairpersons in the pilot study conveyed the complexity of their roles in managing 
tensions. In particular, they made known their ability to negotiate and set realistic 
expectations that can be communicated to investors and shareholders. One chairperson 
explained how one shareholder had unrealistic expectations of what the CEO could 
achieve. Because the company needed to attract new investors in order to turn itself 
around, this shareholder pressured the chairperson to try to obtain a bolder – yet 
unrealistic – strategy and communicate it to the market to raise funds. The chairperson 
explained:  
So it was managing his expectations because we went through screaming 
matches where he said, “Well, that doesn’t get back to where we, where I 
want to be.” I said, “Frankly, [shareholder name], I know it doesn’t, but I 
don’t care: that’s what we can do. If you want me to go out and sit in front of 
people,” I said, “I can tell them we can get there, but we can’t get there.” 
(Chairperson 1) 
The chairperson later explained how he attempted to compromise and try to ensure 
that the strategy presented externally was realistically achievable, once again conveying 
the tensions with the shareholder:  
I said, “The compromise is: I will commit to this bit, which is the base case. 
You can layer on whatever you like, and some of that might come through, 
but you can’t take the base case and layer on five initiatives that take you to 
 
 
 104 
two times base.” That’s what he wanted to do. So there were lots of tensions 
there during that period. (Chairperson 1) 
A further aspect that emerged in relation to the chairperson’s role was a demand to 
bring tensions to the board’s attention during meetings. The chairperson has the discretion 
to change the board agenda, introduce other topics and lead board meetings. One 
chairperson explained this very clearly: 
And, anyway, I looked at the pack and I saw it had the agenda and we all did 
this little tour of our Austrian operation, then sat down at this boardroom to 
have the board meeting. And I just remember just saying, “Well, this is the 
agenda,” and I just tore it up. I said, “I’ve looked at this pack. And we’re not 
leaving this room because I don’t think at the moment we’re going to pass the 
January covenant test.” The finance director was trying to minimise it, and 
the chief executive didn’t really understand it. (Chairperson 2) 
The above excerpt reveals a requirement for the chairperson to sense denial or over-
optimism in the executive team, and bring to the surface any tensions that may be 
disastrous if not addressed.  
 
3.6.6 Learning points from the pilot study  
The pilot study served a number of objectives. First, it attempted to identify the key 
themes within a smaller sample as a means of uncovering potential new areas of inquiry, 
as well as confirming the existing interview protocol and the interview inquiry logic. It 
also tested whether it was appropriate to follow the analytical process into the main study.  
There were several insights gained from the pilot-study findings which were useful 
in calibrating the methods for use within the main study.  
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First, invoking past stories of the participant’s career that entailed far-reaching 
change proved useful in eliciting the sharing of situations likely to include tensions, 
dissent and contradictions. Participants’ descriptions of the external factors affecting the 
firm and the key challenges they entailed were seen by the researcher as worthy of further 
exploration within the main study, with a view to understanding subsequent perceptions 
of constraint, choice and support. The interplay between the chairperson and CEO was 
expected to be a productive theme within the interview, as the literature review had 
flagged this aspect as critical in resolving tensions at board level. Moreover, the 
challenges of strategy formulation, implementation and communication emerged as a 
central and distinctive part of the CEO role, and gave the researcher further 
encouragement to pursue the inquiry along these lines into the main study. Furthermore, 
the chairperson’s role as expectations setter was less obvious from the extant literature, 
so this was an extremely interesting point to have emerged from the pilot. The chairperson 
as leader of the board – board meetings in particular – was less surprising but was 
nevertheless an important finding in the context of handling tensions at that level. These 
observations indicated that the interview guide was valid and applicable going forward, 
but nonetheless suggested some important nuances that could be considered.  
The interview protocol can be found in Appendix 2.  
Importantly, the pilot study was particularly useful in giving the researcher the 
experience and the confidence to conduct elite interviews in a professional manner. This 
was perhaps the most important learning in terms of the data collection procedure: how 
to approach the subject, adopting an acceptable language and tone, as well as an 
understanding of when to probe and when to let the participant speak freely.  
The next sections discuss the data collection and analysis procedures for the main 
study.  
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3.7 Research methods: main study  
What was learnt from the pilot study assisted in calibrating the interview themes and 
approaches for the main study. This section further expands on the issues surrounding 
gaining access to business elites, the characterisation and discussion of the full-study 
sample, the use and conduct of elite interviewing, the application of thematic analysis 
techniques, and considerations concerning researcher bias.  
3.7.1 Gaining access  
It is well documented by both governance and political science researchers who have 
sought to interview elites that access is highly problematic (Kakabadse and Louchart, 
2012). Governance researchers talk about difficulties in accessing the black box, for 
example (Leblanc and Schwartz, 2007). Many researchers emphasise the fact that elites 
are widely sought after but are often extremely busy (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; 
Berry, 2002; Kincaid and Bright, 1957). It is important in gaining access to elites to state 
a clear purpose, and mention prestigious sponsors and the reputation of the researcher’s 
affiliation (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Kincaid and Bright, 1957). This research was 
fortunate in benefiting from the latter. The researcher’s affiliation, Henley Business 
School, enjoys a great deal of respect among British business elites; and the researcher’s 
supervisors are also well known in the business community for their expertise in 
researching and advising top teams, boards and other elite bodies. Importantly, the 
research also benefited from the support of a high-profile City of London-based 
professional services firm, well connected and respected among business elites, which 
supported the research by lending additional credibility and access. The researcher sent a 
letter to prospective interviewees clearly stating the purpose of the research and arguing 
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how the research might be of value to the business elite community (see Appendix 1). 
The recipients were drawn from the supervisors’ and the professional services firm’s 
networks, selecting those that most closely reflected the sampling criteria. The letter 
included a brief but robust rationale for the research, and allusions to prestige and trust 
(i.e. Henley Business School, the supervisors’ reputation and the relationship with the 
professional services firm). These elements were fundamental in gaining access to high-
calibre individuals with substantial chairperson and CEO experience. The personal 
assistant of one of the managing directors of the professional services firm helped in 
directing the invitation letter and in arranging the interviews. Most interviews were held 
at the interviewees’ offices, and some were done at the sponsoring firm’s site in the heart 
of the City of London.  
3.7.2 Main-study sample  
The final sample included 30 individuals who had held board roles as chairperson, CEO 
or both during their careers. Additionally, it was also possible to interview two chief 
financial officers (CFOs) to investigate the CEO–CFO relationship, which emerged as 
critical during CEO interviews. Those in the final sample were genuinely high-profile 
figures among the UK business elite. Many held prestigious titles such as Lord; others 
had been awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE). Some had held important roles 
in the British government. All of the participants had been CEOs and/or chairpersons of 
multi-billion-pound businesses in various sectors. Working with such a list made the 
research both highly interesting and challenging: this aspect will be explored later when 
discussing the conduct of the interviews. However, gender balance within the sample was 
impossible to achieve. Of the 30 individuals that agreed to participate only one was 
female. By October 2015, FTSE 100 boards could claim 26.1% female representation 
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(Davies, 2015), and this study had aimed for a representative sample. The failure to 
achieve this could be due to the existence of an “old boys’ network”, members of which 
communicated to one other encouraging participation in the study. Also, the focus on 
chairpersons and CEOs considerably reduced the number of possibilities: at the end of 
2015 there were only three female chairpersons and five female CEOs at FTSE 100 
companies (accounting for only about 4 per cent). The single female director in this study 
sample represents 3.1% of the total sample.  
Furthermore, all participants were from a white background, with 29 “White 
British” (WB) and three from “Other White Background” (OWB). Table 8 provides a 
characterisation of the sample, conveying current and past roles that were mentioned in 
interviews, age, gender and ethnicity.  
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Table 8: Main-study sample demographics  
Role Age Gender Ethnicity Qualification 
Chairperson 1 60 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 2 70 M WB Law  
Chairperson 3 66 M WB NA 
Chairperson 4 63 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 5 56 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 6 62 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 7 54 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 8 64 M OWB MBA 
Chairperson 9 68 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 10 64 M WB Geography & economics 
Chairperson 11 62 M WB Engineering 
Chairperson 12 61 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 13 61 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 14 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO 1 56 M WB Accounting 
CEO 2 53 M WB MBA 
CEO 3 49 M WB Accounting 
CEO 4 52 M OWB Accounting 
CEO 5 62 M WB MBA 
CEO 6 52 M WB MBA 
CEO 7 50 M WB Economics 
CEO 8 56 M OWB International relations 
CEO 9 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO 10 58 M WB Accounting 
CEO 11 64 M WB NA 
CEO 12 66 M WB NA 
CEO 13 53 F WB Management studies 
CEO 14 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO 15 57 M WB Geology 
CEO 16 61 M WB MBA 
CEO 17 50 M WB AMP 
CEO 18 69 M WB Accounting 
CEO 19 53 M WB Accounting 
CEO 20 57 M WB MBA 
CEO 21 60 M WB MBA 
CFO 1 53 M WB Accounting 
CFO 2 54 M WB Accounting 
Note 1: WB – White British; OWB – Other White Background; AMP – Advanced Management 
Programme; NA – Not Available.  
Note 2: From the 30 individuals who participated in this study five provided their experiences as 
CEO and chairperson and hence the total number of role experiences is 35 (14 chairpersons and 
21 CEOs). Chairperson 6 and CEO 5 correspond to one individual, as does chairperson 3 and 
CEO 12; Chairperson 1 and CEO 21; Chairperson 12 and CEO 16; and Chairperson 14 and CEO 
14.  
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The research was not interested in particular demographics, however. The focus 
was in role fulfilment and how participants perceived and responded to tensions in their 
roles as chairperson or CEO. For example, it was not the aim of the research to ascertain 
whether females perceived different tensions in their role from males or gave different 
responses (albeit a valid question for future research). This research was of a more 
exploratory and general nature, irrespective of sample demographics. However, the 
demographics were noted as a potential influence on findings: gender, age and 
homogeneity of background in particular could have a bearing on some of the findings. 
The age profile of the sample was also quite homogeneous. The average age of 
participants was 58, with chairpersons being older on average (61.7 years) than CEOs (56 
years). Equally interesting to note is the homogeneity of the sample with regards to 
qualifications. Out of the 32 participants (including the two CFOs), 24 (or 75 per cent) 
were either chartered accountants (12 individuals, or 43.75 per cent) or holders of a master 
of business administration (MBA) or similar qualification (10 individuals or 31.25 per 
cent). The remaining 25 per cent of the sample, representing eight individuals, had 
qualifications in a range of subjects including economics, geology, international relations 
and law. It wasn’t possible to ascertain the qualifications of two of the participants.  
Table 9 presents the spread of the sample according to industry. 
Table 9: Sample by industry  
Sectors  N Sectors  N 
Manufacturing  5 Telecom 2 
Retail  3 Infrastructure 2 
Printing & publishing 3 Defense & aerospace  1 
Oil & gas  3 Energy  1 
High-tech 3 Entertainment  1 
Travel & leisure  3 Banking 1 
Construction 3 Insurance  1 
Broadcasting 2 Consulting  1 
Pharma  2 Total 37 
 
 
 111 
Interviewees reported their experiences as having arisen from 17 different sectors. 
Although sector was not a large concern in the research design, a spread across sectors, 
with none clearly dominating, diminishes potential interference of the nature of industry 
with the findings. The number of sectors reported is greater than the number of 
interviewees because five individuals (CEOs and chairpersons) discussed a role in a 
different industry from earlier in their career.  
The next section will discuss the data collection procedure in the main study, 
discussing further the conduct of elite interviewing.  
3.7.3 Main study: elite interviewing  
Elites – business, political or others – are often described as disliking (to the point of 
refusal) being straitjacketed by a predetermined, sequential ordering of questions 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Kincaid and Bright, 1957).  
The use of open-ended questions is recommended when there is a requirement to 
probe for information, when there is little previous research on the topic, and when it is 
important to give interviewees maximum flexibility in elaborating their responses and 
engage in wide-ranging discussions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Kakabadse and 
Louchart, 2012). It enables the interviewer to perceive contextual nuances and “probe 
beneath the surface of a response to the reason and premises that underlie it” (Aberbach 
and Rockman, 2002:674). Open-ended questions lend the elite interview more of a 
conversational tone, and often the order of questions is not observed (Aberbach and 
Rockman, 2002; Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012). 
Having decided to conduct these interviews using open-ended questions, they began 
by asking benign questions about the interviewees’ background and career achievements, 
which are often regarded by experienced elite interviewers as a good way to start the 
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conversation (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Kincaid and Bright, 1957). The researcher 
began to note particular experiences and histories where the respondent had been involved 
as either CEO or chairperson and gently invited the participant to elaborate on his/her role 
in that story. As the narrative progressed, the researcher posed further open-ended 
questions, probing particular aspects. Bearing the interview themes in mind, the 
researcher would frame the questions “on the spot” rather than relying on a predetermined 
list.  
However, there are risks associated with the use of open-ended questions. As Berry 
(2002) notes: 
… open-ended questioning – the riskiest but potentially more valuable type 
of elite interviewing – requires interviewers to know when to probe and how 
to formulate follow-up questions on the fly. It’s a high-wire act. (Berry, 
2002:679) 
In conducting interviews in this way there is a recognised trade-off between “the 
advantages of conversational flow and depth of response and the disadvantages of 
inconsistent ordering of questions” (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002:674). Such costs often 
come in the form of an increased difficulty in producing “an analytical elegant end 
product”, by making coding and analysis more problematical (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002:674).  
The reality, and the crux, of conducting effective elite interviews that lead to valid 
and reliable information is poignantly and simply expressed by Berry (2002:679): “the 
best interviewer is not the one who writes the best questions. Rather, excellent 
interviewers are excellent conversationalists.” This assertion is corroborated by the 
present study.  
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Preparation for the interviews, the way the researcher presented himself and how 
he used the information obtained from public sources to engage the participant were 
critical aspects. The researcher attempted to engage in “natural” and well-informed 
conversations with all participants—“natural” meaning that the flow of the conversation, 
its twists and turns, and the use of public episodes involving the participant were blended 
into the flow of the discussion in such a way that the participant would not discern 
previous preparation, but rather confidence, knowledge and genuine interest from the 
researcher. There was a clear learning curve from the initial interviews through to the end 
of data collection. At first, the researcher was understandably less confident and indeed 
slightly nervous, but by the fourth interview was beginning to grow both in confidence 
and skill. 
A number of “traps” await those conducting elite interviews. According to Berry 
(2002), there are three possible pitfalls: i) one or more participants who are more 
persuasive than the rest shaping the dominant understanding of the interviewer; ii) bias 
of the responses towards the corporate viewpoint and; iii) an exaggeration by respondents 
of the importance of their roles (Berry, 2002). In fact, on some occasions it was felt that 
participants were partially acting as “corporate spokesmen” (Kincaid and Bright, 1957). 
Others might have either slightly exaggerated or downplayed their roles. Certainly, some 
were more persuasive and articulate, or by dint of more extroverted personalities made 
their points all the more convincing. The researcher aimed to control such factors through 
additional questioning (for example, asking who else was involved and contributed) or 
by asking questions that the researcher already had information about (for example, issues 
that emerged from previous interviews describing similar aspects or information in the 
public domain).  
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Another issue with elite interviewing concerns retrospective accounts, which are 
prone to limited and imperfect recall, issues of espoused theories in reconstructing the 
past, hindsight bias, attribution errors and over-response (Huber and Power, 1985). But 
researchers agree that by far the largest cause of inaccuracy is inadequate elicitation of 
data (Huber and Power, 1985:173), an issue that has been appropriately addressed in this 
study, as explained in this section.  
On balance, the data collected during the interview process was found to comprise 
reliable and valid accounts of participants’ experiences as chairpersons and CEOs.  
3.7.4 Data analysis  
Data analysis employed thematic analysis techniques as discussed in Section 3.4.10 in 
this chapter. The next sections outline in more detail the steps taken by the researcher in 
the analysis of the full interview data as well as some of the issues encountered.  
3.7.4.1 Transcription of interview data 
The interviews lasted 60 minutes on average, with a few lasting less (45 minutes) and 
others lasting up to 90 minutes. Interviews were tape-recorded for accuracy and following 
the interviewees’ consent.  
The interview material was subsequently transcribed by a professional transcriber 
into Microsoft Word documents, with a code attributed to each document (Appendix 3: 
Interview transcript example). The transcription preserved interruptions, pauses, silences, 
laughter and the participants’ reactions to questions. These procedures are in line with 
past studies using qualitative interviews (e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Smith, 
2014).  
The next section discusses the analysis procedures undertaken.  
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3.7.4.2 Applying thematic analysis  
The thematic analysis undertaken in this study was developed through five stages which 
are briefly outlined in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Thematic analysis procedures  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Although they appear linear, these five steps were subject to numerous iterations 
especially between phases 2, 3 and 4. Each of these steps is detailed below. 
i) Immersion  
Transcripts were read several times and side notes taken. A résumé of each interview was 
developed with the main ideas and key points in order to build a first impression of the 
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PHASE 2 
FIRST-ORDER CODING  
 
- Read full transcripts several times  
- Separate data for chairperson and CEO roles  
- Compose thick descriptions by role  
- Theory-driven coding for demands, constraints and 
choices as per the guiding theory (Stewart, 1982) and 
for “supports” (added by the researcher) 
- Open coding for data not fitting role theory categories 
(tensions, contradictions…) 
 
PHASE 3 
SECOND-ORDER CODING 
- Apply selective coding to “first-order codes” 
identifying main categories across demands, choices, 
constraints, supports, tensions 
- Generate second-order sub-themes  
 
PHASE 4 
DEVELOP THEMES 
- Compare sub-themes, establish relationships between 
sub-themes and develop overarching themes 
- Name the themes  
 
PHASE 5 
DEVELOP 
PROPOSITIONS 
- Analyse the relationship between the themes  
- Develop the theoretical propositions  
- Construct the model  
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dataset. Transcripts were separated into two groups: individuals who discussed their role 
as chairperson and individuals who discussed their role as CEO. While the initial idea 
was to collect more than one role experience as chairperson and/or CEO per individual, 
only five individuals provided more than one meaningful account from different role 
experiences. Most individuals provided in-depth information of their experience in one 
role as either CEO or chairperson. Some mentioned other experiences only briefly, but, 
other than the five mentioned, they lacked the breadth and depth to allow for any 
meaningful coding. These hints about other experiences were discarded in order to ensure 
the coding was done for a meaningful and complete set of data about role experiences. 
The final dataset included 14 chairperson role accounts and 21 CEO role accounts from 
30 participants, plus two additional accounts from CFOs who had worked with two of the 
CEOs in the sample. Previous studies have used similar data transcription and immersion 
procedures (e.g. Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Smith, 2014).  
ii) First-order coding  
First-order coding was developed using Stewart’s (1982) Demands–Constraints–Choices 
(DCC) model of roles. Chairperson and CEO role experiences were coded for demands 
(i.e. requirements to do certain types of work and satisfy certain criteria); constraints (e.g. 
individual, interpersonal and contextual elements such as resource limitations, legal 
norms and regulations, the extent to which work is defined, and attitudes of other people 
in the boardroom which may constrain directors from attending to the role’s demands); 
and choices, such as the amount of time directors choose to devote to the demands of the 
role, which aspects of the work to do or delegate, and boundary management. In addition, 
the data was coded for supports (elements that support or enable role incumbents to 
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overcome constraints, work through demands or make particular choices). Role theory 
has been used in past studies in a similar manner (e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007).  
Employing an existing theory for code development is the most commonly used 
approach in social science and is termed appropriately theory-driven code development 
(Boyatzis, 1998; Glaser, 1978). Yet the purpose of using role theory in this study was not 
to test the theory, but rather to allow a common frame within which to look at inductively 
collected data, ensuring, at least for the initial coding, a consistent approach to analysis 
that could yield greater reliability and validity. Armed with the concepts of role demands, 
constraints, choices and supports (the last concept added later), the researcher was able to 
ensure better inter-coder reliability. Although a second coder was not employed formally, 
discussions with colleagues and especially with supervisors provided ongoing confidence 
about the reliability of the coding process being followed. The use of pre-existing codes 
and themes along with a search for new codes and themes in the data is an approach 
advocated by proponents of framework analysis (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor, 2003) 
and template analysis (King, 2013). In reality, what is called open coding (Glaser, 1978; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990) is often used in thematic analysis and this was the case in the 
present study. As Gibbs (2007:46) puts it, “these two approaches to generating codes are 
not exclusive. Most researchers move backwards and forwards between both sources of 
interpretation during their analysis.” 
iii) Second-order coding  
Second-order coding procedures focused on aggregating demands, constraints, choices 
and supports within and between roles by identifying core categories to form higher-level 
sub-themes. This process is often described as selective coding (Glaser, 1992). Similar 
techniques entailing first- and second-order coding have been used in past research: for 
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example, studying the management of paradoxes of innovation (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 
2009). 
iv) Develop themes  
The different codes were refined and combined according to observed regularities in the 
data. Higher-level themes were formed as a result. For example, one theme that emerged 
across the data was that of the interplay between the chairperson and CEO roles. Many 
of the constraints, demands, choices and supports for both chairperson and CEO roles that 
emerged related to the higher-level phenomenon of “chairperson–CEO role relationship” 
which through further refinement of the data was labelled “chairperson–CEO role 
boundedness” and became one of the higher-level themes. Figure 5 illustrates the 
application of the thematic analysis for Theme II, “Chairperson and CEO roles: role 
boundedness”. Thematic analysis, in a grounded approach style, has been used in similar 
studies examining the relationship between CEOs and chairpersons (Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006). An overview of the coding structure arrived at using the 
NVIVO 10 software can be found in appendix 4.  
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Figure 5: Example of Theme II formation – “Chairperson and CEO roles: role boundedness” 
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(…) 
 
 Establish a working 
relationship with 
chairperson and keep 
him/her informed (…) 
 CEO behaviour 
 Lack of independence  
 Lack of industry 
experience 
 Boundary delineation (…) 
 Board behaviour 
 Board composition 
 Chairperson behaviour 
 Boundary delineation 
 Shareholders’, analyists’ 
and investors’ behaviour 
(…) 
 
 When to challenge, 
advise, partner or buffer 
the CEO 
 When to set stricter 
boundaries  
 Levels of communication 
(…) 
 Frequency of 
communication and 
information to the 
chairperson 
 When to take 
chairperson’s advice, and 
challenge (…) 
 Relationship with the 
CEO 
 CEO behaviour (…) 
 Relationship with the 
chairperson  
 Chairperson as buffer, 
adviser, counsel and 
partner (…) 
SECOND-ORDER CODING (selective 
coding) 
THEME DEVELOPMENT  
Sub-theme I: Chairperson–CEO relationship qualities  
 Chairperson time to devote to role and relationship 
trust 
 Complementary skills, experiences and 
perspectives 
Sub-theme II: Role boundary delineation  
 The extent to which the chairperson enters into 
CEO territory and in which areas is this seen as 
legitimate.  
 The more or less negotiated process ranging from 
normative to contextual boundary delineation  
Sub-theme III: Chairperson role in relation to CEO  
 Chairperson as a buffer  
 Chairperson as adviser and counsel 
 Chairperson as a partner  
THEME II: Chairperson 
and CEO roles: role 
boundedness 
PRESERVATION OF FORMATIVE CONTEXT  
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v) Develop propositions and the theoretical model  
At this stage relationships are proposed between the themes and codes, forming an 
empirical model for future testing. This model is laid out and discussed in Chapter 5.  
The next section reflects on potential biases that the researcher could introduce into 
the interpretation and analysis of the data. 
3.7.4.3 Researcher bias  
As Boyatzis asserts, reliability in the use of thematic analysis is down to “consistency of 
judgement, not verification, which is a purely positivistic notion” (Boyatzis, 1998:144). 
The process undertaken in this study – exploring chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses to 
strategic tensions: that is, understanding what tensions individuals occupying these roles 
perceive and what meanings and responses they produce – required substantial 
interpretation by the researcher, necessitating consistency of judgement. Although this 
was controlled by employing a guiding theory and having rounds of discussions with 
supervisors experienced in the art of interpretation, there is always the danger that any 
judgement is susceptible to researcher bias (i.e. because of mind-set, preconceptions, 
experiences, etc.). The work of the interpretative social scientist is inevitably prone to 
bias arising from the researcher’s involvement and construction of meanings in the 
analysis stage. Efforts were made throughout the development and implementation of the 
methodology such that the research design would keep the potential for bias to a 
minimum, as well as ensuring personal discipline in adhering to ethical standards related 
to a focus on evidence and preservation of the “original meaning and context” of the 
interview material.  
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3.8 Chapter summary  
This chapter has presented the methodological choices made by the researcher in an 
attempt to explore chairpersons’ and CEOs’ responses to strategic tensions. A qualitative, 
exploratory and inductive methodology was proposed. The researcher’s efforts in 
selecting suitable participants were outlined and the process of conducting elite 
interviews with participants explained. Further, the use of the DCC model of roles 
(Stewart, 1982), as a lens through which to look at role experiences, was presented, along 
with a detailed explanation of the thematic analysis undertaken. Examples were given 
where appropriate.  
Chapter 4, next, presents detailed results of the thematic analysis undertaken which 
are simultaneously discussed in relation to relevant literature.  
  
  122 
Chapter 4 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents data analysis and discussion arising from the application of 
Stewart’s (1982) Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) model of roles to the roles of 
chairperson and chief executive officer (CEO) as detailed in Chapter 3. It aims to offer a 
logical and clear progression, and a discussion of findings, by identifying four 
overarching themes:  
Theme I. Chairperson and CEO roles: perception of business context and 
competing demands; 
Theme II. Chairperson and CEO roles: role boundedness;  
Theme III. Chairperson role: leading the board in order to deal with strategic 
tensions;  
Theme IV. CEO role: strategic behaviour. 
These themes are subsequently organised into sub-themes, which emerged from 
the in-depth analysis. While the analytical process was essentially inductive, from data to 
codes, codes to sub-themes and then to themes, this chapter starts with the themes in order 
to demonstrate a logical chain of evidence leading to theme formation. The themes are 
discussed against relevant literature which is necessarily drawn from different disciplines 
and theories supporting the aspects under investigation and informing further discussion. 
Each theme is an integral and important part of this thesis exploring how chairperson and 
CEO roles respond to strategic tensions.  
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4.2  Role analysis  
This chapter also presents an analysis of data from semi-structured interviews designed 
to answer the research question: how do those fulfilling CEO and chairperson roles 
respond to strategic tensions? Participants were asked to speak of instances in their careers 
when they faced tensions while acting as chairperson or CEO. The research benefited 
from some interviewees offering a chief financial officer (CFO)’s perspective, thereby 
giving a more objective view of a CEO’s performance.  
Role analysis of both CEO and chairperson was undertaken based on the 
Demands–Constraints–Choices (DCC) model developed by Rosemary Stewart (1982). It 
identifies the nature of the perceived demands, constraints and choices for each role, as 
well as the elements of support on which these roles draw. Demands are the elements of 
the role essential for any incumbent in order to remain in the role. Constraints refer to the 
personal, interpersonal and contextual elements that constrain action in meeting these 
demands. Examples include resource rigidity or scarcity, time, regulatory and legal 
aspects, as well as attitudes of others. Choices refer to the spaces left for choice: what 
work is undertaken in face of the demands and constraints, what to prioritise, what to 
delegate, and, importantly, how to do the work. Choices also imply what emphasis to 
place on certain aspects of the role and attendant boundary management (Stewart, 1982). 
A further dimension of role analysis has been added to capture elements that are not 
adequately covered by Stewart’s three dimensions. Roles often have supports: that is, 
elements that enable the incumbent to overcome constraints, work through demands 
and/or make particular choices.  
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4.3  Theme development  
The analysis revealed a number of patterns and trends that ultimately led to four 
overarching themes. The first theme discusses the business contexts within which CEOs 
and chairpersons perceived competing demands while fulfilling their roles (Theme I. 
chairperson and CEO roles: perception of business context and competing 
demands). The second focuses on the various elements that comprise the interplay 
between the roles of chairperson and CEO and its bounded nature (Theme II. 
chairperson and CEO roles: role boundedness). This includes elements of CEO role 
constraint such as non-executive director (NED) and board behaviour, and shareholder 
and market pressures, as well as demands made of a chairperson such as experience and 
independence of thought and behaviour. Importantly, this theme discusses relationship 
qualities, boundary management and different roles the chairperson might play in relation 
to the CEO. The third theme discusses aspects of the chairperson’s role (demands and 
choices) where the incumbent holds substantial discretion (Theme III. Chairperson 
role: leading the board in order to deal with strategic tensions). These include board 
composition and engagement, board debate, contribution and dynamics, and board 
contribution to strategy. The last theme deals with strategic behaviour focusing on 
demands and choices within the CEO role in relation to top management team 
composition and dynamics, strategy development, structure and communication and 
alignment (Theme IV. CEO role: strategic behaviour). Table 1 provides an overview 
of the themes and sub-themes.  
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Table 10: Summary of themes  
 
Themes  
 
 
Sub-themes  
4.4 Theme I. 
Chairperson and CEO 
roles: perception of 
business context and 
competing demands  
4.4.1 Perceptions of business context: 
4.4.1.1 Economic and financial crisis;  
4.4.1.2 Technology change; 
4.4.1.3 Far-reaching regulatory change. 
4.4.2 Competing demands: 
4.4.2.1 Strategic competing demands of restructuring and growth;  
4.4.2.2 Strategic competing demands of exploitation and exploration; 
4.4.2.3 Role-based competing demands of operational and strategic work; 
4.4.2.4 Role-based competing demands of diversity of thinking and unity of action; 
 
4.5 Theme II. 
Chairperson and CEO 
roles: role boundedness  
4.5.1 Chairperson–CEO relationship qualities  
4.5.2 Managing role boundaries  
4.5.3 Chairperson role in relation to the CEO 
4.5.3.1 Chairperson role as a buffer  
4.5.3.2 Chairperson role as counsel and advisor of the CEO 
4.5.3.3 Chairperson role as partner of the CEO  
 
4.6 Theme III. 
Chairperson role: 
leading the board in 
order to deal with 
strategic tensions 
 
4.6.1 Determine and manage board composition 
4.6.2 Ensure adequate board engagement  
4.6.3 Managing board debate, contribution and dynamics  
4.6.4 Board as contribution to strategy  
4.7 Theme IV. CEO 
role: strategic behaviour 
4.7.1 Top management team (TMT) size, composition and dynamics 
4.7.2 Strategy formulation  
4.7.3 Organisational structure redesign  
4.7.4 Strategy communication and alignment  
Source: compiled by the author 
 
In the following sections the four themes will be discussed against relevant 
literature with the support of evidentiary quotes drawn from the interviews. 
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4.4 Theme I. Chairperson and CEO roles: perception of 
business context and competing demands 
Chairperson and CEO role analysis reveals that the two roles are subject to similar 
strategic tensions. CEOs and chairpersons perceived competing strategic demands and 
tensions arising from three general contexts: i) technological change; ii) external 
economic and financial shocks; and iii) far-reaching regulatory intervention. These 
contexts were characterised by high uncertainty, complexity, instability, and resource 
scarcity. Within these contexts, competing demands of exploration and exploitation and 
restructuring and growth were perceived by both CEOs and chairpersons. Within their 
respective roles further tensions were revealed. CEOs noted tensions between operational 
and strategic work, and both CEOs and chairpersons pointed to the demands of ensuring 
diversity and debate while maintaining unity and cohesion in the top management team 
and the boardroom, respectively.  
This section discusses the contexts and nature of these competing strategic 
demands and tensions, providing evidentiary data from both chairperson and CEO 
interviews.  
4.4.1  Perceptions of business context: technology change, economic 
recession, financial crisis and regulatory change  
Data analysis shows that CEOs and chairpersons perceive and experience tensions in the 
contexts of poor organisational performance driven by economic recessions, 
technological disruption and far-reaching regulatory changes. In the contexts of high 
uncertainty, instability, complexity, low munificence and resource scarcity, tensions 
emerge because the organisational consensus at the top of how to survive, compete and 
grow is no longer valid in the face of a new set of circumstances. In this sense, tensions 
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emerge as a consequence of a misfit between the organisation and its environment, and 
how this misfit is perceived by different stakeholders of the organisation. Tensions 
emerge when it becomes evident that the old consensus upon which the organisation is 
governed and managed is no longer valid. Forging a new consensus – i.e. articulating a 
purpose and asserting where the competitive advantage lies – that is able to accommodate 
the tensions triggered by environmental changes is a difficult process. 
This section therefore analyses and discusses CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perception 
of external organisational environments and the perceived competing strategic and role-
based demands that arise. Both CEO and chairperson roles include global mandates with 
the responsibility of assessing the external environment and make sense of the strategic 
challenges facing the company. By being at the strategic apex of the organisation, the 
CEO operates at the boundary between the organisation and the external environment 
(Thompson, 1967) with important and undisputed boundary-spanning responsibilities 
(Mintzberg, 1979; Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). Likewise, the chairperson 
role has often been depicted as one that demands scanning and interpretation of the 
external environment (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 
2007). Even back in the 1990s the public-company chairperson role in the UK was shown 
to be crucial during corporate renewal, scanning the external environment and setting the 
strategic vision for the organisation (Parker, 1990). How CEOs and chairpersons make 
sense of the external environment is thus of critical importance in how they carry out their 
role in terms of their choices and actions concerning top management team (TMT) size 
and composition, strategy, structure and governance processes, among others 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009; Miles et al., 1978; Daft and Weick, 1984; 
Child, 1972).  
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I now turn to a discussion of the general business contexts that emerged from the 
analysis.  
4.4.1.1 Economic recession and financial crisis  
CEOs and chairpersons in this study reported the emergence of strategic tensions arising 
in contexts of economic recession and financial crisis. Perceptions of the external 
environment revealed high levels of uncertainty, instability, low munificence (Starbuck, 
1976) and resource scarcity (Smith and Lewis, 2011). All the experiences of CEOs and 
chairpersons in this study were of organisations facing dramatic downturns in 
performance, where their very survival – to different degrees – was in question.  
For example, the CEO of a telecom company explained how the 2008 financial 
crisis brought uncertainty to the business and exposed a number of company weaknesses.  
I came June 2008 and I think the financial crisis had hit a couple of months 
before that. So we were still going through but we’re going through massive 
liquidity because back, if you remember, it didn’t sort of, it wasn’t just one 
day, it sort of unfolded and every, you knew almost … the challenge … there 
was a global recession. (CEO 3) 
Similarly, the CEO of a construction company explained how the 2008 banking 
crisis hit the company quickly and continued to do so, also bringing uncertainty (and 
tensions) about what to do to adapt the organisation to the new set of circumstances.  
… the collapse of mortgage lending in the UK and the effects it had on the 
housing market. So we weren’t responsible for the banking crisis but we were 
incredibly heavily affected by it, and it happened overnight. They didn’t know 
how far it was going to go and whether it would stop and, of course, actually 
contagion made it just get worse and worse and worse so April was the point 
where the banks just basically said: that’s it, we’re not really lending any 
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more. We didn’t know how deep it would go. We didn’t know what that was 
going to do. (CEO 1) 
The chairperson of a large bank emphasised the unpredictability of the 2008 
financial crisis as well as the huge uncertainty of the extent and impacts of the crisis 
within the industry and on the bank, referring to it as “completely unchartered territory”, 
and spoke of an inability to understand what needed to be done.  
The credit crunch happened slowly with increasing intensity and that – I take 
no embarrassment in saying – I didn’t see it coming, because no one saw it 
coming, which was the problem. But, actually, one thought that the world was 
a safer place, because they had experienced 15 years of almost uninterrupted 
economic growth. Well, it just kept getting worse, and the terrifying thing 
was: nobody could see the bottom and no one could see the bottom, and – I’m 
mixing my metaphors – we were in completely uncharted territory: no one 
had been through this before so no one knew what to do – they really didn’t. 
(Chairperson 9) 
These examples show how the 2008 financial crisis and economic recession that 
followed brought enormous uncertainty to both CEOs and chairpersons. Thompson 
(1967:159) described dealing with environmental uncertainty as the fundamental problem 
with which top managers must cope. Environmental uncertainty “can be experienced by 
an organisation’s administrators as they try to understand, make sense out of, and respond 
to conditions in the external environment” (Milliken, 1987:133). Data reveals that both 
CEOs and chairpersons perceived high levels of uncertainty of state (incomplete 
understanding of how components of the environment are changing and interrelate), 
effect (the predictability of the impact on the organisation) and response (lack of 
knowledge about what to do as well as about the consequences of choice and action) 
(Milliken, 1987:136). Moreover, the unfolding and unique nature of the crisis 
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(“completely unchartered territory” [Chairperson 9]) challenged CEOs’ and chairpersons’ 
interpretation of events. Some scholars have argued that sense-making processes of 
scanning (i.e. collecting information), interpretation (giving meaning to data) and 
learning (action taken) become blurred and feed back on each other under circumstances 
of high uncertainty where action is a primary concern (Daft and Weick, 1984; Thomas, 
Clark and Gioia, 1993). In such cases of high equivocality (Daft and Weick, 1984) and 
uncertainty (Milliken, 1987), role incumbents engage in substantial sense-making 
activity, often taking actions in order to test the boundaries of the environment that 
generates the required information for continued sense-making (Daft and Weick, 1984). 
For example, one chairperson reported writing a joint letter with the CEO to the investor 
community stating that they were confident they had enough liquidity to weather the 
crisis, with a view to reducing uncertainty and generating environmental feedback to 
inform further action (i.e. more confidently pursue different forms of capital raising, or 
negotiate better terms with authorities such as the regulator or the Bank of England). 
CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perceptions amid the 2008 financial crisis indicated “no clear 
way to engage with the world” which led to explicit efforts of sense-making and 
environmental enactment (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld, 2005). However, as Child 
(1997:54) noted, “the environment has properties which cannot simply be enacted by 
organisational actors, albeit some properties might be negotiated through social 
interaction between actors and external contacts”. Taken together, evidence suggests that, 
in fact, quasi-legal constraints and powerful outsider forces limit the extent to which 
CEOs (and chairpersons) can enjoy latitude of action (discretion), and therefore the extent 
to which they can enact their environment (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987).  
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4.4.1.2 Technology change  
A large number of CEOs and chairpersons from a variety of sectors also reported how 
environments characterised by high rates of technological change caused substantial 
uncertainty and threatened the very survival of their companies. Although many of these 
events exposed other fragilities or were coupled with economic recessions, such 
environments appear to comprise what some scholars describe as “technological 
discontinuities” (e.g. Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Tushman and Rosenkopf, 1996). The 
rate at which a technological change occurs (Dess and Beard, 1984) emerges as a critical 
factor in determining responses to developing tensions. 
Technological discontinuities have been shown to dramatically increase uncertainty 
(Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Dess and Beard, 1984). However, very high rates of 
technological change appear to reduce the perceived choices available to CEOs and 
chairpersons. Such environmental conditions were evident in interviews with 
chairpersons of music, entertainment and traditional print businesses, as well as with 
CEOs of retail, electronics and even utilities.  
One chairperson of a large music and entertainment company explained how the 
pace of technology disruption to the existing business model was so swift that it rendered 
much of the transformation of the company difficult to achieve.  
one of the great learnings for me in my time, short period, not to the end of 
its life, but short period as chairman of [company A], was actually to come 
across a company where the speed of change in the market [driven by digital 
technology] was so swift that actually there probably was no immediate 
answer other than a route through administration. (Chairperson 4)  
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The chairperson of a traditional print business explained how digital disruption, 
economic recession and high financial leverage combined to make the task of 
transforming the company very challenging.  
Declining EBITDA from a traditionally declining print business, a business 
that turned down heavily in a recession and the debt constant so it equals a 
big problem. (Chairperson 7) 
In the examples provided, the rate of technology disruption meant that quickly 
diminishing cash flows didn’t allow resources to be reallocated to grow the business with 
new requirements in terms of skills, structure and so on. In such companies, technology 
disrupted both the products and distribution of the traditional business, sales dropped 
dramatically, and the transition to a digital-based business model became impossible. 
High financial leverage and organisational constraints further complicated the job for 
CEOs and chairpersons. 
Other examples, although still depicting digital technology disruption as very 
challenging, pointed to a lower rate of disruption. In such cases, there was still demand 
for the existing business, which was declining at a lower rate, allowing the necessary time 
and resources to plan the transformation into digital. 
… very challenging going from print publishing houses to a digital content 
services company, so it’s a challenge. (Chairperson 2) 
the business a) hadn’t grown for years, b) did not seem able to come to terms 
with the strategic onslaught of a web world, of an electronics environment … 
so the challenge there was that the business thought it was quite good – and 
indeed it was – and so convincing an organisation that they would be 
strategically gobbled up and helping them understand how we needed to 
convert to a web environment is harder when a business already thinks it’s 
pretty good. (CEO 13) 
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The CEO of a large food retail business placed tensions in the context of digital 
technology disruption from different players, talking about uncertainty about the future 
in terms of the evolution of the competitive landscape and the growth of the new online 
businesses.  
You’ve got too much space and too many players, so you’ve got the perfect 
storm. And online is the big thing. If you get it right you could be successful 
and – I do – I believe that 40% of all sales could be online and groceries over 
the next 20, 30 years – yes I do. (CEO 11) 
The CEO of a large energy company described the environment as highly 
unstable, with the company experiencing the emergence of a variety of technologies that 
brought uncertainty and complexity to the business and, with them, questions about how 
to compete and prosper.  
Well I would say that the industry – until around 2000, that sort of era – was 
effectively steady-state. You could predict broadly what might happen two 
years out from what was happening in the last two years, but then you had a 
whole series of things starting to happen. You had a policy discontinuity … 
decarbonisation thrust upon the industry; there was the discontinuity in 
industrial technology. Coal technology was moving forward, you’ve got wind 
turbine, and suddenly you had technology choice. You had DC cable, so 
suddenly, from a technologically moribund industry, suddenly there was a lot 
more technology – and I’m talking about here about hard metal technology 
… You then got the digital technology also affecting how customers started 
to think about energy. (CEO 19) 
These examples highlight the resistance to, and difficulty in, breaking the old 
consensus in the company, thus emphasising the effect of organisational factors.  
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4.4.1.3 Regulatory change  
CEOs and chairpersons also mentioned contexts of far-reaching regulatory change as 
being conducive to uncertainty, complexity and tension. Regulatory intervention may 
force companies to change and restructure in order to adapt to a new competitive 
environment. 
… the government had decided to pull forward the opening-up of the market 
to competition by ten years, which meant that the company had three years to 
get itself ready to be a sharp commercial operation. (CEO 18) 
… there was substantial pressure on budgets in European markets, given 
what was already a difficult economic climate, because we appointed him in 
2008, and was going to get worse. Our own outlook for Europe was 
significantly more pessimistic than the Europeans, and I think has been 
validated by what has happened since. Healthcare budgets around the world 
are under pressure: we didn’t feel that the US pricing model was going to be 
long-term sustainable. The ObamaCare was just emerging as a way forward, 
but fundamentally ObamaCare was about a trade-off for lower prices against 
better coverage and more people being captured, and we weren’t necessarily 
convinced that there would be more people captured; but nevertheless lower 
pricing was going to change the environment. (Chairperson 3) 
CEOs and chairpersons elicited contexts where the old business assumptions may 
no longer be valid, generating tensions about how to interpret the new environment and 
what actions would enable them to survive and prosper. These contexts were threefold: 
a) a context of economic recession and global financial crisis; b) a context of 
technological change that disrupts to different extents existing competitive advantage; 
and c) a context of regulatory change that disrupts industry structure and competitive 
dynamics. These contexts are characterised by uncertainty, instability and complexity that 
change the pre-existing consensus about the business environment and the strategic 
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direction of the company, and bring to the fore particular strategic and role-based 
demands.  
4.4.2 Competing strategic and role-based demands 
The need to identify and manage competing strategic demands emerged as a key 
challenge for both chairpersons and CEOs. Role incumbents often perceived competing 
demands of: i) restructuring and growth; ii) exploration and exploitation; as well as the 
role-based demands of iii) operational and strategic work; and iv) diversity of thinking 
and unity of action. These are discussed below.  
4.4.2.1 Competing strategic demands of restructuring and growth  
CEOs and chairpersons in this study perceive competing demands between the need to 
restructure the business to cope with either an economic slowdown, a technology 
disruption or regulatory change, and the need to grow the business in order to improve 
company performance and remain competitive under a new set of circumstances. Scholars 
often refer to these as paradoxes, defined as “contradictory yet interrelated elements that 
exist simultaneously and persist over time” (Smith and Lewis, 2011:382). Since paradox 
is perceptual and socially constructed (Lewis, 2000), this thesis expected to reveal CEOs 
and chairpersons describing such competing demands as paradoxical. However, this is 
not borne out by the data. Upon examination of the evidence, this thesis takes the view 
that CEOs and chairpersons perceive these demands as interrelated and difficult (and 
therefore not as paradoxes). 
Studies on corporate turnarounds explain how CEOs (and chairpersons) face 
competing demands of retrenchment and recovery, here referred to as restructuring and 
growth. CEOs and chairpersons in this study have all described situations that fit a 
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definition of corporate turnaround. A corporate turnaround can be defined as a dynamic 
process that aims for the recovery of an organisation’s performance after a period of life-
threatening decline (Boyne and Meier, 2009; Pearce and Robbins, 1993). Turnaround 
literature posits that CEOs, and other top roles including chairpersons, often face 
competing strategic demands of retrenchment and recovery (Martin and Kimberly, 2008; 
Morrow, Johnson and Busenitz, 2004). This is confirmed in the following interviews with 
CEOs whose firms were facing environments characterised by economic recession.  
So we cut as deeply as we thought we could, but of course we also knew that 
there would be a demand for houses at some stage in the future; so you were 
trying to get as far down as you could but retain the capability to grow again. 
(CEO 1) 
But the strategic issues here were how to get yourself out of a situation rather 
than long-term strategic evolution of the company. For the company, that was 
a little bit too advanced, although later on I had tried to address it. (CEO 2) 
By creating the space in terms of the cost transformation programme, we 
were able to say to the board, and to the outside world: we will carry on 
delivering profit growth; it might be one year it’s flat or something, but we’re 
not asking you to take any risk in terms of macro, because we’ll pay for it 
with the cost transformation we’re doing. (CEO 3) 
The above excerpts from three CEOs illustrate the tensions between restructuring 
(which reduces capacity, costs and risks and requires discipline) and growth (which 
increases capacity, costs and risks and requires creativity and strategic thinking). We may 
see CEOs addressing these competing demands sequentially, prioritising retrenchment 
over recovery (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Lohrke, Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2012), while 
others do it concurrently (Martin and Kimberly, 2008; Morrow, Johnson and Busenitz, 
2004). Moreover, turnaround literature links the decision about whether to address these 
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competing demands sequentially or concurrently to external conditions (i.e. economic 
problems, technology, competitive and societal change) and internal conditions (i.e. lack 
of operating controls, over-expenditure, excessive financial leverage and top 
management) affecting the firm (Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Pajunen, 2005). 
Additionally, the severity of decline has also been found to influence how CEOs perceive 
competing retrenchment–recovery demands and their approach to the turnaround effort 
(Schendel, Patton and Riggs, 1976). 
One chairperson explained the difficulties of handling the competing strategic 
demands of restructuring and growth posed by high rates of technology disruption.  
I think the difficulty often is that the skills needed for the new part are so 
profoundly different and the cash-flow characteristics of what you’re creating 
are so profoundly different. So, for example, if you look at what are seen as 
successful businesses that have undermined a company like ours, like 
[company A], I doubt that [company A] is yet making profits. I think there 
are very few traditional companies that have actually managed to turn their 
business model on their head and say the characteristics are going to be 
profoundly different. In fact, we did invest in what is probably the second 
most successful digital music platform, but it was dwarfed by the issues in the 
legacy business. (Chairperson 4) 
Other chairpersons described similar situations and talked about how the existing 
structure and culture often severely constrain the ability to grow successfully.  
So, well, the challenges obviously were a declining level of EBITDA, massive 
level of debt and internal cultural resistance to change – because most of the 
people in the business were heavily steeped in print and not really digitally 
savvy. The resistance was more in the sales force who simply didn’t have the 
skill sets to sell digital products. They didn’t have the knowledge. They didn’t 
understand what they were, and selling a book is quite different from selling 
a website. More complicated. It requires a different type of knowledge; and 
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you can retrain maybe 20% of the sales force, but in effect we had to recruit 
a new sales force. There’s also massive turnover in the sales force. There’s – 
the churn in the sales force is about 20% per annum so that creates its own 
issues. Another problem was that the business had been run geographically 
so we had different practices and different IT systems, different products, 
different pricing structures … whereas the digital world in effect knows no 
geographic boundaries. (Chairperson 7) 
This section has provided some evidence of how CEOs and chairpersons often 
perceive competing strategic demands of restructuring and growth, triggered by events in 
the external environment such as technological change, economic recession and financial 
crisis, and regulatory changes. How CEOs and chairpersons manage and respond to such 
strategic competing demands is discussed in Themes II, III and IV later in this chapter.  
4.4.2.2 Competing strategic demands of exploitation and exploration  
In contexts of resource scarcity and high uncertainty, latent strategic tensions become 
more salient (Smith and Lewis, 2011) as each business unit seeks to compete for scarce 
organisational resources and CEO attention. In addition to perceptions of restructuring 
and growth, many CEOs and chairpersons referred to strategic tensions between business 
units dedicated to exploitation (e.g. commercial, production and distribution of existing 
products) and exploration (i.e. developing new, innovative products, markets, etc.). 
Exploitation has been conceptualised as the pursuit of “refinement, efficiency, selection 
and implementation”, whereas exploration includes activities aiming for “search, 
variation, experimentation and innovation” (March 1991:1). Such tensions have 
historically been viewed in different ways. Contingency theories of organisation point to 
the role of the CEO as the ultimate dispeller of tensions between departments and units 
for which external environments create differences in terms of goals, structure, time span 
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and culture (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973). The ability of an 
organisation and its leaders to effectively balance and handle both exploration and 
exploitation has subsequently emerged under the concept of “ambidexterity” (e.g. 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Raisch et al., 2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005) and 
continues to attract a lot of attention. There have been numerous studies focusing on the 
role of the CEO in managing ambidexterity, proposing different structural (O’Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004), contextual (Birkinshaw and Gibson, 2004) and leadership practices 
(Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011) to effectively handle these tensions for organisational 
success. These tensions are illustrated in the interviews with both CEOs and chairpersons.  
The CEO of a media and entertainment business undergoing restructuring 
described tensions between the “creative” side of the business (which requires freedom, 
creativity, exploratory behaviour, where failure needs somehow to be tolerated and the 
horizons are often long-term) and business units dedicated to production and distribution 
(which require discipline and efficiency, where failure is not tolerated and the focus is 
very short-term). 
… if you look at what is the fundamentals of the business: that is, you create 
a show, you produce a show, you sell it; you produce it and then you exploit 
it. That is basically the sort of model that [the company] has. The company is 
still, I would argue, the best company in the field, is still the most creative 
company. It is still the best production company. Where it needs to learn is to 
also become the best exploiting company of its field. There is a natural tension 
between the production side, the creative and production side of the business, 
and [the] company’s worldwide distribution division. (CEO 4) 
The CEO of a telecom company described a similar tension between the R&D 
division and the sales division. 
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… you had all of the salespeople fielding enquiries from all the carriers 
around the world, screaming and yelling at the R&D people about how they 
couldn’t deliver enough product; and the R&D people, similarly, didn’t have 
the resources to do it with, so it was also a question of defusing the emotions 
that were there. It was getting – the sales side was basically Swedish-led, the 
R&D side was basically Japanese-led, and it was turning into this. (CEO 5) 
In a high-tech company undergoing restructuring, the CEO described tensions 
between the R&D and sales divisions in terms of short- and long-term horizons and 
perceived competing objectives.  
… the other thing is: if you’ve got divisions that are quite different in their 
nature, so one business is perhaps really quite long-term, very long sale 
cycles, another part of the business very short sale cycles and small 
transaction values. Because, again, there’s a natural misunderstanding and 
a feeling on both sides that one bit of the business is less important because 
it’s all long-term and they never actually sign anything. And the other division 
is: “Oh, well, they’re so short-termist and they – the transaction values are 
so small it’s peanuts. It’s in the rounding areas; it doesn’t make any 
difference.” (CEO 6) 
Similarly, the chairperson of a large media business emphasised the tensions 
between the creative organisation and the commercial organisation in the context of 
restructuring.  
I think what equips companies culturally talent-wise and organisations that 
succeed in, typically, in a digital context, is very different from what tends to 
drive companies in the legacy world. And what you get especially in creative 
businesses like this – where you have hugely creative people who love what 
they do – is that they tend to find the technology very troublesome: they’re 
not very interested in it – they’re really interested in what they do, producing 
brilliant television, and it’s extremely inconvenient that this other stuff is 
happening. And the CEO is very good at managing these creative people … 
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it’s a different art form … I think what you tend to find with these technology-
based challenges is they, they’re not just collisions of technology, they’re 
collisions of culture and organisation … and it’s something that you have to 
try and manage the best you can, but recognise that somebody who loves 
producing television programmes is probably not going to be deeply 
commercial and somebody who sells advertising, does deals in advertising, 
is not going to be deeply creative. And those people, even here you ought to, 
you find television creatives regard the idea that they should have to do 
something to please advertisers is almost a, is quite an upsetting idea for 
them, it, it’s all pollution. (Chairperson 1) 
These extracts support the idea that CEOs and chairpersons perceive and face 
strategic tension at the business-unit level between business units of exploitative and 
explorative natures which attempt to push their agendas and compete for CEO attention 
and for resources.  
4.4.2.3 Competing role-based demands of operational and strategic work  
While competing strategic demands are perceived by both CEOs and chairpersons, some 
competing demands are role-based: that is, they are specific to each role. Some CEOs 
reported facing competing operational and strategic demands, as represented by the 
following extracts. 
The nature of the stakeholders and the relentless focus on tactical things … 
The air time we get was much more; it was never about: Should we 
restructure the industry? Should we do some joint-ventures? Whateverit 
might be. Because it always just looped back to today’s thing. And it just 
became a political kick around the areas of operational focus rather than 
strategic. (CEO 2) 
No, I think it was issues, fundamental issues of strategy: Why are we in this 
thing? ... I think the execution, all of the executional stuff, the targets that we 
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had, we did pretty well on – ultimately it was a structural issue. It was, yeah, 
strategic issue. It was much more fundamental structural issue. (CEO 5) 
The CEO role has often been depicted as one of reconciling internal and external 
demands (e.g. Mintzberg, 2009; Kotter, 1982). D’Aveni and Macmillan (1990) showed 
how failing firms’ top management teams (and therefore CEOs) fail to reconcile internal 
and external environmental issues and fail to focus on the long term due to short-term 
pressures on resources. In the above examples, operational, short-term pressures were so 
high that CEOs left long-term strategic issues unaddressed, with important implications 
for the firm as well as for the CEOs’ personal well-being. Interestingly, both CEOs lacked 
a chief operating officer (COO) in their respective companies. Research has shown that 
the presence of a COO reduces information processing demands for the CEO (Marcel, 
2009) and allows the CEO to delegate internal, operational affairs while concentrating on 
long-term strategic issues and relationships with powerful external constituencies (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). The choices available to CEOs in handling competing strategic and 
role-based demands will be explored in more detail under Theme IV below.  
4.4.2.4 Competing demands of diversity of thinking and unity of action  
Chairpersons and CEOs in this study perceive competing role-based demands of ensuring, 
respectively, diversity of outlook and ideas among board and top management team 
(TMT), while simultaneously ensuring cohesion, consensus and fast decision-making. 
Such demands are role-based because they are specific to each role, and the tensions are 
similarly variable according the different composition of TMTs and boards. One 
chairperson perceived his role to be one of ensuring a diverse board in terms of skills and 
experience, while simultaneously maintaining enough cohesion and unity to reach 
decisions (i.e. ensure it’s a real team).  
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I’m a strong believer in diversity, but it has a risk. It makes your board very 
versatile, very different – which is an asset – but you then also have to make 
sure that it’s a real team, that people don’t start thinking from their own 
angle. And so it, to me, is the best recipe, but it’s also the most difficult recipe. 
(Chairperson 8) 
Another chairperson perceived his role to be one of making the most of a diverse 
board, by enabling robust debate that surfaces and handles tensions and differences of 
view, while simultaneously demanding trust and respect so that different views can be 
properly debated without jeopardizing board unity.  
… the board that is incapable of having debate, or if it’s a very frequent thing 
– you’ll find that lots of boards don’t want – and the chairman will intervene 
when people start arguing, and they’ll close it out, take it outside the meeting. 
But that board is going to be tested when you get into this moment of 
challenges, and, because it’s not capable of facing into the issues, will fail. 
No, but the point is to have that debate. If you have argument in a board, you 
have to have security in the board – security meaning people – there’s 
embedded trust and respect, and “I think your contribution is worthwhile, you 
think my contribution’s worthwhile, so we’ll listen to each other, express our 
views clearly, listen clearly and not think this is somehow a career-
threatening, life-threatening event to have a difference of view”. (Chairperson 
1) 
The chairperson’s role in managing boardroom dynamics is well established in the 
research literature, as well as being guided by regulation, particularly with regard to 
allowing for differences of view about the firm’s strategy and wider issues, while 
facilitating meaningful consensus and alignment (Cadbury, 1992; Dulewicz, Gay and 
Taylor, 2007; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Taylor, 2001). Managing diversity and 
unity, and conflict and cohesion, is fundamental in ensuring effective and timely 
responses to strategic issues.  
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Many CEOs in this study have testified to the value of building a diverse TMT in 
terms of skills and experience appropriate to the strategic challenges being faced by the 
firm. They assert that external complexity and instability call not only for variety in terms 
of TMT composition, but also for fast decision-making, consensus and unity of action.  
I brought my own team in … so day one I brought in a marketeer, and I didn’t 
even bother to check out the existing marketeer, I had a conversation with her 
very politely on the first afternoon, then fired her. She said, “That’s not fair.” 
I said, “It’s not fair, but that’s what I’ve decided to do. It’s my decision.” I 
did exactly the same with effectively bringing in [executive’s name] who came 
in as my right-hand man to go down to the engine room and report that all 
the dials were connected to all the right things. I didn’t trust anybody else to 
do that. I decided to leave the two operations people … because I knew both. 
I said, “I’ll take that as my prime responsibility.” I will go and see what I 
really think, but I’m going to give them time. I left in place the finance director 
because I knew she could add up and I knew at that time she was relatively 
well respected by the community, but I – and also because I thought that’s 
probably the one person you don’t want to change at the moment while I want 
to get control of the numbers. In terms of the two core businesses, three core 
businesses, I promoted all internally, but I brought them up very fast. So I 
identified talent: three or four of them. (CEO 11) 
The CEO as leader of the TMT is charged with the responsibility for both ensuring 
its robustness in terms of diversity of skills and experience appropriate to the challenges 
being faced, as well as ensuring that the team remains cohesive and aligned. There is 
extensive research on this, often emphasising TMT heterogeneity (Finklestein, Hambrick 
and Cannella, 2009), role interdependence (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Hambrick, 
1994) and processes of social integration (O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 1989) and 
consensus (Dess and Origer, 1987). The CEO is expected to play the leading role in 
setting the tone for team interactions, encouraging open discussions and effective dispute 
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resolution (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). The role of the CEO in handling 
tensions in the TMT is discussed further under Theme IV in Section 4.7.1.  
The role of chairpersons and CEOs in handling competing demands of diversity 
and unity, and conflict and cohesion, within the board and the TMT respectively, will be 
further explored below under Themes III and IV.  
Table 11 summarises the competing strategic and role-based demands emerging 
from CEOs’ and chairpersons’ interviews.  
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Table 11: CEOs’ and chairpersons’ competing strategic and role-based demands  
Competing 
demands  
Description  Locus  
4.4.2.1 
Restructuring and 
growth  
Refers to competing strategic demands of restructuring and 
growth at the organisational level. CEOs perceive the need 
to restructure the business while simultaneously facing 
demands to grow the business. Such demands require, on 
the one hand, reducing costs, risks and capacity while on the 
other increasing investment, capacity and risk.  
Organisational 
(CEO and 
chairperson 
roles) 
4.4.2.2 
Exploration and 
exploitation 
 
Refers to competing demands arising from business units of 
a different nature: typically R&D and sales and distribution 
units, which compete for CEO attention and resources. 
These units have different temporal focus (i.e. long and 
short term), different mind-sets and cultures (i.e. discipline 
and creativity) and different ways of measuring success. 
The challenge for the CEO is to find ways of fostering 
productive collaboration between the units.  
Organisational/ 
business unit 
(CEO and 
chairperson 
roles) 
4.4.2.3 
Operational and 
strategic work 
Refers to tensions about where to allocate time for 
competing short-term operational (which may have 
strategic implications) and long-term strategic challenges 
within the role. CEOs may focus on and be absorbed by 
operational elements of the role and fail to address more 
fundamental issues of strategy and purpose which would 
lead to better operational decisions.  
 
Role 
(CEO role) 
4.4.2.4 
Diversity of 
thinking and 
unity of action 
 
Refers to competing demands of ensuring diversity of 
thinking and contribution, while equally striving for 
consensus, fast decision-making and unity of action under 
difficult circumstances. CEOs face such competing 
demands in their roles as leaders of the top management 
team (TMT) whereas chairpersons report such competing 
demands in their roles as board leaders.  
 
Role 
(CEO and 
chairperson 
roles) 
Source: compiled by the author 
There follows a summary of the perceptions of CEOs and chairpersons about the 
business environment and competing strategic and role-based demands, as reported under 
Theme I.  
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4.4.3 Summary of Theme I  
This theme was concerned with exploring the nature of the contexts and competing 
demands perceived by CEOs and chairpersons while fulfilling their roles. It therefore 
elaborated how CEOs and chairpersons perceive and make sense of the external 
environment as well as the competing demands. Results support prior research on the 
CEO (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979; Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009) and chairperson 
(e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Dulewicz, Gay and Taylor, 2007; Parker, 1990) 
roles, which depict them as sitting at the boundary between the organisation and its 
environment, and therefore having important boundary-spanning responsibilities. The 
responsibility for interpreting and making sense of the environment for the whole system 
(Daft and Weick, 1984; Miles et al., 1978:6) emerges as a primary role requirement for 
both CEOs and chairpersons. Findings in this section also suggest that boundary-spanning 
and making sense of the organisation’s external environment are requirements for both. 
It has been shown how financial crisis, economic recessions, technology 
discontinuities and far-reaching regulatory interventions create environments perceived 
by role incumbents as highly uncertain and characterised by low munificence and 
resource scarcity. Such perceived environments have been shown to influence choices of 
strategy and structure (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009; Miles et al., 1978; Daft 
and Weick, 1984; Child, 1972); this is addressed later in this chapter. This section 
uncovers what competing strategic and role-based demands they perceive and face in such 
environments. CEOs and chairpersons in this study perceive similar competing strategic 
demands of restructuring and growth (e.g. Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Martin and 
Kimberly, 2008), as well as business-unit-level competing strategic demands of 
exploration and exploitation (e.g. Raisch et al., 2009; Smith and Tushman, 2005). Such 
demands are felt equally by both role incumbents, both being responsible for boundary-
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spanning activities and sense-making and interpretation of the company’s external 
environment.  
Other competing demands have emerged that are role-based. CEOs often perceive 
a clash between day-to-day, operational and short-term demands and more long-term, 
strategic work. Important elements may contribute to this such as inadequate structure 
(i.e. absence of a chief operating officer to delegate to) or an unbalanced board with too 
much focus on operations. In addition, both CEOs and chairpersons reported facing the 
difficult task of reconciling the desirable diversity of skills and experiences both in the 
TMT and in the board with the required unity, cohesion and pace of decision-making 
required by circumstances.  
The next section will explore and develop Theme II, which considers the interplay 
and dynamics between the chairperson and CEO roles.  
4.5 Theme II: Chairperson and CEO roles: role boundedness  
This theme explores the interplay between the roles of chairperson and CEO which will 
be seen to be critical in handling strategic tensions. Here we follow Stewart’s (1991) 
findings that the role of the CEO can only be properly understood in relation to that of 
the chairperson: that is, both roles are interdependent and determined by the context and 
the individuals occupying those roles. This study identifies a number of aspects that 
emerged at the intersection of the CEO and chairperson roles. Such aspects are expressed 
in three sub-themes: i) qualities of the chairperson–CEO relationship; ii) chairperson–
CEO role boundaries; and iii) the chairperson role in relation to the CEO. These sub-
themes are discussed next.  
  149 
4.5.1 Qualities of the chairperson–CEO relationship  
This study found the relationship between the chairperson and the CEO to be critical. 
Important qualities in this relationship, which enable the effective handling of strategic 
tensions, are: i) chairperson time and relationship trust; and ii) complementarity of skills, 
experience and perspectives. These are explored next, supported by relevant data and 
research.  
4.5.1.1 Chairperson time and relationship trust 
Chairpersons and CEOs in this study emphasised the centrality of this relationship in 
determining effective responses to strategic tensions. Individual CEOs and chairpersons 
alike have stressed the imperative for this relationship to be based on high levels of trust, 
which is in line with previous findings (e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Roberts, 2002).  
One highly experienced chairperson explained the criticality of the relationship and 
the importance of trust as the platform for open dialogue and constructive discussion. 
I have experience of it [i.e. CEO–chairperson relationship] not working – 
and nothing works: it’s like almost an all-or-nothing-type thing. Trust 
absolutely critical; clear communication; very open-door policy; ability to 
not just discuss the issue at hand but chew the fat around the piece – so it’s 
got to be relaxed, it’s got to be throwing things out there. It’s got to be a good 
dialogue, but trust is critical. (Chairperson 5) 
The CEO of a large travel and leisure company described the basic trust that 
cemented the relationship as a solid belief that the chairperson was “routing for the CEO” 
and wished her success. This strong trust in the chairperson’s intentions allowed the 
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relationship to withstand robust, constructive discussions without losing cohesion and 
unity.  
The CEO, in my opinion, needs to know that the chairman is rooting for her 
– that challenge, question, but the challenge and questioning and rigour, but 
that really believe and help you be successful. And I never, throughout our 
career working together, doubted that. (CEO 13) 
A similar account was given by the CEO of a large retail firm, where high levels of 
trust were again to be found at the basis of the relationship, allowing open and robust 
discussion and challenges between chairperson and CEO. 
We used to say … “Can you tell me? Are you sure about this? Why do you 
think you’re sure about this?” I used to have to argue my corner, but I trusted 
him, and I knew he was not after me, to test me, he was just … It was a proper 
conversation: “Can I help you? Or have you thought about this?” But I used 
to take it on the basis: well, he’s asking me because maybe he will come out 
with a better answer. You both have to go in open-minded: that’s why it has 
to be a very robust trust. And I did not have that with his successor. (CEO 11) 
Another chairperson described the relationship as “pivotal”, and said that building 
trust in the relationship is important and needs to be continually worked at. 
… because a lot of it was about listening, distilling, encouraging, fostering 
trust – and I think those are many of the qualities you need, and not having a 
big ego, to be honest. And I think many of those are qualities that a chairman 
needs to lead a board and that a chairman needs in the pivotal relationship 
that he or she has with a chief executive. (Chairperson 4) 
High levels of trust were shown to serve as a platform for open dialogue and 
effective communication and debate between role incumbents. Evidence shows that CEO 
and chairperson are mutually responsible for nurturing the “magic relationship” and that 
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trust and professional integrity are salient attributes of the relationship’s effect on board 
performance (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006:145). Yet trust develops through 
time and this requires intense “routine interactions” between the two (Roberts, 2002). For 
example, Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) found that longer tenures were associated 
with greater accumulated shared experience and better relationships: 
… The longer board members worked together, the more meaningful their 
relationships become and the greater their understanding of the organisation 
and its strength, weaknesses and idiosyncrasies, the greater the opportunity 
for the chairman and the CEO to evolve a shared mind-set concerning the 
vision for the future of the organisation. (p. 186)  
The amount of time the chairperson can devote to the role was found to matter for 
UK directors in terms of developing better and more intimate relationships with 
management (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006) but also as a key determinant of 
the type of relationship established between the chairperson and the CEO (Coombes and 
Wong, 2004; Stewart, 1991). 
In this study, the history of interaction between the chairperson and the CEO, and 
the time the chairperson devotes to the role, have also emerged as critical in building trust 
and shared understanding of the strategic tensions facing the firm. One CEO explained 
how the lack of time, and little history of interaction with his chairperson, resulted in poor 
handling of severe challenges facing the firm. 
… and we have no relationship between the CEO and chairman because 
there’d been no time to build a relationship. So it was not a good start. And 
if I’m honest it just went downhill from there … (CEO 15)  
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Another CEO reported spending insufficient time with his part-time chairperson 
debating strategic issues in the context of company restructuring and of multiple powerful 
stakeholders demanding different things from the company. 
I suddenly realised that it wasn’t a great relationship. We had become very 
comfortable in our roles, and, when we got a new chairman, it became 
apparent that we should have spent a lot more time together explaining our 
thought processes about what we’re going to do, why we’re going to do those. 
I just carried on in the assumption that the chairman knew what I was doing. 
(CEO 2)  
In contrast, CEOs that succeeded in handling strategic tensions reported a much 
higher frequency and quality in their interactions with the chairperson. The CEO of a 
large building firm explained his relationship with the chairperson during the 2008 
financial and property crisis. 
I’d have a lot of conversations with [chairperson’s name], so in a way you’re 
just trying to calibrate: so this is what I think we should do – let’s calibrate 
that. Initially, you had no time so you were basically saying: we calibrated it 
crudely; we’re just going to do it. But, as time went on, you were able to 
calibrate that more, think more, get more data and think about how you 
refined it. (CEO 1) 
Similarly, one CEO explained how trust and frequency of interaction are linked and 
work as a platform for debate and challenge: 
I think it’s very interesting, so I talk to my chairman three or four times a 
week. And when something big, when we had our biggest, one of our biggest 
issues, I probably spoke to him three times a day. And it’s interesting to 
reflect: why would I talk to somebody three times a day if we loved each other 
and I, he was: Why am I ringing him? I’m ringing him for two reasons: one 
is to get his advice on an issue because I think he’s going to add something – 
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because if I thought, if I thought I was just going to hear my echo, why would 
I ring somebody three times a day just to hear my echo? I trust and respect 
him. (CEO 7) 
Prior work (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010) has identified philos as a 
critical chairperson–CEO relationship quality, of which trust is the principle component. 
Philos has been defined as “an enabling social structure for overcoming resistance to 
change and the discomfort experienced from uncertainty” (Krackhardt, 1992:238). 
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995:712) have defined trust as the “willingness of a party 
to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other part”. Trust has also been characterised as the “product of 
strong, affective and time-honoured relationships where change is the product of philos” 
(Krackhardt and Stern, 1988:138). Philos enables strategic tensions to be raised in the 
relationship without fear of recrimination or loss of face (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and 
Knyght, 2010; Westphal and Bedner, 2005). In this way, the chairperson–CEO 
relationship provides a context in which the CEO can think provisionally, and which 
acknowledges the ambiguities and uncertainties inherent in decision-making (Roberts, 
2002:504). The presence of strong philos has also been identified as condition for CEOs 
and chairpersons to develop shared interpretative capacity (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and 
Knyght, 2010). This is discussed in the next section.  
4.5.1.2 Complementarity of skills, experience and perspectives  
Previous research has found complementarity of chairperson–CEO skills, experiences, 
perspectives, temperament, business focus and values to be of critical importance in 
effectively addressing strategic tensions facing the firm (Roberts, 2002). For example, a 
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visionary chairperson and a detail-oriented CEO (business focus) can make for a balance 
between future innovation and current operational results (Roberts, 2002). As Roberts 
puts it: 
Building upon these different personal resources the separation of roles and 
responsibilities can then serve to realise a balance between meeting short-
term performance pressures and building long-term capability… (Roberts, 
2002:503) 
The ability of chairpersons and CEOs to interpret information and events in a 
similar fashion both in terms of value (positive or negative) and impact (low or high) is 
seen by board members as a critical condition for effectiveness (Kakabadse, Kakabadse 
and Knyght, 2010). Shared sense-making (Weick, 1995) is thus enabled by strong philos 
but also by the presence of complementary skills, experience and mental maps (Roberts, 
2002).  
The presence of “shared sense-making” allows both role incumbents to come to a 
shared understanding of the strategic tensions facing the firm. In this study, many 
interviewees stressed the critical importance of shared understanding in responding to 
strategic tensions. 
You’ve got to have a chairman and a chief executive who have the same view 
on that subject. If you were in a situation of that nature, I don’t think you 
could have the chairman having one view and the chief executive having 
another. I can’t see it. It’s just so big. And if the chief executive and the 
chairman have differing views they’ve really got to hammer it out and come 
to a single view before it starts to get stress- or pressure-tested with the board 
and everyone else. (CEO 10) 
In particular, the chairperson’s industry background and international experience 
were found to be important in enabling shared sense-making. When these factors are 
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absent, the chairperson’s contribution and support for the CEO in handling tensions 
becomes ineffective.  
… a chairman who knew nothing about our business and nothing about 
America. He had hardly set foot in America. That was a big handicap. 
Because I’m a massive believer in the chairman needs to understand the 
business of the board that he’s chairing. (CEO 15)  
Another example was reported by the CEO of a large infrastructure firm where the 
chairperson’s lack of experience in handling multiple stakeholders caused him to ignore 
or downplay the tensions being faced by the CEO as a result of attending to operational 
demands while dealing with stakeholder pressure to change course. This meant that the 
chairperson was unable to act as a buffer for the CEO against such pressures (the buffering 
role of the chairperson is explored and discussed in Section 4.5.3.1).  
I sometimes question whether he had the right experience. Had never really 
been thrust into the limelight of political scrutiny and public scrutiny like this. 
It came as a bit of a shock to him and I wouldn’t say he wasn’t bright enough 
but he probably didn’t have the experience. (CEO 2)  
The qualities of the relationship, as outlined above, allow for challenges to be raised 
and discussed, so that responses can be formulated. These qualities also enable both 
individuals to negotiate different role boundaries appropriate to the challenges at hand. 
Role boundary dynamics are discussed next. 
4.5.2 Chairperson–CEO role boundaries  
Role boundary delineation has been raised as a critical dimension of chairperson–CEO 
relationships (e.g. Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Stewart, 1991).  
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While normative prescriptions and conventional wisdom state that the chairperson 
runs the board and the CEO runs the firm (Roberts, 2002), this study finds that boundary 
management is dynamic and dependent on the context and role incumbents’ perceptions 
of their roles, particularly when the firm’s strategic direction and competitive advantage 
is unclear. This study’s findings indicate that boundary management is often, but not 
always, a dynamic negotiated process that depends both on the role incumbents’ 
interpretation of their own roles, as well as the circumstances surrounding the relationship 
and which are ever-evolving. This is in line with other studies which attribute tensions in 
the relationship to personal idiosyncrasies as well as poorly delineated peripheral 
responsibilities (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006). Delineating role boundaries 
inevitably generates tensions because role incumbents may not always share the same 
understanding of the boundaries or perceive a need to rearrange them.  
Some CEOs and chairpersons expressed views consistent with the conventional role 
boundaries, with a clear distinction between executive and non-executive domains. This 
corresponds to the chairperson’s role as consultant (Stewart, 1991), where the initiative 
in seeking advice rests with the CEO. It also denotes a rigid interpretation of role 
boundaries, accepting the normative description of these roles, and downplaying the 
business context within which they are enacted, and thus how they may require 
adjustments in their delineation and interplay.  
That’s what you want, isn’t it? That’s what every chief executive wants. He 
doesn’t want the patsy; he doesn’t want somebody managing him, because 
then you are not chief executive. So it’s a very fine balance. (CEO 11) 
I said to the CEO, “Look, I’m not going to try and do your job. I’m a resource: 
use me as you see fit.” I thought we had quite a constructive relationship and 
some, in my mind, some really good discussions about the things he was 
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grappling with in the business. Whether that was really of great value to him, 
I’m not sure. (Chairperson 6) 
I think the chairman runs the board and the CEO runs the business. That’s 
the way it should work. That’s really a CEO’s job, isn’t it? Not the chairman’s 
job. You’re there to be used as a resource if you’re asked to help with 
something. (Chairperson 7) 
Other interviews evinced a much more flexible and dynamic interpretation of role 
boundaries. For some, role boundaries were less important, and role incumbents’ skills, 
experience and relationships were the criteria for effectiveness. Research into how role 
arrangements are formed and impact each other was first published by Hodgson, 
Levinson and Zaleznik (1965) in a pioneering study of three executives’ “role 
constellations”. Hodgson and his colleagues referred to a process of “emotional division 
of labor” and specialisation of function by each role-holder, so that they become 
complementary and form a balanced “integrated whole” (Hodgson, Levinson and 
Zaleznik, 1965:xxi). Referring to pairs as a stable and effective “role constellation”, 
Hodgson explained how some pairs were found to specialise in internal demands and 
external, boundary-spanning activities by each taking responsibility for one aspect 
(Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik, 1965). This thesis gives further support to the work of 
Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik (1965), as well as the chairperson role as partner to the 
CEO proposed by Stewart (1991). The following excerpt illustrates the specialisation of 
functions as proposed by previous studies: 
The chairman and chief executive work as a team. In a good team you don’t 
all do the same thing: there’s a centre-forward and a centre-back, and in a 
difficult situation the chairman has to move into a – you could call it an 
executive role, but it’s more of a leadership role and the chief executive – 
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because there’s so much to do – is taking a line of responsibility for the 
operation. (CEO 21) 
 However, evidence suggests that specialisation might not be organised in such a 
structured way (i.e. CEO dealing with internal affairs and chairperson with external 
affairs) as evidenced in the following CEO account: 
He’d be dealing with things that I should have been dealing with and I was 
dealing with a lot of things which, in the truth, he should have been dealing 
with. But, because I had personal relationships with, or, it just didn’t work 
that way. But, because you’ve got this common aim, rather than “not my job: 
chairman’s job”, or “not my job: chief executive’s job”, it’s what they call 
the greyness between the relationship I think is the really important thing. 
(CEO 10) 
 Instead, evidence suggests that, when facing challenging strategic tensions, role 
boundaries often become blurred and the configuration of the roles becomes much more 
dependent on the challenges being faced and the distinct skills, experience and 
relationships that role incumbents possess. This points to recent evidence showing that 
“the boundary between what the chair and CEO do is subject to renegotiation and change 
as the relationship develops and in the light of changing circumstances” (Cornforth and 
Macmillan, 2016:17). 
Further, some CEOs established the boundaries around operations and strategy, 
with the chairperson taking an advisory role on strategic matters. The operational day-to-
day is sometimes seen as exclusively the CEO’s responsibility, while, when strategic 
decisions are being considered, the chairperson is perceived to have legitimacy to 
intervene and advise. 
That depends a bit from the situation. In the daily operation I don’t seek his 
advice because otherwise he would have taken the role, on strategic moves 
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definitely… And then he is playing exactly the right level of mixing in and 
keeping out. But he is really somebody … I couldn’t imagine a better 
chairman for the time being. (CEO 8) 
Some chairpersons revealed strong preferences in terms of role boundary 
management. They expect to have more involvement in strategy and choose to intervene 
more in terms of what the CEO can do, suggesting that whether to support or challenge 
CEO actions will depend on the particular challenges and circumstances the firm is 
facing. The chairperson of a large media company explained: 
… The CEO would say, I’m sure, I stayed involved too far, too long – all chief 
executives say that. Unless you can manage, that tension is going to be there 
and you’ve got to be prepared to manage it, because a good chief executive 
is a very strong, very controlling leader, and controlling leaders want to have 
a very high degree of space and independence, and I respect that. That’s the 
trouble with it. My view is the chairman’s job is somewhere between half a 
day a week and seven days a week: it’s all the situation and, let’s face it, if 
the chief executive goes under a bus, you’re the next one up, and there are 
times when you have to be very engaged, and you’re not an operating 
executive. (Chairperson 1) 
Boundary management was often referred to by chairpersons as “a balance between 
accelerating and pulling the brake”, denoting the chairperson’s role as both a support and 
a constraint to that of the CEO, often reducing the CEO’s power of discretion. This 
balance often depends on the circumstances facing the firm. Some CEOs react rather 
negatively when chairpersons limit their power of discretion. Two CEOs in this study 
exited the company in conflict with their chairperson. For example, the approach of 
Chairperson 8, quoted below, led to escalating conflict with his CEO who wanted a high 
degree of freedom which Chairperson 8 wasn’t prepared to concede. 
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I think you need as a chairman to know what the balance is between giving 
freedom and pulling the brake or giving guidance. And I think, in the first 
years – I mean the CEO almost had carte blanche because you knew if she 
cannot fix it is not going to be fixed, and the CFO had the financial skill to 
deal with it. (Chairperson 8)  
He continued: 
I think what you do as a chairman is, I guess, you – but it’s like you provide 
the framework for the painting and then you let the CEO paint. And depending 
on the capabilities and the development of a CEO you either narrow the frame 
and you say, “This is where you can paint” or you’re widening and say, 
“Paint it”. So, as a chairman, you set the boundaries and you say, “We’re 
not going to sell the airline”. We are, and you have other discussions as to 
what the framework is, but it’s a broad framework in which you say, to the 
CEO, “Now you paint”. (Chairperson 8) 
Similarly, the CEO of a high-tech company explained in quite an emotional tone 
the constraining effect of his chairperson on his actions. 
The chairman of the company didn’t want to relinquish any kind of credit or 
control to me. So he and I had this battle … At first we collaborated but, as 
things got more stressful, so that relationship became more and more 
difficult. I remember: he said, “You’re the accelerator and I’m the brake.” I 
thought, “No, I don’t need no brake, thank you very much.” It’s hard enough 
doing stuff as it is without having somebody who’s the brake. You know: what 
do I need a brake for? (CEO 16)  
Boundary management is a critical decision for the chairperson, depending as it 
does on the firm’s specific challenges and the CEO’s own abilities and development. This 
area is not uncontroversial, however, and CEOs may react against the attempts of 
chairpersons to restrict and control CEO action, or disregard the chairperson’s advice.  
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Relationship attributes and role delineation provides the structure within which the 
chairperson and the CEO act, and therefore determine which role(s) the chairperson can 
play in relation to the CEO. This is the subject of the next section.  
4.5.3 Chairperson roles in relation to the CEO  
This study found that chairpersons play three fundamental roles in relation to the CEO: i) 
a buffering role; ii) an advisory role; and iii) a partner role. During periods of substantial 
change and uncertainty, if the company is underperforming, the buffering role is a central 
one that enables and constrains CEO action. The advisory and partnership roles are at 
least partially related to the buffering role. These roles are now discussed further, 
supported by evidence from this study and from extant literature.  
4.5.3.1 The chairperson as buffer  
Evidence suggests that chairpersons play an important function by buffering the CEO 
from non-executive directors (NEDs) and dysfunctional board behaviour, as well as from 
the pressures and expectations of shareholders, investors, analysts and other market 
players. This buffering function appears critical in preventing excessive orientation 
towards either short or long term.  
CEOs experience pressure from various constituencies to accelerate change, deliver 
better short-term results, or pursue particular strategies (e.g. acquisitions). In effect, the 
exercise of control by the CEOs has been claimed to be a function of the constraints and 
more or less explicit powers that are posed by NEDs, shareholders and sometimes 
creditors (Herman, 1981).  
Among these constituencies, boards and NEDs, shareholders and the market (i.e. 
analysts, investors) are the ones perceived by CEOs and chairpersons as exerting 
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influence over CEO behaviour. The chairperson has an important role in both protecting 
the CEO from undue external pressures and expectations and in regulating the CEO’s 
behaviour in the case of excessive acquiescence to such pressures. Thus, the chairperson 
plays a pivotal role in aligning expectations and ensuring that a sustainable and realistic 
sense of direction is maintained.  
The next sections explore evidence of NED and board behaviour constraining CEO 
action, as well as the influence of shareholders, investors and market analysts in terms of 
performance expectations. It follows a discussion on the role of the chairperson in 
buffering the CEO from these pressures and expectations. Useful chairperson 
characteristics for effective buffering are then explored, as inferred from the analysis.  
4.5.3.1.1  Non-executive director (NED) and board behaviour  
CEOs and some chairpersons reported many instances where non-executive directors’ 
(NEDs’) behaviour deflected CEOs’ attention towards operations and short-term, 
polarised discussions, and inhibited overall decision-making. They did this through 
pursuit of personal agendas; defensive behaviour protective of reputation in relation to 
company poor performance; an unbalanced focus on operations and performance rather 
than the long term; and a frequent lack of independence. The consequences for CEOs 
were difficulties in agreeing on objectives and competitive advantage, as well as in 
responding to company challenges in a timely fashion.  
Some CEOs considered excessive industry experience on the board had led to 
option-reducing behaviour and difficulties in agreeing a strategic direction; others thought 
differing agendas and lack of independence had impeded good strategic discussions and 
alignment. 
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Other non-execs sometimes do it for the wrong reason. They do it because 
they want power, not because they want to effect change which is necessary. 
So we had another example on the [company] board: somebody was difficult, 
for his own ends and not for the company’s interests. That’s very unhelpful. 
(CEO 11) 
Building and maintaining a reputation as expert monitors has been proposed by 
agency theorists as a key incentive for NEDs to devote time and effort in scrutinising and 
challenging CEO decisions (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, this 
incentive may sometimes work to constrain to the CEO in his/her efforts to make changes 
to the business in response to difficult problems. Evidence from this study suggests that 
NEDs that remain on the board during poor performance cycles may become defensive 
and prevent the new CEO from identifying and addressing problems; this implies poor 
monitoring, thus undermining NEDs’ reputation as expert monitors. This is especially so 
when those NEDs are already dealing with potential reputation-damaging situations in 
other boards where they are directors.  
One CEO explained how NEDs became defensive when the new CEO brought 
ongoing problems in the business to their attention. 
… non-execs can get very defensive … so one of the things I noticed was a lot 
of the non-execs were far more interested in protecting their position in – not 
in terms of their position on the board, but in terms of: there was all these 
problems in one of the divisions and it suddenly wasn’t their fault, wasn’t 
their problem. And their role in the board was far more about being defensive 
about it than actually helping the company solve the problem. And that was 
a real drawback. (CEO 3) 
Similar NED behaviour was described by the CEO of a retail company, where 
NEDs, in attempting to protect their reputation, demonstrated denial became defensive 
about company problems that developed under their watch.  
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NEDs were not slow: they were in denial. So there’s two parts to that. One is 
they didn’t know what data to look at. The second thing is that they were 
associated with the data and therefore it was unpleasant to have to recognise 
the data was the data that they had been presiding over. (CEO 11) 
A CEO facing a very difficult situation explained how the NEDs were unreachable 
while the situation was unfolding. 
Dived for cover, particularly the Americans … talk about absent on the 
bridge, literally … because they did not want to be subpoenaed to go and 
appear before Congress… (CEO 15) 
NEDs of underperforming firms “might be tempted to abandon the firm to limit the 
damage to their reputation, evade legal liability and escape the workload of restructuring 
an underperforming firm” (Yermack, 2004:2,294). They may also be difficult with a new 
CEO in attempting to ensure their reputation is not damaged. Such behaviour often leads 
to losses in the relationship between the CEO and NEDs and obstructs decision-making. 
These consequences may be avoided if the chairperson performs his or her buffering role 
effectively.  
The problem of NEDs’ lack of independence was also cited repeatedly by CEOs 
who are addressing difficult strategic tensions. NEDs who are associated with particular 
shareholders or investors undermine boardroom debate by conveying the views and 
interests of those investors and making it difficult for different options to be heard, 
thereby undermining alignment and effective decision-making.  
The board meetings are not the best places to strategise, because too many 
people are looking for too many different reasons. If you think about most 
boards of directors, they’ve got at least two non-executives who are probably 
appointed by an investor with a – although they’re supposed to be doing the 
job of a non-exec, they’re actually either, they don’t read the papers, they are 
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pinned down without reading the papers, you know what it’s like”. 
(Chairperson 12) 
The CEO of a large telecom business experienced such behaviour while attempting 
to ensure the company’s long-term strategy was viable, and became unable to do so in a 
timely fashion due essentially to lack of NED independence which led to a failure to 
converge on one agenda.  
The thing I’ve often felt like saying at a board meeting – I was never brave 
enough to do it – was to say: you guys are directors of this company; you 
should not be coming to these board meetings as the representatives of 
[company A] or of [company B], you should leave those business cards at the 
door ... And I very often felt that it was skewed the wrong way. (CEO 5) 
Finally, NED behaviour, driven by inappropriate concerns, may result in 
unbalanced focus in discussions with the CEO, pulling him or her towards particular 
perspectives, potentially losing sight of the long term, or of viable solutions outside the 
expertise of the NEDs. One CEO explained how board meetings were always heavily 
skewed towards performance and the short term, inhibiting the discussion of important 
long-term questions. 
… they [NEDs] would always start the meeting with: well, I know we’re about 
to talk about the long term ... but what, just can you explain to me what 
happened last weekend at so-and-so. All of the time it was very short-term 
and performance-related questions. You just got into the routine of knowing 
everything about everything and that’s a lot of reports that come on a daily 
basis and you have to absorb a lot of information. What went in all of that is 
doing the long-term relationship building with government, stakeholders and 
the customers. (CEO 2) 
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A chairperson who was in the process of changing the composition of the board 
explained how the CEO was facing a hard time with the NEDs, who all had single industry 
experience and were not competent to scrutinise the CEOs proposals and understand their 
value. 
So there’s a lot of change and all that, but then you have a board which is 
very much the product of the past, which sees the world in a very peculiar 
way. Because, again, it’s a very strange – and most boards, as we talked 
about before, are made up of broadly a mixture of specialist and generalist 
that create a balance which are able to take the overview of the business. This 
one is made up entirely of people who essentially are – well, who come from 
exactly the same world that this business is in and they can’t quite see in all 
cases … (Chairperson 14) 
There is little research that discusses actual NED behaviour in the boardroom. What 
there is largely focuses on identifying and describing behaviour associated with effective 
role fulfilment, rather than exposing cases of NED dysfunctional behaviour and its 
consequences.  
The study of UK non-executive directors by Roberts, McNulty and Stiles (2005) 
pointed to the development of negative boardroom dynamics between the CEO and non-
executives whereby executives become frustrated or resentful of NED actions and 
contributions that are poorly informed or inappropriate, leading to mistrust and breaks in 
information flows. But, apart from occasional statements like these, little has been 
discussed about actual NED motives and their potentially constraining behaviour in the 
boardroom.  
The next section explores how shareholders’, investors’ and analysts’ expectations 
put pressure on CEOs to go in certain, and sometimes conflicting, directions. 
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4.5.3.1.2 Shareholders, analysts and other market pressures  
CEOs and chairpersons talked about instances where primarily shareholders but also 
investors, analysts and other market players pressured the CEO to make early 
announcements, focusing on short-term performance rather than long-term purpose and 
strategy. In particular, some chairpersons referred to instances where shareholders were 
in disagreement about the company’s purpose and competitive advantage, as well as in 
regards to short-term and long-term performance. These instances were described as 
impacting CEOs’ discretion in pursuing a particular strategic direction, and significantly 
delaying appropriate action to improve the company’s performance.  
CEOs often face contradictory expectations from resource providers (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). Exchange markets often place more emphasis on short-term gains than 
on long-term investments (Hansen and Hill, 1991; Short and Keasy, 1997) with different 
classes of shareholders differing in terms of earnings expectations. Resource providers’ 
contradictory expectations make it difficult for the CEO to reconcile them into one agenda 
(Czarniawska, 1985). In business contexts characterised by resource scarcity and 
uncertainty, CEOs may be over-influenced by resource providers’ and other market 
players’ agendas, as companies in this situation are often looking to raise fresh capital.  
A CEO that was attempting to restructure the firm while simultaneously launching 
an ambitious investment in a new technology explained how a variety of stakeholders 
including boards, analysts and shareholders expected the CEO to make short-term 
announcements or acquire businesses to quickly boost the share price. 
… because it maybe goes to your short term, long term: between boards, 
analysts, shareholders, they want the announcements to come early, and so, 
if you’re doing a product launch or something, they want it to go out really 
early so it’s in the marketplace. Well, that just tells all your competitors what 
you’re doing. And yet there was huge pressure to do that … The same with 
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cost transformation. Everyone wanted us to announce how many people we 
were going to fire and that’s a terrible thing for your staff. The board wanted 
an acquisition strategy. (CEO 3) 
Analysts were repeatedly cited as influencing CEO behaviour. In the case quoted 
above, analysts went on to issue negative recommendations about the CEO’s 
announcement of an investment plan for an unproven new technology. Recent studies 
find that analysts’ negative recommendations result in a higher probability of CEO 
dismissal (Wiersema and Zhang, 2011), have a consequence on investors’ decisions 
(Barber et al., 2001) and impact on CEOs’ behaviour and corporate governance (Westphal 
and Graebner, 2010; Yu, 2008). Moreover, studies have found that, during periods of 
technological change, analysts’ negative recommendations are increasingly associated 
with firms reducing the level of strategic investment, which suggests that analysts can 
affect firms’ strategic direction (Benner and Ranganathan, 2012). Those firms that 
persevere with long-term technology investments are likely to face continual pressure to 
align with analysts and shareholders (Suchman, 1995). Benner and Ranganathan’s (2012) 
study also finds that firms that persist in long-term investments despite negative analyst 
and market recommendations often engage in higher share buyback to signal alignment 
with shareholders. This “game of expectations” often places CEOs in a difficult position 
as they attempt to balance short- and long-term demands and maintain a sense of strategic 
direction. 
The chairperson of a large business explained how the CEO and management team 
were facing extraordinary difficulty in handling different expectations of two distinct 
shareholder groups in terms of short- and long-term performance. He went on to explain 
how he coached the CEO and the team on how to reconcile these different expectations, 
while working with shareholder groups to buy time so that a solution could be devised.  
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If you’re doing a transaction like that, or if you’re in that situation, you’ve 
got to get a lot of stars aligned in pretty close proximity to each other. We 
had to deal with this intergenerational issue of the rich and the less, or the 
old and the rich, and the new and the poor amongst the shareholder group 
who were going to be important for the future – because. Because the new 
and the poor had just gone off and said, “You know what: we’ll just set up 
our own firm. These people are all – they’ve got too much money and they’re 
going to make a lot of money out of this. What’s in it for us? Why are we going 
to kick around?” (Chairperson 13) 
Another case was described by the chairperson of a large internet-based telecom 
company. Facing a decline in performance and rumours that much larger competitors 
were attempting to enter their business with innovative products and services, the 
question of whether to invest for the future and risk competing with very large companies, 
or exit and sell the company to one of these competitors became a tension between distinct 
investor groups that was difficult to resolve. The chairperson explained:  
… the investor group that we had on the board: they were nearly all of them 
sitting in California and they were saying, “These guys don’t get it: the future 
is in Silicon Valley, in Menlo Park – we need to put everything there.” And 
you had [shareholder A] on the board saying, “The way of the world is not a 
downloadable client, it’s a browser.” So he would sit in the board, and 
elsewhere, basically just championing the concept of the browser, with a 
group of people that had built a very successful product that was a 
downloadable client, and they didn’t very easily begin to understand each 
other. They [shareholder B]: part of the dynamic was this was the biggest 
investment [shareholder B] had ever made. [Shareholder B] bet its future on 
this company investment, so you had a situation where [shareholder B] and 
others were very keen to realise their investment sooner rather than later. The 
two founders and [shareholder A] would have been much happier to play for 
the long run. (Chairperson 6) 
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Different risk appetites and emotional attachment to the company were at play. The 
chairperson who was facing this situation ultimately fired the CEO and recruited a highly 
experienced and respected CEO from Silicon Valley who was able to ultimately achieve 
consensus around selling the business to a large competitor and giving the shareholders a 
return of three times equity. The chairperson’s manoeuvring and independence was 
critical in diffusing the tension.  
Data from this study suggests that the norm for CEOs is to feel pressure to 
delivering short-term performance, often with the consequence of neglecting long-term 
strategic issues. 
I used to get a lot of operational questions. Whenever you went to see 
government ministers, the first thing they would say … All of the time you’re 
being brought back to an operational perspective when a chief executive 
ought to be able to be dealing with the longer term, the bigger picture with 
the stakeholders. (CEO 2) 
It is critical that the CEO retains the confidence of the board and the shareholders 
concerning the company’s strategic direction and does so with vigour and confidence. 
Without alignment with the board and the shareholders, it becomes difficult for the CEO 
to reconcile these different expectations.  
I think it’s in retaining the confidence of – the sense of unity and confidence 
of – all of the board and all of the shareholders as you go through a really 
radical transformation of the company. (Chairperson 4) 
CEOs face a myriad of expectations which are often contradictory and difficult to 
reconcile. Mintzberg (2009) in his book Managing depicted CEOs as gatekeepers and 
buffers in the flow of influence, as valves that control what gets passed on and how. By 
this understanding, the CEO’s role is seen as one that insulates the organisation from 
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external pressures and expectations. The last two sections have shown how these 
influences may present themselves in the form of board behaviour and expectations of 
the CEO’s performance, shareholders’ and investors’ different expectations of CEO 
strategic decisions, or stock market analysts’ recommendations regarding the company 
stock. Mintzberg (2009) described five types of CEO buffering or gatekeeping behaviour: 
Sieves (CEOs who allow influence – for example, from analysts – flow too easily into the 
organisation, forcing everyone to manage for the short term); Dams (CEOs who insulate 
the organisation too much from external influence, thereby becoming detached from the 
external world); Sponges (CEOs who absorb too much of the pressure and may thus 
experience burnout); Hoses (CEOs who place too much pressure on people outside the 
company who may therefore become hostile); and Drips (CEOs who exert little external 
pressure, thereby poorly representing their company).  
In a somewhat similar line of thinking, Tengblad (2004) depicts CEOs as 
“expectation handlers” who need to manage internal and external expectations, attributing 
the increased prominence of this role to the rise in importance of capital markets that 
largely operate on the basis of expectations about future performance (i.e. future cash 
flows) and increasingly use a variety of financial instruments based on expectations (i.e. 
hedging, derivatives, options and futures). CEOs are depicted as feeling accountable to 
market actors and dependent on investor confidence, and therefore often feel compelled 
to modify their behaviour in the direction of fulfilling such expectations (Tengblad, 
2004). The problem is framed by Tengblad as follows: “how to create a balance between 
moulding expectations so that the stock market will perform well, without creating 
unrealistic expectations, was seen as one of the most difficult tasks for a CEO” (Tengblad, 
2004:591).  
The problem with handling different expectations and insulating the organisation 
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from external pressures is further demonstrated in a survey of 400 CFOs (chief financial 
officers) of US listed companies. CFOs perceive “a constant tension between the short-
term and the long-term objectives of the firm” (Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal, 2005:35), 
and “are willing to make small to moderate sacrifices in economic value to meet earnings 
expectations from analysts and investors” (p. 5) to avoid severe market penalties to the 
company as well as reputational damage.  
What both Mintzberg (2009) and Tengblad show is that the CEO is at the centre of 
attention for a variety of powerful constituents who all signal expectations of behaviour 
to the CEO, often contradictory or politically motivated, pressuring the CEO to manage 
the business in the direction of such expectations. Mintzberg (2009) and Tengblad (2004) 
also demonstrate how difficult it is for CEOs to fulfil this buffering function and how 
wrong it can go. But who or what buffers the CEO from these expectations, especially in 
times of poor performance? Who makes sure the CEO is handling expectations and 
buffering the organisation in a balanced manner? 
In this thesis – and to some extent already shown in the last two sections – the 
chairperson role is identified as critical in ensuring the CEO is able to handle expectations 
in an appropriate manner. The chairperson buffering role in relation to the CEO is 
discussed next.  
4.5.3.1.3 The chairperson buffering role  
In this study, a clear pattern emerged regarding the chairperson as a buffer for the CEO. 
Chairpersons perceive buffering the CEO to be a key requirement of their role and, in 
turn, CEOs value this aspect of the chairperson’s role, finding it important in supporting 
them to carry out their role effectively. As the CEO is exposed to multiple and often 
contradictory expectations from the board, analysts, shareholders and investors, he or she 
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often struggles to manage the firm in a way that takes account of this variety of pressures 
in a balanced way. There are risks in managing for the short term, diminishing 
commitment to long-term value creation, earnings management, overconfidence and a 
whole range of different behaviours.  
Past research has seldom seen the buffering role of the chairperson as critical. For 
example, O’Neal and Thomas’s (1996) study surveyed and interviewed dozens of US 
board members and found that the “buffering of top management from outside pressures” 
was rated last (with only about two per cent of total responses) on a list of perceived board 
roles. Past work has identified the chairperson as the conduit between the non-executive 
directors and the CEO and vice versa (e.g. Kakabadse, 2007; Roberts and Stiles, 1999). 
By performing this buffering function, the chairperson ensures that the collective 
messages and concerns of the NEDs are conveyed to the CEO in such a manner so as to 
not be perceived as antagonistic, conflicting or as a vote of no confidence. Similarly, the 
CEO may convey to the chairperson important considerations about NED behaviour (as 
discussed in Section 4.5.3.1.1), which the chairperson may find useful in correcting board 
behaviour or even composition.  
Time and again during the course of this study, chairpersons and CEOs described 
the chairperson role as a buffer, using expressions such as “containing and channelling”, 
“sponge” and “dissipates waves”. One CEO explained the importance of the chairperson 
in regulating the relationships and information flow between the board and the CEO. 
And if he has a discussion, then [chairperson’s name] is somehow containing 
it again and channelling it again and giving the feedback to us. So it is really 
– he is not an executive chairman, and that is fine – but he is an active 
chairman that he is giving his advice when his advice is needed. (CEO 20) 
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Another chairperson explained that his role is to take “the brickbats” from the board, 
shareholders and other important stakeholders who may signal loss of confidence in 
strategy, a reaction to earnings or to particular CEO decisions. Provided the chairperson 
trusts the CEO and his or her capability, the chairperson can protect him or her from these 
pressures, ensuring that the he or she is focused on delivering strategy or advising him or 
her about adjustments that may need to be considered.  
So the main characteristic of a chairman, I think, is: you’re there, you’re like 
a sponge in many ways, to be able to take the brickbats and, at the end of the 
day, you take the crap and the executive team take the glory. That’s the way 
I think it needs to be. (Chairperson 10) 
A similar view was conveyed by the CEO of a large telecom company. The CEO 
explained how the chairperson worked as a buffer in absorbing shareholders’ concerns 
about company performance. Shareholders, capital markets and their players are often 
“impatient” with regards to results (Tengblad, 2004). It is up to the chairperson of the 
board to understand the different expectations and help the CEO in crafting appropriate 
responses or helping the CEO resist temptation to acquiesce to such expectations, which 
can be damaging in the long term.  
… an ideal chairman is one who dissipates waves, not extenuates them in 
either direction. The sort of people get in, it’s too one way or the other, and 
he doesn’t, a bad chairman extenuates, so if the shareholders are 
complaining a bit, he, a good chairman understands, absorbs and gives the 
CEO time etc. What he doesn’t do is he doesn’t make everything work. 
[Chairperson name] was a superb chairman in that sense that he naturally 
understood that. (CEO 3) 
The idea that the chairperson needs to manage expectations around the CEO and 
create space and time for the CEO to deliver sustained results has been stressed by several 
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CEOs and chairpersons. This support from the chairperson in containing feedback from 
different stakeholders about performance and CEO actions does not mean the chairperson 
is “captured” by the CEO. Rather, the chairperson uses independent judgement built on 
solid experience to determine whether and to what extent to insulate the CEO from such 
pressures. Ultimately, however, the chairperson may have to fire the CEO.   
The chairman made it very clear to me that he was there to give me air cover, 
that he would back me until he had to sack me, but he would give me plenty 
of time to back me before he’d sack me. (CEO 11) 
In contexts of poor performance, the CEO needs to communicate expectations to a 
variety of stakeholders (i.e. the board, the shareholders, media) as to how long it is going 
to take to return to acceptable levels of performance and what can be expected in the 
foreseeable future. Evidence from this study suggests that the chairperson plays a critical 
role in supporting the CEO in communicating realistic expectations to relevant 
stakeholders which then allows the CEO to produce the right balance between short-term 
and long-term performance without suffering too much pressure from external 
constituents. The chairperson of a large media company explained: 
… my thing as chairman was to, then to explain to all the stakeholders, which 
means the people who work for you first – well, the board, people who work 
for you, somebody said suppliers, and then the shareholders and the media in 
that sequence, that the true extent and the severity of the problem and what 
they could expect as a result. So the first thing is, in public companies 
especially, you have to define success and you define the timetable: don’t let 
the market do it. People will always encourage you to say, “This is a problem 
but we can solve it and we’ll turn it around in a year or two”, because a lot 
of people like to believe that. The profound problems are not a year or two’s 
problem – they’re a three- to five-year problem – and so it’s very, very 
important the company and the executive team are given that space to 
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operate, because then they can make radical decisions which may be profit-
impoverishing in the short term, but the right thing for the long-term change. 
And this is partly the job of the chairman to create that space… (Chairperson 
1) 
Situations exist where CEOs start giving in to market expectations and make 
promises that cannot be kept without jeopardising long-term investments. In such cases 
the chairperson again acts as a buffer and ensures the CEO commits to the longer term, 
sending messages to the market community that the company is pursuing a long-term 
strategy and won’t give in to short-term pressures.  
What we said – because you can only test your market so far – I had this 
conversation: why are you making these promises about earnings and things 
– just, you’re doing all the right things, we’re piling money into this; it’s a 
great long-term investment; why do you have to? I said, “I’ve got a 
management team. I don’t want them bushwhacked because the market has 
no patience… (Chairperson 4) 
In this section, the chairperson’s buffering role in relation to the CEO has been 
explored and discussed. We have seen that CEOs face a variety of expectations from 
powerful stakeholders, including the board, and that in handling these expectations the 
CEO may be tempted to change direction and jeopardise the long term. The chairperson 
role emerged as critical in insulating the CEO from pressures and helping shape, contain 
and handle expectations thus creating the conditions for CEO and company success.  
However, for chairpersons to be effective buffers and handle expectations around 
the CEO, they must display a number of personal characteristics. This is discussed in the 
next section.  
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4.5.3.1.4 Chairperson characteristics for effective buffering  
We have seen that the chairperson plays a critical role in relation to the CEO by acting as 
a buffer to pressures, as well as advising the CEO on the best course of action. However, 
evidence suggests that to be effective in fulfilling this important role, chairpersons require 
significant and appropriate experience and need to exhibit independent thinking and 
behaviour.  
4.5.3.1.4.1 Significant and appropriate experience  
Inadequate industry experience on the part of chairperson and insufficient knowledge of 
the circumstances facing the firm is perceived as a significant constraint on the ability of 
chairpersons to act as a buffer and give adequate advice. To act as a buffer, the chairperson 
needs to be able to recognise the tensions facing the business and the CEO in order to 
manage the pressures coming from the board, shareholders and the market, and advise or 
challenge the CEO accordingly. The following extracts exemplify this. 
… so I think any amount of wise birds around the board table would have 
struggled to deal with a chairman who’d been CEO and had that experience 
of being a CEO, which was basically riding up into nonsense territory. (CEO 
6) 
I sometimes question whether he had the right experience. Had never really 
been thrust into the limelight of political scrutiny and public scrutiny like this. 
It came as a bit of a shock to him and I wouldn’t say he wasn’t bright enough 
but he probably didn’t have the experience. (CEO 2)  
CEOs who were left to face multiple pressures (expectations) from external 
powerful stakeholders explained how their chairpersons’ inadequate experience didn’t 
equip them to understand tensions faced by the CEO and act appropriately to insulate, 
advise or challenge. In this thesis, chairperson experience refers to a deep understanding 
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of the company, as well as the industry and geographies in which it operates, and therefore 
of the nature of the stakeholders: a crucial foundation in understanding the nature of 
strategic tensions that develop and commanding the respect and trust of those 
stakeholders.  
Past research has identified industry and company knowledge as well as 
independence (both structural and of mind) as fundamental characteristics of the effective 
chairperson (e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013; Coombes and Wong, 2004). The effective 
chairperson requires a “capacity to engage in and resolve disputes and minimise 
dysfunctional interactions” (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006:146), critical for 
which is the ability to act with independence based on a solid understanding of the 
industry and the company. Leblanc (2004) argues that the quest for companies to find 
independent chairpersons or non-executive directors to appease regulators often results 
in hiring individuals who are too distant from the reality of the company and industry. 
Hence, the balance of experience and independence reveals itself as critical yet sometimes 
difficult to achieve.  
The next section discusses further the importance of independence for the 
chairperson to act as an effective buffer and advisor to the CEO. 
4.5.3.1.4.2  Independence of thinking and behaviour  
Lack of chairperson independence (i.e. both material as well as of thinking and behaviour) 
was perceived by both CEOs and chairpersons in this study as a fundamental constraint 
on the chairperson’s ability to act as an effective buffer, and thus leaving the CEO 
vulnerable to the pressures of particular shareholder groups and directors. As a 
consequence, debate can become polarised and decisions dragged towards the preferences 
of a particular shareholder, which may often differ from the firm’s best interest. Past 
research has often used proxies for chairperson independence, such as the separation of 
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the role of chairperson from the CEO (e.g. Rechner and Dalton, 1989) or whether the 
chairperson had a previous relationship with the company or the management team that 
could compromise independence (Leblanc, 2004). One study found that independent 
chairs (i.e. separate from the CEO role) can improve performance in underperforming 
firms (Grinstein and Valles, 2008). However, the relationship between chairperson 
independence measured in this way and firm performance remains unclear (e.g. Dalton et 
al., 1998), and the impact on managerial entrenchment, risk-taking and executive 
compensation is found to be low (Krause, Semadeni and Cannella, 2013).  
Researchers that were able to take a closer look, using qualitative methods, at the 
reality of boards have come to explain why such results are inconclusive. As Leblanc 
(2004) explained, independence is a “state of mind” and therefore manifests itself in the 
particular formative context of the board and the strategic decisions to be made. Hence, 
material independence does not guarantee de facto independence. What is decisive is “the 
independence of judgment, competencies and behaviors of the chairperson of the board – 
not merely the separation of chair and CEO” (Leblanc, 2004:438).  
In this study, chairpersons acting non-independently were often described as a 
constraint on CEOs’ ability to focus on long-term strategy. One CEO explained how his 
chairperson’s lack of independence made it difficult to address long-term business aspects 
relating to technology, because the chairperson didn’t want to partner with a company 
that was competing with another company where he was CEO.  
Because he was acting not as chairman but as CEO of [company A], which 
is what his fundamental accountability was. And I hadn’t thought about it that 
way because he was always involved, but thinking it through subsequently it 
was subconsciously because he was always carrying an [company A] agenda 
with him. (CEO 5)  
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Another example came from the CEO of a large entertainment business under 
restructuring who explained how the chairperson had been placed by one of the 
shareholders, which was an investment bank, and had primarily financial and short-term 
objectives, which were not compatible with the “creative” and therefore more long-term 
nature of the industry. This created tension with other shareholders who had a more long-
term view of the firm. To the CEO this meant having to manage a difficult balance 
between short-term, financial objectives and keeping the creative ability of the company 
strong for the long term. With strong pressure from the shareholders and the chairperson, 
he faced real difficulties in setting the stage for the company’s sustainable recovery. 
Anyway, there were two representatives from each of the shareholders, and 
they appointed one independent, supposedly independent, chairman. The 
problem was he was proposed by [shareholder A, i.e. a financial institution], 
he’s an advisor to [shareholder A] and he turned out to always side with 
[shareholder A], so it created a lot of tension with the other shareholders, 
who found out too late that this was not a neutral setup. And obviously, as a 
chairman, you have a certain influence, and also in terms of voting it would 
tilt it towards [shareholder A]. (CEO 4)  
Time and again, similar stories emerged from CEO interviews. One CEO of a large 
infrastructure firm explained how the chairperson exhibited little independent thinking 
and was always siding with government, leaving the CEO isolated in terms of exploring 
alternative strategic options and completely vulnerable to government pressures. 
… you can’t repeat this, but we had a new chairman who seemed to have a 
different motivation. That he, the change of government, no desire to run the 
[company] properly; he just wanted to do whatever the government wanted. 
(CEO 2)  
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The chairperson of a retail firm explained the necessity for chairpersons to be 
independent from external influences, to be able to think and behave independently of 
external pressures with vested interests. It is important that chairpersons relinquish 
ambitions for executive positions, promotions or further rewards. The chairperson 
commented:  
… as chairman of [company name] I’m not looking for anything from 
anybody. I think the wonderful thing about – and maybe it’s part of the 
qualification why people become chairmen of companies towards the end of 
their careers – is they are in a position where the only thing that matters is 
trying to do the right thing and you’re not looking for, I’m not looking for 
another job, another promotion, a reward. And I think that’s quite a good 
position to be in as chairman. (Chairperson 4) 
The last two sections have identified chairpersons’ experience (in relation to the 
company, the industry and the company’s stakeholders) and independence (material and 
of thinking) as critical requirements in buffering the CEO from undue external pressures.  
The next two sections explore two additional roles that chairpersons play in relation 
to CEOs and which emerged from this study: the adviser/counsellor role and the partner 
role.  
4.5.3.2 The chairperson as adviser/counsellor to the CEO  
Acting as an adviser to the CEO has also emerged as an aspect of the chairperson’s role. 
Chairpersons are a discussion partner for the CEO, a sounding board which helps CEOs 
to gain clarity and confidence about particular challenges. One interesting finding was 
the role of the chairperson as a counsellor, a “regulator of CEO emotions”, particularly 
where emotions are negative.  
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One chairperson explained how the counselling role of chairperson for the CEO and 
the executive team is important when facing strategic tensions that may impact on the 
CEO’s values and emotions. 
The mentoring role that a chairman has with respect to the executive team as 
a whole, particularly chief executive, comes to the fore under such challenges. 
Provided you believe your chief executive is part of the answer rather than 
part of the problem – which is what we hadn’t believed and I made sure that 
the board had that view and I’ve conveyed it very strongly to the CEO on a 
number of occasions – because some of this stuff is very hard to take, 
particularly if it cuts against everything you stand for and is in your DNA. 
(Chairperson 3)  
This counselling role and the regulation of CEO emotions was confirmed as an 
important role for the chairperson. The next two chairperson accounts highlight the 
importance of their mentoring and counselling roles.  
And I, as chairman, particularly with the chief executive … he was actually 
on the psychologist’s couch, if you can imagine this: you could’ve seen me 
here with my notes, him lying on the couch. I had just a massive outpouring 
of everything from his entire time in this business that he thought was wrong 
with it, that he thought was wrong with the leadership, that he thought was 
wrong with this individual and everything else. So I had to do a lot of 
listening. All part of the trust process: if he’s going to tell you his innermost 
secrets, you sit there and listen. (Chairperson 13) 
I saw the CEO regularly one-to-one obviously between board meetings. He 
liked to come and get stuff off his chest which was important. (Chairperson 7) 
In these and other cases, the chairperson was critical in regulating the CEO’s 
emotional stability, ensuring that he or she remained objective and focused, and 
preventing the sort of ineffective behaviour that may ensue when emotions are high. 
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Research has shown how CEOs’ emotions may lead to strategic performance conformity 
(Delgado-Garcia, La Fuente-Sabaté and Manuel, 2010), dysfunctional CEO–top 
management team dynamics (Kisfalvi and Pitcher, 2003) and, more generally, impact on 
board task performance (Brundin and Nordqvist, 2008).  
In addition to the emotional dimension of the counselling role, this study also 
reveals the more classical role of the chairperson as an adviser to the CEO (e.g. Dulewicz, 
Gay and Taylor, 2006; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005; Stewart, 1991), where a 
cognitive dimension prevails of exchanging ideas and potential solutions about particular 
business tensions with the CEO.  
The chairman should be the discussion partner for the chief executive, 
somebody that hopefully the chief executive will come to and say, “I’m not 
quite sure what to do about this; what do you think?” No, now my attitude is 
that with the CEO, whom I trust completely, he will tell me, I’d trust him to 
tell me what’s on his mind and I’ll back his judgement and nine – if we have 
a difference of perspective – then nine times out of ten I will say to him, “This 
is my thought” and then leave it with him. And he will, sometimes he will say, 
“I’ve been thinking about what you said and I think there’s something in 
that.” Or more often it comes back as his idea … (Chairperson 1) 
Chairpersons can simultaneously advise and challenge the CEO, by testing the 
CEO’s ideas and adding different perspectives before they go before the board for 
discussion and decision. This requires that the CEO and chairperson enjoy strong mutual 
trust and are open-minded about the issues at hand (e.g. Roberts, 2002), as discussed at 
the start of this theme.  
… he was there to have, to give me impartial advice on a Chatham House 
Rules basis, that I could go and say to him, “Look, I really haven’t a fxxxxx 
clue what to do. I’m thinking of this. What do you think?” Not having to go 
to the board and say that … It was a proper conversation: “Can I help you?” 
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or “Have you thought about this?” But I used to take it on the basis: well, 
he’s asking me because maybe he will come out with a better answer. You 
both have to go in open-minded. (CEO 11) 
CEOs talked about the need to have absolute trust in the chairperson, to be able to 
take questions to the chairperson and challenge in a positive and constructive manner.  
The CEO in my opinion needs to know that the chairman is routing for her, 
that challenge, question, but the challenge and questioning and rigour, but 
that really believe and help you be successful. And I never – throughout our 
career working together – doubted that. (CEO 13) 
Although challenging and being supportive might be seen as contradictory, CEOs 
assert that these types of behaviour can and should exist simultaneously. For the CEO of 
a pharmaceutical company, the chairperson was a “senior adviser, with the edge of 
governance”, emphasising the importance of having challenging debates with the 
chairperson before gaining his support. 
I think [the chairperson] is a senior adviser, with the edge of governance. 
You want somebody who’s going to be supportive, but you can’t have 
somebody who just says yes to everything or never challenges or never asks 
a difficult – what’s the point? The chairman lets me do what I want but only 
after we’ve done the work to show it’s the right thing to do. I think those things 
[i.e. being challenging and supportive], all those behaviours are perfectly 
possible to co-exist with a civil, friendly relationship. (CEO 7) 
Other CEOs mentioned the chairperson’s contribution in advising on strategy, by 
challenging plans and identifying new aspects not yet taken into consideration by 
management. 
That depends a bit from the situation. In the daily operation I don’t seek his 
advice, because otherwise he would have taken the role. On strategic moves 
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definitely, I take him early on board that he sees the rationale and that he 
starts to challenge where he thinks that we could think further or better on 
aspects I have not yet taken into consideration – and there he has his 
experience and this is great to take profit from. (CEO 8) 
Similarly, one CEO reported having had many conversations with the chairperson, 
conversations that served to calibrate and refine strategy to address the firm’s strategic 
challenges. 
I’d have a lot of conversations with [chairperson name], so in a way you’re 
just trying to calibrate – so this is what I think we should do: let’s calibrate 
that. Initially, you had no time so you were basically saying, “We calibrated 
it crudely; we’re just going to do it”, but as time went on you were able to 
calibrate that more, think more, get more data and think about how you 
refined it. (CEO 1) 
This section has explored additional roles the chairperson plays in relation to the 
CEO. Evidence suggests chairpersons often play a counselling role which involves a 
process of emotionally regulating the CEO. This may be especially true in contexts of 
poor performance and far-reaching change where CEOs are under multiple pressures and 
face a magnitude of challenges. The chairperson’s second role is an advisory one, where 
we observe a more cognitive dimension of testing, calibrating and challenging strategy-
related ideas and dilemmas. The chairperson emerges as the first source of challenge and 
support (the co-existence of which is believed to be possible within the same 
relationship), before proposals are put forward to the board of directors.  
4.5.3.3 The chairperson as a partner of the CEO 
A final role that a chairperson plays in relation to the CEO is that of partner (Stewart, 
1991). In some occasions, the chairperson takes on executive responsibility for a 
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particular business unit as a way of handling certain tensions. As discussed above, it is 
only possible for the chairperson to act as a partner where there exists strong trust and the 
chairperson has time to devote to role; in addition, individuals’ interpretations of their 
roles must allow for an expansion of traditional boundaries. In one firm, the CEO 
explained how he and the chairperson shared executive responsibilities between the 
distribution and commercial units (which report to the CEO) and the development and 
production units (which report to the chairperson). When tensions emerge between these 
units they can only be resolved by the CEO and the chairperson working together.  
… we want the [distribution company] to look at it as a business case and not 
be forced into a decision. So what we have, what have we done? The UK and 
the US entities report into the chairman, as being the heart of creativity, as 
well, so, and the executive, who runs the worldwide distribution business, she 
reports into me. So, if there’s a conflict, it can only be resolved at board level 
because I don’t want distribution to be forced into a deal that they don’t like. 
So then they will have to come forward and, if they don’t agree on what to do, 
and then it is up to the chairman and to me to come to a verdict and make a 
decision. And that’s the sort of, yeah, tension that you feel in the business and 
it’s the way we resolve it, and we’ve got other examples that come very close 
to it. (CEO 3) 
Evidence suggests that, when chairpersons and CEOs are not able to share executive 
responsibility, things can go wrong. One CEO explained how he struggled to address 
long-term strategy and operational trade-offs due to inappropriate division of 
responsibility with his chairperson: the chairperson should have partnered with the CEO 
to handle stakeholders and their long-term demands which would have enabled the CEO 
to gain clarity and make the appropriate operational trade-offs.  
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I’m sure the chairman should have helped me, spotted what was going on. 
We should have had a much better division of responsibilities between the 
stakeholder management and the executive, the operational side … (CEO 2)  
Next, a summary of the chairperson–CEO role boundedness theme is presented.  
4.5.4 Summary of chairperson–CEO role boundedness  
This theme has explored the interplay between the roles of chairperson and CEO. It has 
explored the many and complex nuances that exist at the interaction of the chairperson 
and CEO roles and the importance of enabling effective handling of strategic tensions 
that arise in contexts marked by far-reaching change, such as technology change, 
economic recession and financial crisis, and regulatory change.  
The first aspect that became evident is that the quality of the relationship between 
the chairperson and the CEO is critical in determining responses to strategic tensions. The 
presence of high levels of trust in the relationship (e.g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; 
Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010) was found to be the platform upon which 
effective relations are built. In line with previous research (e.g. Coombes and Wong, 
2004; Stewart, 1991) it was found that the amount of time the chairperson devotes to the 
role (along with long tenures) determines not only the amount of routine interactions, 
which contribute to the development of high levels of trust (e.g. Kakabadse, Kakabadse 
and Barratt, 2006; Roberts, 2002), but also directly affects the delineation between the 
roles. These findings are akin to what Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght (2010) termed 
affective philos, of which a high level of trust is the principal component. These 
relationship qualities enable strategic tensions and challenges to be raised by either of the 
parties without fear of recrimination, loss of face or other penalties (e.g. Westphal and 
Bedner, 2005) as well as providing the CEO with a safe context for rehearsing complex 
and often ambiguous ideas under conditions of uncertainty (Roberts, 2002).  
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A second dimension of the chairperson–CEO relationship that emerged in this study 
was the presence of complementary skills, experience and perspectives, in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Roberts, 2002). Such complementarity of skills, experience and 
perspectives allows for both incumbents to separate efforts to balance short- and long-
term performance (Roberts, 2002:503) but also to develop a more complete – and, 
importantly, shared – sense-making (Weick, 1995) supported by a similar interpretive 
capability (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010). While both roles individually have 
responsibility for scanning the environment and interpreting events affecting the firm (as 
observed in Theme I), they are also required to complement each other and arrive at a 
shared understanding of strategic tensions and challenges, and the available courses of 
action. Examples have been shown where a failure to develop a common interpretation 
of events and circumstances were seen as causes of ineffective handling of tensions.  
The issue of role boundary delineation between chairperson and CEO was explored 
as it was strongly evinced in the data and is often a critical aspect of CEO and chairperson 
interactions (e.g. Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Stewart, 1991). Role 
boundary delineation has been shown to be highly dependent on the individual 
incumbents’ own interpretation of role and context within which the roles are enacted and 
interact. Irrespective of context and circumstances facing the firm, in many cases role 
boundary delineation was heavily influenced by normative prescriptions enshrined in 
governance codes and conventional wisdom, viz. that the chairperson leads the board and 
the CEO leads the firm (Roberts, 2002; Financial Reporting Council, 2016). While 
providing clear boundaries, such arrangements are not sensitive to contextual and 
circumstantial requirements and change. In these cases, the chairperson often assumes the 
role of consultant providing advice only at the request of the CEO (Stewart, 1991). Other 
accounts, however, have shown that CEOs and chairpersons can interpret roles in context 
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and away from rigid prescriptions, to the extent that role boundaries become less 
important and the incumbents’ skills, relationships and experience are the criteria for the 
specialisation of function and division of labour (Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik, 1965). 
Under these circumstances, the chairperson and the CEO are true partners (Stewart, 1991) 
in addressing strategic tensions. It was also noted that such arrangements reflect recent 
evidence that the delineation of role boundaries follows a negotiated order perspective 
(Cornforth and Macmillan, 2016). Evidence emerged from the study showing that, where 
there is no agreement on role boundaries, or they fail to adapt to changing circumstances, 
CEOs often react negatively to a chairperson who is perceived to be curtailing the CEO’s 
power of discretion. Interestingly, chairpersons used similar expressions in two of the 
cases, describing their roles as “accelerators and brakes” in relation to the CEO; this was 
perceived by the respective CEOs as being rather constraining.  
The exploration of the chairperson–CEO relationship informed a subsequent 
exploration of three key roles the chairperson may play in relation to the CEO: i) a 
buffering role in handling expectations from powerful stakeholders; ii) an advisory and 
counselling role; and iii) a partner role.  
The buffering role emerged as central. It was shown how NEDs may exhibit 
dysfunctional behaviour and how shareholders, investors and analysts may all place 
expectations upon the CEO to go in particular, often contradictory, directions (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). The CEO has been described by Tengblad (2004) as an “expectations 
handler”. Although this function is critical, particularly in contexts of far-reaching 
change, CEOs often face difficulties in reconciling the disparate expectations into one 
coherent agenda (Czarniawska, 1985). The role of the chairperson as a buffer emerged in 
this study as critical in supporting the CEO in this role. Chairpersons were depicted as 
“sponges”, “containers and channels” and “dissipaters of waves”, allowing the CEO time 
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and space to develop appropriate solutions that account for the variety of expectations, 
primarily in terms of short- and long-term performance. The chairperson helps the CEO 
set the expectations for the board and the market both in terms of time horizons and 
outcomes. This theme identifies two chairperson characteristics for effective buffering: i) 
appropriate industry experience and knowledge of the company (with a focus on 
understanding the critical stakeholders and nature of tensions); and ii) independence 
(material and of thinking and behaviour).  
This theme closed by exploring two additional roles of the chairperson in relation 
to the CEO. The advisory and counselling roles highlight the importance of the 
chairperson both advising the CEO on strategic matters and on regulating CEOs’ 
emotions. The role of the chairperson as partner refers to instances where the chairperson 
and CEO split executive responsibilities to handle strategic tensions.  
The next theme is termed “Chairperson role: leading the board in order to deal 
with strategic tensions” and will explore some unique features of the chairperson’s role 
in ensuring the effectiveness of the board’s contribution.  
4.6 Theme III: Chairperson role: leading the board in order 
to deal with strategic tensions 
This theme explores the chairperson’s role in leading the board of directors. It identifies 
the demands of the role and choices available to the chairperson in enacting the core 
responsibilities of what being a chairperson means: building and leading an effective 
board. When chairpersons are ineffective in discharging their role, this may place a 
constraint on CEOs; hence, CEOs’ perception of these elements of the chairperson’s role 
is also discussed.  
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Three key sub-themes emerged from the analysis of the chairperson role with regard 
to both demands (what the chairperson is required to do) and choices (how does the 
chairperson do it and which elements does the chairperson prioritise). A fourth sub-theme 
concerns how CEOs perceive the board’s contribution to strategy. The sub-themes are: 
 Determining and managing board composition; 
 Establishing board engagement policy and practice; 
 Managing board dynamics and contribution with regard to strategic tension-
generating topics; 
 Board contribution to strategy.  
CEO role analysis demonstrated that their own effectiveness depends on how 
chairpersons implement these features of the chairperson’s role. If the chairperson is 
effective, then these aspects emerge as supportive of the CEO; otherwise, they act as a 
constraint. Moreover, CEOs perceive their role as being co-responsible for adequate 
engagement with and dynamics within the board.  
4.6.1 Determining and managing board composition  
Determining and managing board composition is a demand of the chairperson role. Parker 
(1990) depicted the UK chairperson role as one of leading strategic change by composing 
the board in line with the challenges being faced by the firm. This thesis concurs with 
Parker’s study. One chairperson explained: 
It’s my job to change the composition of the board if it is not reflecting what’s 
needed. I asked to see every non-exec, every board member individually and 
I said to them all there’s going to be far-reaching change … But the board 
has got to change too, and so I’m going to see everybody and then I will tell 
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you what shape the board is going to be in and who’s going to be on it. 
(Chairperson 1) 
Findings in this study show that the choice of skills and experience (among other 
attributes) that are relevant for board members considering the challenges facing the 
company remain at the discretion of the chairperson.  
Composition and resource provision. Composing the board so that it matches the 
strategic demands facing the company emerged as a common denominator on how 
chairpersons choose to build their boards. While the balance between executive and non-
executive directors on boards is largely mandated by regulation (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016), chairpersons add the most value by carefully constructing a board the 
members of which possess the right mix of skills and experience that are relevant within 
the firm’s context. In this sense, board composition is firm- and context-specific and may 
explain why the vast amount of studies on board composition are for the most 
inconclusive (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). What emerges from the findings in 
this thesis is that board composition is determined largely by the chairperson after 
considering the external environment and the strategic challenges facing the firm. 
Contingency theorists (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) have long argued that organisations 
develop internal structures that match the requirements of the external environment. In 
particular, Pfeffer (1972) noted how boards are composed so that the firm’s external 
interdependencies and uncertainty are reduced. Board directors are thus selected on the 
basis that they can “coopt or partially absorb, important external organisations” (Pfeffer, 
1972:222).  
Evidence from this thesis shows repeatedly that the chairperson’s perception of the 
external environment and the strategic challenges facing the firm largely determines the 
choice of board composition. One example comes from the chairperson of an 
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infrastructure firm undergoing restructuring and complex strategic challenges. The 
chairperson explained the rationale for selecting and nominating directors to the board, 
stressing skills and experience in the industry and in related industries that have faced or 
are facing similar challenges, and the opportunity to foster cross-industry learning and 
bring different perspectives. In addition, other members were selected on the basis of their 
understanding of the different stakeholders that were important to the company: investor 
and finance, customers and government.  
The way the board is constructed, I am looking for a slightly broader footprint 
of skills and experiences. What I always do is to have two deeply experienced 
industry operators, so people who actually know how to build and operate in 
this industry. Two strong financial people, one who runs the audit risk 
committee … also brings a much more of what I call a retail, rather than 
corporate, finance. Another director which is very customer-driven, a lot of 
retail experience, but also understanding aviation, congested airspace, air 
traffic control, moving people through airports, and a lot of analogies 
between how those problems have been solved and the problems we face … 
and how he learnt how to manage lots more people using technology and so 
forth … I brought one who’s got huge experience in capital-intensive asset 
management and performance and another whose background is actually 
consulting with government, knows how government works, so again, 
because of our political stakeholders… (Chairperson 11) 
This excerpt supports research that shows that firms (i.e. chairpersons) change 
board composition to enhance the resource-provisioning role of directors when the 
organisation faces uncertainty and changes in dependencies with the external 
environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000), 
particularly when such an environment is causing poor performance (Boeker and 
Goodstein, 1991). It also concurs with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) when they argue that 
directors provide specific resources to the firm under the form of advice and expertise in 
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a variety of strategic areas: critical information, communication and support from and 
with important external constituencies; and legitimacy. CEOs in this study find value in 
boards that reflect the firm’s environment and that have the right skills and experiences 
to scan it and reduce uncertainty and complexity. 
… you need to have a board which has got the finger on the pulse of every 
demographic, every trend, of every innovation, of every technical change, of 
every behavioural change. It comes back then to composition of the board: 
what sort of people you need to have. Well, you need to have somebody who 
understands technology, somebody who understands marketing, somebody 
who possibly understands behavioural, somebody who understands 
consumer: each of those people can bring one of those little bits of vibration 
in. (CEO 11) 
Interestingly, chairpersons highlighted the fact that board composition should be 
able to reflect the strategic tensions facing the business, improving the board’s ability to 
address them effectively. Two distinct means of attaining this have emerged. One is 
ensuring that the board is composed of individuals who have distinct skills and experience 
related to the disparate forces affecting the firm. One example (below) came from the 
chairperson of a company facing significant digital technology disruption. He explained 
how he valued individuals who understood the legacy business well (store-based, 
requiring a different organisational and strategic rationale) and individuals who had 
expertise in web platforms, which was regarded as the future business model. The 
question for the company was how and to what extent to evolve the business from store-
based to web-based, recognising that both business models would have to co-exist. 
We had a board meeting yesterday which was really the legacy business, a 
lot about what is happening in execution – and that can be anything from 
issues in the distribution centres, where there are people on the board with, 
who can step back and give a different perspective, and on the web platform, 
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where again we have a lot of, you know, whether it’s [NED’s name] or others 
who have real expertise in these areas where they can just give a different 
perspective. (Chairperson 4) 
Composing the board of experts representing the old and the new allows the debate 
to be more fruitful and provides a platform for exploring ways to take advantage of the 
legacy business while evolving to a web environment.  
The second means of ensuring the board is composed of individuals who reflect the 
strategic tensions facing the firm is arguably more difficult to attain. Instead of having 
separate directors with skills and experience in either the old business model or the new 
one, one chairperson explained how he was searching for directors who possessed skills 
and experience in both the “old business” and the “new business”, which is based on 
digital technology.  
High-tech, high-touch is really what makes us unique. We are not a high-tech 
company and we’re no longer a just-touch company. It’s high-tech, high-
touch. I think we move more in a balanced way of what are the elements. But 
I think I now, oddly enough, I will tell you the one capability that I probably 
am still looking for is somebody that understands the business. That sounds 
odd, very odd, but you either have people in this industry that are yesterday’s 
people that know how to run the business of yesterday or you have those who 
believe that the technological model is the future. But somebody who really 
understands the marriage between high-tech, high-touch – if you know it, let 
me know. We have it inside the company but it’s, I’m looking for a challenger 
from the outside that could say, “Oh, but, hey, have you thought about X, Y 
or Z?” Now it has to come from different angles. And there’s nothing wrong 
then with having two individuals on the board, one with this one and one with 
the other one, but ideally you find somebody that has it integrated. 
(Chairperson 8) 
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While it is common to observe board members with unique expertise in either the 
legacy business or the new emerging business, this may also lead to challenges in terms 
of advising or challenging management’s strategic proposals, and require more time and 
effort to integrate different directors’ perspectives. Having members with the skills and 
experience to facilitate an understanding of both sides of a particular strategic tension (i.e. 
old business and new business, high-tech and high-touch) appears to provide the board 
with a greater integrative capability and a greater ability to challenge and advise 
management.  
Composition and cognitive diversity. The chairperson of a manufacturing 
company highlighted the importance of the board being composed of individuals with 
“different patterns of thinking” who can challenge conventional approaches to problem-
solving. Cognitive diversity (i.e. as opposed to gender or race diversity, for example) is 
seen as important in enhancing the board’s capabilities for solving challenges faced by 
the company. The importance of cognitive diversity for board effectiveness has been 
theoretically modelled by Forbes and Milliken (1999), who explain that cognitive 
diversity would lead to higher cognitive conflict which in turn would benefit the search 
for more innovative solutions or better scrutiny of executive proposals.  
It’s to try and get a different pattern of thinking, so in my mind diversity has 
got absolutely nothing to do with either gender or race: it’s to do with 
thinking patterns. And the problem that you have around board tables is a lot 
of people have come through the sort of school that we’ve been through. Yeah, 
you’re either a professional accountant or you’re a lawyer that’s had a 
similar sort of background and training and we tend to tackle problems in a 
very similar way. And it is very, very helpful to have people around a board 
table on a subcommittee who just say, “Why? Why don’t we do this?” And 
you generally get that lateral thinking, as I call it, from people with a different 
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background coming through. So I’m a big fan of it, but, as I say, nothing to 
do, you almost by accident get a bit of it with sex or race… (Chairperson 5) 
CEOs in this study agree that cognitive diversity built on diverse experience and 
skills is important for effective boardroom debate. 
I think if you look at, between the chairman and the senior independent 
director, you would get even more diversity in the way we would look at it. 
Now, one of those four people come from the sector, so they bring a sector 
view, one is from a finance world and the other’s from a big industrial 
business but not in the sector, so they come at things from slightly different 
perspectives. And some have more detailed knowledge of the business than 
others, right, and that does drive a bit of difference, which is good, because 
it also, it allows the debate to play out a little bit. (CEO 7) 
The importance of diversity of skills and experience on the board was highlighted 
by other CEOs: 
I think the more diversity you have the better, so we have four women on our 
board, we have people from the technology sector, so experienced 
professional board members. I think diversity is absolutely key. We needed 
specific skills; you know, we needed technology skills; we needed web skills; 
we needed people who understood the airlines. So the diversity is in the 
ethnicity, in the gender and in the capabilities and skills. (CEO 13) 
Notwithstanding the need for cognitive diversity built on distinct skills and 
experience, boards are a collective decision-making body, and are required to arrive at 
some form of consensus, sometimes under great pressure and in a very short time-frame. 
Past research has found inconclusive results on the effect of cognitive diversity (measured 
as level of cognitive conflict) on board control and service roles (Zona and Zattoni, 2007) 
and a negative impact on the board’s strategic role (Van Ees, van der Laan and Postma, 
2008), often implying the necessity of a trade-off between the benefits of cognitive 
  198 
diversity and the loss of group cohesiveness (Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009). One 
chairperson described the difficulty of reconciling board cognitive diversity and 
cohesiveness. 
I’m a strong believer in diversity, but it has a risk. It makes your board very 
versatile, very different, which is an asset, but you then also have to make 
sure that it’s a real team, that people don’t start thinking from their own 
angle. And so it to me is the best recipe, but it’s also the most difficult recipe. 
(Chairperson 8) 
While cognitive diversity brings differing solutions and perspectives, which are of 
benefit in arriving at more robust decisions, it simultaneously has the potential for 
destructive conflict, making consensus more difficult and ultimately fracturing the board. 
Chairpersons want both board diversity (option-increasing) and board unity and 
consensus (option-reducing), which are often difficult to reconcile. However, there is 
conflicting evidence. Godstein, Gautam and Boeker (1994) found that board diversity as 
measured by occupational backgrounds of board members had a constraining effect on 
the degree of strategic change, but this effect was not present in larger boards (i.e. those 
with less cohesion).  
The chairperson’s ability to manage difference of viewpoint on important strategic 
topics while attaining a workable consensus and maintaining board unity has been 
described as fundamental to the long-term success of the firm (Cadbury, 1992; Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2007; Taylor, 2001). This has emerged as a role-based tension for 
chairpersons, as explained at the beginning of this chapter (refer to Theme I, Section 
4.4.2.4) 
Composition and signalling. In addition to this, chairpersons alluded to a 
signalling function of board composition decisions. A change in board composition 
signals to the market and to inside the company the commitment of the chairperson to 
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change (particularly if the company is facing problems) and also that change is starting 
“from the top”. In the excerpt below, whereas the previous board was composed almost 
exclusively of British nationals, the chairperson wanted the board to reflect the variety of 
countries in which the company operates, sending a signal that the company was not “a 
UK company” but a “very international one”, while ensuring the board had critical 
resources in both destination markets and customer base. Again, this agrees with the 
resource-dependence perspective, but adds an additional dimension as to the motives of 
chairpersons in choosing particular board compositions: i.e. in this case a signalling 
function. Recent research showed that board diversity can be used to signal firms’ product 
markets or their progressiveness (e.g. that they are forward-looking or socially 
responsible) (Broome and Krawiec, 2008). 
… the first action after having become chairman of the board was really to 
make some changes to the board, and that gave a clear signal also to the 
inside and to the outside world as to changes starting from the top. And we 
started recruiting new board members, having a clear picture of what are the 
views, what are the qualities, what are the skills that we need in order to 
complement. I think the board members were more chosen as to what’s a nice 
name as to what can they contribute to the business … I said I want to see the 
best female and I want to see the best male for each of those functions and we 
chose. We have a board today that over a third is of a different gender than 
the other and we have a board that today has I think nationalities from 
Turkey, Belgium, Netherlands, the US and the UK. And so also giving a signal 
that this is not a UK company. This is a very international company, although 
it didn’t behave like that. (Chairperson 8) 
Composition and industry experience. While chairpersons referred to diversity 
of skills and experience and the resulting cognitive diversity, none made any particular 
mention of industry experience. CEOs, on the other hand, described industry experience 
as both a support and a constraint in enacting required changes. Resource-dependence 
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proponents argue that industry-related experience on the board is critical for firms in 
gathering important information and links from industry-relevant sources and thereby 
reducing uncertainty and providing access to critical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). However, when industry-related experience dominates, events are likely to be 
perceived and interpreted through the board’s “industry wisdom” (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979) and responses devised according to “industry recipes” (Haynes and Hillman, 2010). 
The CEO of a large construction firm explained how the strong presence of industry 
experience on the board during the 2008 financial crisis and property downturn helped 
him devise an appropriate response. 
The executives on the board had been through previous recessions. There was 
one non-executive who had been in the industry all the way through. And that 
was critical to supporting me, because he was the external independent voice, 
if you like, on the board of: “Are you doing the right things?” because he’d 
seen it done before and he’d seen it done by lots of other companies … It was 
the combined knowledge of the industry, basically, said: we do need to do this 
very, very fast … You draw on other people’s experiences and try to extract 
those to get the best plan you can. I always use the board as highly paid 
advisers. In fact, most of the people on the board by that stage I would say 
were really contributing to the whole debate and had been through similar 
things, either through the industry or through their own experiences and 
therefore they would enable us to calibrate whether we had it right. (CEO 1) 
Another CEO presiding over restructuring in a recessionary environment explained 
how the board’s lack of industry-specific knowledge and skills meant a lack of support 
for the industry-specific trade-offs the CEO was confronted with under the restructuring 
endeavour.  
But it was still a highly operational business and the board didn’t really 
necessarily understand operations … didn’t necessarily understand the 
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difficult trade-off that we were making on a daily, weekly basis. They lacked 
the operational stuff that we had to deal with. (CEO 2) 
The above accounts show how industry experience is valued by CEOs. Both 
companies were facing a downturn yet with no fundamental change in the industry that 
would have required a radical deviation from industry norms. Other CEOs that were 
facing more fundamental strategic change viewed strong industry orientation on the board 
as a constraint to the required strategic change. This is partially in line with Haynes and 
Hillman (2010), who found that boards with great capital depth (i.e. the same industry 
expertise as the focal firm) are less likely to deviate from industry norms, somehow 
constraining the degree of strategic change. One CEO explained how the predominance 
of industry-expert board members contributed to the company deciding against shifting 
from industry norms in the direction of technology-based business models. 
… most of the board members before at [the company] came from travel, and 
it was quite sort of incestuous. (CEO 13)  
Another CEO who was proposing a radical investment in new technology faced a 
difficult time in convincing the board of the merits of this strategic change away from 
industry norms, which he attributed to lack of industry experience and exposure. 
… but a lot of people, actually, they didn’t have particularly the skill sets, 
industry experience or exposure. (CEO 3) 
Board composition emerged as a chairperson role demand. Chairpersons retain 
significant discretion on board composition, particularly in terms of skills and experience. 
Chairpersons emphasised the importance of ensuring that the board was composed of a 
mix of skills and experience that adequately reflect the firm’s environment and the 
strategic challenges and tensions being faced. The resulting cognitive diversity helps in 
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devising more comprehensive responses to company challenges. Board composition was 
observed by chairpersons as serving the purposes of reducing external dependencies and 
uncertainty, increasing legitimacy, advising management, and signalling the direction of 
change to external constituencies. Accounts from CEOs spotlighted how influential is the 
proportion of industry-specific knowledge on the board. CEOs facing fundamental 
changes in industry saw this as constraining strategic attempts to change from “old” 
industry norms, whereas CEOs in environments where industry was recessionary but not 
fundamentally changing saw high levels of industry expertise as value-adding.  
While board composition is a fundamental area of demand and decision-making for 
chairpersons and it lays the foundations for an effective board, it is of little value if there 
is poor engagement by the board with the CEO and the business. This emerged as a further 
demand for the chairperson, and is explored next.  
4.6.2 Ensuring adequate board engagement  
In addition to determining and managing board composition, a key chairperson demand 
is to ensure adequate level of board engagement with the business and with the CEO. 
How chairpersons establish and develop board engagement policy and practice, 
determining board agenda and organising board work are discussed next.  
4.6.2.1 Non-executive directors’ (NEDs’) engagement with the business 
Chairpersons are charged with the responsibility of dictating and promoting the expected 
levels of NEDs’ engagement. High levels of NED engagement are perceived by 
chairpersons as promoting NEDs’ knowledge about the company and its challenges, and 
hence better equipping them to discharge their duties of challenging and advising 
management. One chairperson explained his approach: 
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… and the board members have total carte blanche to go wherever they like 
in the company. They can go into executive meetings, R&D research, product 
marketing, the management meeting that the CEO chairs, visit any research 
establishment, any manufacturing or commercial unit, find out what’s going 
on, ask questions, be better informed and hopefully more able to add value 
when it came to looking at the issues and challenges. No chaperoning – and 
initially I said, “Go and be a fly on the wall, but if you need to ask a question, 
ask a question”, and that is now part of the way the company operates. And 
I always had that right, if you like, but I wanted to make sure all my board 
members did. (Chairperson 3) 
The chairperson of a large retailer explained his approach of ensuring that non-
executive board members are close to the business and connected with the business 
reality. 
We actually have quite a few breakfasts where non-executives come in here 
and talk to people of all levels in the business, because we really want people 
to understand what the board does. And I think it always surprises people in 
the business how in touch the board is with day-to-day life here, because 
normally you would think this is some remote thing that you never see. But 
actually I think almost all of our non-execs have been in and done these 
employee breakfasts and I think that’s really valuable. And I do a number of 
them as well and they can get a sense of “should I trust these people to both 
hold to account and challenge?” but also encourage the executive team, 
because I think they expect that from a board. (Chairperson 4) 
Past studies in UK and US contexts identified that effective chairpersons ensure 
these engagement practices are part of their board culture. Having access to independent 
sources of information (e.g. by visiting operations, directing questions to lower levels of 
management, and accessing company documents) have been identified as effective 
chairperson practices that contribute to effective NED role fulfilment as regards 
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monitoring and advising management (Carter and Lorsch, 2004; McCabe and Nowak, 
2008; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). 
It is thus up to the chairperson to set the tone and expectations of NED engagement 
and contribution (Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005), enabling them to gain access to 
unfiltered direct information from different business units, employees, customers and 
other stakeholders. This allows NEDs to move away from a management-feeding process 
and be more effective in challenging and advising management.  
4.6.2.2 Board engagement with the CEO  
Board–CEO engagement is another important aspect for the chairperson to manage. As 
noted by several researchers, strong and engaged boards mean effective chairpersonship 
(e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005). Regarding board–CEO 
engagement, two aspects are salient in this study: i) the need to engage with the board in 
a timely manner regarding strategic tension-generating topics and; ii) supportive 
engagement between the board and the CEO.  
Engaging the board in a timely manner regarding strategic tension-generating 
topics. The chairperson of a large pharmaceutical company explained how he 
implemented a change to CEO–board interaction. Topics that were a cause of tension 
were raised in good time with the board, allowing the board to understand and explore 
them with the CEO before problems materialised or major commitments were made. This 
in turn demanded greater engagement by board members with the business challenges.  
… I wanted to change the way the board and management interacted. So that 
meant that what I wanted from the CEO was that he would bring ideas to the 
board at an early stage of development, recognising that some of them would 
be half-baked and jumped, but giving the opportunity for the board to interact 
at an early stage and understand therefore what he was trying to achieve … 
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That then placed a demand on the board to be much more engaged than they 
had been, so they understood more deeply the issues and challenges that the 
company had. So we evolved, both he raising subjects early on that concerned 
him; sometimes they were late because it was an emerging risk that suddenly 
hit us. (Chairperson 3) 
Another chairperson from a large tobacco company reported a similar practice in 
CEO–board interaction. Here, the disruptive potential of e-cigarettes is a constant 
presence. Interaction allows the continual exploration of the company’s position in the 
face of this emergent threat. 
… off the top of my head, probably six or seven briefing papers over a year 
or two years, 18 months probably, and the board is fully engaged. But much 
more engaged from an education point of view: “Do you guys think we’re 
sort of going down the right track?” But, no, the board, no, very focused – 
important issue. (Chairperson 4) 
Another chairperson explained his role in ensuring that the CEO and the board 
discuss tension-generating topics early and continuously. 
… my role here would be kind of to ensure that the board was completely 
informed and involved in these huge changes, right through, not just one-off, 
but steadily and continuously. (Chairperson 2) 
CEOs expressed similar views about CEO–board interaction, that is: in raising 
potentially tension-generating topics early with the board, so that engagement built 
slowly, directors became increasingly aware of the tensions and gained trust in the way 
the CEO was addressing them. If such tensions become salient and materialise as issues, 
the board is in a comfortable position to support the executive. 
… quite often we’ll produce for the board what looks like a board paper, what 
looks like an authorisation paper – but isn’t – and essentially it goes to the 
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board with a condition that there will be no decision taken, but it gives 
everybody a safe environment to explore how they feel about this option.  
Now, the deal is: you can’t criticise us, so the risk of that is that you could 
say, “Well, look, you’ve taken five ideas to get what you want. One said turn 
right, one said turn left, one said go forward. And you didn’t do any of them. 
Do you know what you’re doing?” Right that’s – which is where I think some 
people could lack. My view is the only way to really give the board a clear 
view of where the solution space is, is to be able to explore the solution space 
… the value of the board is at its maximum when the option is being initially 
considered, and it diminishes as it becomes more crystallised. And the reason 
for that is: because in a company this size you’d expect a lot of the details to 
be, you would not expect a useless proposal when you’ve got a company of 
this size. (CEO 7) 
Time and again CEOs explained how ensuring boards’ early and continuous 
engagement with strategic topics allows confidence, awareness and understanding to 
grow, so that, when and if a decision is required, there is a history of interaction and 
thinking on the topic. This engagement process allows the CEO to understand each 
individual director’s views and preferences, and shape the proposals to accommodate 
these views, before submitting to the board for a decision. 
We’re always engaging with topics. So what we tend to do is: we will put a 
topic into the board to get a discussion round about it, to get their views and 
input, so as we essentially shape things before we get to the decision. Because 
what I don’t like is: I do not like forcing people to have to make a decision. 
Because I don’t want people to be uncomfortable … you fight battles you 
know you’re going to win. I’m not going to take things into a board that I’ve 
not rehearsed. I’ve got an understanding of how [director A] thinks or how 
[director B] thinks. I haven’t spent time thinking about what their pluses and 
minuses are and how their behaviours will end up. (CEO 9) 
Some CEOs described the relationship with the board as transparent and open (i.e. 
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any issues can be debated) and indicated the importance of having opportunities to meet 
informally outside normal board meetings for providing the right context for good debate 
and discussion of important issues. 
… we have a horribly transparent relationship; there are very few things that 
the board doesn’t know. We deliberately have two mechanisms of the board 
which work extremely well. So the dinner, the board dinner, which very often 
will be me on my own with the non-executives, we’re entirely free-flowing and 
strategic: What’s happening? What do we think about the environment? What 
do we think other companies are, so where are the big scary issues? So they’ll 
be regularly, and very often there will be over a period of two or three years, 
the same subject might be covered in 70% of those meetings, not super detail. 
(CEO 7) 
Chairpersons and CEOs both indicated that successful board–CEO engagement 
needs to be based on strategic topics – threats and opportunities – in a climate of openness 
and transparency that allows difficult issues to be discussed. This is often facilitated by 
encouraging informal dinners and opportunities for engagement outside the traditional, 
formal and minuted board meetings. Engagement is depicted as an ongoing process in 
which strategic topics are raised early (and sometimes stay on the agenda for years) so 
that the views of individual board members are heard before the CEO commits too 
strongly to a course of action. This allows directors to gain trust about how strategic 
tensions are being addressed and gives them a continuous feed about how executive 
thinking is evolving.  
Supportive engagement between the board and the CEO. Building ongoing 
board engagement regarding strategic business challenges allows a continuous alignment 
to be built between the board and the CEO. Such continuous alignment ensures there are 
no surprises for the board when strategic challenges precipitate action. Because the board 
has been continuously engaged with the topics and a shared understanding of the issues 
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has been slowly built, trust has developed and the board more readily engages with the 
necessary decisions in a supportive manner. CEOs in this study all agree that when 
engagement with strategic topics is done openly and progressively in the manner 
described above, the board is more likely to show support for decisions when they become 
due. 
… it’s about taking them on board, it’s about involving them, it’s making them 
feel they’re part of the decision-making. It’s about – and this is where boards 
in total, i.e. non execs and executives, if they work together, can be very 
unified and very strong and all speaking off the same song sheet. (CEO 11) 
Two further CEOs explained how they felt total unity and alignment between the 
board and the executives when the time came to make difficult decisions about ongoing 
strategic tensions. 
… in the world of trying to deal with a myriad of complex issues and 
stakeholders with the board 100% behind you, I knew I could rely on them. 
You couldn’t get a cigarette paper between the executive and the board, so as 
we went to the outside world we were unanimous. (CEO 2) 
… they trusted what we were saying … that’s where a board moves, in my 
humble opinion, from being one which is construed as an unnatural work 
team by the essence of what governance says: it’s where you want them then 
to coalesce, when you have a problem, to be a natural work team … it’s really 
important the board takes that same approach, which says: so you’ve got to 
have unity; which says: we were supportive of the executive doing this, the 
whole board was supportive of it, because quite often we get “where was the 
board?” and you say the board was absolutely 100% behind us. (CEO 10) 
When engagement is done in this way it reduces the time needed to respond to 
strategic issues that materialise requiring immediate action.  
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… it was a conversation with my executive colleagues, and obviously the 
board were heavily involved in this. They were, obviously, they could see what 
was happening. We were keeping them very informed on it. [The board was] 
interested in we were taking action, the necessary action, as fast as we could, 
and then it was about reporting back to them the progress that we were 
making. (CEO 1) 
Chairpersons have overall responsibility for ensuring adequate levels and quality of 
engagement between the board and the CEO. It is for the chairperson to set expectations 
about engagement and how the board is to interact with the CEO. Obviously, engagement 
is a two-way process and the CEO needs to play his or her part in keeping the board 
informed and engaged. In addition to setting the tone for board–CEO engagement, the 
chairperson has an additional responsibility to determine and organise the board agenda 
and work in such a manner that quality of engagement is attained. This is discussed next.  
4.6.2.3 Organising board agenda and working for engagement  
Chairpersons have wide-ranging choice in shaping board agendas, and ensuring that the 
board engages with tension-generating topics appropriately. Setting the board agenda, 
and avoiding the domination of the CEO in this process, has been consistently cited in 
research as an important chairperson responsibility (Bailey and Peck, 2013; McNulty et 
al., 2011; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). In this 
study, the chairperson of a large tobacco company explained how the threat of e-cigarettes 
as a substitute for the company’s product is a recurring issue on the board agenda.  
E-cigarettes exactly the same [i.e. regular item on the board agenda]. We’re 
very conscious that it could be very disruptive, or people talk about it as the 
Kodak moment potentially for tobacco. We don’t think so now, but we are 
alert to it and we think that we have enough rigour into the process to work 
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out at what point it flips that we can be genuinely fast followers. (Chairperson 
5) 
Another chairperson was decisive when asked about his role in dealing with 
strategic tensions. In a business facing technology disruption, which requires a transition 
to a new business model based on digital technology, the chairperson highlighted his role 
in ensuring that the tensions between legacy business and new business get into the board 
agenda and are challenged vigorously.  
My one job which I can do as a chairman is get these issues on the table: like 
the legacy issue, it’s really useful. I’ve got a good board who care, they’re 
engaged, they challenge, but it’s not this niggling kind of challenge that they 
teach people on strategy courses: some nonsense, babbling on like this. I just 
want to say, “Come on, give me something substantive. Let’s get into the 
business. Don’t sit there and try to be cute by asking piddling questions.” 
(Chairperson 2) 
Chairpersons respond to strategic tensions by ensuring they are present on the board 
agenda and that robust discussions happen which allow a continuous common 
understanding of those tensions and the strategic direction. This enables board members 
to confront the tensions on an ongoing basis and continuously monitor and calibrate 
executive thinking and strategic proposals.  
The chairperson has wide-ranging choice in how to organise board activities. This 
includes the number of formal meetings to be held in a given year and the areas of focus 
in which the board can add value. Chairperson 2 described how he organises the board 
work. 
I determined the board would focus on four things where we could add value 
– the whole idea was adding value. So: governance, strategy, business 
performance monitoring and people – and that’s it, and we focus on that. So 
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we, our six meetings have one of those things as the theme: they’re almost 
completely devoted to that, and all the administration, we don’t let our 
agenda. The agenda goes out before the board, well in advance of the board 
meeting, and people, if there’s something they want to focus on, we bring the 
people in or we talk about it, but that’s not why we’re there primarily.  So we 
do business performance at our, logically in London, and our annual results 
in, at the end of February – that includes a whole variety of setting, that’s the 
operating plan for the year, there’s the treasury, liquidity planning, risk 
analysis, but it’s business, we do that in February, and we do it again in July, 
late July at the interims, which again makes sense, because that’s when we 
have all our numbers fresh and we’re ready to go; we spend a lot of time on 
business planning. We focus on governance and shareholder issues in April 
because that’s our AGM, so we bring ourselves up to speed on all the 
governance and shareholder stuff, so that’s logical. So that leaves us June, 
October and December to focus on strategy and people, which is great. So, 
and then, in December, we kind of do a very quick strategic plan wrap-up and 
say, “OK, this is what we said the world was going to look like. This is where 
we were going. Has anything changed?” And, if we say then, whoops, we’d 
better, and then we spend the rest of the time on succession planning of 
people. (Chairperson 2) 
How the board functions, however, may need to be changed according to 
circumstances. One chairperson explained how he increased the number of meetings as 
well as the level of information brought before the board during the 2008–2009 financial 
crisis.  
Our normal board cycle, they meet every year and, I forget, it was 2008, 2009, 
we had 30 meetings one year and just about the same the next year. And that 
had two effects. One is: it denied the opportunity of saying, “Well, you, you’ve 
moved into a place where I wouldn’t be happy with”, but, secondly, it actually 
had the opposite effect, is they felt that they could, because it wasn’t just, 
there was, “Here’s the latest”, it was “Here’s the problem: what, how are we 
going to solve it?” They were deeply involved, and I absolutely reached out 
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to each and every one of them to do that. And some were better than others 
at coping with that, but they, no one could say there weren’t given a chance 
to say their bit … (Chairperson 9) 
Chairpersons have freedom of choice in organising board work and the frequency 
of board meetings and also in defining the priority areas. It is also up to the chairperson 
to make changes to the board’s function that reflect changes in business circumstances. 
Chairpersons also have freedom of choice to decide when special subcommittees 
are required to address non-programmed issues as well as deciding who sits on 
committees and subcommittees. Since Cadbury (1992), audit, remuneration and 
nomination committees have been progressively adopted and are now established in the 
vast majority of FTSE publicly listed companies. Such committees, it is argued, constitute 
strategic tools to increase external legitimacy and ensure specialised monitoring and 
control of executive action (Harrison, 1987). Other studies have shown that non-executive 
directors working simultaneously in remuneration and audit committees might find it hard 
to reconcile a strategy and monitoring function (Spira and Bender, 2004). Less discussed 
in the literature is the impact of board committees and subcommittees on information 
flows and overall NED engagement. In this study, chairpersons see committee work as 
necessary for addressing particular emerging topics of concern, but they also see 
committees and subcommittees as dangerous, as they can exclude some board members 
from important decisions, and place them at an informational disadvantage, thereby 
breaking down engagement. One chairperson explained: 
There’ll be a subcommittee. We always form them when there’s something 
big going on. For example, M&As: we will always run a subset of the board 
and I will always make sure that the skills I want are there. I tell those people 
they’ve got to just free up their diaries, and I will speak to them if they are 
having problems. And we do meetings late at night and we do meetings on 
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Sundays. And so we’ve got that added flexibility: mandatory they attend. But 
the rest of the board is always informed when we’re having a subcommittee 
meeting and they are all invited to attend, but they’re not mandatory 
attendees. (Chairperson 5) 
This concern about the potential for committees and subcommittees to break 
information flows and engagement was expressed several times. 
… even though we have committees, everybody is free to join every committee 
and, yeah, as a matter of fact, everybody joins every committee. So they are 
not a full voting member but everybody is, and so there is not a two speed or 
two level of intelligence – particularly dangerous in my mind when it comes 
to audit that the audit people know so much more than the non-audit 
members. So all board members were continuously on the same level of 
information. (Chairperson 8) 
Such concerns by chairpersons echo the concerns of Sharpe (2012), who warns that 
increased formalisation of structure and complexity of boards may have unintended 
effects on the processing of information for good decision-making. To ensure that 
committees and subcommittees are not a constraining factor, some chairpersons choose 
to have an open policy where every board member is invited to sit on committees and 
subcommittees, thereby enabling an equal level of information and engagement of non-
executives on important business topics.  
4.6.3 Managing board debate, dynamics and contribution 
In this study the chairperson role has been depicted as one of leading the board. Critical 
areas of chairperson decision-making revolve around board composition, policy and 
practice regarding engagement, and organising the board agenda and work. All these 
aspects lay the foundations for effective contributions and dynamics during board 
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meetings. The chairperson is the key individual who chairs board meetings and manages 
board dynamics and contribution, assuming a pivotal role in maintaining a climate of trust 
and openness, ensuring that tensions are fully confronted without the board losing its 
unity (also discussed in Theme I, Section 4.4.2.4). These findings are in line with 
previous studies and are discussed next in greater detail. 
4.6.3.1 Managing board dynamics and debate on tension-generating topics  
Chairpersons emphasised their role in marshalling board members’ expertise and 
experience, allowing for different perspectives to be debated freely inside the boardroom. 
It is also part of the chairperson’s role to act as the integrator of differing perspectives by 
summarising and concluding on the different views brought by board members on 
particular topics. The ability of the chairperson to conduct effective board meetings by 
means of open discussion and debate has been noted as a critical feature of the 
chairperson’s role, and one that has a decisive impact on board effectiveness (Bailey and 
Peck, 2013; Garratt, 1999; McNulty et al., 2011; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005). 
… when you get to chairman level, you need to do a lot more of: right – this 
is the issue; what do people think? And let the debate go, maybe direct the 
debate a little bit, pull people in, but try and let the debate happen. And then 
conclude and summarise and let the decision be a board decision rather than 
a chairman decision. (Chairperson 5) 
The importance of having a good-quality debate that builds on board members’ 
different experience and skills is perceived by chairpersons to be important, particularly 
with regard to difficult strategic items that are by their nature contentious. The 
chairperson’s task is to ensure that board members do collide and have constructive 
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conflict, but also to summarise and facilitate the integration of different views. The role 
of the chairperson is to expose tension points rather than avoid them, promoting open 
debate and healthy levels of cognitive conflict. One chairperson explained his view: 
… these are the situations where there’s lots of issues and lots of judgements 
to be made. And a good board should be one that can debate those issues 
openly and can manage argument successfully. The job of the chairman is 
making sure that issues come on the table and people do collide. Now it, you 
would love to think the board will be as one, there will be no conflict, but 
actually there are issues – discuss them, otherwise you will make a wrong 
judgement. But the executive team need that supportive guidance, and that 
doesn’t just mean saying yes. (Chairperson 1) 
Some CEOs expressed agreement on this point:  
Now, some boards, I think, either don’t want to talk about things which are 
not real and some executives don’t want to talk about scary stuff that could 
be very dangerous. You need to get rid of both of those aspects and those 
discussions have to happen. (CEO 7) 
In line with previous findings, it is for the chairperson to acts as a “conductor”, 
manage dissent and work towards a consensual common view, setting the tone on 
governance matters (Leblanc, 2004). Such a key requirement requires the role incumbent 
to be acutely aware of the board climate, sensing changes in mood, and understanding 
changing dynamics (Kakabadse et al., 2001). 
Time and again, chairpersons emphasised the requirement for tension-generating 
topics to be fully discussed while ensuring that boardroom conflict remains constructive. 
It is up to the chairperson to ensure that all non-executives have their say in order to 
maximise the knowledge and skills present in the board, bring in different perspectives, 
and ensure collective engagement and accountability.  
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It doesn’t mean that you should never have disagreement in the boardroom, 
no, but you should be careful: you should dose it because if you, either it 
becomes a vote of non-confidence vis-à-vis an individual. The challenge for 
a chairman has to make sure that touchy items become a topic and not an 
item from the CEO. On the next board meeting we have two what I call topics, 
and everybody can there say draw a line or raise a flag because it’s a topic. 
It’s different versus if the CEO would say, “This is what I want to do”, 
because then you have to say no to the CEO or yes to the CEO. But here it’s 
brought as to “this is a topic” and everybody just, you have a guided 
discussion … During the board meetings you make sure as a chairman that 
everybody has his point of view because you have different characters. You 
have some people that are very talkative. There are some people they are just 
saying nothing, but once they say something it’s dot on. But try to make sure 
that at the end of an important discussion that you go round the table and ask 
each member their view, so they can’t hide by saying nothing. (Chairperson 
8) 
Boards that are unable to cultivate open debate and challenge on tension-generating 
topics are seen as dysfunctional and unable to cope with decisions on strategic tensions 
when they become inevitable. One chairperson new to the firm explained how, during a 
board dinner, he questioned executives openly and challenged their answers, which came 
as a shock, as this had not been a practice of the previous incumbent. In fact, this firm had 
severe financial and competition problems and ended up bankrupt despite the 
chairperson’s efforts. 
And, indeed, when we went to the management in the US for the first time as 
a board, and I did a board dinner the night before and I chaired the 
conversation then. I went round and questioned every executive from the US 
management team in front of everyone else. That had never happened before. 
Apparently, they were quite taken aback by that: the process and the detail of 
the questions. And having the pushback on the answers. (Chairperson 7) 
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One highly experienced chairperson made the case for the criticality of having open 
and frequent boardroom debate and challenge on important strategic issues. The 
chairperson needs to set the tone for the discussions inside the boardroom: 
… the board that is incapable of having debate or, if it’s a very frequent thing, 
you’ll find that lots of boards don’t want, and the chairman will intervene 
when people start arguing and they’ll close it out, take it outside the meeting. 
But that board is going to be tested when you get into this moment of 
challenges and, because it’s not capable of facing into the issues, will fail. 
No, but the point is to have that debate. If you have argument in a board, you 
have to have security in the board, security meaning people; there’s 
embedded trust and respect, and “I think your contribution is worthwhile; 
you think my contribution’s worthwhile”, so we’ll listen to each other, 
express our views clearly, listen clearly and not think this is somehow a 
career-threatening, life-threatening event to have a difference of view. 
(Chairperson 1) 
When boards are able to discuss strategic issues freely and constructive challenge 
is part of the board’s culture, the company benefits from different perspectives that make 
for a better-informed strategy, avoiding the dominance of one particular view.  
One chairperson described a situation in which the contribution of all members was 
important in reaching a consensus about the company’s competitive advantage in a 
situation of restructuring and technology disruption. He described how the CEO’s vision 
was to move the business entirely into the digital space, whereas the contribution of other 
board members provided a counterpoint, favouring the retention of a physical presence in 
stores. 
The CEO’s vision would probably in its more extreme be initially through a 
storeless society with massive online booking without an airplane and maybe 
even without a product. Really the magic intermediate. And [executive A] 
would then say, “Hey, but if you don’t have a product in this kind of industry, 
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you’re not going to have anything. You need product.” And that brought in 
the focus of product. The CFO brought in the element of finance in terms of, 
“Hey, but your airline isn’t all that bad. It eats a lot of capital, but at the same 
time if we are moving into a sale and leaseback, it really can bring some 
capital in there.” So they’re, those are examples where you have a discussion. 
(Chairperson 8) 
In contrast, one CEO (who viewed his chairperson as ineffective) explained how he 
feels boards are unprepared to deal with major tensions where solutions are not obvious 
and trade-offs are required. Lack of time to reflect on tensions and a tendency for boards 
to prefer quick solutions were described as impeding boards’ contribution to difficult 
strategic tensions. In such boards, he asserted, loud voices and personality often drive 
decisions.  
Boards tend to like to find solutions to problems. Where they struggle is where 
there is no solution to be found. And where you, where you’ve got to make a 
trade-off and your personal trade-off is driven by your value set, and my 
personal trade-off is driven by my value set, and somebody’s got to make a 
decision in that. Those are difficult and they simply don’t have the time to 
really reflect on the trade-offs, the different perspectives, and quite often, too 
often, the decision is influenced by personality and loud speaking. People who 
shout and are passionate about it. (CEO 2) 
He continued by describing the boardroom environment during board meetings:  
Board meetings weren’t as challenging as they might be. We weren’t getting 
the benefit of the non-execs’ experience. They weren’t coming forward with, 
“Have you thought about doing this?” “Perhaps if we did that?” or “I’ve 
been listening to a stakeholder and they think a little bit more of this, a little 
bit less of that” type stuff. So it was quite a passive board. It really didn’t 
engender any real dialogue in collective problem solving. (CEO 2) 
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Having brought to light the chairperson’s role in setting the tone for board debate 
and fostering vigorous discussion on strategic tension-generating topics, we now turn to 
the involvement of the board in the firm’s strategy. The extent to which the chairperson 
wants the board involved in strategy (O’Neal and Thomas, 1995), the agenda for board 
meetings, the process and conduct of meetings, and the role of away-days or informal 
dialogue between the board and the executives (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999) all count 
among the factors determining the degree of board involvement in strategy, and which 
also emerge in this thesis. Past literature has portrayed board involvement in strategy as 
a passive–active continuum (e.g. Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Hendry, Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2010; Zahra, 1990). Scholars propounding the passive–active continuum have 
found that UK boards play an active role in strategy, challenging managerial perspectives, 
especially in times of crisis or poor performance (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles 
and Taylor, 1996, 2001; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001), and chairpersons’ accounts in 
the present study suggest this is the case. Insofar as directors draw on their knowledge, 
experience and skills to influence management and shape strategy, they assume the role 
of resource providers (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). However, this thesis challenges 
this idea of the passive–active continuum, in that it “assumes linearity in the strategy 
process, but strategic decisions often evolve through complex, non-linear and fragmented 
processes” (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010:35). Chairperson accounts in this thesis 
on how board meetings require the board to adopt an active and challenging position with 
regard to strategic tension-generating topics and management proposals suggest that, in 
fact, strategy resembles more of a highly contextual, interactive and complex practice 
where active and passive behaviours co-exist (Carter and Lorsch, 2004). Boards 
participate in strategy by continuously interacting with management and other 
stakeholders (Jensen and Zajac, 2004; Useem and Zelleke, 2006). Recent research on 
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“strategy as practice” found that boards focus more on “interactive strategising” (as 
opposed to procedural strategising) involving “direct face-to-face interaction between 
senior management and other organisational actors in order to influence the development 
and execution of strategy” (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010:37). Such strategising 
practice is seen as a “interpretative practice” which enables “top managers to argue for 
their own interpretations of strategy” relying on “social exchanges in which individuals 
and groups communicate, persuade, negotiate (and re-negotiate), continuously building 
shared frameworks of meaning about strategy in order to influence each other behaviors” 
(Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010:37). Importantly, such “interactive strategising” is 
likely to be used when the board’s strategic stance favours a change in strategic direction. 
Such is the case in this thesis. Similar ideas have been put forward by O’Shannassy 
(2010), distinguishing between the board’s role in shaping strategic thinking 
(conceptually similar to interactive strategising) – which is continuous (all year round), 
creative, people-oriented and combines rational and generative processes – and its role in 
strategic planning (procedural strategising), which consists of episodic, rational, 
convergent and programmed activities.  
In this section, the role of the chairperson in determining the quality of boardroom 
debate and in fostering constructive conflict around strategic, tension-generating topics 
has been discussed. Also discussed was how chairpersons critically determine the degree 
of board involvement and influence over the firm’s strategy. These observations primarily 
focused on the role of the chairperson in conducting board meetings. But how do CEOs 
see boards’ influence on and contribution to the firm’s strategy when the firm is 
underperforming and facing substantial strategic challenges? This is the topic of the next 
section.  
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4.6.4 Board contribution to strategy  
Chairpersons’ perspectives on the role and contribution of the board – especially the 
numerous examples of challenging boardroom debate around strategic tension-generating 
topics – would indicate that boards participate substantially in determining the strategic 
direction of the firm. However, chairpersons’ accounts were unclear regarding the real 
influence of board debate on strategy. CEOs’ perceptions of the actual contribution of the 
board in determining strategic direction emerged as distinct from those of the 
chairpersons. It appears that, notwithstanding the boardroom process described by 
chairpersons, the actual contribution of the board to strategy is seen by CEOs as marginal 
and incremental at best. The board appears to function more as a source of legitimacy that 
supports the strategy which is largely determined by the CEO and the top management 
team.  
One CEO explained how the board “mostly went along” with the executive ideas 
on strategy in a firm undergoing a strategic transformation. 
Every year we had a strategy meeting which lasted two days, and all of these 
ideas came out of those meetings. And I’d introduce them and we’d have a 
sensible discussion about them. Mostly they went along with our ideas. (CEO 
11) 
CEOs might identify areas where board contribution is welcome, implying a limit 
to the scope and depth of board contribution. One CEO explained: 
The board’s role in the transformation is to keep our back free and to be 
supportive on what we are doing and to challenge the plans where we think, 
“That is a good idea”. So that is something I expect from the board. And 
there, I think, the board is really somebody who has to challenge us and has 
to not just look into the financial KPIs, but as well to back us in our way that 
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we say there are other things which are as important to get to before we then 
may get to brilliant financial results. (CEO 8) 
A different account showed how the board had been supportive of the CEO’s 
strategy, offering relatively a marginal contribution to the overall strategic direction of 
the company.  
Totally supportive, absolutely the right thing, stick with it. And when it came 
to budgets and things, then actually the board probably pushed us a little, 
maybe in the time of austerity we were, you could accuse us of sandbagging 
a bit on forecasting. And so, I think, the board did a good job of again creating 
some tension there between the board and the execs to make sure that, in spite 
of the fact that we were in a little bit of a reining in, particularly on costs, that 
we were sufficiently ambitious in terms of revenue, with a view to being more 
ambitious on actually investing. I always found the board a) pretty supportive 
and b) not really ever coming up with any rocket science, but just sometimes 
giving you that little push to do something that you know you ought to do 
anyway. (CEO 6) 
Another CEO emphasised again the supportive nature of the board’s role, asserting 
that the co-development of strategy is between the CEO and the executive team with the 
board playing a minimal role. 
The role of the board was to be as supportive with me as possible, probably. 
I’m a great believer that everything must be as transparent as it can be. So, I 
always work in making sure everyone is onside as best possible. I actually 
think the co-developing [i.e. strategy] comes from my people. (CEO 9) 
CEOs emphasised the urgency of responses to company challenges as hindering 
boards’ capacity to contribute more to the overall response and strategic direction. One 
CEO explained that those boards that have the greatest positive impact are those that 
recognise the need to respond quickly and go with the management programme, 
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simultaneously stressing the board’s role of as one of providing legitimacy, ultimately 
approving strategy as the “representative of shareholders”.  
… the board is the representative of the shareholders. You can’t go off and 
make all these changes –  particularly if they have input in terms of taking 
out people, restructuring the business – you can’t do that unless you’ve got 
the board’s support: not unless you’re suicidal and want to be short-lived. 
Boards that have the greatest part, the greatest positive impact, are those that 
recognise that, if you are the board of a company going through an enormous 
transformation or change, you’ve got to get with the programme; you’ve got 
to be faster, pacier, able to take more risks, as well as challenging and being 
more rigorous. (CEO 13) 
A similar idea was conveyed by other CEOs: 
Well, because it was happening so fast, it didn’t feel like the board was saying, 
“Oh, hang on a minute.” It was more: “This is what we’re doing.” It was a 
relatively constant discussion. What the board were, I guess, interested in 
was: we were taking action, the necessary action, as fast as we could, and 
then it was about reporting back to them the progress that we were making. 
(CEO 1) 
… but you go through a series of issues here. You have to bear in mind that 
the executive team has worked through this and the board is catching up with 
it later. (CEO 14) 
The evidence presented above suggests that, from a CEO perspective, and in spite 
of challenging discussions during board meetings and strategy away-days, boards are 
largely supportive of the strategic proposals initiated by the CEO. CEOs used expressions 
such as “mostly they went along with our ideas”, “the board challenges the plans where 
we think it’s a good idea”, “[the board] never really coming up with rocket science”, “my 
co-developing comes from my people [i.e. executive team]”, “boards … have to get with 
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the programme”, “it didn’t feel like the board was saying, ‘Oh, hang on a minute’” and 
“the board is catching up with it later”. These expressions suggest that management 
controls the development of strategy and boards largely conform with management 
proposals, after probing the underlying assumptions. 
The firms referred to by CEOs in this study were all experiencing poor performance 
and many were in real crisis situations. Contrary to extant research which sees boards as 
having a greater involvement in strategy during crisis and poor firm performance (e.g. 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999), CEO accounts reveal that, while the participation of 
boards may increase, their actual contribution in directly influencing strategy is 
apparently reduced. One explanation is that, in some situations, board influence is enacted 
by selecting a CEO with the desired experience and who favours directors’ views on a 
particular strategy (Westphal and Frederickson, 2001). However, other factors emerged 
to explain the apparent limited contribution, namely: i) the velocity of environmental 
change; and ii) information asymmetry between the board and the management. During 
times of crisis and acute poor performance, events often occur very quickly and 
management often needs to respond before they have a real chance to discuss it in depth 
with the board. In addition, the pressure to respond to dramatic changes in performance 
during a crisis renders boards unable to deeply scrutinise the required decisions, or make 
dramatic changes in the strategy proposed by management unless the strategy is seen to 
be inappropriate. Information asymmetry between the board and management further 
constrains board involvement and contribution (O’Neal and Thomas, 1995). Underlying 
some of the CEO quotes is the still dominant belief that strategy initiation, development 
and implementation is the CEO’s exclusive domain (refer to Theme IV, Section 4.7.2).  
Zahra (1990:116) called this “an unspoken territorial imperative”, which, despite 
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evidence of greater board involvement in strategy, still underlies much of board–CEO 
exchanges.  
4.6.5 Summary of the chairperson role: leading the board in order to deal 
with strategic tensions  
This theme has explored the role of the chairperson in composing and leading the board 
during times of environmental change and poor performance which cause strategic 
tension.  
Chairpersons have substantial freedom of choice in determining a number of critical 
board features, policies and practices for enabling effective handling of the strategic 
tensions and challenges affecting the firm.  
The first area of responsibility and choice for the chairperson is determining and 
manage board composition. It was shown that chairpersons take on a resource-
dependence perspective (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Canella and 
Paetzold, 2000) by ensuring that the board is composed of directors with the right mix of 
skills and experience that reflect changes in the external environment and the strategic 
challenges being faced by the firm. In addition, chairpersons compose their board so as 
to ensure “cognitive diversity” which equips the board with a greater ability to generate 
different perspectives on strategic problems. It has been shown how CEOs in this study 
considered boards with too much or too little industry experience a constraining factor in 
initiating strategic change (e.g. Haynes and Hillman, 2010). Chairpersons described the 
role-based tension experienced in attempting to maximise cognitive diversity, with its 
concomitant cognitive conflict, while simultaneously aiming for cohesion and meaningful 
consensus (Cadbury, 1992; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Taylor, 2001). 
Chairpersons have been found to also use board composition to signal commitment to 
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change to important stakeholders as well as communicating the company’s identity 
(Broome and Krawiec, 2009).  
A second area where chairpersons have a critical role is in determining board 
engagement policy and practice and creating the conditions for engagement to be 
effective. Chairpersons shape non-executive directors’ (NEDs’) engagement with the 
business by ensuring they can visit operations regularly, speak to other levels of 
management and access company documents. This allows NEDs to acquire information 
independently and reach an objective view of how the company is performing, allowing 
for more effective monitoring and advice to management (e.g. McCabe and Nowak, 2008; 
Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). In addition, chairpersons establish the rules and tone 
of engagement between the board and the CEO. It has been shown how the board can 
provide a more effective contribution if strategic, tension-generating topics are raised in 
a timely fashion with the board, allowing for NEDs to contribute before too much 
commitment and detail has been built into proposals, or before decisions are due. This 
allows boards to demonstrate supportive engagement when tensions materialise and 
decisions are required, because they had been given the opportunity to understand and 
trace the evolution of these strategic issues through time and check management 
assumptions on a continuous basis. For tension-generating topics to be subjected to 
consistent debate on the board, they need to be present on the agenda. In line with past 
research (e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995) the findings from 
this study show chairpersons take care to get the right items on the agenda. In addition, it 
has been shown how chairpersons can further facilitate good-quality engagement by 
organising board work around clearly defined priorities and having committee policies 
that encourage participation of all board members. 
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A third requirement for a chairperson is to lead boardroom meetings (Garratt, 1999; 
McNulty et al., 2011; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), cultivating open and high-quality 
debate on strategic tension-generating topics. The chairperson has to ensure that all board 
members contribute to the debate, making maximum use of the variety of skills and 
experience, and encouraging cognitive conflict while maintain cohesion and meaningful 
consensus over the firm’s strategic direction (e.g. Leblanc, 2004). Encouraging the board 
to challenge executive thinking and provide alternative views led this discussion to the 
involvement of boards in strategy. Two distinct findings emerged, which can be traced in 
existing literature. First, boards use primarily “interactive strategising practices” – that is, 
face-to-face interaction and debate which results in mutual influence over the 
development and implementation of strategy (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010). This 
type of strategising activity has been found to be employed particularly when firms 
require a change in strategic direction (Hendry, Kiel and Nicholson, 2010). The findings 
in this thesis also agree with past studies that the level of such involvement is affected by: 
the content of board agenda; the board process and conduct of board meetings; the use of 
away-days for strategy meetings (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999); and the chairperson’s 
preferences as to the degree of board involvement on strategy (O’Neal and Thomas, 
1995). This theme finished by looking at how CEOs view the actual contribution of the 
board to strategy under circumstances of poor performance and crisis. Surprisingly, CEO 
accounts show that the actual influence of the board in shaping strategy is limited (often 
to marginal or incremental improvements) by the pace of change and the information 
asymmetry between the board and the management.  
The next theme – termed “CEO role: strategic behaviour” – discusses the role of 
the CEO in strategy development and implementation in contexts of far-reaching change 
as described in Theme I.  
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4.7 Theme IV. CEO role: strategic behaviour 
CEO role analysis identified four critical aspects when facing competing demands in 
contexts of uncertainty and change: i) top management team composition, size and 
dynamics; ii) strategy formulation; iii) redesign of organisational structure; and iv) 
strategy communication and alignment. These four domains are core demands for the 
CEO in which the CEO enjoys substantial discretion. While they can be seen as almost 
sequential, what emerged is that there are complex interrelationships between these 
domains when strategic tensions are being addressed by the CEO.  
4.7.1 Top management team (TMT) composition, size and dynamics  
An area of discretion that emerged strongly among CEOs in this study is the 
determination of the TMT composition, size and dynamics. These are explored in the next 
sections.  
4.7.1.1 TMT composition  
Research has linked CEO succession and TMT composition changes with changes in the 
external environment and/or a decline in firm performance (Pfeffer and Davis-Blake, 
1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
This study found that incoming CEOs facing technology and regulatory disruptions 
that fundamentally affect competitive advantage chose to make substantial changes to 
TMT composition in the direction of increased diversity of skills and experience. This is 
in line with Keck and Tushman’s (1993) findings that reorientations, environmental 
shocks, technological discontinuities and CEO successions are each associated with 
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increases in team changes and heterogeneity. One CEO of a firm facing technology 
disruption and poor performance explained his approach: 
I brought my own team in … so day one I brought in a marketeer, and I didn’t 
even bother to check out the existing marketeer, I had a conversation with her 
very politely on the first afternoon, then fired her. I did exactly the same with 
effectively bringing in [executive’s name] who came in as my right-hand man 
to go down to the engine room and report that all the dials were connected to 
all the right things. I didn’t trust anybody else to do that. I decided to leave 
the two operations people … because I knew both. I left in place the finance 
director because I knew she could add up and I knew at that time she was a 
relatively well respected by the community, but I – and also because I thought 
that’s probably the one person you don’t want to change at the moment while 
I want to get control of the numbers. In terms of the three core businesses I 
promoted all internally, but I brought them up very fast. So I identified talent: 
three or four of them. (CEO 11) 
The CEO of another company facing very similar problems followed a similar 
pattern: 
Yes, about a third, a third, a third. That’s my normal in a transformation: a 
third of the people that I inherit are great, a third I’m having to promote from 
within, too many layers of management, and a third I hired from outside. 
That’s pretty much par for the course. (CEO 13) 
The degree of complexity and instability in the firm’s environment has long been 
linked with changes in structure (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967), since greater 
environmental complexity often poses competing demands (Thompson, 1967), which 
require a diversity of skills and experience forcing greater structural differentiation 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Past studies have suggested that larger and more 
heterogeneous TMTs are often found in firms facing environmental complexity (Janis, 
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1972). Environmental complexity and instability (i.e. the extent of discontinuous change) 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) often requires a greater division of labour within the top 
team, increasing differences in interpersonal and time orientations among executives 
(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Galbraith, 1973), which make consensus on the strategic 
direction of the firm more difficult to attain (Dess and Origer, 1987:326). In effect, 
research has found that top team demographic diversity decreases strategic consensus (i.e. 
the degree to which individual mental models of strategy overlap) (Knight et al., 1999).  
In order to maintain a degree of social integration and facilitate consensus, CEOs 
appear to select trusted individuals with whom they share past experiences in similar 
situations. Past studies have found that the level of intra-group trust mediates the tension 
between task conflict and relationship conflict (Simons and Peterson, 2000). This is to 
say that high levels of trust help avoid task conflicts becoming relationship conflicts, 
thereby ensuring group cohesion. This is observed in many CEO accounts such as the one 
above (CEO 13). Some CEOs made trust and past shared experience explicit criteria upon 
which to base TMT hiring decisions: 
So you surround yourself with the brightest people that you trust, that you 
know are going to be loyal and are going to be able to execute. (CEO 18) 
Evidence shows that CEOs also promote executives from within the firm. These 
members may be more likely to be loyal to a CEO who promotes them, while bringing 
firm-specific knowledge which may be important in determining existing constraints for 
change as well as identifying areas of excellence that may not be readily visible to the 
CEO or other outside members of the team. This also ensures both continuity and change 
within the top team as the CEO seeks to strategically transform the company. Past 
research confirms that, when facing turbulent environments such as technological 
discontinuities, high- to medium-performing firms tend to retain firm-specific knowledge 
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in the top team (i.e. in the form of legitimacy, social networks and links with firm 
competencies) by promoting a CEO from within the firm and/or making sensible changes 
to TMT composition (retaining some existing executives), achieving a balance between 
change and continuity (Virany, Tushman and Romanelli, 1992).  
An interesting finding of this thesis is that CEOs whose firms were facing 
environmental change that did not fundamentally threaten the firm’s competitive 
advantage (i.e. in this thesis, the financial crisis of 2008 and the economic recession that 
followed) and that were acute (very sudden changes in market conditions), made little or 
no changes to TMT composition and size.  
4.7.1.2 TMT size  
In addition to selecting executives who are likely to be loyal and trustworthy, CEOs 
appear to use TMT size as a mechanism to facilitate social integration and consensus 
within the team. One CEO explained the importance of deciding on the size of the top 
team. 
You have to have a distributive shared sense of responsibility and a common 
agenda. There’s a reason why there are 12 jurors and Jesus Christ had 12 
disciples. There is a limit on teams and I always slightly scratch my head 
when I look at management teams with 17 or … At its heart I think a 
leadership team, of an organisation of size, I think a leadership team really 
begins [to] top out north of 12 in terms of its optimal functionality. So I think 
team size is a very conscious choice by the leader, and I think it’s well worth 
spending time on it. (CEO 17) 
Social integration and consensus are the key dimensions of a TMT process that is 
defined as “the nature of interaction among top managers as they engage in strategic 
decision-making” (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009:124). Social integration has 
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been defined as “the attraction to the group, satisfaction with other members of the group, 
and social interaction among the group members” (O’Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 
1989:22), whereas consensus refers to “the extent of agreement of all parties on a group 
decision-making” (Dess and Origer, 1987:313). Past research has identified that as TMT 
size increases it negatively impacts on the frequency of communication and team 
coordination (Shaw and Harkey, 1976), group cohesiveness and cooperation (Wagner, 
1995), social integration (Shaw, 1981; Smith et al., 1994) and consensus (Shull, Delbeq 
and Cummings, 1970). Many CEOs appear to consider these aspects when making 
decisions about the TMT. The pressure to respond to strategic tensions arising in complex 
organisations experiencing substantial external environment instability has been met by 
smaller TMTs and hence a greater ability to achieve consensus:  
… you don’t always have the same amount of time: you need smaller teams, 
you need less consensus building, and they tend to be resolved high up in the 
organisation. (CEO 7) 
Thus far findings suggest that incoming CEOs of firms facing complex and unstable 
environments, often driven by technology discontinuities threatening competitive 
advantage, often change their top teams substantially. In so doing, they make conscious 
choices about the degree of diversity, the levels of loyalty and trust, the preservation of 
firm-specific knowledge and continuity and size of the team. The concern appears to be 
the ability to address the particular strategic challenges facing the firm while retaining 
cohesion and consensus. Interestingly, CEOs whose firms were facing externally driven 
financial and economic problems (with sudden market slowdowns) remained at the helm 
and made little or no reference to changing the top team. This suggests that the nature of 
a firm’s problem is significant in decisions to either maintain or change the CEO and the 
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top team. Next, this thesis will consider the importance CEOs attach to managing TMT 
dynamics, role interdependencies and various tactics used to resolve tension and conflict.  
4.7.1.3 TMT dynamics  
The CEO leads the top management team. He or she sets the stage for the nature of 
interaction between different executive roles. CEOs employ certain tactics to ensure 
alignment between different roles in the top team. This thesis identifies: i) the role of the 
CEO in the TMT process; ii) CEO–CFO role interdependence and relationship; and iii) 
education of senior leadership and role rotation. These aspects of TMT functioning are 
discussed next.  
4.7.1.3.1 The role of the CEO in the TMT process  
This thesis identifies the CEO as having the responsibility for setting the stage for team 
interactions (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). The TMT process has been 
defined as “the nature of interaction among top managers as they engage in strategic 
decision-making” (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009:124). Irrespective of 
environmental conditions and particular strategic challenges, CEOs referred to the 
requirement of leading the team in a manner that encourages open discussion and 
challenge, while simultaneously ensuring meaningful consensus and unity of action. This 
has been described as a role-based tension faced by CEOs (refer to Theme I, Section 
4.4.2). 
… although I could challenge them and we could have some conversations, if 
they didn’t want to do it they’d fight me back and they’d gang up with the 
other two against me, and I’d lose. So I used to say, even if I had one more 
vote than you and there’s three of you and I’ve only got two votes, I lose. We 
used to have a conversation like that sometimes: “OK guys, well, I’ve listened 
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to you. I’m not happy, but you’ve said that. I’ll take your word. You’re my 
team.” … And they want to know there’s been, if you like, a democratic 
process, but once the process has been agreed it was, so people used to know 
that I used to argue with the finance director. Sometimes they could hear us, 
right, but they say, “OK, but we made a decision and once we’d made a 
decision, it was cabinet rules, cabinet responsibility, we’re all in this, there’s 
no backsliding, we’ve all agreed to do it.” (CEO 11) 
Some CEOs described similar processes for leading TMT interactions. Such a 
process seems to be based on a consensual and democratic style of decision-making where 
TMT members are encouraged to contribute and challenge the decision-making process, 
even in opposition to the CEO. In the above description and in later CEO accounts in this 
section, CEOs described themselves as “first among equals” (primus inter pares), 
implying an equality of power. Past research has demonstrated that CEOs of a 
transformational leadership orientation (Bass, 1997) is related to consensus decision-
making in TMTs and team effectiveness (Flood et al., 2000). Other studies have found 
that a CEO’s empowering leadership positively impacts on TMT behavioural integration 
which in turn increases TMT potency and firm performance (Carmeli, Schaubroeck and 
Tishler, 2011). When CEOs are less dominant, TMT members engage in more 
information sharing, are more cooperative and collaborative, and tend to value group 
objectives over individual ones (Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 1988).  
Another aspect emerging strongly among CEOs is the belief that large and complex 
businesses cannot be managed centrally by the CEO. This is consistent with the findings 
of Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988) that power centralisation destroys collaboration and 
increases political and competitive activity among TMT members.  Rather, participants 
referred to the need to trust executives, to delegate more and to develop a “distributive 
shared sense of responsibility” and a common agenda.  
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CEOs provided evidence of difficulties in assuming complete centrality in large, 
complex organisations, pointing to the importance of delegation and a common agenda. 
… it is absolutely impossible in that situation to manage a business of scale 
and complexity on a single-point basis or on a central-control basis. You have 
to have a distributive shared sense of responsibility and a common agenda. 
(CEO 17) 
I only believe that in a sizeable business you cannot run the business top-
down, and particularly not the business as ours because there is no, what I 
would call, there’s no inherent discipline. (CEO 4) 
The CEO of a large high-tech company explained how he initially adopted a more 
controlling and centralised approach in managing the executive team, and then gradually 
started to delegate more, acknowledging the difficulties in scaling the business when the 
CEO takes such a central controlling role. 
I adopted a style, after the slight negativity about control I did adjust 
behaviour a little bit and, not too much because I think control was right at 
the time. But you can’t scale a business having everything coming through 
the CEO. So we had moved away from, we had actually delegated a lot more 
from the executive team and the executive team delegated a lot more from the 
CEO. And so my style was “first among equals”, really, and in terms of 
constructing a team my advice to lots of people these days is: I’d have been 
very happy to work for half of my executive team, and no point in hiring 
somebody that you don’t respect that much really because you want really 
strong people around you. (CEO 6) 
It is important to note that all CEOs in this thesis were facing severe declines in 
performance resulting from technological discontinuities, economic recessions and 
financial crisis, and far-reaching regulatory changes. Past research has shown CEOs to be 
risk-averse, thus resorting to centralised decision-making (Hurdle, 1974; Staw, 
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Sandelands and Dutton, 1981). However, other studies have found that, in circumstances 
of poor performance, CEOs increase their risk-taking and are more willing to delegate 
(Bowman, 1982). This thesis found evidence for more delegation in line with Bowman’s 
findings.  
Many CEOs stressed their role in setting appropriate TMT composition, size and 
decision-making processes. While CEOs discussed TMTs as a whole, there was much 
less emphasis on role interdependence and dynamics between particular executive roles. 
However, there was one exception: the relationship with the chief financial officer (CFO), 
and his/her interdependence with the CEO role during times of poor performance – 
irrespective of the environmental conditions leading to the decline – emerged as central 
and are discussed in the next section. 
4.7.1.3.2 CEO–CFO relationship and role interdependence 
CEOs in this study repeatedly referred to the CFO role and their relationship with the 
CFO as an important source of support in handling strategic tensions. Nonetheless, it was 
also often described by CEOs as a source of constraint. One CEO, whose firm was 
undergoing restructuring, explained how the CFO he had inherited was too focused on 
strategic issues at a time when the CEO required a hands-on CFO who could control the 
numbers. This was a disturbance for the CEO, often causing him to spend time away from 
his role in order to acquire a more detailed understanding of financial aspects. The CFO 
eventually left the company. He explained: 
… as we were going through this I became the CFO, because I just got into 
the detail of everything, and the CFO was much more strategic which was 
rather unhelpful in a period where you’re going … So the CFO that I 
inherited was somebody who is actually quite a big guy but was more in the 
strategic: he’d always had a lot of people providing the low-level stuff. And 
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so from day one I’d look at what he was doing and start challenging him 
about his role and the detail you need to get into. (CEO 1) 
Another example came from the CEO of a retail company undergoing a large 
transformation. The CEO was alerted to the fact that the CFO was undermining the CEO’s 
messages about strategic direction. Moreover, the CEO was unhappy with the CFO’s 
performance when presenting to shareholders.  
… but I was alerted to, and as it happened eight weeks later, nine weeks later, 
when we were doing some of the final presentations to the shareholders, I 
realised she wasn’t up to scratch and I fired her. It was quite a tough call, but 
I did it. Actually, it was mismatch between what I was trying to do 
strategically and she was undermining it behind my back saying, “Well, [the 
CEO] wants to do this, but actually don’t bother: he doesn’t really mean it.” 
(CEO 11) 
Inadequate CFO skills and focus, or lack of trust, make the relationship a 
constraining factor for the CEO in attempting to successfully enact his or her role. 
However, if trust and complementarity of perspectives and experience are present, the 
relationship with the CFO serves as an important means of support for the CEO and also 
an important element of how CEOs respond to strategic tensions, particularly when 
undergoing restructuring and growth. 
Literature acknowledges that during times of poor performance, or when critical 
financial policy issues are being considered, the CFO role is likely to become more 
relevant and powerful (Reutzel and Cannella, 2004). In fact, to the extent that the TMT 
is highly differentiated vis-à-vis the roles of its members, such an effect is thought to be 
true for other roles, depending on the context and the strategic issue at hand (Cannella 
and Holcomb, 2005; Roberto, 2003). Some research suggests that CEOs are delegating 
more strategic responsibility to CFOs (Tulimieri and Banai, 2010) and that CFOs provide 
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important advice to CEOs on the financial feasibility and risks involved in particular 
strategic moves (Scheumann, 1999).  
So FD was my decision and we had a shortlist of two: both very, very good 
but both very operational. [I wanted] somebody who absolutely could grasp 
the numbers. I wanted someone who was very, very strong operationally. I 
mean [the chosen CFO] actually is good on treasury as well, but it was the 
operational stuff. It’s not about strategy. The CFO also had some operational 
experience running part of the business in his previous role, so that felt to be 
like somebody who would really get into the detail of everything. I wanted a 
classic CFO who I could absolutely 100% rely on to drive the numbers of the 
business because I had to move away from just doing that. (CEO 1) 
When firms are faring badly, the CFO influence is likely to be enhanced, but so far 
the strategic relationship between the CEO and CFO has barely begun to be examined, 
rather focusing on the role of CFO more generally. One exception (Han, Zhang and Han, 
2015) has found that, where a strategic partnership between the CEO and CFO exists (i.e. 
where the CFO is allowed influence over matters of strategy), Chinese listed firms had 
superior financial performance.  
In this study the relationship between the CEO and the CFO as a source of support 
for the CEO and a mechanism to manage difficult business tensions emerged as key. Most 
accounts from CEOs in this study highlight the CFO’s importance over and above other 
TMT members. The relationship was referred to as a “partnership”, with the CFO taking 
responsibility for financial aspects and the CEO strategic aspects, but with high levels of 
communication, debate and challenge between the two. 
One CEO described his relationship with the CFO as one of heated debate and 
mutual influence on strategic decisions, while making sure the relationship did not suffer. 
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… a very strong CFO who will challenge the status quo. I’m used to that, and 
I was happy with it. I had very difficult, not difficult, but I had a very robust 
relationship with the CFO at [company’s name]: we used to fight like cat and 
dog, and that’s right and proper. I used to say, “[CFO name], we need to do 
this, we need to push that, we need to do this”, and he’d say, “We can’t do 
that, I’m not sure that’s been the case.” And then it all comes down to people. 
This is an easy conversation or a difficult conversation, there is no right 
answer, there is no perfect model, nobody’s got it right and it’s all about that 
yin and that yang… (CEO 11) 
Another CEO referred to his CFO as a partner and described how their relationship 
was marked by mutual learning in handling company restructuring: 
I had a new partner-in-crime in that, about six months before the profit 
warning, I’d hired a CFO. And he was, he wasn’t an experienced public 
company CFO, like me, so we were absolutely in the same position learning 
together. But just as I’d had a decade or so of operational general 
management, he’d had a decade or so of being financial controller. He’d 
done a private equity CFO job and, so we learnt together really. (CEO 6) 
Extracts from CFO interviews gave additional credence to the CEO perspective on 
the criticality of this partnership. One CFO explained the open and challenging dialogue 
he had with the CEO and described the importance that, after a heated debate, an 
integration of views would occur which allows for a robust agreement. 
The CEO doesn’t try and second-guess what I’m doing. Yeah, so we’ve had 
our moments, but not in a tense way, I’m sure the CEO would agree with that. 
I have no problem telling the CEO what I think he’s doing wrong, so that’s 
not a problem to me. I’ve never had a fear factor about losing my job. I think 
one of the reasons why people don’t interact well, or they don’t operate 
effectively, is because they don’t say what they want to say. So you’ve got to 
say what you think. And I think right from when I came in I’ve always been 
very clear with the CEO about: look, maybe we need to approach it in this 
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way; maybe we need to do something slightly differently. I think we’ve a very 
good relationship, I think we get on well, and I’m quite frank with him. I’m 
sure there’s times that he’ll tell me something and I think, well, that’s just, 
that’s not right, and you’ve got to look at X or Y. I’ll say something to him 
and he’ll say, “Look, piss off, I’ve decided X and Y and you can do something 
else”, but you’ve got to have that dialogue. I think a lot of, look, it’s stating 
the obvious: it’s just, it doesn’t matter what you’re doing, if you’re all trying 
to do something and you’re pulling in different directions. (CFO 1) 
The CFO of a large building company explained how the CEO gave him a lot of 
autonomy and latitude to handle financial restructuring, while the CEO focused 
completely on ensuring the strategy was being implemented. 
… the CFO can be very centre-stage, because I think the reality is: you’ve got 
problems with your banks, probably, you’ve got challenges trying to make 
numbers for the city and the board want to hear from the CFO. The CEO is 
ensuring the strategy is being implemented operationally. He doesn’t chase 
around after me saying, “What about this?” and “What about that?” I think 
he gives me a lot of autonomy, a lot of latitude, which is important. (CFO 1) 
Later in the interview, CFO 1 recognised that the focus of the role and its boundaries 
changed with time as the financial restructuring ended, stressing the importance of 
splitting competing demands between the roles of CEO and CFO and reconfiguring role 
boundaries as circumstances change. The dialogue between the two roles was also 
emphasised as being critical in ensuring that restructuring and strategy are aligned and do 
not conflict.  
… my job now [after restructuring] is very different. It’s a much more stable 
type of job, so what I want to do is obviously to get more involved in the 
business operationally because I haven’t got all this firefighting to do over 
here. So my role has to evolve, and I think the CEO steps back from stuff and 
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says, “OK, well, you deal with that and I’ll deal with this” and so on. I think 
it’s been good. But you’ve got to have that dialogue. (CFO 1) 
Another CFO provided an interesting account of how he worked through 
restructuring and growth with his CEO. The CFO and CEO roles were clearly negotiated. 
The responsibility for the financial restructuring was led by the CFO and the long-term 
strategy was developed by the CEO. In a first account, the division of responsibilities 
between the two roles was attributed to the CEO’s lack of skills in handling bankers and 
unsecured creditors during restructuring. 
I would say that, in terms of company survival, getting the company, to getting 
support from our bankers or creditors, our regulators, that was me, OK, and 
I was, we quite clearly allocated responsibilities for the CEO to develop 
strategy. I was doing all of that swashbuckling stuff and exciting stuff. I 
agreed with the CEO she needed to do the longer-term transformation. I 
probably dealt with the CEO most, so it was probably the CEO working more 
with me than working with the, a broader team, I would say. The CEO didn’t 
have the skill sets to deal with the bankers or whoever. These aren’t normal 
bankers you deal with: banking’s an old industry. They lend money and, if 
you don’t pay them back, they’re not very nice people they send round. It’s 
always been the case, and they do have burly people who come round and 
say, “We’re in an ugly place and you don’t want to be in that cold ugly place 
under the stairs do you?” That’s the way they talk. (CFO 2) 
Later in the interview the CFO explained how it is difficult for restructuring and 
growth to be the responsibility of the same individual, which offers an additional 
explanation as to why the competing demands were split between the two roles. It became 
clear that it is not simply a question of skills, but more about the difficulty for one 
individual to deal with contrasting demands requiring different types of thinking and 
behaviour.  
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I said to the CEO right at the beginning that she shouldn’t get involved in this 
and she said, “Should I be doing it?” I said, “If we’re not doing that we’ll 
get no future”, so I deal with it and she got sucked into it. Your head goes, 
you mean you’re, you start thinking of that bank nearly pulled me today or 
whatever, and you’re not thinking about the long term. You can’t see it: how 
can you maintain a view and a vision when you’ve just been in, rolling in the 
muck with some unsecure creditor or supplier. It’s not easy. I’ve been doing 
this for years, so it’s probably easier for me to do that, but it’s not easy, 
believe me. You come out ashen-faced from battling, and then you have to go 
and think about strategy. And then she’d be feeding me strategy and I’d be 
telling her where we are. (CFO 2) 
The integration of short-term financial and operational restructuring and long-term 
growth strategy occurs through frequent and robust communication between the CEO and 
the CFO, so that continuous alignment between short- and long-term action is attained. 
While research in this area is scarce, there have been calls from commentators for an 
effective partnership between CEOs and CFOs, with some even calling for a shared-
leadership model between the two (Howell, 2006; Tulimieri and Banai, 2010). This 
section has provided evidence that this dyadic relationship is indeed an important source 
of support for the CEO during periods of poor performance and changing external 
environments, which bring about strategic tensions between restructuring and the short 
term and growth and the long term. These tensions are absorbed by the management team, 
with different roles often conflicting in their priorities and perspectives. The next section 
looks at evidence for the role of the CEO as one of ensuring “cognitive recognition” and 
integration of tensions when there are clashes between different executive roles.  
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4.7.1.3.3 Education of senior leadership and role rotation  
Strategic choice theorists have called for organisations to seek high levels of 
differentiation and integration in order to adapt and prosper in new environments 
(Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). By differentiation these scholars mean 
role differentiation, defined as “the cognitive and emotional orientation of managers in 
different functional departments” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:11). In turn, integration 
was defined as “the quality of the state of collaboration that exists among departments 
that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment” (Lawrence 
and Lorsch, 1973:11). In this thesis, it was found that, when strategic tensions become 
salient due to poor performance and resource scarcity, divisions and conflict within the 
TMT are likely to arise, with different executives at opposing poles likely to argue against 
each other’s positions, and competing for scarce firm resources and CEO attention. The 
following excerpt illustrates a situation where a CEO had to handle tensions between the 
CFO and the chief technology officer (CTO) (and respective business units) during a 
period of restructuring.  
… I think by that time we had, we were a team [executive team] and we were 
a team with constructive tension, so there were those around the table that 
were very keen on “but you mustn’t cut this because it’s the long term”, so 
we had the people protecting the long term. And there was a very little bit of 
friction around the CTO maintaining that we really: bugger the shareholders, 
they don’t matter; the long term is all that matters; world domination, etc. 
And the CFO who had to come on the road with me and he, there was a little 
bit of tension there probably. I think it was manageable constructive tension 
throughout, but at a time of crisis like this it gets to be a little bit personalised 
for the first time, so it’s: “he’s only in it for the short term”. Well, no, he isn’t 
actually, he’s, but if we don’t have a short term there won’t be a long term. 
(CEO 6) 
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In contexts such as the one just described, the danger is that conflict becomes 
destructive of the integration needed between units with disparate time and cognitive 
orientations. The competing demands of restructuring and growth arising from 
environmental change emphasise the perceived difference and incompatibility between 
different roles in the TMT. In the case above, the CFO perceived short-term demands of 
liquidity as more important, whereas the CTO perceived – by virtue of role – long-term 
demands related with R&D and innovation as crucial. According to early theorists, in 
order for firms to arrive at high levels of differentiation and integration, the solution lies 
in “integrator roles and devices” located at the appropriate level where the necessary 
knowledge about the environment is available (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:157-158). In 
line with this, Galbraith (1973) proposed that the integrator role should coordinate the 
decision process and that such a role should have “a wide network of contacts in the 
organisation, be able to establish trust and equalise power differences in the joint decision 
process” (Galbraith, 1973:93). In addition, integrators should “make use of confrontation, 
smoothing-over differences and forcing decision tactics to solve conflict and achieve 
integration” (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:53). In the above account, the CEO emphasised 
his role in ensuring that tensions between these key roles remained constructive, 
promoting an integration of views that accommodated competing demands. Not only do 
changes in the environment drive larger differences between different roles, emphasising 
different aspects of competing demands, but also emotions run higher and discussions 
become “personalised for the first time” as role incumbents perceive the decisions as more 
critical. The CEO went on to explain how he educates senior leadership in understanding 
competing demands between different business units by temporarily swapping 
executives’ roles in order to create a form of “cognitive recognition” of the tensions 
among the executive team. 
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We changed a few responsibilities around as well, amongst the exec team 
throughout the period. I deliberately cycled some people around into roles 
that certainly some of the staff thought, “This is a bit odd.” But I wanted an 
exec team where there were lots of interchangeability and lots of … 
particularly around the exec table. Basically in a [company name]-type 
company typically you’ve got engineers designing things: it’s all wonderful; 
salespeople not selling things – “Oh, that’s because the engineers have 
designed something that’s crap”, well, no, that’s because the salespeople are 
crap and they can’t sell. So one of the obvious things early on was to get the 
guy who had headed up engineering to run sales and the sales team, and all 
the managers in sales thought I was absolutely nuts. He’s now the CEO. So I 
think that training people and having people working in slightly different 
positions … so he knows a bit about what the product marketing people are 
doing and the engineering people are doing and all that sort of thing, and but 
now he’s responsible for pulling stuff together. (CEO 6) 
While conflict within the TMT is seen as essential for effective strategic choice 
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997), there is also a tension for CEOs who are 
required to “both stimulate and repress conflict” (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 
1997:45) when it becomes dangerous to the integrity of the TMT or to strategic alignment. 
Building heterogeneous teams, encouraging frequent and quality interaction and ensuring 
different lenses are brought to bear in the team have emerged from the findings in this 
study, in line with Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois (1997). The above account also 
revealed that encouraging executives to temporarily assume the leadership of each other’s 
divisions makes for greater integrative capability in the team, as each executive can think 
from the perspective of multiple roles. Having executives assuming distinct, caricature 
roles in top team debates (i.e. Mr Action, Mr Steady, Futurist, Counsellor, etc.), which 
represent opposite poles (i.e. short and long term, status quo and change, structure and 
flexibility) is a phenomenon found in high-conflict/ high-performance top teams 
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(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997). Although the two practices are different, 
they both aim to expose strategic tensions and make executives recognise and integrate 
different perspectives. The CEO role is depicted as a “symphony conductor” who exerts 
on the team as a “levelling influence” (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997). 
Another CEO talked about his experience of contrasting and apparently 
irreconcilable views between the leadership of the commercial and R&D divisions and 
how he developed team-building initiatives and got different business units leadership to 
work together and overcome what initially sounded like an insurmountable tension. 
… Within three months of getting there I had the top team on a beach in 
Denmark building rafts and going out, paddling rafts and all that stupid stuff. 
But actually out of that we came up with, on the second day, a whole set of 
targets for the next five years, every single one of which, except one, we 
achieved in that period … The only solution to this tension is that we go 
together to the board in December – this was September – and make a 
commitment that we will meet these targets and say to the board we want their 
endorsement of us increasing dramatically the R&D resources … So that we 
can deliver the products, in the meantime, you sales guys: you’ve got to 
manage the customers with what we can deliver rather than what they would 
like to have. And, without getting people away and getting them to common 
understanding of the problem, we would never have got that. (CEO 5) 
CEOs play a fundamental role in building “cognitive recognition” among the 
executive team members who lead different business units. Their role is to teach how 
strategic tensions of restructuring and growth, exploration and exploitation can be 
successfully handled. In so doing, a CEO assumes the role of “maestro”, harmonising the 
different roles and cognitive and emotional orientations that become salient in times of 
high uncertainty and complexity.  
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4.7.2 Strategy formulation  
All CEOs in this study highlighted strategy formulation and implementation as a core role 
demand. CEOs are extremely protective of their role as “strategists”, i.e. those who own 
the strategy formulation and development process.  
Well, one of the things I made sure I was in charge of was strategy. So I’d 
done a lot of the strategic work. (CEO 9) 
Numerous CEOs explained how their role changed from restructuring to 
establishing a longer-term growth strategy. 
I think the key thing for me as a CEO now is to define what the business does 
over the next five years. That’s my biggest challenge and we’ve been at that 
for a year and we’re just about to launch it, so we’ve got out new strategy 
with all the pieces are going. (CEO 1) 
My role in the other two was strategy as well as implementation as it was here 
… the first phase was 18 months, the second phase was 18 months and the 
final phase was going to be about four or five years. (CEO 2) 
Others emphasised their role in establishing the firm’s strategic position and 
executing the necessary actions to accomplish it.  
And we wanted to be the hunter rather than the prey. And then embarked on 
executing the strategy … (CEO 12) 
Strategy formulation and implementation has long been recognised as the CEO’s 
central role. For example, Mintzberg (1979) found that the CEO and the executive team 
have a global mandate to ensure the firm serves its mission and is aligned with external 
resource providers who control or have power over the firm. Strategy formulation 
involves “the interpretation of the environment and the development of consistent 
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patterns in streams of organisational decisions” (Mintzberg, 1979:25) as they emerge. 
Contrary to these views, Porter (1980) proposed strategy as a design exercise after careful 
rational analysis of the external environment facing the firm. Barney (1991) proposed an 
inside-out view where analysis would focus on those of the firm’s resources that could 
yield competitive advantage. Others proposed that strategy is highly idiosyncratic and 
depends on the characteristics (e.g. age, education, experience) of CEOs, which guide 
interpretation and choice (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009).  
In this study, CEOs’ narratives of strategy formation are in line with both Porter 
(1980) and Barney (1991), whereby CEOs iterate between the analysis of the external 
environment and the firm’s resources to determine the best fit. An alternative explanation 
arises from a consideration of the sample characteristics which points to the possibility of 
executive characteristics driving patterns of strategic behaviour. All CEOs were in the 
same age cohort (50 to 60 years old) and were British nationals with vast experience in 
strategy at large listed UK companies. Most of them learned strategy in the ’80s or ’90s, 
a time in which both Porter’s and Barney’s ideas were widely accepted in strategy 
practice. This may serve to explain why, in this study, CEOs’ strategy formation 
behaviour is closer to Porter’s and Barney’s ideas and why a behavioural pattern can be 
discerned. 
With this in mind, the next sections explore evidence that shows that CEOs focus 
strategy formulation around three fundamental aspects: i) articulating a business purpose; 
ii) determining competitive advantage and unique capabilities; and iii) determining the 
pace and scale of change. The extent to which these activities are pursued vary essentially 
as a function of the perceptions of the external environment.  
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4.7.2.1 Articulating a business purpose  
Literature is unclear in distinguishing between purpose, mission and vision, often using 
the terms synonymously. Most argue that mission is the raison d’être of the company, 
“an enduring statement of purpose that distinguishes one organisation from other similar 
organisations” (David, 1989:90). Others (Collins and Porras, 1991) refer to vision 
composed of a guiding philosophy (purpose, core beliefs and values) and a tangible image 
(mission statement and vivid description). Whereas purpose is seen as part of the guiding 
philosophy coming from within people (without reference to the environment), mission 
is affected by external environmental considerations. For Bartlett and Ghoshal (1994:80), 
the best firms “place less emphasis in a clear strategic plan than on building a rich, 
engaging corporate purpose”, thus making the articulation of the business’s purpose 
distinct from strategic formulation, and preceding it.  
Articulating a clear business purpose (often also called mission or vision) has been 
referred as an important primary choice for CEOs. Ireland and Hitt (1999), for example, 
found that the vast majority of CEOs consider the setting of the firm’s vision, values and 
strategy as their primary responsibility. CEOs have also been depicted as fulfilling a role 
of “sense-giving”: that is, interpreting the external environment and internal conditions 
and providing meaning on behalf of the whole organisation (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 1991). 
In this study, this is particularly true of CEOs who faced technology or regulatory 
disruptions that fundamentally changed the purpose and competitive advantage within 
which the firm operated. CEOs who underwent the 2008 financial crisis and economic 
recession did not voice the articulation of a business purpose as a key component of the 
strategy formation process.  
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One CEO of a large telecom company reveals the importance of articulating a 
distinct purpose as a tool for delegation and empowerment of management at all levels in 
addressing operational problems and dilemmas.  
The word people use is “vision”, and I hate it. And they use the word 
“journey”, and I hate it. But it’s about getting – what the CEO has to do is 
articulate this thing about why are we here, what are we here for and what is 
it that we and only we can do? And if you can articulate that, then you have 
a good chance of getting not only the consensus and the data in the 
organisation, you’ve also got a good chance of people saying two or three 
levels down the organisation. I sometimes have direct evidence of this: that 
we’ve got a problem to solve. And they would go back to this “why are we 
here?” thing, and if we understand and accept this is why we are here, what 
we are here to do, we can solve this problem ourselves without having to go 
upstairs for permission, so it also becomes a very enabling and very 
empowering. And that’s the point: that you can almost let go and say actually 
this organisation’s running on its own horsepower, because everyone’s 
bought into the same framework, and that means the dilemmas often get 
solved by somebody else without you having to stay awake at night trying to 
figure it out … If you’ve done the bit as the leader or the CEO correctly and 
saying why are we here, then I think some of those things get solved. (CEO 5) 
A distinct purpose also facilitates consensus over difficult-to-solve problems. In the 
CEO account above it is unclear, however, whether this distinct purpose (i.e. what we and 
only we can do) refers to the concept of competitive advantage as a differentiated market 
position as defined by Porter (1980, 1991) or whether it refers to the firm’s unique 
resources and capabilities as proposed by the resource-based view of the firm (e.g. 
Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). Whatever the case, the business purpose, or mission, appears 
to be the first step in the strategy formulation process for CEOs who perceive the firm’s 
purpose and competitive advantage to have been disrupted. 
Another CEO described his discussions on the board about the company’s purpose 
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and identity, which was fundamental in subsequently driving decisions in terms of 
competing demands between different business units, and within units, between shop-
based and online retailing. In this statement we observe how initial conditions (e.g. Porter, 
1991) matter in defining the corporate purpose (i.e. we are a tour operator as long as we 
have planes to fill) as well as how the combination of existing resources and capabilities 
(shop-based, high-touch) with new ones (digital-based, high-tech) (Grant, 1991) create a 
distinctive statement of purpose (i.e. we are high-tech and high-touch).  
… another dilemma was, in this discussion: are we a tour operator or are we 
a retailer? And I then closed this discussion and said, “Look, guys, as long 
as we have planes to fill we are a tour operator and not a retailer. A retailer 
is somebody who has no risk, and ...” And I said, “A tour operator per se by 
definition cannot run an airline. I have never seen a tour operator running 
an airline with any, the most efficient way. We are a tour operator and we are 
high-tech and high-touch.” (CEO 8) 
A CEO of a large insurance and financial company established the company 
purpose as one of being an inclusive business (i.e. previously it was exclusive). He 
explained how determining a distinct purpose helps in everyday decision-making by 
reference to that purpose, enabling the organisation to shift direction quickly as required 
by circumstances. 
And you need to have this ability to react quite quickly to it. Because, if you 
end up taking so long to shift direction, things have already moved again and 
again and again. And I guarantee, if you thought you were moving over here, 
you should’ve been moving over there with it. So, again, people think 
businesses should all be about making big decisions. I actually think it’s all 
about making small decisions. It’s small, little things that end up keep 
nudging you forward within that purpose of being an inclusive business. 
(CEO 9) 
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Another example was provided by a CEO who was unable to articulate and agree 
before the board a distinct purpose for the firm. Without it, he faced great difficulties in 
trading off between competing operational demands and providing acceptable 
justifications for his decisions to different stakeholders.  
So we never really have the conversation, the bigger grown-up conversation, 
which is what the company role in this industry was. Is it right that we should 
be doing this? Because these are, these are difficult trade-offs. And they are 
multi-stakeholder. (CEO 2) 
In this study, a clear distinctive purpose was found to facilitate leadership at all 
levels, helping to contextualise decisions about contrasting demands and tensions. In 
other words, it allows some form of consistency of decision-making throughout the firm. 
Determining a clear, distinct purpose has been argued to effectively help CEOs to ensure 
that “short-term actions are made by reference to long-term goals” (David, 1989:95), 
“unify an organisation’s efforts” (Collin and Porras, 1991:38), improve the quality of 
strategy formulation and the odds of successful implementation (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 
1994:82), and “focus its learning efforts in order to increase competitive advantage” 
(Ireland and Hitt, 1999:48). 
4.7.2.2 Determining competitive advantage and unique capabilities  
Another key aspect of strategy formulation observed across interviews is the choice of 
how to compete, given the organisation’s unique capabilities and an understanding of 
market forces and likely evolution. This requires CEOs to articulate a strategic rationale 
and to determine what the organisation does best – what it does that is unique and where 
the competitive advantage lies. A requirement to determine the company’s competitive 
advantage emerged irrespective of the nature of external environmental changes. Firms 
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that faced sudden and significant drops in demand and/or mounting debt as a result of 
economic recession and the 2008 financial crisis were compelled to ascertain which of 
the firm’s capabilities were associated with competitive advantage. This enabled CEOs 
to ensure that restructuring did no damage to those capabilities that were still valid. Firms 
that faced technology and regulatory disruption had to identify both current and future 
capabilities that could give the firm a renewed competitive advantage.  
One CEO identified an existing distribution network capability to serve large 
numbers of customers as the distinct organisational capability providing competitive 
advantage. This insight enabled a diversification strategy based on acquisition of a 
telecom business.  
… the most important thing is to understand what you do best and we, what 
we did best was looking after large volumes of customers, so every customer 
contact point is an opportunity to provide them with excellent customer 
service to win their loyalty … And if you give them excellent customer service 
then you can get a greater share of their wallet because they’ll buy other 
products. And when we were thinking longer-term, what, how, what shall we 
do with the business? How can we actually increase our share of the wallet 
even more? Well, we could add more products that we don’t currently 
provide. So I got into telecoms … so we opened up a telecoms business and I 
bought a telecoms business and it worked exceptionally well. (CEO 18) 
The CEO of a large high-tech company identified its competitive advantage as the 
ability to design and produce energy-efficient technology strategically aimed at different 
market segments (e.g. servers) where rivals were not able to compete. The account below 
describes strategy as a position in the market vis-à-vis competitors (Porter, 1980, 1991), 
deriving from the firm’s superior technological capability – as proposed by the resource-
based view (Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991).  
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… we’re going to open up another flank here on [competitor name] because 
actually there’s no reason why we can’t just win. Rather than beat [the 
competitor] in mobile, we are going to win across the piece and we’re going 
into servers, because servers are being sort of phones, PCs, but in the so-
called … world they can have a bunch of joint-based servers. Actually, we did 
a little bit of experiment and we reckon, just in the first experiments we did 
in, we could probably save getting on for three-quarters of the power. By 
2010 we’d convinced [two key clients] to try some of this, and clients’ early 
experiments were suggesting they could probably save up to 90% of that 
power. (CEO 6) 
Another CEO extended the company’s distinct advantage of creating unique shows 
and series, from TV to YouTube, highlighting that the decision to enter new businesses 
needs to be closely related to what the company does best – i.e. its superior capability in 
creating innovative TV shows (competitive advantage). Again, the approach appears 
close to the resource-based view of strategy, in which existing, distinct capabilities are 
applied to a new market in which those capabilities yield distinctive advantage and 
additional rent.  
… we have entered into this video, this online video area, where we now 
produce shows for YouTube. And that’s a very different area from where we 
used to be, so we’ve set up new entities under a new banner to start business 
in that field. So it has to be adjacent to what we do, because otherwise there 
is no reason for us to do it. (CEO 4) 
The above examples all came from firms that were facing restructuring due to 
economic recession or financial strains, but where competitive advantage remained 
unaffected – i.e. external conditions did not eradicate their competitive advantage. As 
such, CEO focus was essentially in understanding the internal bundle of resources and 
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capabilities that comprised existing competitive advantage, and ensure its protection, 
preservation and replication.  
In other cases, CEOs perceived their existing competitive advantage to have 
become obsolete. In such cases, strategy was articulated as seeking to reposition the 
company in the market, closer to Porter’s (1980, 1991) recommendations. CEOs would 
then modify the exiting resource base, acquire new resources and develop new 
capabilities.  
The CEO of a large insurance and financial services company decided that, in order 
to remain competitive and survive, he needed to change the business from an exclusive 
to an inclusive one, serving customer segments otherwise disregarded by the company as 
unimportant. Competitive advantage was seen as the company’s ability to provide saving 
solutions to a wide range of customer segments as opposed to the premium customer 
segments previously targeted. This understanding led to fundamental changes in the 
company’s structure, culture and processes.  
… a lot of how we think is moving from: we used to value customers who 
would give us £100,000. I want to value a customer who’s going to give us a 
penny a month, and turn it completely round to the opposite view. So, a lot of 
the dynamics that are going on at the moment, we are very much, sort of, 
reorientating ourselves from being what could be viewed as an exclusive 
business to a more inclusive business, OK? Because, longer-term, we strongly 
believe in this shift in terms of individual responsibility. Governments will do 
less, corporates will do more, and individuals will do more. So you’re 
actually seeing a big shift. Now, each country is going at different pace. (CEO 
9) 
Another example is provided by the CEO of a large telecom company that 
underwent a major investment in new technology providing greater data capacity and 
connection speed, while undergoing a major restructuring program.  
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I believed it was, I believed it was the right thing. I saw that the world was 
becoming about data, everything was going to be about data, and that turned 
out to be the right decision. But all our competitors said, “Ah, no one’s going 
to buy it, no one’s interested, who would do that? etc.” (CEO 3) 
Determining the organisation’s competitive advantage is fundamental in deciding 
which assets, structures and markets are important (i.e. where to allocate resources) and 
which elements are not supporting the organisation’s competitive advantage and therefore 
should be divested or transformed. The fundamental choice for the CEO is to realise and 
articulate clearly what the competitive advantage of the organisation is and, having done 
so, take consistent decisions in terms of resource allocation. Irrespective of whether the 
competitive advantage remains valid or is rendered obsolete by changes in the external 
environment, CEOs must identify what that competitive advantage is in order to protect, 
nurture or build it as the case may be.  
4.7.2.3 Determining the pace and scale of change  
The need to determine the pace and scale of change was highlighted and emerged as one 
of the core demands for participant CEOs. Accounts show that determining the pace of 
change is a core responsibility of the CEO, with even as much weight attached to this 
capability as that of knowing what to change. In general, all accounts indicated the 
necessity of making changes quickly, yet some participants intimated that being too fast 
or too slow may be detrimental to the change process.  
The CEO of a building company undergoing restructuring due to the economic 
recession in 2008–2010 described the obligation to scale the business at an incredible 
pace to ensure survival while simultaneously ensuring continuity in the way the business 
operated. The essence was about enacting change fast while retaining a sense of direction.  
  257 
… we were changing it, as I say, flying – changing the wings while we were 
flying was how it felt at times. But that is effectively what we had to do. We 
had no choice because if we didn’t change the bloody wings we knew we’d 
fall out of the sky. (CEO 1) 
The CEO of a pharmaceutical company also facing economic recession around the 
same time stressed the need to determine the “right pace of change”, being a consideration 
almost as important as determining what to change. Being too slow or too fast was 
considered detrimental to the successful adaptation of the business to a new set of 
circumstances.  
I think being able to differentiate – it’s quite important in periods of 
significant change, I think, to be able to differentiate not just the change but 
the velocity of the change. So it’s very easy to be too slow; it’s equally 
dangerous to be too fast – and trying to understand that is quite important. 
Being able to try and manage your responses on a time basis or a speed basis 
I think is almost as important as diagnosing what you want to do. (CEO 7) 
Another example was provided by the CEO of a large company undergoing a 
transformation from a shop-based to a digital business model. Again the CEO stressed 
the importance of managing the transition fast, ensuring the company was ahead of 
competitors moving in the same direction.  
And critical for the transformation is that we get it right with the technology 
and that we get it right with the pace, and that we are fast enough to transform 
ourselves. And, but the pace of the development in the technology that we can 
really make it up and make it faster – that we are not just running behind the 
others but then somehow giving the pace as well. (CEO 8) 
Determining the pace and scale of change emerged as a critical demand for the 
CEO. For example, it is up to the CEO to determine how fast to move from restructuring 
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to growth, and the extent of restructuring is critical to success in managing strategic 
tensions. According to Mintzberg, as part of the strategy formulation process, the CEO 
and his/her team is “trying to maintain a pace of change that is responsive to the 
environment without being disruptive to the organisation” (Mintzberg, 1979:26). 
4.7.3 Organisational structure redesign  
Having determined the purpose, competitive advantage and the pace and scale of change 
– that is, after formulating strategy – CEOs turn to the redesign of organisational structure. 
That is to say that structure follows strategy (e.g. Chandler, 1962). CEOs and their top 
teams have significant control over how they perceive the environment, how they 
formulate strategy and how they determine organisational design and structure (Child, 
1972). According to Miles et al. (1978:7), they “conceptually associate strategy with 
intent and structure with action”. In contrast, Porter (1991:102) argues that “a firm’s 
strategy defines its configuration of activities and how they interrelate”, but proceeds 
from an examination of the external environment, particularly industry structure (Porter, 
1980). In this sense, strategy follows structure. Other more recent studies affirmed the 
primacy of structure over strategy, by showing that boards can take action that leads to 
changes in CEO and strategy (Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001). Moreover, it is still a 
matter of contention whether strategy determines top team structure and composition or 
whether strategy is a creation of the top management team (Finkelstein, Hambrick and 
Cannella, 2009). In Section 4.7.1.1 in this thesis it has been shown how CEOs facing 
technology and regulatory disruption select their top team based on a broad understanding 
of the challenges facing the company, rather than obeying a clearly defined corporate 
strategy. Moreover, strategy development was often observed to be a result of top team – 
and to some extent board – discussions (see Theme III, Section 4.6.3 and Theme IV, 
  259 
Section 4.7.2). Notwithstanding the ongoing debate, in this thesis the pattern that emerged 
is one of structure following strategy. One CEO put it very clearly: 
… life is one part strategy and nine parts execution. (CEO 3) 
The above sentence from a highly experienced CEO makes the case for strategy 
formulation followed by structure change and redesign. It also suggests that CEOs have 
relatively less choice in formulating strategy compared to the many ways strategy can be 
implemented (i.e. the possibilities for structural configurations in fulfilling the strategy).  
Indeed, CEO interviews revealed an important strategic tension manifested in 
implementing strategy – that is, in making structural changes to serve a new strategy. All 
CEOs undergoing significant, far-reaching change voiced a need to both restructure and 
grow, although enacting it in different ways. When competitive advantage was perceived 
as unaffected (i.e. typically in cases of economic recession or financial crisis), CEOs 
prioritised restructuring over growth. In turn, when competitive advantage is perceived 
as being eroded (i.e. typically in cases of technology or regulatory change), CEOs attend 
to restructuring and growth simultaneously.  
The next sections explore these distinct patterns in organisational redesign.  
4.7.3.1 Sequential restructuring and growth  
Restructuring and growth have emerged as recurrent competing demands for CEOs. 
CEOs in this study were experiencing severe declines in company performance due to 
external environmental changes (recession, financial crisis, technology and regulatory 
changes) which exposed firm’s internal weaknesses and required CEOs to initiate a 
turnaround effort. Turnaround often refers to the “dynamic processes that aim for the 
recovery of an organisation’s performance after a period of life-threatening decline” 
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(Boyne and Meier, 2009; Pearce and Robbins, 1993). Turnaround literature identifies two 
typical and distinct types of activity. Retrenchment activities are those that seek to 
improve firm operational efficiency, profitability and strengthen the firm’s (current) 
industry position by disposing of non-strategic and non-performing assets and employing 
cost-cutting measures across the firm (Robbins and Pearce, 1992). Recovery activities are 
those more fundamental structural changes that transform and reposition the firm for 
sustained growth and profitability (Barker and Duhaime, 1997). Given that retrenchment 
and recovery activities may conflict, it is a matter of contention in the literature whether 
they should be done sequentially (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003; Lohrke, Ahlstrom 
and Bruton, 2012; Filatotchev and Toms, 2006) or simultaneously (Arogyaswamy, 
Barker and Yasai-Ardekani, 1995; Pajunen, 2005; Schmitt and Raisch, 2013). The 
difficulty in reconciling restructuring and growth (or, in turnaround terminology, 
retrenchment and recovery) has emerged from the CEO interviews. Restructuring reduces 
capacity, risk and resources in order to better exploit existing assets, whereas growth 
implies increasing capacity, taking more risk, committing more resources and exploring 
new markets and/or products.  
CEOs that reported drastic, yet temporary, reductions in demand for existing 
products as a result of a recessive economic cycle (and sometimes coupled with high 
financial leverage) often choose to focus first on a restructuring strategy; and only when 
restructuring was completed, or nearly completed, and the market had reverted to an 
upward trajectory, did CEOs return to a growth strategy. This is in line with stage models 
of corporate turnaround, where retrenchment and recovery are done sequentially. This 
study finds that sequential restructuring and growth is pursued when the reason for the 
decline is not perceived as a disruption to the firm’s competitive advantage.  
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CEOs emphasised that each phase requires different people, different thinking and 
different behaviour; whereas in the restructuring phase a “financial mind-set” prevails, in 
the growth phase a “strategic mind-set” is prominent. One CEO explained how during the 
first years of his tenure he focused completely on restructuring while attempting to 
preserve core capabilities for future growth. When restructuring was completed, he 
devoted his time entirely to a long-term growth strategy. This CEO recognised that 
restructuring and growth require different skills, different people and a different mind-
set. As discussed in the strategy formulation section, irrespective of the nature of 
environmental conditions, CEOs need to understand the core capabilities that contribute 
to the firm’s current or future competitive advantage.  
So we cut as deeply as we thought we could, but of course we also knew that 
there would be a demand for houses at some stage in the future. So you were 
trying to get as far down as you could but retain the capability to grow again. 
We now need the thinkers to think about where we’re going to take the 
business longer-term … now we need to really think about the future of the 
business and where we take it: how do we manage over the next five years? 
And that is quite a shift for us. It’s, there’s none of the numerical stuff in there. 
It’s talking about the way we build houses, it’s talking about how we develop 
our people and how do we change the landowner relationships and customer 
at the heart of everything we do? That’s the key thing. So there is a whole 
series of things there that don’t look anything like what we’ve been doing for 
the last five years, but actually they are about our future and my role is to, if 
you like, put that in place. So there is a clear road path that we can now get 
on and deliver against … and then effectively where do I need to put my time? 
It’s into the future of where the business goes rather than dealing with the 
draining of the swamp, which to a large extent is now behind us. (CEO 1) 
A similar experience was discussed by a CEO who focused his first three years 
entirely on restructuring, which he recognised as requiring a distinct “vision and decision-
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making”. Yet, because restructuring means discipline, control and risk reduction, the 
CEO perceived the company to be losing the competitive battle by shedding talented 
employees (read: current competitive advantage). So he took the decision to initiate a 
long-term growth strategy in parallel, which demanded creativity, collaboration and risk-
taking. The loss of talent during restructuring has been highlighted as a consequence of 
long periods of retrenchment (Trevor and Nyberg, 2008). This move was seen by the CEO 
as “unique” as, according to his experience, growth strategies only start when the financial 
restructuring is over.  
And we said, “We’re not rushing: we’re three years into restructuring – the 
company is wearing out; people are wearing out.” So that is one element that 
we had to face at [the company name] which was different from other 
restructuring, so that needs a certain vision and certain decision-making. And 
there’s one unique element, because, as a result of this prolonged 
restructuring, we entered into changing strategy – a strategy exercise and 
changing strategy, already while the restructuring was not behind us. Now 
normally that doesn’t happen. Changing the strategy happens after the 
restructuring, the financial restructuring is done. But we couldn’t wait 
anymore because we said we’re losing out and we might finally like to start 
in maybe two, three years down the road – but then there’s no company 
anymore, so the patient has to move forward while it is trying to become 
healthy again, so that is why this is different. (CEO 4) 
Other CEOs described the concept of separating short-term actions required for 
restructuring from long-term actions enabling future growth. Too much emphasis on 
restructuring without protecting capabilities required for future growth may ensure 
survival in the short term but place the company at a competitive disadvantage in the long 
term. Hence, balancing short- and long-term demands is a critical challenge for the CEO. 
The CEO of a high-tech company explained:  
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And we separated out the really long-term things that had to be protected 
from the shorter-term things: we changed, we invented some new products so 
that people could buy cheaper versions of the products. Because one of the 
problems we had before was people just couldn’t afford to buy these licences. 
And we knew that: we knew this experience about cutting long-term projects, 
our customers cutting long-term projects – one of the barriers was the price 
of dealing with [the company]. And so we invented some new products which 
were basically priced at: well, instead of buying a licence that enabled you to 
design lots of chips with [the company] we basically cut it up into bite-size 
pieces – not rocket science at all. And people could buy a small chunk and 
that at least kept them in the game. And we assumed that it would be cyclical 
and that they would appear again at some stage. We didn’t know how long it 
was going to be, so we needed to make sure that it was sustainable at a lower 
level. (CEO 6) 
From the above examples a number of aspects become clear. First, when the main 
cause of decline is external economic and/or financial conditions which do not alter the 
firm’s competitive advantage, CEOs choose to follow a sequential pattern of 
retrenchment and recovery. Yet CEOs identify and preserve the capabilities that must not 
be affected by restructuring, thereby ensuring reconciliation between short-term survival 
and long-term competitive advantage. Some CEOs that initially place greater emphasis 
on restructuring recognise at some point that recovery needs to happen in parallel, as the 
company may lose important capabilities (e.g. key people leaving the company, low 
morale). CEOs emphasise the idea that both phases require significantly different 
behaviour, mind-sets and people: one described transitioning from restructuring to growth 
as “quite a shift”, indicating the difficulties inherent in the transition.  
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4.7.3.2 Simultaneous restructuring and growth  
CEOs that experienced some form of technology disruption to the firm’s business model 
reported a different approach to restructuring and growth. As we have seen, the external 
environment is perceived to be eradicating existing competitive advantage and therefore 
retrenchment is seen as important but insufficient. In an initial short period the CEO 
focuses on restructuring, but in time enacts both restructuring and growth. CEOs retrench 
both assets and costs, while finding new configurations of resources and creating entirely 
new structures based on different technology. The decision to enact restructuring and 
growth simultaneously has been defended by several turnaround academics (Lim et al., 
2013; Morrow, Johnson and Busenitz, 2004; Martin and Kimberly, 2008). These scholars 
argue that firms cannot engage in retrenchment without a clear understanding of how to 
recover (i.e. which assets will be critical for the long-term competitiveness of the firm). 
Further, firms often require external finance to be successful in the turnaround effort and 
investors are only willing to invest if the firm can articulate how it is to be competitive, 
which entails both short-term retrenchment and long-term growth (Filatotchev and Toms, 
2006).  
The CEO of a large retail company indicated the need to enact restructuring and 
growth simultaneously, balancing short- and long-term demands. He spoke of having to 
“pat his head and rub his tummy”, referring to the contradictory nature of the two 
strategies and the difficulty of addressing both in parallel. He articulates this as a central 
demand of the CEO role.  
Well, that all comes down to building. You go from fire brigade management 
– the day-to-day stuff, survival, the need for a change, cash, instant stuff – 
into: OK, we’ve now bought, we’re out of intensive care, we’re in the general 
ward, now we need to take some exercise, now we need to … And that’s about 
building the team, starting to build the long-term strategy, go from a one-year 
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strategy to a three-year strategy and then start building on from there. But 
it’s an iterative process and judgement call completely about how you need 
to do it. And a chief executive needs to be able to pat his head and rub his 
tummy, and have a twofold strategy. It needs to have more of the same to 
make sure we don’t backslide, and we need to start planning for success. And, 
if we are successful, this is what we’re going to do as well, and you need to 
start both in parallel. (CEO 11) 
Another CEO elaborated further about the tensions between restructuring and 
growth which require fundamentally different types of teams and approaches. While the 
CEO initially split restructuring and growth, focusing on restructuring, he then gradually 
began to integrate a simultaneous restructuring and growth strategy.  
Yes, two different type of teams and approaches. Yeah, well, two different 
types of thinking and behaviour. But what you should do – and you’ve just 
put your finger on it – is you should start doing some things which don’t 
unwind other things, so they’re add-ons which you can do in a discreet way 
which are going to add value to business maybe in two or three years’ time. 
So you plant seeds. (CEO 11) 
A further CEO described the tensions between restructuring and growth during 
digital disruption. He emphasised a primary focus on restructuring the business with a 
financial mind-set dominating (i.e. liquidity) while establishing the new long-term 
capabilities that would enable profitable growth. The result was a retention of both 
elements of the legacy, declining business model (i.e. exclusively shop-based) and the 
new growing business (i.e. digital presence). Interestingly, he spoke of the pressure to 
switch the business model entirely to digital, but instead chose to pursue a “high-tech and 
high-touch” (i.e. both shop- and online-based) approach, retaining the ability to satisfy 
the capacity of the airline business. 
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But we could get the cash and then we had to write off goodwill, but that was 
not cash-relevant, and in a turnaround you really have to focus on cash. And 
we got more cash in that I spent for restructuring, so it was a really self-
finance turnaround … And principally wanted to move into a digital world, 
and there I was somehow pushed to reduce and to bring up the percentage of 
online bookings. And I could easily push that off by closing all the shops; then 
I would have had 100%, almost. But it would not have landed well, because I 
had as well planes to fill. And there we then found in this dilemma: how far 
do we go if I am to compromise? That was me – mine to decide – if we close 
those shops who are not profitable on short plan. So where we lose money to 
have the shops and we said, “We keep all those shops open who are 
contributing on the shop level to the head office or to the central costs and 
are giving us valued power, and are somehow in proximity to another shop.” 
(CEO 8) 
One CEO explained how he initiated restructuring and growth simultaneously. 
While the company was stagnant, with very fragile growth and high levels of inefficiency, 
the CEO took the decision to embark in a cost transformation exercise, releasing the 
necessary resources to simultaneously invest in new, risky technology and gain first-
mover advantage over competitors. As the technology was new to the industry, it wasn’t 
at that point cannibalising the existing business, and hence the CEO had more time to 
make a transition.  
So what investment [in the new product technology] is on its own, actually 
quite risky. But if it goes wrong, we’ll stop doing it, in which case the profits 
will come back up because, actually, we’re doing it anyway. And if it goes 
right, the profits will come up. But what we’re, we’re effectively paying for 
the investment with the cost transformation. So, the profits, the free cash flow 
we’ll generate will still be up next year, despite spending all of this money. 
So in some ways you don’t have to worry too much about the micro nature of 
the decision: we’ll pay for it. So we turned the decision – that’s what I mean: 
there’s a difference between a risky micro decision and a macro decision, so 
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how can you actually, finding ways effectively to create the space to do the 
stuff. Because if I’d had to turn round to shareholders – which is the normal: 
companies normally have a decision which is one, particularly companies in 
a, maybe a declining industry, or an industry that’s perceived as declining 
one is: they milk the business for as long as they can, and pay out a higher 
and higher dividends; but ultimately you’re buying into a declining cash flow 
stream. Sometimes, not even ultimately, you just are. Or they say, “The 
future’s wonderful in five years’ time, but in the meantime you’re going to 
have to take a massive decline in cash flows and etc.” (CEO 3) 
CEO accounts indicate that enacting restructuring and growth simultaneously is 
often a choice of how to handle strategic tensions. The accounts underlined the 
importance of understanding and managing the differences between the two approaches 
(i.e. in terms of thinking and behaviour) as well as the interdependencies (i.e. realising 
resources from restructuring in order to grow sustainably) and then being able to 
implement them consistently.  
4.7.3.3 Allocating exploration and exploitation demands to different business units  
An additional structural choice handled by CEOs was to create split divisions based on 
different time and goal orientations (i.e. exploitation and exploration units), holding them 
to different standards, and providing separate leadership at the top. This has been 
proposed by ambidexterity scholars as a structural solution to ensure coordination and 
integration of exploration and exploitation (e.g. Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Raisch et 
al., 2009). Structural differentiation allows each unit to focus effectively on its distinct 
competence of either exploitation and exploration, requiring as they do a different focus, 
thinking and behaviour, while top management ensures there is integration at the top 
(Smith and Tushman, 2005). For example, Lubatkin et al. (2006) found that top 
management team behavioural integration is an integrative mechanism that aids in 
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processing disparate demands of exploitation and exploration. Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and 
Bourgeois (1997) suggested that top team integration facilitates the recognition by 
executives of each other’s preferences and conflicting roles. The development of reward 
systems contingent on the achievement of shared goals between exploitative and 
explorative divisions has also been identified as a useful integrative mechanism for 
structurally differentiated units (Jansen et al., 2009). 
One CEO perceived the company to be very good at creating new products (i.e. 
exploring) and less able to distribute and sell finished products (i.e. exploiting). He took 
the decision to structurally split business units, holding them to different standards, as 
illustrated next.  
… if you look at what is the fundamentals of the business: that is, you create 
a show, you produce a show, you sell it and you produce it and then you 
exploit it … The company is still, I would argue, the best company in the field, 
is still the most creative company. It is still the best production company. 
Where it needs to learn is to also become the best exploiting company of its 
field. [The company] never been very good at that, and we need to improve 
that. First thing we did was set up this distribution business. We’ve got now 
one unit: it’s called [Company] Worldwide Distribution, that is not in 
production but is entirely into distribution of finished program … So they sell 
our own shows and they do acquire rights to other people’s shows and, in 
particular, on the scripted side. (CEO 4) 
Another CEO of a travel and leisure company took the decision to decouple the tour 
operator division from the airline business, holding them to different standards (i.e. 
different target customers, different distribution channels).  
We decoupled two units and said there has to be strong links. And there were 
strong links and a couple of weekly meetings, half-a-day meetings, where we 
were looking into it every yield, every city, every load factor, every yield 
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development and then shifting capacity from one to the other. And we started 
with 85% of the capacity of the airline had to fill, had to be filled by the tour 
operator; we are now down to 65%. And that means that the tour operator is 
much more relaxed in filling the capacity. It’s still too much but we can’t do 
it in one step: we will do it in a further step when we come down to 50%. And 
this gives the tour operator a much more relaxed position on the pricing 
because it does not have to just run behind the capacity to fill. And, on the 
other hand, we said the airline has to build up their own sales chance with 
seat-only and with the web, and to go somehow into a different clientele and 
client segment and develop GDS and all these different sales chance, which 
are then not having, or which are not directing to exactly the same place as 
we are directing it in the tour operator. And this worked really well … Yeah, 
mentally we separated it: not yet we operationally anyway, yes. (CEO 8) 
While in the past the tour operator and the airline businesses were competing with 
each other for the same customers, the CEO, in splitting the two businesses and holding 
them to different standards, was able to direct each business to different market segments; 
and provide direction and integration to both businesses from the top by means of a series 
of weekly meetings where both businesses are brought together and differences are 
addressed. A common key performance indicator (KPI) system was also developed to 
provide integration between the airline’s and tour operator’s activities.  
4.7.4 Strategy communication and alignment  
To ensure consistency throughout the organisation the CEO must communicate internally 
to ascertain that employees at all levels can implement the strategy vigorously and 
consistently. CEO accounts highlighted a requirement to undertake the communication 
personally, to lead by example, and for the message be extremely simple and focused. It 
has long been recognised that successful strategic change depends not only on the creation 
of new strategies and structures but, importantly, also the ability to convey a new mission 
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and strategic priorities to a variety of stakeholders (Gioia et al., 1994; Smircich, 1983). 
The acceptance of the new mission and/or strategy is an important element in the CEO’s 
quest for legitimacy (Fiss and Zajac, 2006). The role of the CEO in communicating 
expectations of behaviour aligned with the new purpose and strategy has been noted by 
Tengblad (2004). CEOs use a variety of tactics such as meetings with personnel, 
management conferences and other forums to communicate messages about the desired 
state of affairs in the form of simple messages such as “the ten commandments”, the 
company “cornerstones” or “new mission”. In this thesis participants provided abundant 
examples of such behaviour (Tengblad, 2004).  
One CEO of a building company undergoing restructuring took an eight-week tour 
across the business, translating the strategy into a simple message that ensured all the 
organisation was consistent in implementing strategy.  
I decided to do an eight-week tour of the country, so I went to every single 
business, spoke to every employee and basically said, “There are just three 
things you need to do. It’s about reducing cost, it’s about driving sales and 
it’s about retaining cash.” … It was a big road tour that we did, that I did, 
going to every single business … went through it with every single 
management team and basically said, “These are the three things we have to 
do. It’s not complicated; you’ve just got to do them incredibly well.” But the 
communication, I think, was the most critical element. Very simple. Reduce 
costs, drive sales, and bring in cash. (CEO 1)  
Another CEO of a pharmaceutical company described communication of the new 
mission across the organisation to ensure alignment as a crucial, ongoing and dynamic 
challenge.  
In a company of this size, by the time you get the last person aligned to the 
new mission, the mission has started, so it’s a very – I think alignment is a 
24-hour, seven-days-a-week forever mid challenge, because alignment, the 
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implicit assumption of alignment, is that: if only you could explain to 
everybody in their bubble, then everybody would align and you’re not stable. 
But the reality is that a) that’s very difficult, b) people hear different things, 
so they don’t always get it, and c) there is a natural drift: humans do not do 
the same thing – even humans who were asked to do the most predictable 
thing in the most measured environment will consistently fail to do it. And so 
you’re, and which eventually deteriorates alignment, at the margin it doesn’t, 
but at the gross level it destroys alignment, and so you can’t, you’re always 
– that’s a huge agenda. (CEO 7) 
The CEO of a high-tech company revealed the importance of increasing 
communication about the company’s position in the industry and how the company was 
to compete, referring to different forms of communication, open-door policies and 
leading by example as ways of aligning people with the company’s strategy. 
… I increased the amount of communication, so I got all the execs out doing 
so-called town hall meetings with their staff in different parts of the world. I 
did a lot of that myself and the CFO … they need to understand the dynamics 
in the industry and the company’s position in the industry and how everything 
worked. And so a lot of face-to-face communication, written communication, 
all the open-door policies and that sort of thing and leading by example. So 
when you’re trying to tell people to be careful about money, then you don’t 
have the execs flying around business class. It’s nonsense, and so leading by 
example and communicating I think are the key things. (CEO 6) 
The CEO of a large entertainment company held “monthly reviews” with leadership 
from different units to discuss progress against the company strategy, as well as to 
reinforce and motivate managing directors’ positive achievement in some areas, or make 
suggestions for improvements in others.  
… I do a monthly business review with all of the major units that I oversee 
directly. And part of that is going through what’s happening in the business, 
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but part of it is just simply to have a direct relationship with the MDs and just 
chat about what’s happening and give compliments about what’s going well 
or make a suggestion… (CEO 3) 
Strategy communication ensures that leadership at all levels understands the drivers 
of strategy and can implement actions at different levels that are aligned and consistent 
with the corporate strategy. Determining where the competitive advantage lies and then 
communicating appropriate expectations very clearly to leadership at all levels of the 
organisation are two critical choices for the CEO in ensuring organisational alignment 
and engagement with the strategy and its effective execution.  
4.7.5 Summary of Theme IV: CEO role: strategic behaviour  
This theme has been concerned with CEOs’ strategic behaviour. Four fundamental areas 
emerged as critical for the CEO role in contexts of far-reaching change: i) top 
management team composition, size and dynamics; ii) strategy formulation; iii) redesign 
of organisational structure; and iv) strategy communication and alignment. These are 
critical demands of the CEO role where incumbents face both choices and competing 
demands. 
CEOs have been shown to enjoy substantial discretion in determining the 
composition, size and dynamics of the top management team (TMT). It has been shown 
how changes in TMT composition and size are likely to happen when CEOs perceive 
environmental changes as fundamentally challenging the company’s competitive 
advantage (i.e. technology and regulatory changes). When CEOs perceive change not to 
affect competitive advantage (i.e. an economic and financial crisis), CEOs tend to 
maintain TMT composition and size. Those CEOs who do make changes to the TMT 
focus both on ensuring diversity of skills and experiences that are relevant in light of the 
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challenges faced by the company, while also seeking to select individuals who are trusted 
and loyal. This ensures a balance between team diversity and cohesion. At the same time 
CEOs are tasked with preserving firm-specific knowledge by both retaining existing TMT 
members and promoting others from within the company. This helps to ensure that 
continuity and change are adequately balanced, and that the TMT retains valuable inside 
knowledge. TMT differentiation, and continuity and change decisions, are made 
consciously by CEOs and are common in environments characterised by uncertainty, 
instability and complexity (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Virany, Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1992). TMT size was found to be a conscious choice for CEOs. Smaller teams 
were normally chosen to facilitate consensus and fast decision-making, often required in 
companies facing seriously low performance. These choices about structure and 
composition emerged as antecedents of the TMT processes of consensus and social 
integration (Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009). CEOs, it was found, are given 
latitude in the way they lead top team decision processes. However, we observe common 
themes referred to by CEOs. CEOs were found to encourage open debate and discussion 
within the TMT, and see their role as “primus inter pares”. A concern for open debate 
and constructive challenge within the TMT decision process was accompanied by a 
preoccupation with ensuring the TMT remained cohesive and that meaningful consensus 
was attained. CEOs also spoke of a decentralised style of decision-making, and greater 
delegation both to the top team and from the top team to lower levels of management. 
This pointed to increased levels of delegation and risk-taking by CEOs in firms facing 
seriously low performance, and is in line with findings from Bowman (1982).  
In discussing preferences and choices in composing and leading the TMT, there 
was little reference to role interdependence within the TMT – with one exception. The 
role of chief financial officer (CFO) and the relationship with the CEO emerged as a 
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critical factor during restructuring and strategic transformation. Where there was 
misalignment between the CEO and the CFO (either in the form of low trust or where the 
CFO was not focusing on the right aspects of role), CEOs referred to this as a source of 
constraint with negative implications for CEO time and focus, as well as having 
implications for strategy implementation. However, many CEOs described the CFO as a 
fundamental partner in driving restructuring and strategic transformation. What emerged 
was a partnership between the two, where competing demands arising from restructuring 
and growth are split, with CFOs taking greater responsibility for short-term restructuring 
and CEOs focusing more on the company’s longer-term transformation. A relationship 
based on challenge and communication between these roles provided a platform for 
integrating short- and long-term demands. While past research found the CFO role 
became more important during times of poor performance (Reutzel and Cannella, 2004), 
hardly any research has been done in investigating the dyadic relationship between these 
key roles, the one exception being Han, Zhang and Han, 2015.  
Tensions between TMT executives with different time, cognitive and emotional 
orientations arising from role demands were commonly cited by CEOs. The CEO role 
emerged as an integrator of competing perspectives within the TMT, ensuring cognitive 
recognition of different perspectives, and maintaining team integrity. In some cases CEOs 
encouraged executives to assume temporary leadership of each other’s divisions or 
promoted team-building exercises to ensure integration and a more holistic recognition 
of strategic competing demands. In this sense, CEOs were depicted as “symphony 
conductors” in line with Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997.  
A second area of demand and choice for CEOs is strategy formulation. CEOs that 
perceived the external environment to be one of technology or regulatory change 
disrupting the company’s competitive advantage declared a requirement to articulate a 
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distinct business purpose. This was found to enable the organisation to make sense of the 
new environment and company direction, and helped CEOs make decisions about 
competing demands and complex problems, as well as serving as a tool for empowerment 
for managerial decisions at all levels. The articulation and communication of a new 
business purpose also highlighted CEOs’ “sense-giving” function (Gioia and Chittipeddi, 
1991). It emerged as a way of ensuring that short-term actions and decisions were made 
with reference to long-term goals (David, 1989).  
A further aspect closely related to the articulation of a distinctive purpose was the 
requirement to determine the company’s competitive advantage and unique capabilities. 
Irrespective of whether environmental conditions disrupted competitive advantage, CEOs 
referred to a need to identify it. CEOs who were facing economic recession and financial 
crisis which did not fundamentally disrupt competitive advantage found it nonetheless 
useful to determine competitive advantage so that decisions about restructuring and 
growth could be made so as to preserve and reinforce underlying capabilities. Those 
CEOs facing technology and regulatory disruptions that eradicated competitive advantage 
faced the task of identifying a new competitive advantage based on an analysis of both 
market position (Porter, 1980, 1991) and firm resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; 
Grant, 1991). This enabled CEOs to protect existing resources that would be useful under 
the new circumstances as well as acquiring new ones. Understanding the sources of 
competitive advantage allows CEOs to make consistent choices in terms of structure and 
resource allocation.  
A final aspect relating to strategy formulation is determining the pace and scale of 
change. In contexts of uncertainty and complexity, CEOs voiced the need to establish the 
scale of restructuring and how fast business should be transformed for growth, affirming 
that this needs to be clearly determined. Restructuring that is too large and happens too 
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fast may ensure survival in the short term but can mean that important capabilities in the 
form of talent and valued combinations of resources are destroyed – which may make it 
harder for the firm to face the future. And yet being too slow in enacting strategic change 
may mean companies lose the competitive battle. Hence CEOs must balance the need for 
stability and continuity with the need for change (Mintzberg, 1979).  
Organisational redesign follows strategy formulation. Two fundamental aspects of 
structure emerged: the need to balance restructuring and growth as well as exploitation 
and exploration. It was shown how CEOs choose to implement restructuring and growth 
sequentially or simultaneously according to the characteristics of the environment. 
Sequential approaches were observed when CEOs perceive the external environmental 
change (i.e. economic recession, financial crisis) as not disruptive to existing competitive 
advantage. The focus of the CEO in this case is to prioritise restructuring while protecting 
the existing distinctive capabilities that are the basis of current competitive advantage. 
This approach was found to be in line with stage models of corporate turnaround (Bruton, 
Ahlstrom and Wan, 2003; Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Robbins and Pearce, 1992). 
Conversely, when CEOs perceive the current competitive advantage to have been 
eradicated (i.e. by technology or regulatory change), they implement restructuring and 
growth simultaneously. This approach is line with turnaround scholars who argue for 
simultaneous enactment of retrenchment and recovery as the only way to achieve 
sustained corporate performance (e.g. Arogyaswamy, Barker and Yasai-Ardekani, 1995; 
Schmitt and Raisch, 2013). The argument that perceptions of competitive advantage drive 
the choice about sequential or simultaneous restructuring and growth has been hardly 
acknowledged in turnaround literature.  
CEOs were also observed considering organisational redesign around exploitation 
and exploration. Structural separation of business units around exploration and 
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exploitation was a frequent choice for CEOs who wanted to increase efficiency in the 
short term and innovation in the longer term. This has been described by ambidexterity 
scholars as structural ambidexterity (Tushman and O’Reilly, 1996; Raisch et al., 2009). 
It was also found that, while structural differentiation allows a focus by different divisions 
on either exploration or exploitation, there are a number of integrative mechanisms that 
can be used to integrate the efforts of structurally differentiated units. In line with past 
research, it was found that integration occurs at the top between executive leaders of each 
unit (Smith and Tushman, 2005), suggesting that behavioural integration in the top team 
is important in reconciling competing demands and the tensions between exploitation and 
exploration (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy and Bourgeois, 1997; Lubatkin et al., 2006). The use 
of common reward systems – where shared goals among distinct divisions are articulated 
– have also emerged as a mechanism for integration between exploitation and exploration 
divisions (Jansen et al., 2009). 
CEOs were also found to devote substantial time and energy to strategy 
communication and organisational alignment by means of: meetings with leadership at 
other levels, business tours, “town halls” and other communication activities – and also 
through leading by example. Communicating the new vision or the key actions expected 
was seen as an ongoing task, where alignment is a dynamic and continuous process. CEOs 
are in this sense “communicators of expectations” (Tengblad, 2004) and this is critical 
for both CEO legitimacy and effective strategy implementation (Fiss and Zajac, 2006; 
Gioia et al., 1994). 
The next section summarises the four themes, providing a synthesis of the 
analysis and discussion in this chapter.  
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4.8 Summary of Chapter 4  
This chapter has identified and discussed four overarching themes that have emerged 
from the analytical work undertaken in this study. These themes are as follows: 
Theme I: Chairperson and CEO roles: perception of business context and 
competing demands; 
Theme II: Chairperson and CEO roles: role boundedness  
Theme III: Chairperson role: leading the board in order to deal with strategic 
tensions; 
Theme IV: CEO role: strategic \behaviour  
Theme I is concerned with exploring the nature of business contexts and competing 
demands perceived by CEOs and chairpersons while fulfilling their roles. Strategic and 
role-based tensions faced by both chairpersons and CEOs emerged in contexts 
characterised by high levels of uncertainty, instability, complexity, resource scarcity and 
low munificence driven by i) economic recession and financial crisis; ii) technology 
change; and iii) far-reaching regulatory change. Here, firms were suffering from 
substantially low performance and their very survival was threatened. CEOs and 
chairpersons perceived two fundamental strategic tensions: between restructuring and 
growth and between exploitation and exploration. Role-based tensions were also 
identified. In some instances, CEOs faced tensions in articulating the operational and 
strategic demands of their work. Both CEOs and chairpersons pointed to the increased 
salience of tensions between diversity and debate, and unity and consensus, in the top 
management team and in the board, respectively. Within this theme, the roles of both 
chairperson and CEO are identified as having important boundary-spanning 
responsibilities and are tasked with sense-making of the external environment. How the 
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external environment and fundamental strategic tensions are perceived by CEO and 
chairperson have been shown to influence the way chairpersons and CEOs work together 
and the relationship they establish, as well as how they fulfil their respective roles.  
Theme II explores the dynamic interplay between the chairperson and CEO roles. 
This interplay emerged very strongly from data analysis as being critical in determining 
each incumbent’s effectiveness and, importantly, the organisation’s ability to effectively 
respond to strategic tensions arising from environmental change. 
High levels of trust, shared experience, frequency of communication and 
complementarity of skills, experience and perspectives were identified as critical in 
determining how role boundaries are delineated, as well as the nature of the role the 
chairperson can play in relation to the CEO. These relationship qualities being present 
means tensions can be raised and investigated by either party without fear of recrimination 
or loss of face, as well as allowing both to arrive at a meaningful common understanding 
of the challenges and options available. A shared understanding was found to be critical 
for both to fulfil their roles effectively. Boundary management is partly determined by 
relationship qualities and incumbents’ interpretation of their roles. Irrespective of the 
nature of the challenges facing the firm, incumbents often delineate roles according to 
accepted, normative prescriptions enshrined in corporate governance codes and practice 
(the chairperson leads the board and the CEO leads the company). However, a number of 
CEOs and chairpersons do not rely on such rigid prescriptions and negotiate them 
according to the circumstances at hand. Boundaries are negotiated with reference to how 
each incumbent can effectively contribute skills, experience and relationships in handling 
challenges. Here, the division of labour between the CEO and the chairperson is not 
negotiated around neat categories (i.e. internal versus external) but is highly dependent 
on the specific contributions each can make to the ever-evolving challenges. 
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The amalgamation of relationship qualities and the way role boundaries are 
delineated shapes the range of roles the chairperson can play in relation to the CEO and 
how effectively these are performed. Findings revealed three key roles chairpersons may 
play in relation to the CEO in contexts of far-reaching change. A central role, and little 
discussed in the governance literature, is that of buffering. It was shown how CEOs are 
at the centre of the convergence of (often contradictory) expectations of different 
powerful stakeholders. In particular, it was observed how non-executive directors’ 
(NEDs’), boards’, shareholders’ and market analysts’ expectations and behaviour often 
put pressure on the CEO to go in different (and often contradictory) directions, making it 
difficult to reconcile them into a coherent agenda. The role of the chairperson as a buffer 
emerged as a fundamental support enabling CEOs to withstand such pressures and 
maintain a sense of direction. CEOs are vulnerable to the multitude of expectations, as 
they may be tempted to forgo the balance between the short and long term, or set 
unrealistic expectations to appease particular constituencies and/or reduce pressure. 
Chairpersons intervene as buffers to “dissipate waves”, act as “sponges” and as 
“containers and channels”. The chairperson mediates this “game of expectations” 
between the CEO and the board, shareholders and other market players. To do this, 
chairpersons require true independence of mind and behaviour as well as an in-depth 
understanding of the industry and the nature of stakeholder expectations. As CEOs can 
be frustrated by multiple expectations and pressures, chairpersons have the additional role 
of counselling and advising CEOs. Chairpersons often act as CEOs’ “emotional 
regulators”, ensuring that sound and balanced judgement is maintained, and advise on 
alternative courses of action in response to emerging tensions. On some occasions, 
chairpersons were found to be working as partners of CEOs, effectively sharing executive 
and leadership responsibility for different sides of a particular tension.  
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Theme III is concerned with the unique features of the chairperson’s role: in 
particular, how the chairperson leads the board of directors to handle strategic tensions 
that emerge in contexts of far-reaching change and poor performance. While much of 
board structure, composition and practice is influenced by the UK Corporate Governance 
Code, chairpersons retain substantial discretion in how they fulfil their role as leaders of 
the board. Critical demands that emerged were board composition, NED–board 
engagement, board agenda and work organisation, and leading boardroom debate, 
dynamics and contribution. 
Chairpersons were found to compose the board so as to ensure alignment between 
strategic challenges and individual directors’ skills, experience and connections with 
relevant external organisations, emphasising the board as a provider of resources that can 
support the executive in reducing uncertainty and handling strategic tensions. In addition, 
a diversity of skills and experience allows chairpersons to build cognitive diversity around 
the table which maximises the board’s ability to challenge and advise management, and 
to bring additional perspectives to particular challenges. Chairpersons also utilise board 
composition to signal commitment to change to important stakeholders inside and outside 
the company. Levels of industry expertise on the board were found to function as both a 
constraint and a support to the executives. Chairpersons and CEOs highlighted that too 
much industry expertise, while allowing a deep understanding of typical business 
tensions, nonetheless reduces the ability to observe changing industry dynamics and see 
beyond industry recipes. And too little industry expertise may mean the board is unable 
to understand the strategic and operational tensions faced by CEOs, and therefore be able 
to offer little in the way of support. In making decisions about board structure and 
composition, chairpersons often face the tension of ensuring a balance between diversity 
and versatility and board cohesion and consensus.  
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Chairpersons devote substantial time to ensuring adequate levels and high quality 
of engagement between NEDs and the company, and between the board as a whole and 
the CEO. Chairpersons set the engagement policy and expectations for NEDs by 
promoting NED visits to company operations, encouraging them to speak to other levels 
of management and giving them access to company documents. These practices support 
NEDs in building an independent information platform from which to more effectively 
challenge and/or advise management. Additionally, chairpersons set the tone for the 
engagement between the board as a collective body and the CEO. In particular, 
chairpersons emphasised the need to engage with strategic tension-generating topics as 
early as possible before there was too much detail and commitment. This practice requires 
chairpersons to ensure that these topics are built into the board agenda, and that board 
work is organised in a way that facilitates engagement. For example, subcommittees have 
been identified as having the potential to reduce information flows and engagement 
among NEDs, and many chairpersons choose to allow all directors to attend 
subcommittee meetings.  
A final chairperson demand is that of leading boardroom debate, dynamics and 
contribution. Chairpersons were found to cultivate open and high-quality debate about 
strategic, tension-generating topics. They have the responsibility for encouraging a 
contribution to the debate from all board members, and encouraging cognitive conflict 
while maintaining cohesion and meaningful consensus about the company’s strategic 
direction. There are vivid descriptions by chairpersons of an “interactive strategising 
practice” which is more important than formal strategic planning sessions when 
companies require a change in strategic direction. In this sense, chairpersons determine 
the degree to which the board is involved in strategy making. The theme closes with how 
CEOs perceive the actual contribution of boards to strategy making. Despite the 
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chairpersons’ narrative of challenge and debate about strategic tension-generating topics 
in the boardroom, the perception of CEOs is that boards are too constrained by lack of 
time, lack of knowledge of the company and of the pace and scale of change to be able to 
contribute more than incrementally or marginally to shaping strategy. However, it may 
be that the very threat of board scrutiny shapes the way CEOs think about strategy in their 
quest for legitimacy.  
Finally, Theme IV focuses on CEOs’ strategic behaviour. Four sub-themes have 
emerged defining CEOs’ strategic behaviour: i) top management team (TMT) 
composition, size and dynamics; ii) strategy formulation; iii) redesign of organizational 
structure; and iv) strategic communication and alignment. Although these key aspects of 
the CEO’s role may appear linear, in reality they dynamically and continuously influence 
each other – and not all CEOs pursue them in the same fashion. For example, CEOs 
experiencing an economic recession and/or financial crisis which are perceived as not 
fundamentally changing the company’s competitive advantage do not tend to change their 
top management team. On the other hand, CEOs who face far-reaching technology or 
regulatory change which is perceived as disrupting competitive advantage do change the 
TMT – substantially. It was shown how CEOs choose to compose their teams so that they 
adequately reflect, in terms of skills and experience, the strategic challenges facing the 
firm. In addition, CEOs seek to ensure a balance between diversity and team cohesion by 
hiring trusted executive members from the outside, as well as promoting others from 
within the company. This also allows CEOs to retain firm-specific knowledge that is 
valuable when changing strategic direction. Forming smaller top teams emerged as an 
additional choice for CEOs in further facilitating top team behavioural integration and 
consensus. CEOs depicted themselves as “primus inter pares”. They lead the top team so 
that open debate and constructive challenge are encouraged during decision-making, 
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while simultaneously seeking to maintain a united and cohesive team. In a context of far-
reaching change, CEOs were found to decentralise decision-making and delegate more to 
executive colleagues. Further, how the CEO and the chief financial officer (CFO) work 
together emerged as a critical factor in successful handling of strategic tensions, 
particularly between short-term restructuring and long-term growth. Within the TMT, 
CEOs were depicted as integrators and “symphony conductors”, as they ensure that 
executives with different time availability, and cognitive and emotional orientations, are 
able to work through differences and coordinate efforts. In addition to educating other 
executives in working together, CEOs may instruct them to swap positions or engage in 
team-building exercises to build cognitive recognition of each other’s differences and 
points of convergence.  
Strategy formulation emerged as the second area of demand and choice for the CEO 
encompassing the formulation of a new, distinctive business purpose, determining 
competitive advantage and distinct capabilities and also the pace and scale of change. 
CEOs who perceived current competitive advantage as unaffected did not consider the 
articulation of a distinct business purpose as a part of strategy formulation. However, this 
was seen as a requirement by CEOs who were facing technology and regulatory 
disruptions that eradicated competitive advantage and rendered underlying capabilities 
obsolete. In such cases, the articulation of the company’s purpose was seen by CEOs as 
a sense-giving tool, as well as a tool to empower everyone in the organisation to make 
decisions that align with that purpose. The articulation of a purpose also allows short- and 
long-term action to be carried out in a coherent manner. Findings also pointed to a 
requirement to identify the company’s current and future competitive position and 
advantage, irrespective of the environmental conditions affecting the firm. This allows 
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for subsequent choices about organisational structure to protect the firm’s underlying 
capabilities, dispose of obsolete ones or reconfigure them, and acquire new resources.  
Fundamental tensions emerged between restructuring and growth and between 
exploitative and explorative structures and activities. It was shown how CEOs face 
tensions between undertaking restructuring and growth sequentially or simultaneously 
and how external environmental conditions may affect these choices. Further, it was 
shown how CEOs often rearrange the relationship between exploitative and explorative 
divisions inside the company, by resorting to structural differentiation and using 
integrative mechanisms to ensure coordination.  
Finally, CEOs devote much time to ensuring that strategy (and in some cases 
purpose) are communicated throughout the organisation and that continuous alignment is 
built to ensure the organisation moves in the intended direction.  
The next chapter will present the empirical model and propositions arising from the 
analysis and discussion of the four overarching themes in this chapter. An identification 
and discussion of the theoretical and practical contributions arising from this thesis will 
follow.  
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Chapter 5 
RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND 
CONTRIBUTIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings this thesis to a conclusion. It starts by summarising the thesis findings 
and specifying the emergent model and propositions of how chairpersons and CEOs 
respond to strategic tensions. It follows an assessment of the quality of the research, which 
contends that the research meets the criteria for a qualitative, exploratory inquiry. The 
next section examines the extent to which the aims and objectives of the research have 
been achieved. This is followed by an identification and discussion of contributions to 
theory and practice, along with considerations for future research and the limitations of 
the study. The chapter closes with a personal reflection on the PhD journey and with a 
summary. 
5.2 Summary of findings 
In the previous chapter the findings of the thematic analysis undertaken were presented 
and discussed in relation to relevant literature. The findings were organised into four 
overarching themes (please refer to Table 10, Chapter 4) which are now summarised in 
terms of key findings and emerging relationships. 
The first theme discussed the nature of the external environments and strategic 
tensions as perceived by CEOs and chairpersons. The findings reveal that neither CEOs 
nor chairpersons perceive or frame strategic tensions as paradoxical, contrary to what is 
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proposed by the vast majority of literature on paradox (e.g. Smith and Tushman, 2005; 
Smith, 2014). The evidence suggests that the paradox concept, and some of the language 
associated with it, is little more than academic jargon, rather than a reality for CEOs and 
chairpersons in this study (Fredberg, 2014). This is not to say that these individuals do 
not experience tensions – in fact, they are beset by them. Rather, framing tensions as 
paradoxical appears neither to distinguish nor drive the behaviour of CEOs and 
chairpersons. Instead, this study finds that contingency theory and strategic choice (Child, 
1972, 1997; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967) are still predominant in 
explaining CEO and chairperson role behaviour and practice, both in relation to what is 
distinctive to each role as well as the interaction between the roles (Stewart, 1991). 
Responses to strategic tensions are thus partly influenced by how role incumbents 
perceive the environment in terms of the demands and constraints as well as how they 
interpret and enact their roles in context. Both CEOs and chairpersons play important 
boundary-spanning roles as they sit at the boundary between the organisation and the 
external environment (e.g. Finkelstein, Hambrick and Cannella, 2009; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007; Mintzberg, 1979; Thompson, 1967); they also play a sense-making role 
under conditions of high uncertainty (e.g. Daft and Weick, 1984). No differences were 
found between CEOs and chairpersons in relation to how they perceived and framed the 
strategic demands and constraints engendered by the external environment. Strategic 
demands were often perceived as competing and difficult, but not as paradoxical. 
Strategic tensions of restructuring and growth (e.g. Filatotchev and Toms, 2006; Schmitt 
and Raisch, 2013), and (to a lesser extent) of exploration and exploitation (Raisch et al., 
2009; Tushman and O´Reilly, 1996), were consistently perceived by both CEOs and 
chairpersons across contexts and industries. However, in those role domains that are 
distinctive to either CEO or chairperson, the incumbent perceived different role-based 
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tensions. For example, CEOs consistently mentioned tensions between encouraging top 
management team (TMT) diversity and cognitive conflict, while also ensuring consensus 
and speed and unity of action. CEOs also referred to instances where they have faced 
tensions between their operational day-to-day activities and goals, and their strategic 
responsibilities and activities. Chairpersons, on the other hand, perceived a tension 
between encouraging debate and cognitive conflict and simultaneously maintaining 
cohesion and unity of action in the board. 
Theme II explored the dynamic interplay between the chairperson and CEO roles. 
The findings indicate that this relationship is critical in enabling the effective handling of 
strategic tensions. The degree of interdependence between CEO and chairperson roles 
(although generally high) is variable, and depends on how each role incumbent interprets 
his/her role, the history of interaction and levels of trust between incumbents (e.g. 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010), the time 
the chairperson can devote to the role (Coombes and Wong, 2004; Stewart, 1991), the 
complementarity of skills and experiences of incumbents (Roberts, 2002), as well as the 
context in which the roles are enacted. Such variables influence boundary management 
activities, the extent to which the chairperson and the CEO influence each other, and the 
roles that the chairperson can play in relation to the CEO. In this study, chairpersons were 
shown to play a buffering, advisory/counselling and partner role in relation to the CEO. 
The role of buffering emerged as central in determining how strategic tensions are 
handled. CEOs are at the centre of the convergence of different and often contradictory 
expectations about the direction of travel, arising from different groups of powerful 
stakeholders such as the board (in particular non-executive directors [NEDs]), 
shareholders, investors and market analysts. The CEO thus struggles to reconcile them 
into one coherent agenda (Czarniawska, 1985) and maintain a strategic direction that 
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accommodates different risk orientations, different appetites for short- and long-term 
performance and different perceptions about competitive advantage and the pace and 
scale of strategic change. The chairperson buffering role emerges as the critical 
mechanism that insulates the CEO from particular pressures as well as regulating CEO 
responses (Lynn, 2005) (which may conform to, deviate from, “impression manage” or 
ignore expectations). By sitting between strategy and governance, the chairperson plays 
a critical role in alignment of expectations, the building of trust and in ensuring that a 
credible sense of direction is followed that balances risk, short- and long-term 
performance, and pace and scale of strategic change. In regulating CEOs’ behaviour, 
chairpersons appear to exercise advisory and counselling roles. The advisory role has a 
cognitive dimension and finds expression in debate around, and calibration of ideas 
surrounding, particular issues or problems; whereas the counselling role has a more 
emotional dimension – regulating a CEO’s emotions and thereby helping him/her to 
remain focused and objective. Evidence shows that the chairperson aims to ensure a 
CEO’s emotional stability and objectivity, employing his/her industry experience and 
strong sense of independence to coach and counsel the CEO through strategic tensions 
arising from different pressures and contradictory expectations. Further, sometimes 
chairpersons also act as partners, actually taking executive responsibility for one aspect 
of a tension (for example, exploration with a view to the long term), which is akin to the 
separation of efforts proposed by paradox theory (Lewis, Andriopoulos and Smith, 2014; 
Smith, 2014). 
Theme III examined those role demands, constraints and choices that are uniquely 
associated with the chairperson role. These included determining board composition, 
establishing board engagement policy and practice, managing board dynamics and 
contribution with regard to strategic tension-generating topics, and board contribution to 
  290 
strategy. The chairperson is found to enjoy a high level of discretion in choosing among 
different options for board composition, engagement and chairing style in board 
meetings, for example. The selection of these practices is partly influenced by normative 
prescriptions enshrined in the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016), and partly by the formative context within which they are enacted. 
Chairpersons’ responses to strategic tensions have been found to be practice-based, 
contingent on the environmental conditions and the formative context of the board, which 
“consists in imaginative assumptions about the possible and desirable form of human 
association as well as in institutional arrangements or non-institutionalized social 
practices” (Unger, 1987:89). Board composition, for example, was found to be influenced 
by chairpersons’ perceptions of the external environment which determined the requisite 
variety of skills and experience needed by the board to be effective in addressing strategic 
challenges (e.g. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). However, by 
assembling a diverse board, chairpersons then face tensions in managing the board for 
constructive dialogue, consensus and unity of action. Fast-changing external 
environments require simultaneously the requisite variety as well as speed of decision-
making and action – which are difficult to reconcile (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; 
Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009; Taylor, 2001). Other examples of practices that 
constitute responses to strategic tensions are: agenda-building by boards that is reflective 
of tensions; promotion of NEDs’ engagement with the business at various levels, as well 
as with the CEO (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005); and requesting 
greater access to information at the right level of detail and of the right quality (Carter 
and Lorsch, 2004; McCabe and Nowak, 2008; Roberts, McNulty and Stiles, 2005). 
Chairpersons’ responses to strategic tensions appear to be enacted through practice, which 
both aids the handling of tensions and prepares the way for other tensions to emerge. How 
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the chairperson enacts the unique features of his/her role in leading the board, for example 
– i.e. ensuring quality engagement between the CEO and the NEDs, determining the 
board agenda, or setting the framework and tone for the board’s contribution to strategy 
(McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; O’Neal and Thomas, 1995) – influences both the 
relationship with the CEO and the CEO’s role-specific behaviours. CEOs may become 
resentful about the way the board is led, or frustrated by too much or inadequate scrutiny 
of proposals, which is a reflection of the CEO’s relationship with the chairperson and 
how the chairperson approaches his/her role. 
Theme IV concentrated on the CEO’s role-specific demands, constraints, supports 
and choices. Four key role domains were distinguished: i) TMT size, composition and 
dynamics; ii) strategy formulation; iii) organisational structure redesign; and iv) strategy 
communication and alignment. CEOs enjoy substantial discretion in pursuing these role 
domains. A CEO’s choice of practices is critically impacted by how the external 
environment is perceived. In contexts of far-reaching change where competitive 
advantage is disrupted and there is urgency to take action, CEOs were found: to change 
their top teams to favour increased differentiation to reflect the challenges that the 
environment is creating for the firm (e.g. Keck and Tushman, 1993; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1985); to construct smaller top teams or use a subset of the team as the core 
decision-making unit; to delegate and decentralise more decision-making authority 
(Bowman, 1982; Carmeli, Schaubroeck and Tishler, 2011; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois, 
1988); and to manage top team dynamics and the relationship with the CFO so that 
tensions are raised and integrated in a manner that is beneficial for the organisation while 
maintaining team cohesion. This study was able to isolate some discrete role behaviours 
and practices that are intended to handle tensions at various levels. CEOs were found to 
use role rotation, constructive dialogue and team-building exercises to increase the 
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recognition of tensions among the top team and ensure better behavioural integration on 
an ongoing basis (e.g. Carmeli, Schaubroeck and Tishler, 2011). Moreover, the CEO–
CFO relationship was found to be critical in navigating the strategic tensions of 
restructuring and growth, with the CEO focusing on strategy and the long term and the 
CFO focusing on short-term financial performance (e.g. Reutzel and Cannella, 2004; 
Scheumann, 1999; Tulimieri and Banai, 2010). Further, when environmental conditions 
are perceived to be disrupting competitive advantage, CEOs engage in developing a new 
purpose for the firm that often serves as a framework for the top team and lower levels in 
which to handle trade-offs, dilemmas and other everyday tensions (e.g. Collins and 
Porras, 1991; David, 1989). These CEO practices and relationships are continuous and 
ongoing, and do not follow a predesigned set of responses to strategic tensions (for 
example, of differentiation and integration) as proposed by the vast majority of studies 
on paradoxical tensions (e.g. Smith, 2014). 
The next section develops a high-level model of the relationship between the 
themes and sub-themes uncovered by this study, and develops propositions that enable 
future testing of the proposed model. 
5.3 Emergent model of chairperson and CEO responses to 
strategic tensions 
The results from this study have enabled the development of a model that attempts to 
explain how chairpersons and CEOs enact their roles in response to strategic tensions 
during times of far-reaching environmental change. This model is depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Emergent model of chairperson and CEO role behaviour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Developed by the author. 
5.3.1 Developing propositions 
The external environment including particular events (economic recession, financial 
crisis, technology change and regulatory change) and corresponding levels of perceived 
uncertainty, complexity, instability and resource scarcity, as well as perceived urgency of 
action, were all found to impact on how both CEOs and chairpersons attended to 
particular role demands: that is, it affected the discretion and choice of behaviour in role. 
Further, perceptions of external environmental conditions were also found to influence 
and shape interactions between chairperson and CEO. 
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boundedness  
Chairperson role: 
leading the board  
External environmental conditions and demands  
P1 P3 P2 
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CEO strategic behaviour was found to be impacted by an individual’s perception of 
the external environment. For example, CEOs were found to make different choices in 
relation to the composition, size and dynamics of the TMT according to the CEO’s 
perception of the environment. CEOs who perceive major technology and regulatory 
disruptions as compromising competitive advantage appear to make major changes in the 
top team in the direction of greater differentiation and new domains that reflect the 
environmental requirements, whereas CEOs who perceive competitive advantage to 
remain unaffected (typically when the environment is characterised by recession or 
financial crisis) make small or no changes to the top team. CEOs were also found to 
construct smaller teams, or rely on a subset of the existing team, when environmental 
conditions were perceived to demand an urgent response. Other findings linking CEO 
perceptions of the environment to CEO choices include: constructing smaller top teams 
to enable cohesion and consensus; driving towards fast consensus or striking a balance 
between consensus and debate in the top team; delegating more to the top team or 
centralising more decision-making authority; choices over strategy formulation (the 
relative pace and scale of change, changes in the business purpose, determination of 
competitive advantage and unique capabilities); choices over organisational structure 
redesign (i.e. whether to pursue restructuring and growth actions sequentially or 
simultaneously); and influence on the time spent on organisational communication and 
alignment activities. The following proposition can thus be formulated: 
P1: A CEO’s perception of external environmental conditions and demands 
influences the role incumbent’s choice of behaviour. 
Similarly, how the individual chairperson perceives the external environment drives 
his/her choices of behaviour and practice as the leader of the board of directors. For 
example, a relative balance struck between promoting cognitive conflict and driving 
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towards consensus in the way the chairperson conducts board meetings appears to be 
influenced by that chairperson’s perceptions of levels of resource scarcity and rate of 
decline. Further, the chairperson’s choice of board members appears to be dependent on 
perceived external environmental conditions and demands. The following proposition can 
therefore be put forward: 
P2: A chairperson’s perception of external environmental conditions and demands 
influences the role incumbent’s choice of behaviour. 
In addition to influencing how both CEOs and chairpersons behave within their 
specific role domains, perceptions of environmental conditions also appear to influence 
how the two roles interact. The degree of perceived environmental uncertainty and 
complexity appears to have an impact on levels of trust between the role incumbents and 
how their role boundaries are delineated. The following proposition emerges: 
P3: Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ perception of external environmental conditions and 
demands influence how role incumbents interact. 
Overall, these three propositions indicate that CEO and chairperson role behaviour 
is contingent on (perceived) external environment characteristics. For example: whether 
to pursue more delegation or more centralisation in the top team; whether to compose a 
team or a board more or less heterogeneously; or whether to manage the top team or the 
board with a focus on consensus or on diversity of views all depend on how chairpersons 
and CEOs perceive the external environment in terms of uncertainty, complexity, 
instability and resource scarcity, and the extent to which such environmental conditions 
are disruptive to competitive advantage and/or demand an urgent response. Such 
behaviours and choices also appear to be made in a role-specific manner: that is, they are 
bounded by the role the individual occupies. For example, the chairperson is not expected 
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to make decisions about the composition of the top team (apart from selecting the CEO), 
nor is the CEO expected to lead board meetings or determine board engagement and 
composition. However, the two roles are also found to be highly interdependent, and how 
they interact is also impacted by how the external environment and associated challenges 
are perceived: levels of trust and how boundaries are managed may be affected. These 
propositions reveal that CEOs’ and chairpersons’ behaviour in response to challenges in 
the external environment, as well as the nature and quality of the interaction between 
CEOs and chairpersons, can still be explained by a contingency perspective, which 
predominates. It is very much an “if–then” logic, not a paradoxical logic, that emerges. 
CEOs and chairpersons do not appear to perceive and frame external environmental 
demands as paradoxical, and neither do their role behaviours (i.e. responses) reflect this. 
Chairperson–CEO interaction is characterised by boundedness. The degree to 
which each role is permeable to the influence of the other depends critically on a complex 
set of aspects which interrelate to form a unique and highly contextual relationship. Their 
relationship both constrains and enables their role-specific behaviours and choices. This 
study depicts this relationship as influencing CEO behaviour and therefore strategic 
outcomes: particularly TMT dynamics, strategy formulation (pace and scale of change, 
organisational purpose, determination of competitive advantage and unique capabilities) 
and organisational redesign choices. The following proposition is therefore advanced: 
P4: Chairperson–CEO interaction impacts on the CEO’s discretionary behaviour 
and choice. 
Particular aspects of chairperson–CEO interaction have emerged as having a greater 
influence on how CEOs use their discretion and make important strategic choices. 
Literature has primarily focused on the chairperson as a counsellor, adviser and partner 
to the CEO (Stewart, 1991), on their complementary resources (Roberts, 2002), and on 
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their relationship (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006), but much less attention has 
been paid to the buffering role that the chairperson plays in relation to the CEO. In this 
study, this role emerged as central and critical to governance effectiveness and as a key 
influencing factor on CEO discretionary behaviour and choice. As discussed, the 
buffering role enables the CEO to handle multiple, often contradictory, expectations and 
maintain alignment and a sense of direction. The chairperson enacts the buffering role 
through processes of insulation and/or regulation (Lynn, 2005) (cognitive, behavioural 
and emotional) of the CEO in the context of a multiplicity of contradictory expectations 
and tensions from a variety of powerful stakeholders. Evidence also appears to link 
chairpersons’ advisory and counselling roles with the “regulation” side of buffering. The 
“advice” part of the role is where the chairperson helps shape, test, calibrate and thus 
regulate the CEO’s cognitive processes in relation to particular challenges. The 
“counselling” part of the role refers to the more emotional dimensions of CEO behaviour 
and his/her reaction to particular events or situations. The “partner” role, however, 
appears to be linked to more insulating mechanisms whereby the chairperson removes 
(by agreement) certain demands from the remit of the CEO, thus alleviating tension. The 
following three propositions therefore emerged, which link the chairperson’s roles of 
buffering, counselling/advice and partnering to effects on CEO discretionary action and 
choice. 
P4.1: The chairperson buffering role in relation to the CEO impacts on CEO 
discretionary behaviour and choice. 
P4.2: The chairperson counselling/advisory role in relation to the CEO impacts on 
CEO discretionary behaviour and choice. 
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P4.3: The chairperson partner role in relation to the CEO impacts on CEO 
discretionary behaviour and choice. 
The above propositions comprise a two-way dynamic process. As the CEO enacts 
his/her role and uses discretion and choice, he/she may deviate or create expectations 
different from those that have been discussed with the chairperson, thereby impacting on 
the trust within the relationship, how boundaries are delineated, and therefore having a 
bearing on which roles the chairperson chooses to emphasise (the chairperson may feel 
the need to be more active, or regulate, advise and/or counsel the CEO). The following 
proposition can therefore be put forward: 
P5: The CEO’s strategic behaviour impacts on chairperson–CEO relationship 
dynamics. 
In a similar fashion, the use of discretion and choice by the chairperson in leading 
the board of directors has an impact on chairperson–CEO interactions and the 
effectiveness of the relationship. A critical example from this study concerns how a 
chairperson manages boardroom meetings, the extent to which challenge is allowed inside 
the boardroom, and how he/she harnesses the collective board contribution in a supportive 
manner. Where chairpersons fail to accomplish a balance between support and challenge, 
or fail to ensure the right boardroom culture, the CEO might disengage, trust the 
chairperson less and therefore seek less in the way of advice, counselling or other type of 
support. But the opposite also holds. The relationship between the CEO and the 
chairperson impacts on the chairperson’s discretionary actions and choice when leading 
the board. For example, the chairperson might discourage challenge or allow the CEO to 
determine most of the agenda if he/she trusts the CEO. The following propositions can 
therefore be put forward: 
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P6: The chairperson’s discretionary actions when leading the board impact on the 
effectiveness of the relationship between the chairperson and the CEO. 
P7: The interaction/relationship between the chairperson and the CEO role has an 
impact on the chairperson’s discretionary actions in leading the board. 
How the CEO behaves in his/her role-specific domains (i.e. TMT size, composition, 
dynamics, strategy formulation, organisational redesign and communication and 
alignment) also impacts on how the chairperson behaves in his/her role-specific domains 
(board composition, engagement, dynamics, debate and contribution). And the converse 
is true. The following propositions can be advanced: 
P8: The CEO’s strategic behaviour influences the chairperson’s behaviour in 
leading the board. 
P9: The chairperson’s discretionary actions in leading the board influence the 
CEO’s strategic behaviour. 
The model and corresponding propositions developed in this section highlight the 
highly interdependent and complex nature of the CEO and chairperson roles, and how 
these roles work to handle strategic tensions. The model also attempts to describe how 
tensions and responses to tensions are embedded in practice and in critical relationships, 
rather than being designed a priori by the CEO. 
The next section provides a discussion of how this study meets relevant qualitative 
research quality criteria, and outlines measures taken by the author to enhance the study’s 
research quality. 
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5.4 Evaluation of research quality 
A relatively recent paper by Denzin (2009) continues to paint a dark picture for 
interpretivist qualitative research studies. Research quality frameworks around the world, 
including in the US, UK, Australia and elsewhere, continue to support a “golden rule” 
approach to research quality based on the positive scientific method (Denzin, 2009; 
Morse, 2006). The politics of evidence, say Denzin (2009) and others, has been won by 
positivists. The result is that qualitative researchers find it difficult to have their work 
valued and published, which consequently makes for a much harder road to academic 
tenure (Denzin, 2009). 
This thesis would certainly suffer if it were to be seen through the lenses of the 
positivist orthodoxy of evidence, imposing on the research inadequate conventional 
measures of validity, generalisability and reliability (Mays and Pope, 2000). Instead, this 
thesis must be viewed within the interpretivist paradigm, where purpose, meaning and the 
research process are centre-stage (Maxwell, 2004). Although several criteria have been 
proposed to evaluate qualitative research quality (see, for example, Altheide and Johnson, 
1994; Hammersley, 1992; Kirk and Miller, 1986), the criteria of credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability (Guba, 1981; Lincoln and Guba, 1985) 
continue to form the consensual view of research quality among the qualitative research 
community. Table 12 summarises the steps taken in this thesis to ensure good-quality 
research standards. 
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Table 12: Research quality criteria  
Quality criteria Typical strategies  Operationalisation in this study 
Credibility   Clear and robust research design; 
 Supervision and counselling by an 
experienced researcher; 
 Use of triangulation techniques; 
 Extensive exposure to the 
population under study. 
 The proposed research design has been laid out 
clearly in Chapter 3. 
 This thesis has been supervised by two specialists 
in governance and qualitative methodologies. The 
analysis and results interpretation has been 
discussed several times, allowing for reflection 
and calibration. 
 Triangulation wasn’t done systematically, but 
instances existed where triangulation between 
chairperson and CEO perceptions about the same 
issue could be drawn out. Interviews with 
additional CFOs helped triangulate information 
obtained from CEOs. 
 The author has had significant engagement with 
CEOs and chairpersons of UK companies, by 
participating in additional research projects, 
conferences, seminars and dinners. 
Transferability   Thorough description of the 
participants and their relevance to 
the question being investigated; 
 Description of the general and 
specific contexts of the research 
and its results; 
 Reflecting on the influence of the 
researcher’s prior understandings 
and the influence on the research 
process. 
 The participants have been thoroughly described in 
the methodology section (age, position, 
experience, education and ethnicity, as well as 
their industry affiliation). Participants were highly 
appropriate for the provision of information 
relevant to the research question. 
 The research positions the study in the UK 
context, particularly UK listed companies’ 
boardrooms. Furthermore, it elaborates on the 
particular contexts facing participants throughout 
the analytical process.  
Dependability   Clearly demonstrating the research 
options and choices throughout the 
study; 
 Demonstrating congruence 
between research question, 
method, analysis and results. 
 This thesis provides a detailed narrative of the 
methodological choices. It is founded on social 
constructivist ontology and interpretivist 
epistemology to explore how chairpersons and 
CEOs respond to strategic tensions. Data 
collection and analysis procedures, as well as the 
guiding theory used, are consistent with them and 
with the philosophical principles that underpin the 
research.  
Confirmability   Reflexive analysis; 
 “Audit trail”; 
 Clearly demonstrating the research 
options and choices throughout the 
study. 
 The author used reflexive analysis throughout the 
thesis to ensure personal bias would not interfere 
with research quality. 
 This thesis provides a high level of structure and 
detailed quotes from the participants’ in-depth 
interviews, illustrating each theme, sub-theme and 
code. In addition, this thesis is transparent in how 
the themes were arrived at. It also provides a 
coding structure in the appendices.  
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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In this thesis a number of practices have been employed by the author to ensure the 
research quality criteria of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability 
were met. 
The first concern was to develop a clear, robust and consistent research design (e.g. 
Mays and Pope, 2000). The research question, philosophical position and methods 
employed are consistent in their philosophical underpinning concerning the nature of 
reality and how to seek evidence that can explain the particular phenomena under study: 
viz. how chairpersons and CEOs respond to strategic tensions (for details see Table 6, 
Chapter 3). Research design and its execution is perhaps the single most important 
component of research quality, enhancing credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. Furthermore, credibility of the study has been enhanced by discussing – 
on a number of occasions, with two highly experienced researchers both in governance 
and in qualitative research methods (i.e. supervisors) – the ongoing analytical process and 
the emerging results. This inspired an increased confidence about the plausibility of the 
results. 
The use of triangulation of source (between CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perceptions, 
and CEOs’ and CFOs’ perceptions, for example) allowed for further confidence about 
particular codes, sub-themes and themes. Sample composition is a further source of 
credibility, with highly experienced chairpersons and CEOs talking about their role 
experiences. This, along with the careful manner in which the interviews were conducted, 
substantiates the credibility of the data and subsequent analysis. One of the major 
limitations (and hence impediments to research quality) in qualitative research is the 
researcher’s bias, which is necessarily present throughout the interpretive process. This 
potential pitfall was largely resolved by employing role theory as a theoretical framework 
within which to examine the data. In addition, the author made substantial efforts to 
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reflect on the analysis and explore how the author’s prior information and preconceptions 
might have affected particular outcomes. To further enhance confirmability, the author 
strove to ensure a logical progression in the presentation of results, providing as many 
quotes from respondents as possible, along with a “coding structure” and theme formation 
example as a means of making the process transparent to external observers. 
5.5 Achievement of research aims and objectives 
The research’s aims and objectives set out at the beginning of this study have been largely 
met. The following paragraphs provide a summary. 
Research aim: to explore the nature of chairperson and CEO responses to strategic 
tensions. The in-depth analysis of chairperson and CEO role experiences allowed for the 
identification of both individual and shared responses to strategic tensions of the role 
incumbents. It was possible to identify discretionary actions of both CEOs and 
chairpersons that are unique to their roles, as well as the interplay and mutual influence 
of these roles in responding to strategic tensions. The aim of this thesis has been achieved. 
Research objective 1: To determine the nature of the business contexts within which 
chairpersons and CEOs perceive and face strategic tensions. The analysis of the 
interview data with chairpersons and CEOs revealed that contexts characterised by 
disruption such as economic recessions, financial crisis, technology change and 
regulatory change produce high levels of uncertainty, resource scarcity, complexity and 
poor performance. It is within these contexts that strategic tensions emerge and are 
perceived by role incumbents. This objective has been achieved. 
Research objective 2: To explore the nature of strategic tensions faced by 
chairpersons and CEOs while enacting their roles. This thesis consistently identifies an 
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overarching strategic tension of restructuring and growth which is perceived by both 
chairpersons and CEOs in contexts of high uncertainty, hostility and poor performance. 
Evidence of perceived strategic tensions of exploration and exploitation was also found 
within both chairperson and CEO roles. In addition, this thesis identifies distinct tensions 
faced by chairpersons and CEOs in their roles. CEOs and chairpersons were found to face 
similar tensions of “ensuring diversity of thinking and unity of action” in the TMT and 
board of directors respectively. While the tension is similar, the contexts are different: 
TMTs have a well-defined hierarchy and meet frequently, whereas boards are groups of 
distinct individuals and meet infrequently. Furthermore, some evidence was found of 
CEOs facing tensions between operational and strategic demands. Tensions emerge and 
are responded to through practice and in critical relationships such as chairperson–CEO, 
CEO–CFO, CEO–TMT, CEO–board: that is, tensions are the product of social interaction 
and are thus socially constructed, not inherent in complex systems. This objective has 
been achieved. 
Research objective 3: To explore the demands, constraints, supports and choices 
faced by chairpersons and CEOs while enacting their roles. By applying the Demands–
Constraints–Choices (DCC) model of roles to chairperson and CEO role experiences, it 
was possible to identify for each role specific sets of demands, constraints and supports, 
as well as to determine the choices (responses) to particular tensions. This objective has 
been achieved. 
Research objective 4: To explore chairperson and CEO responses to strategic 
tensions. The analysis of the interview material using the procedures discussed in Chapter 
3 allowed for the identification of CEO-specific responses (e.g. how to compose and lead 
the TMT; how to educate senior leadership to recognise and work through tensions; role 
rotation; separate efforts with the CFO to focus on different sides of tensions), as well as 
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chairperson-specific responses to tensions (e.g. how the board agenda is constructed; how 
boards are composed; how meetings are conducted). Importantly, this thesis found that 
responses to tensions are critically shaped and influenced by the interactions between 
chairpersons and CEOs. It was possible to identify a set of relationship characteristics and 
patterns of interaction that are consequential for how tensions are handled. Specifically, 
the buffering role of the chairperson (i.e. both insulating the CEO from tensions as well 
as regulating the CEO’s responses to tensions) emerged as a critical mechanism that 
harmonises strategy and governance, as well as providing regulation and legitimacy over 
how tensions are handled. Other critical interactions, in which tensions both emerge and 
are responded to, include the CEO–CFO relationship and dyadic work, CEO–TMT 
relations, and board discussion and debate. This objective has been achieved. 
Research objective 5: Propose a model of chairperson and CEO responses to 
strategic tensions. The model depicted in Figure 6 in this chapter has been developed on 
the basis of the study’s results and discussion, and attempts to explain how chairpersons 
and CEOs perceive and enact their roles in responding to strategic tensions. The model 
proposes key relationships that emerged, developing a number of propositions that can be 
tested in future research efforts. This objective has also been achieved. 
The achievement of the research’s aims and objectives means that the research 
question set out at the beginning of this investigation has been answered. In short, this 
thesis reveals the importance of dyadic work and relationships, practice and contingency 
in how CEOs and chairpersons respond to strategic tensions. 
This section has provided an overview of how the research’s aims and objectives 
were met. The next section examines the thesis’s proposed contribution to theory and 
practice. 
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5.6 Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis makes a contribution to theory and practice. On the theory side, it contributes 
to role theory and its application to the roles of chairperson and CEO. It offers an extended 
understanding of how these roles are enacted and interact, influencing each other, in 
organisational contexts marked by far-reaching change. It also connects with findings that 
challenge existing perspectives on paradox and tension. Contributions to paradox and 
tensions literature include: i) challenging the notion that CEOs and chairpersons perceive 
and frame competing demands as paradoxical, at the same time clarifying the nature of 
tensions; ii) highlighting the importance of dyadic work, relationships and practice in 
handling strategic tensions; and iii) highlighting the importance of contingency factors in 
determining CEOs’ and chairpersons’ responses to strategic tensions. This study also 
provides relevant insights and recommendations for practising CEOs, chairpersons and 
for corporate governance regulators. 
The next sections will provide an expanded discussion of the contributions made 
by this study. 
5.6.1 Contribution to theory 
This thesis contributes to extant role theory and literature on paradox and tensions. The 
next two sections outline and discuss in more detail the nature and magnitude of these 
contributions. 
5.6.1.1 Contribution to role theory 
This thesis contributes to role theory, particular those studies that examine CEO and 
chairperson roles, but also on the application of the Demands–Constraints–Choices 
  307 
(DCC) model (Stewart, 1967, 1982) to these particular roles in a particular context. Past 
studies that used the DCC model as a theoretical lens through which to examine the role 
and interaction of chairpersons and CEOs were conducted in different organisational 
settings, such as the UK National Health System (NHS) (Stewart, 1991), or in more 
general corporate contexts (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006). This thesis has 
sought to apply the DCC role framework to the roles of chairperson and CEO operating 
specifically in UK listed companies that were undergoing major disruptions arising from 
technological change, economic and financial crisis, and far-reaching regulatory change. 
In so doing, the thesis reveals unique features of each role in this context, revealing the 
demands, constraints, choices and supports as well as the patterns of interaction between 
chairperson and CEO. By detailing the analytical process supported by the DCC 
framework, this study confirms the utility of this particular framework as a tool for 
qualitative studies (Parry, 2003). 
Table 13 provides an overview of the areas of contribution and the extent of that 
contribution in relation to role theory research; a discussion follows. 
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Table 13: Contributions to role theory 
Theory/research Contribution  Extent of contribution 
Role theory (Stewart, 
1967, 1982) 
Interdependency of 
chairperson and CEO roles 
The study confirms and extends 
understanding of the complex dynamics 
and nuances of this interdependence and 
how it impacts on role incumbents’ 
discretionary action and choice.  
Role theory (Stewart, 
1967, 1982) and 
Chairperson–CEO 
relationship/dyadic 
work (e.g. 
Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and 
Knyght, 2010; 
Stewart, 1991) 
Chairperson buffering role The study adds new insights to existing 
role theory focusing on chairperson and 
CEO roles by showing the criticality of 
chairperson’s buffering on behalf of the 
CEO when the CEO is facing competing 
and contradictory expectations and 
pressures.  
Importance of dyadic work The study confirms and extends scholarly 
understanding of the relevance of dyadic 
work/relationships in handling competing 
demands by role incumbents. 
 
Source: Developed by the author. 
 
Chairperson and CEO role interdependence. This study confirms the high 
degree of interdependence between the CEO and chairperson (Stewart, 1991) and the 
centrality of their interaction in determining role incumbents’ effectiveness and important 
strategic outcomes (e.g. Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Roberts, 2002). The qualities and 
attributes of the relationship, such as history of interaction, levels of trust, 
complementarity of experience and skills, the time the chairperson can devote to the role 
and the role incumbents’ interpretation of their roles (e.g. Coombes and Wong, 2004; 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse, 
Kakabadse and Knyght, 2010; Stewart, 1991) were all confirmed as fundamental aspects 
that influence how role boundaries are shaped (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; Stewart, 
1991) and the roles the chairperson can play in this relationship. Studies such as that of 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) found that, in the UK, the practice of role delineation 
is institutionalised: the chairperson leads the board and the CEO leads the enterprise. Only 
when it becomes obvious that the CEO is performing poorly does the chairperson become 
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more involved (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). While this thesis finds that such a 
division of responsibilities tends to be the norm for UK boards, there were many instances 
where the traditional role boundaries diverged from normative role prescriptions and 
emphasised the unique contribution each role incumbent could make in helping reduce 
uncertainty and tackle the challenges faced by the company. This study suggests that 
normative role delineation is accountability-focused, whereas role delineation based on 
each role incumbent’s contribution is problem-solving-focused. Evidence from this thesis 
suggests that focusing on normative role delineation during high uncertainty is a futile 
exercise of accountability. Yet focusing on how each role incumbent can contribute to a 
reduction in uncertainty (irrespective of the normative role) provides the clarity required 
for true accountability. 
The chairperson buffering role in relation to the CEO. This study identifies a 
buffering role of the chairperson of the board in relation to the CEO as not only being 
desirable (i.e. according to CEOs in this study) but fundamentally necessary (i.e. 
according to chairpersons in this study) in contexts of uncertainty, resource scarcity and 
poor performance. Thus far, research on buffering has concentrated more on 
“organisational buffering”, neglecting to consider that buffering may be an important 
governance mechanism, which both insulates the CEO from the pressure of multiple 
expectations and regulates the CEO’s responses to them (Lynn, 2005). This study 
therefore makes a contribution to governance studies, particularly in looking at the 
chairperson role and its interplay with the CEO. Whereas past studies have identified how 
chairpersons play a multitude of roles in relation to the CEO – such as partner, executive, 
mentor and consultant (Stewart, 1991) – this study has clearly identified the buffering 
role as central. How this buffering role co-exists with other roles is not clear. It may be 
that chairpersons insulate the CEO by taking some executive responsibility, or partner 
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with the CEO, or regulate CEO responses (i.e. cognitive and emotional) through advice 
and mentoring. 
The identification of the chairperson’s role as a buffer to the CEO in this study is 
made in contexts of uncertainty and resource scarcity where CEOs were attempting to 
move the firm to acceptable levels of performance. In such contexts, CEOs emerge as 
expectation managers, in agreement with Tengblad’s (2004) study of Swedish CEOs. Yet 
Tengblad’s study, and other studies depicting the role of the CEO as a buffer (e.g. 
Mintzberg, 2009), may have missed the point that the managing of multiple expectations 
by the CEO is not carried out on a solitary basis, but is heavily interdependent (at least in 
governance regimes where role separation exists) with the buffering role of the 
chairperson. How well the CEO succeeds in managing multiple and often contradictory 
expectations may be rooted in how effective the chairperson is at buffering. The 
chairperson’s buffering role has been mostly invisible to researchers, especially those 
who study the boardroom using quantitative techniques. Studies have found that role 
separation matters little in reducing or regulating managerial entrenchment, risk-taking 
and executive compensation levels (Krause, Semadeni and Cannella, 2013), while others 
have found that role separation can improve performance in underperforming firms 
(Grinstein and Valles, 2008). This study finds that CEOs’ management of multiple 
expectations in contexts of uncertainty, resource scarcity and poor firm performance, 
including how they balance short- and long-term performance, risk-taking, and pace and 
direction of change, is dependent on the effectiveness of the chairperson’s buffering, not 
just the mere separation of roles. This is in keeping with research that argues that what 
matters is how the separation is arrived at and how these key roles influence each other 
in determining important strategic outcomes (e.g. Leblanc, 2004). This study further 
identifies chairperson independence (of judgement and behaviour) and experience (of the 
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nature of expectations and tensions facing the CEO) as critical characteristics for effective 
role fulfilment, despite the fact that they are difficult to embody simultaneously (Leblanc, 
2004). 
The importance of dyadic work and relationships. A further contribution made 
by this thesis is the finding that dyadic work and relationships are fundamental 
mechanisms by which CEOs handle competing strategic demands. In part, this has been 
already shown in how CEOs and chairpersons influence each other in determining 
important strategic outcomes regarding long- and short-term performance, risk, and pace 
and scale of change. But this thesis shows that other important dyadic relationships and 
work – such as between the CEO and the CFO, or even between the CEO and COO – are 
also critical for CEOs in handling competing strategic demands. In some instances, the 
CEO emerged as a third person acting to harmonise dyadic work between other key top 
team roles (for example, R&D and commercial) through dialogue and team-building 
practices aiming at producing behavioural integration. 
5.6.1.2 Contribution to paradox theory 
This thesis also makes a number of contributions to, and has implications for, paradox 
theory. The study of CEO and chairperson roles in contexts of far-reaching change and 
resource scarcity – which are said to be favourable to the emergence of paradoxes and 
tensions (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011) – revealed important evidence 
relating to: i) the nature of strategic tensions and chairpersons’ and CEOs’ perceptions of 
tensions; ii) dyadic work, relationships and practice as source of tensions as well as a 
mechanism for dynamically working though tensions; and iii) the dominance of a 
contingency mind-set within both CEOs’ and chairpersons’ behaviour. 
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Table 14 provides an overview of these areas of contribution and the extent of the 
contribution; a discussion follows. 
Table 14: Contributions to paradox theory 
Theory  Contribution  Extent of contribution 
Paradox theory 
(e.g. Fredberg, 2014; 
Putnam, Fairhurst and 
Banghart, 2016; 
Schad et al., 2016) 
Nature of tensions 
Chairpersons’ and CEOs’ 
perceptions of tensions 
This study adds to the debate about the 
nature of tensions by showing that they 
are socially constructed as opposed to 
cognitive or inherent in organisational 
systems. Furthermore, this research finds 
that CEOs and chairpersons in the study 
do not perceive and/or frame tensions as 
paradoxical (with all the implications that 
this finding brings), adding to research 
that sees paradox as an elusive concept.  
Constitutive and 
processual 
approaches to 
paradox and tension 
(Putnam, Fairhurst 
and Banghart, 2016; 
Schad et al., 2016) 
The importance of dyadic 
work, relationships and 
practice in the emergence 
and response to tensions 
This thesis adds and extends 
understanding of scholarly work that 
views tensions (and paradoxes) and their 
handling as processual and embedded in 
relationships. Consistent with the finding 
that tensions are socially constructed, this 
thesis finds that tensions emerge and, 
importantly, are handled within dyadic 
relationships (i.e. chairperson–CEO, 
CEO–CFO, etc.). 
Contingency/ 
strategic choice 
theories  
(Child, 1972, 1997; 
Galbraith, 1973; 
Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967) 
The dominance of a 
contingency/strategic 
choice perspective on CEO 
and chairperson role 
behaviour and choice 
This study adds to the ongoing debate 
between paradox scholars and 
contingency studies, by showing the 
predominance of a contingency logic in 
CEO and chairperson choice and practice. 
 
Source: Developed by the author. 
 
Nature of strategic tensions/CEOs’ and chairpersons’ perceptions of tensions. 
There is an ongoing ontological tension debate in paradox and tensions theory as to 
whether paradox and tension are cognitively and socially constructed or inherent in 
complex organisational systems (Lewis and Smith, 2014; Smith and Lewis, 2011). Earlier 
scholars defined paradoxical tensions as “perceptual – that is, cognitive or socially 
constructed polarities that mask the simultaneity of conflicting truths” (Lewis, 2000:761). 
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The current most accepted definition does not specify an ontological position, preferring 
instead a broad definition capable of including both cognitive and social construction, as 
well as an objective nature of tensions as inherent in complex organisational systems 
(Smith and Lewis, 2011). Even those theorists that have asserted a cognitive and socially 
constructed nature for paradox and tension have come to recognise the implications such 
a position has in relation to responses to paradox and tension: “Paradox is a mental 
construction and therefore can be mentally dissolved and paradox is inherent in all social 
life and therefore cannot be dissolved – just lived!” (Lüscher, Lewis and Ingram, 
2006:499). In this thesis, evidence points to the nature of tensions as socially constructed 
and inherent in social interactions. Claims that CEOs and chairpersons perceive and frame 
(cognitively) tensions as paradoxical have received no empirical support. This thesis 
shows instead that CEOs and chairpersons perceive strategic competing demands as 
challenging and difficult to handle (for example, restructuring and growth, or exploration 
and exploitation), but nowhere in the CEO and chairperson narratives were these 
construed as paradoxical. This finding agrees with recent findings by other scholars and 
practitioners (Fredberg, 2014; Johnson, 2014). However, this thesis shows that strategic 
tensions only become meaningful and consequential through social interaction. Strong 
evidence emerged to show that the relationships between different key roles (such as 
between chairperson and CEO, CEO and CFO) and other social exchanges (between CEO 
and TMT, or between CEO and the board) are the places where tensions emerge and gain 
meaning, and where responses are co-developed and become consequential. These 
findings indicate that the phenomena of interest in the study of strategic tensions (and 
perhaps of paradox) lie not so much in individual cognition, or in the macro-
organisational system, but rather in dyadic and group relationships and everyday practice. 
Only very recently, paradox scholars began to recognise the importance of relationships 
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and practice to the formation and handling of tensions. According to Putnam, Fairhurst 
and Banghart (2016), research on paradox and tensions has paid substantial attention to 
large systems and individual cognition as the locus of paradox, but very little on 
“discourses, social interaction processes, practices and ongoing organisational 
activities” (p. 67). This thesis contributes to this emerging line of research on paradox 
and tension, providing strong evidence for the relevance of relationships, dyadic work 
and practices as critical phenomena in explaining how tensions emerge and are 
continuously handled by relevant organisational actors. 
The importance of dyadic work, relationships and practice in the emergence 
and response to tensions. This thesis also brings to the fore the importance of dyadic 
work, relationships and practice to the emergence and handling of strategic tensions, as 
already discussed above. This has only recently been acknowledged by paradox and 
tension theorists (Schad et al., 2016; Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016). Most work 
on responses to strategic tensions and paradoxes has identified the CEO as central in 
handling tensions, often assigning the CEO an integrator role (Smith, 2014; Smith and 
Tushman, 2005; Tushman, Smith and Binns, 2011). While this thesis finds the CEO 
performing this role of integrator” and harmoniser of tensions among the TMT members, 
this thesis identifies critical relationships and dyadic work between the CEO and 
chairperson, as well as between the CEO and the CFO, as both the locus of tension as 
well as the mechanism that allows a workable certainty (Lüscher and Lewis, 2008) and a 
moving-forward (Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016) through practice. Practice in 
turn generates further tensions which can only be handled in relationships such as those 
between the CEO and the chairperson or the CEO and the CFO. One example of how 
practice that seeks to create a balance within one tension has the potential to generate 
other tensions relates to how some CEOs were found to compose their top team. CEOs 
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seek to bring new perspectives and skills from outside the company, while also retaining 
and promoting existing executives to the top team. This allows fresh strategic thinking 
and yet the retention of important firm-specific knowledge which is important for strategy 
implementation. CEOs do this arguably to reap the benefits of both continuity and change. 
Such choice, which has a pragmatic rationale and is intended to support successful 
strategy development and implementation, may bring about tensions of belonging 
between those already in the team and the new elements, or tensions about which of the 
firm’s resources are providing competitive advantage, and so on. As practice and 
relationships are critical in handling tensions, this thesis concurs with Putnam, Fairhurst 
and Banghart (2016) when they argue that a constitutive approach requires a recognition 
that every response to tension is rooted in praxis, where individuals “make choices about 
engaging and responding to them as well as how to move forward amid complex 
circumstances” (p. 80). Such a view of paradox and tensions requires responses that stress 
moving forward, reflexivity and awareness in terms of discursive consciousness and 
recognition of actions/interactions that generate tension (Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 
2016). 
The dominance of a contingency/strategic choice perspective within CEO and 
chairperson role behaviour and choice. Despite claims that paradox and tensions theory 
is a post-contingentialist theory of organisation (Lewis and Smith, 2014), this thesis finds 
no evidence that CEOs and chairpersons behave and make choices supported by a 
“paradoxical mind-set” (Smith and Tushman, 2005). Rather, CEOs and chairpersons 
make choices and enact practices that are contingent on perceived environmental 
conditions such as the degree of uncertainty, whether competitive advantage has been 
disrupted or whether an urgent response is required. How the environment is perceived, 
along with the challenges that beset the organisation, is shown to influence how both 
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CEOs and chairpersons enact their roles in practice and make choices: how the CEO 
composes the TMT, the relative balance between centralisation and decentralisation of 
decision-making, boundary management between the CEO and chairperson, how the 
chairperson composes the board, or how the chairperson handles board meetings by 
balancing challenge and support. To give another example: whether CEOs enact 
restructuring and growth simultaneously or sequentially depends critically on whether 
environmental conditions are seen to have disrupted competitive advantage and the 
perceived degree of urgency in developing a response. 
5.6.2 Contribution to practice 
This thesis explores a question that is of central concern for practising chairpersons, CEOs 
and for regulatory bodies. Its results and insights can be of practical value in improving 
the overall effectiveness of board governance, particularly in the UK. 
The findings in this thesis concur with literature (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007; 
Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Leblanc and Gillies, 2005; Levrau and Van den 
Berghe, 2013) and with the UK Corporate Governance Code (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2016), in that the relationship between the chairperson and CEO is pivotal to the 
effectiveness of the totality of the governance system. In particular, research and 
regulation has been advocating for a clear division of roles and responsibilities between 
the chairperson and the CEO, often differentiating these roles by their nature (non-
executive versus executive) and primary task (governance versus strategy) (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016). In fact, the UK regulator goes as far as to recommend that such 
division of responsibilities be “set out in writing and agreed by the board” (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2016). This thesis finds that the division of tasks and responsibilities 
between the chairperson and the CEO needs to be flexible and applied subject to 
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circumstances, depending on the context, the particular challenges and tensions facing 
the company as well as on role incumbents’ ability (skills, experience, relationships) in 
meeting such challenges. This is particularly true in contexts of high uncertainty and fast 
decline where the focus must be on solving the problem(s) afflicting the firm, rather than 
on remaining fixed within prescribed arrangements which may simply end up serving as 
nothing more than a defence for role incumbents in avoiding true shared accountability 
and stewardship of the company. In summary, it is found that rigid written responsibilities 
may hamper adequate separation of efforts to effectively face particular strategic tensions 
and challenges facing the company. This is an area that deserves consideration by 
regulators, practising chairpersons, CEOs and other players. 
 A second contribution to practice relates to the chairperson role. While much 
research, as well as common wisdom, has established challenge, advice, mentoring and 
partnership as typical roles the chairperson plays in relation to the CEO (e.g. Stewart, 
1991), this thesis finds that the more fundamental role of buffering is often performed by 
chairpersons, particularly where there are multiple divergent expectations of CEO 
behaviour from critical stakeholders such as NEDs, shareholders, investors and analysts. 
The chairperson’s buffering role requires independence of judgement and behaviour, as 
well as an in-depth understanding of the industry’s stakeholders and the tensions likely 
to arise (Leblanc, 2004). It may be of value for practising chairpersons to reflect on the 
inherent processes of insulation and regulation referred to in this thesis, and develop their 
practice further. These processes may be key in ensuring ongoing alignment and 
engagement among critical stakeholders such as the board, shareholders, investors and 
analysts. This buffering role appears to be critical in influencing and shaping important 
strategic outcomes such as strategic direction (purpose, competitive advantage and unique 
capabilities), pace and scale of change, short-/long-term orientation, and risk-taking. In 
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addition, this thesis uncovers a number of practices that chairpersons employ to ensure 
the board is effective in addressing strategic tensions facing the company. Such practices 
start with ensuring cognitive diversity in the way the board is composed. This equips the 
board with a variety of resources that increase the probability of identifying, raising, 
confronting and finding novel ways to work through strategic tensions. To harness this 
potential, chairpersons seek to establish a culture of engagement. On the one hand, NEDs 
are encouraged to visit the business and collect independent information; on the other, the 
CEO is persuaded to bring to the board information of the right quality at the right level 
of detail and in a timely manner, which allows NEDs to track management thinking before 
there is too much detail or too much commitment has been made. Further, chairpersons 
ensure that tension-generating topics are on the board agenda and have specific policies 
for committee meetings that encourage the participation of all board members. While 
chairpersons build their boards with regard to cognitive diversity and independence, they 
then face the difficult task of conducting meetings so as to make the most of the diversity 
and cognitive conflict while achieving meaningful consensus and unity of action. All 
these practices converge to enable the board to be effective in identifying, raising and 
debating strategic tensions facing the business, while generating their own specific 
tensions. Every chairperson practice conceals the potential to generate other tensions, 
while also contributing to the handling of strategic tensions. For example, encouraging 
NEDs to visit operations, ask questions and seek independent external information away 
from the management feeding process has the potential to contribute to better scrutiny 
and more strategic options being presented, while this may also potentially raise issues of 
trust, raise the CEO’s defences and undermine debate. Hence, carrying out well-intended 
practices might not be enough. Chairpersons need to be constantly aware and reflect on 
(Putnman, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016) how these practices are helping to address 
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tensions as well as creating them. In this sense, this study recommends the continuation 
and strengthening of board evaluation practices that recognise the effects of practice in 
handling as well as creating tensions. 
Practising and aspiring CEOs may also benefit from the insights provided in this 
study. Critically, it identifies a number of “good practices” that enable CEOs facing 
strategic tensions in difficult environments to increase their chances of being effective. 
Such practices include building the top team in such a way that allows the requisite variety 
needed to attend to changes in the environment, while ensuring high levels of trust and 
cohesion among team members; in addition, when composing the top team CEOs may 
want to ensure both continuity and change, and internal and external perspectives, by 
retaining and promoting from within while recruiting fresh members from outside. 
Further, CEOs that are facing extraordinarily difficult environments need to resist the 
temptation of too much centralised decision-making, and consider the power of 
delegation and trust in contexts where the speed of response is often critical. In 
compositing and leading the top team, CEOs may also want to consider selecting a CFO 
with whom a productive and complementary relationship can be established. In strategy 
formulation activities, it was shown that CEOs must pay attention to: i) deciding whether 
to conceive a new business purpose; ii) determining where the firm’s competitive 
advantage lies, as well as its unique capabilities; and iii) determining the pace and scale 
of strategic change. 
5.7 Research limitations 
This thesis – as with most, if not all, work in the social science domain – is not without 
limitations. The nature of the methods followed, and questions concerning the 
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transferability of the results and conclusions arrived at, constitute the two fundamental 
areas of limitation in this study. 
The research was conducted in the full knowledge that its results and conclusions 
are valid only within the context of UK listed company boards, where a separation 
between the roles of chairperson and CEO exists. Additionally, the very large size and 
global nature of most organisations considered in this sample certainly have a bearing on 
the nature of the CEOs’ and chairpersons’ roles and the demands, expectations, 
constraints and supports perceived by role incumbents. The sample was not constructed 
to test whether CEOs’ and chairpersons’ roles and handling of strategic tensions would 
vary across sectors. While the focus was on the individual roles, the sample had a spread 
of sectors from which no significant differences emerged. However, future studies might 
be conducted in a sector-specific fashion, perhaps between financial and non-financial 
corporations, between high-tech and low-tech or between manufacturing and service. In 
other contexts, influenced by different sets of regulations, and social and cultural norms, 
the way in which chairpersons and CEOs interpret and enact their roles is certainly subject 
to a variety of different constraints and expectations. Such contextual differences 
undoubtedly have an impact on how role incumbents behave, the extent of particular 
expectations of their behaviour, which practices they follow and, critically, how they 
interact with others. It is therefore assumed that the context-bounded nature of this 
interpretative, exploratory research confers transferability only within the same context, 
although some elements might be applicable in different contexts, subject to the necessary 
adaptations. In addition, as already mentioned in Section 3.7.2, the sample characteristics, 
albeit representative of the context, are quite homogeneous in terms of gender, age, 
ethnicity, qualifications and experience. This homogeneity might explain some of the 
observed patterns of how individuals interpret and enact their roles and how they interact. 
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Nevertheless, the robust research design provides some protection against these 
limitations and allows researchers to follow procedures that will enable them to replicate 
the study in a different context, thereby testing which results hold and which ones vary. 
A second limitation of this study – although measures were taken to reduce it to a 
minimum (see Section 5.4 in this chapter) – is the subjective, interpretive nature of the 
research. It is fully acknowledged that the outputs of this research have been influenced 
at every stage of the execution by the author’s preconceptions, experiences, values and 
relationships with participants. The remedies employed cannot claim to eliminate all 
researcher-induced bias. But, in keeping with Lincoln and Guba’s (1985) calls for 
trustworthiness and credibility in qualitative research, the author has made all efforts to 
remain sincere and preserve the integrity of the research and the informants, while striving 
to produce research based on evidence the results and conclusions of which merit 
credibility among both the research and practice communities. 
5.8 Further research 
This thesis uncovered substantial new questions that warrant future research – and this is 
perhaps the greatest value of exploratory, qualitative research designs. 
A first opportunity for future research is the testing and refinement of the model 
and corresponding propositions that emerged from this study. Such testing could be done 
in both similar and different contexts to extend its applicability. 
From a paradox and tensions perspective, a number of research opportunities have 
emerged. This thesis’s findings indicate that CEOs and chairpersons do not frame 
strategic tensions as paradoxical. However, for the sake of the following argument, let us 
for a moment assume that strategic tensions are perceived as paradoxical. One of the main 
  322 
questions that still pervades paradox theory is that of which paradoxes emerge first and 
how they interrelate and co-evolve. Schad et al. (2016:39) only recently raised the 
following question: “To what degree do performing paradoxes (strategic priorities that 
reflect competing demands) reinforce or mitigate organizing paradoxes (practices for 
control and flexibility) fueled by their implementation?” This thesis finds this question 
highly relevant. The results in this thesis suggest that, for higher-level roles such as those 
of CEO and chairperson, performing paradoxes may be the first consideration which in 
turn leads to the consideration of structures that are able to accommodate competing 
strategic demands. Top roles, particularly that of CEO, are highly incentivised into 
achieving particular results: that is, they are incentivised for performance (Fredberg, 
2014; Waldman and Bowen, 2016). This is to say that organising paradoxes and tensions 
follow performing paradoxes and tensions. This is not dissimilar to the old contingency 
theory adage that “structure follows strategy” (Chandler, 1962). More research is 
necessary on how strategic performing tensions and organising tensions interrelate and 
evolve. 
A further aspect much overlooked by extant literature on paradox and tensions is 
again a contingency question applied to paradox theory. The need to create a distinction 
from other seemingly competing theories has led paradox scholars to neglect the value of 
integrating contingency and paradox considerations. Only recently have scholars (Schad 
et al., 2016; Putnam, Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016) begun to appreciate the synergies 
between paradox and contingency. One insight from this thesis is that, instead of 
assuming that when paradox is present leadership has to engage a “both–and” approach, 
a better question seems to be: under which conditions is a “both–and” approach desirable 
or even possible? For example, this thesis finds some CEOs undergoing turnaround 
strategies, engaging in retrenchment and recovery sequentially, while others pursue both 
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simultaneously. Rather than claiming that CEOs who do both–and somehow have a 
superior “paradoxical mind-set”, there appear to be more practical reasons – such as 
severe resource constraints, velocity of decline, board or shareholder opposition, 
unsupportive and/or ineffective chairperson, legacy structures – that mitigate against or 
even prevent CEOs from using dual strategies. Understanding the interplay between role 
constraints and choices in everyday practice is a good starting point in uncovering the 
nature as well as the contingencies that influence responses to tensions. This also moves 
the debate away from research that sees tensions and paradoxes as discrete entities, 
against which well-designed effective responses can be formulated. New approaches such 
as the constitutive and processual approach (e.g. Hargrave and van de Ven, 2016; Putnam, 
Fairhurst and Banghart, 2016; Schad et al., 2016) to paradox and tension appear more 
promising and closer to what has been uncovered in this thesis. In particular, there is a lot 
of research potential into how tensions emerge and are handled within dyadic 
relationships such as the one between chairperson and CEO, CEO and CFO, or even 
between CEO and COO. While some research, including this thesis, has investigated the 
dynamic interplay, division of tasks and responsibilities and mutual influence between 
CEOs and chairpersons, much less work has been done on the CEO–CFO dyad (but see 
Han, Zhang and Han, 2015). In this thesis, how efforts are separated and integrated 
between these key roles emerged as a critical factor in weathering the strategic tension of 
restructuring and growth. The findings pointing to the criticality of the chairperson’s 
buffering role in relation to the CEO through processes of insulation and regulation 
(Lynn, 2005) also deserve further investigation. Also requiring more attention is: how 
and under what circumstances does the chairperson choose to insulate the CEO from the 
expectations of significant others (i.e. shareholders, investors, analysts, NEDs) or regulate 
the CEO’s responses to such (often contradictory) expectations. It appears that this 
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“buffering function” is critical in enabling CEOs to hold tensions at the top (e.g. Tushman, 
Smith and Binns, 2011) without losing legitimacy or risking penalties from powerful 
stakeholders. It also appears to be important in regulating CEOs’ risk-taking, optimism 
and other emotional aspects, and in preventing excessive conformance with particular 
expectations. A wider opportunity is therefore identified to bring together research on 
organisational buffering and paradox and tension. Paradox scholars would agree with 
minimalist organisational buffering paradigms which state that buffering activities and 
mechanisms should be kept to a minimum (e.g. Bourgeois, 1981; Child, 1972; Porter, 
1990), because limiting the exposure of the firm to the environment leads to 
maladaptation, reduced co-optation and resources, and disequilibrium (Child and 
McGrath, 2001; Sherman and Schultz, 1998; Zimmerman, 1993). In this sense, buffering 
reduces the exposure of organisational agents to the tensions, contradictions and 
paradoxes that arise in confronting the external environment, and which are fundamental 
to sustainability, innovation and ongoing adaptability (e.g. Smith and Lewis, 2011). 
Tensions may remain “artificially” latent and therefore go unnoticed or not addressed in 
an effective manner. From this perspective, paradox scholars ought to be proponent of 
minimalist buffering, or of no buffering at all. Even social buffering, which could describe 
the chairperson buffering role in relation to the CEO as observed in this thesis, was found 
to lead to dependency and ultimately powerlessness (Conger and Kanungo, 1988). 
However, such buffering paradigms tend to stress the insulating side of buffering, while 
ignoring buffering’s regulating mechanisms. CEOs and chairpersons find the role of 
buffering in the context of the board a critical one in handling competing and 
contradictory expectations from a variety of powerful stakeholders. Instead of assuming 
all tensions are “good”, insulation and regulation processes (buffering) could be more of 
a selective mechanism whereby “good” tensions would be allowed in, and “bad” tensions 
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would be regulated or prevented from entering the organisational system. Future research 
might investigate contingency factors that act to moderate the chairperson’s buffering 
role. Perhaps this role varies according to ownership type or dispersion/concentration of 
capital and types of investors? Further, in governance regimes where CEO and 
chairperson roles are held by the same individual, how do CEOs go about aligning and 
reconciling multiple and contradictory expectations? Are there alternative buffers? Are 
there greater or different tensions? 
Many of the research opportunities outlined above involve an investigation of the 
everyday practice and critical dyadic relationships within the organisational system to 
reveal how tensions are formed, (co-)evolve and are handled. This may be best served by 
longitudinal research designs, case study research and observational techniques. 
5.9 Personal reflection 
The last four or so years have been immensely gratifying. At a personal level, it has been 
an excellent growth opportunity. The PhD journey has conferred on me a much greater 
self-awareness and understanding of my strengths, weaknesses, ambitions and limits. It 
has also helped me identify a future direction, one that is more aligned to my true self, 
and one in which I can be fulfilled as an individual and offer my best contribution. It is 
now clear to me that my future lies within the academic community. My contribution to 
the world will be through research and teaching: to play a role and have a voice, however 
small, that scrutinises and supports today’s leaders and helps develop those of tomorrow; 
and to aim to positively influence policy-making for a better world by means of research. 
Realising this has been liberating. But I am starting with the end (at least thus far) of the 
story. 
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The experience of writing this PhD has been beset with tensions. Of course, I am 
not referring here to the tensions discussed in my thesis – those of CEOs and chairpersons 
– but rather those facing PhD students. I’d like to highlight two in particular. One is a 
change of ontological and epistemological perspectives. All my experiences prior to this 
PhD had equipped me to look at the world as an objective reality, developing a mind-set 
and providing the tools to measure it and find solutions to (often apparently) discrete and 
relatively prosaic problems. The PhD process over these last years has made me confront 
my assumed paradigms and “views of reality” and this was not a stress-free activity. It 
has taken time to truly understand and apply different ontological and epistemological 
positions, often finding in myself contradictions between intention and behaviour. It is 
not easy to break from entrenched mental frames. Constructivist and interpretivist 
positions – despite criticisms of subjectivity – are the more robust positions from which 
to start social inquiry. This is because human behaviour – of chairpersons, CEOs or others 
– is often nuanced, complex and surprising, and can often be explained only by the 
idiosyncrasies of individuality and context, both present and historical. As a consequence 
of appreciating the complexity of individual and collective behaviour, I became more 
critical of research that I might have commended only a few years ago. More importantly, 
I began to change my personal world-view. I believe I increasingly began to appreciate 
context and this led me to become increasingly less judgemental, and possibly more 
inclusive and open to difference than I was before. I feel very fortunate that I was able to 
conduct an exploratory qualitative study while I was making this mental journey. 
Inspecting phenomena by interrogating the actors that are close to them stimulates many 
different ideas, areas of inquiry, and practical as well as theoretical issues across the 
particular field of study. I suspect that a more quantitative approach would have 
considerably limited my understanding of corporate governance and its many nuances. 
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The second tension I experienced is one between industry and academia, which 
takes me back to the beginning of this reflection. For a long time during the PhD process, 
I was unsure about whether I wanted to return to a career in industry or to embrace a new 
one in academia. On the one hand, I was disenchanted with industry. I didn’t feel that it 
provided me with purpose and meaning, or with enough freedom to make anything more 
than small contributions, often within the boundaries of the firm I worked for. Yet 
academia has always exerted a strong attraction. In comparison to industry, there is a 
potential to inspire more people through research and teaching, and even to influence 
policy at a more macro level. Nonetheless, the tensions inherent in writing a PhD often 
led to anxious self-reflection: will I ever be any good at research? Today I feel strongly 
that I can make a meaningful contribution. From a personal perspective, I think that the 
success of this PhD can be measured by answering this question: Do I feel capable of 
independently designing and conducting good-quality research that is meaningful, 
rigorous and impactful? I can now confidently answer that question in the affirmative. Of 
course, I have still much to learn, and if I could go back I would probably do many things 
differently in the way I conducted my PhD, but the reality is that I feel the learning process 
is more important than the tangible outcome. I don’t believe one can evaluate the full 
impact of the PhD journey without some distance. So I will probably only fully appreciate 
it in some months’ time. 
5.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter has brought this thesis to a conclusion. It is hoped that the contributions 
made can serve to extend researchers’ knowledge in the areas of board directors and 
strategic tensions, as well as helping practitioners reflect on their everyday practice. The 
  328 
author will of course continue his journey: pursuing some of the questions left answered 
by this research, seeking new ventures and new, exciting research projects that can bring 
about a positive impact on business and society. 
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Appendixes  
Appendix 1: Research Invite Letter 
The University of Reading 
Henley Business School 
Rm EH 500, Greenlands 
Henley-on-Thames 
Oxfordshire, RG9 3AU, UK 
f.m.a.morais@pgr.reading.ac.uk  
 
 
Day, Month, Year 
Name of Participant, Esq. 
 
 
Invitation to participate in Doctoral Research 
 
 
Dear Name of Participant,  
 
 
My name is Filipe Morais, and I am a doctoral student at Henley Business School, University of Reading, 
UK. My research is supervised by Professor Nada Kakabadse and Professor Andrew Kakabadse and your 
contact was facilitated by Alvarez and Marsall with whom we are conducting a research into how boards 
handle complex and discontinuous business challenges. 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my doctoral research programme into how chairpersons and 
CEOs respond to strategic tensions whilst fulfilling their role. These tensions often arise in periods of 
change, crisis but can also arise in ‘normal times’. How board directors respond and deal with tensions 
inside the boardroom may ultimately mean the difference between success and failure for themselves and 
for the companies they serve. As such I would like to explore the nature of tensions that you have faced 
whilst fulfilling chairperson and/or CEO roles during your career. 
 
As a senior business leader, I greatly appreciate your involvement and insight. Your involvement would be 
under the form of a face-to-face interview at a place and time to be agreed, subject to your availability.   
 
As a preparation for the interview I would like you to reflect on particular events of your career where you 
experienced tension inside the boardroom. These tensions may include competing demands, constraints to 
action or interpersonal tensions, or indeed anything that you have experienced as tension.   
 
In particular, I would like you to focus on the role of executive and board leadership in managing or 
resolving these tensions, and the interaction between executives and non-executives. Please think of 
examples of tensions that were effectively handled, and those that were not so effective.  
 
Research material will be anonymous and confidential, subject to the strict ethical guidelines of the 
University of Reading, Henley Business School.  
 
I will of course circulate research findings with all participants which may provide useful insight for 
boardroom effectiveness going forward.  
 
I hope you can positively respond to my invitation.  
Many thanks 
Yours sincerely 
(Signature) 
Filipe Morais  
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide 
The following themes have guided the inquiry process during the interviews: 
 
 the general and specific contexts under which director’s fulfil their roles  
 the constraints, opportunities and choices made available to the director whilst 
fulfilling his role  
 the nature of the (paradoxical) tensions faced by directors   
 the role expectations and social dynamics experienced inside the boardroom 
 the leadership and skills utilised to navigate through tensions  
 the behavioural, emotional or otherwise, responses employed by directors to deal 
with tensions   
 
The interview protocol used in this study in conjunction with the audit trail provided in 
appendix four (N-Vivo Structure) and the Demands-Constraints-Choices (DCC) 
(Stewart, 1982) lenses from which to analyse interview data are important cornerstones 
in ensuring future replicability of this study.   
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Appendix 3: Example of an Interview Transcript  
Interview Date: 25.06.2015 
Transcribed: 29.06.2015 
Interviewee: Mr. X (Chairman, Company Y) (Code: Chaiperson XX) 
 
Well, X, thank you very much for taking time from your schedule to just seeing me 
for this research.   
OK. 
And where are you starting? 
Starting really, well, slightly before you started as Chairman.  I think it was October 
2011.  So Company Y was already in pretty bad shape by then I suppose.  So I think, 
I guess my first question would be what was the trigger for you to arrive and come 
here and start as Chairman?  What was your mandate there?  And what were your 
first concerns as you arrived? 
Yeah.  Well, I think the trigger was that they needed somebody because there was a 
feeling among the colleague Board members that the Board wasn’t really looking at the 
right things and that started with the Chairman, a good Chairman probably for some 
period of time but at the end of that period the colleagues felt that a new chairman was 
needed to have a look at the company.  They first looked at some individuals in the UK, 
then the search was extended to, hey, but we are an international company so let’s look 
internationally, and then for some reason they picked me.  Why did I pick them?  I picked 
Company Y basically because of the strong brand name.  I’ve, if I say what I’m strong at 
it’s building brands and building people and I felt that what was needed here was really 
exploit that brand name.  And secondly in terms maybe not so much building people but 
making sure it was one company.  When I did my look, my search into it there was, there 
were really two concerning things.  One was the business, the way it was evolving, or 
three things, the way it was evolving although there was at that point in time not an 
awareness that it was going to go so drastic to 21st November.  But there was a concern 
that the business was not doing the way that it should be doing.  The second is, well, my 
finding was this was not a company, this was a silo edition of three different companies, 
one in Scandinavia, one in the UK and one in Germany.  And when I asked the question 
as to, don’t you guys believe in best practices they all said yes, I do as long as they take 
mine.  But there was no desire to have one unity in there.  And the third concern was a 
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high financial leverage of the company, but the desire to do something about it, want it, I 
mean you could say, hey, then don’t take the risk.   I did take the risk and in fact the day 
that I came here was the day that the CEO was asked to leave and so the interim CEO got 
here.  Then came 21st November which was the shock as to this company is going to stop 
existing.   
And then those were the three concerns and what were your first actions there then? 
Well, the first action, well, after having become Chairman of the Board was really to 
make some changes to the Board and we, I think there were out of the Board members 
two left immediately and two other ones left shortly thereafter.  That gave a clear signal 
also to the inside and to the outside world as to changes starting from the top and we 
started recruiting new Board members, having a clear picture of what are the views, what 
are the qualities, what are the skills that we need in order to complement.  I think the 
Board members were more chosen as to what’s a nice name as to what can they contribute 
to the business.  So that was the first one which was change the Board.  That happened 
rather quickly, rather efficiently, good work by headhunter company to do that, install the 
interim CEO, gave him the support.  The interim CEO had some, then reached out to 
some excellent financial people outside to make sure that the company stayed alive. That 
was 21st, 22nd, 23rd November.  There is a small anecdote there which shows you how 
strong this company in terms of marketing is.  During that weekend of, that first weekend 
there was of course a risk that this company which is built on trust because people give 
you the money for the six months in advance most of the time and some, there were some 
competitive action as to trust us rather than somebody else.  That was the weekend where 
the hard core of Company Y massively went to the store and said, we don’t let this British 
institution go bankrupt and we had more bookings than previous weekends during that 
weekend.  It tells you something about the strength of the brand and what it is.  But so 
changed the Board, gave support to the interim CEO and then start looking for a new 
management team.  And then that new management team eventually happened with [CFO 
name] first and [new CEO name] second.  And I think it’s excellent that it came that way.  
If I look back as to what’s the success of the transformation I think it’s the fact that you 
have three people that have unique strengths that work together.  You have [CFO name] 
that understands as nobody else how the financial markets and the banking and the 
opportunities work, and without the CFO it would not have worked.  You have [new CEO 
name] who had a drive, a dynamism, a charisma that installed the desire for effective 
change and also, yeah, exposed that to the outside world as to, yeah, we believe her, she 
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delivers.  That meant a psychological change in the troops.  And then you had [COO 
name] who knew how to run this goddamned business because all the other ones were not 
coming from the travel industry.  I have no travel industry background.  [new CEO name] 
did not.  The CFO a little bit, but basically not.  But so that to me is the success of the 
transformation.  It’s unique.  None of those three could have done it individually and none 
of those three should claim that they have done it.  But each of them really worked 
together, those.  That’s the essence of the transformation.  So I was lucky that [CFO name] 
joined first.  I don’t think that [new CEO name] would have picked [CFO name] but she 
worked, they worked perfectly together in that one.  And it tells you probably something 
as to don’t necessarily let, they always say let your CEO pick the CFO.  I’m not sure 
whether that’s good advice because depending on how the CEO is he or she may want to 
pick somebody that listens to him or her whereas here in this case we had a very 
complementary, sometimes conflicting but in the positive word of conflicting, model 
where [CFO name] would say, hey, but here is the financial requirement.  And to be frank 
in that first two years the alive or dead scenario was basically a financial scenario and 
[new CEO name] was making sure that the investment community, the outside world, 
believed the story and that inside there was a dynamism.  She brought in a lot of new 
people, she brought in also the vision of technology and that everybody said, oh, 
Company Y is no longer in the 19th century.  But then instead of just saying it’s new 
technology we had this combination of technology and people and that ultimately became 
the unique way of weaving it.  High tech, high touch is really what makes us unique.  We 
are not a high tech company and we’re no longer a just touch company.  It’s high tech, 
high touch.  So got CFO first and [CFO name] came in in May 2012 and then at that point 
in time I had already got contact with [new CEO name].  And the [new CEO name] 
recruitment is an interesting anecdote in the sense that in my philosophy I’ve always said 
to any headhunter give me the best women and the best men that you have and I’ll make 
the judgement whoever can do it.  So the executive search company came with a list of 
12 men only and I said, that’s not exactly what I asked for.  I said, give me, yeah, but 
there are no females that can really do this job.  I said, there must be.  So the next meeting 
they had a list of about three female candidates and [new CEO name] had sent me a letter 
saying, I can do the job.  So I told the executive company, put her in your basket and then 
we’ll evaluate her together with the others.  And as it turned out in the end there were, we 
had four candidates left, two, two, and in the real end, end we had [new CEO name] on 
one side and I had a male candidate on the other side.  I think both could have, both had 
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similar qualities, both could have done it.  The big advantage of [new CEO name] next to 
the fact that she knew technology but the other individual had that technology drive as 
well she was British.  And this company is still based in London with [COO name] not 
being a Brit, me not being a Brit there was an, I saw an advantage of somebody that is 
anchored in the establishment in London that was next to the, I didn’t know that much 
about her drive at that point in time, that’s something that you discover later.  I knew, I 
could see and know about the combination that what she had done in terms of technology 
and about building businesses but the fact that she was British made then the decision 
over the other candidate who was a Benelux candidate.  And it was probably a bit too 
much of, having a Benelux Chairman and a Benelux CEO that would be too much of a 
coup and would not be the right thing to do.  So she joined.  She joined at, when the, we 
have had consecutive financial restructuring so we had really the saving which was 21st 
November and then in April, then in May, June we had the real first restructuring and that 
was kind of a condition for [new CEO name] and I think for anybody to say, I’m not 
going to join unless you guys have your financial structuring at least as a base right.  That 
base was right and then she joined end July 2012.  I’ll stop here and then you can fill in 
or go on. 
Yes.  There’s one thing.  So you had to change the Board, going back a little bit.  
What were exactly the skills you brought here?  So for instance financial savvy, was 
there a digital understanding or technology or? 
There were all of those, but different ones.  I mean I had a skillset which is I need 
somebody that really understands.  I had somebody onboard with [SID name] who was 
the senior independent who really understood the business.  He had been with companies 
in the travel industry before, but I needed somebody that understood the consumer, 
somebody from the financial side.  I had [Director name] and she was here, and then I 
wanted to have somebody oddly enough that understood the destination and so [Director 
name] from Turkey, that’s the rationale for having him onboard, because we said we send, 
our 20 million customers we send them to a destination but how do the destinations make 
optimum use of that one and come there.  So we had a different set of skills that we had 
been looking for and that we set out with the executive search company as to that’s what 
we have.  And again with the … I said I want to see the best female and I want to see the 
best male for each of those functions and we chose.  And then as a matter of fact that 
turned into the element that we had a Board and we still have a Board today that over a 
third is of a different gender than the other and we have a Board that today has I think 
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nationalities from Turkey, Belgium, Netherlands, the US and the UK.  And so also giving 
a signal that this is not a UK company.  This is a very international company although it 
didn’t behave like that.  And that was the thinking behind going after the different Board 
members where then some, they joined but then we had our [company Z], I’m thinking 
about his name, I’ll give you his name, but he had to resign after a while because of the 
[company Z] discussions.  But he knew the consumer, but [Director name] knew as well.  
So different angles, financial, high tech.   [Director name] is like that, destination.  And 
I’m a strong, but it has a risk.  It makes your board very versatile, very different which is 
an asset but you then also have to make sure that it’s a real team, that people don’t start 
thinking from their own angle.  And so it to me is the best recipe, but it’s also the most 
difficult recipe. 
And how do you manage that because that’s actually one of the critical tasks for the 
Chairman? 
I think it is a critical task and it’s a critical task particularly in case of, well, of crisis and 
I had been on the Board of [Company A] where we had a hostile takeover and we knew 
where we had a disgruntled shareholder and then you see how important that it is.  How 
do you do it?  I think there are a couple of ways.  One is even though we have committees 
everybody is free to join every committee and, yeah, as a matter of fact everybody joins 
every committee.  So they are not a full voting member but everybody is and so there is 
not a two speed or two level of intelligence, particularly dangerous in my mind when it 
comes to audit that the audit people know so much more than the non audit members.  
Everybody could come to the other’s committee.  Everybody did, could come to health 
and safety committee and the same for remuneration committee.  So all Board members 
were on this, continuously on the same level of information.  You cannot do that when 
you have 18 of those, but when we are 10 like we are it’s perfectly doable.  So I’m not in 
favour of huge boards but just big enough that everybody can be on the same level of 
information.  And in terms of during the board meetings I think you make sure as a 
chairman that everybody has his point of view because you have different characters.  
You have some people that are very talkative.  There are some people they are just saying 
nothing but once they say something it’s dot on.  But try to make sure that at the end of 
an important discussion that you go round the table and say, [Director name], do you have 
any point of view?  [Director name], do you have any point of view?  And so even if they 
don’t have it you force it almost so that they have to think about the subject and they 
cannot hide by saying nothing.  And then the third element is what I would call the 
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evening before, have a dinner the evening before.  It’s a different atmosphere versus the 
very structural board meeting. 
It’s very interesting because actually I’m very concerned myself from my research 
about having, respecting too much the committees and what you just said for me 
resonates completely because it does break the flows of information, it does create 
more information asymmetries between people and for you to generate that 
consensus and that one view it’s, sometimes you can act against that. 
Yeah, I’m very concerned about two speed information. 
So, yeah, absolutely and that was really, really a good point.  I mean, yeah, I’ll 
probably share it.  And I think the other thing is, so you did refer that, yeah, [CEO 
name] and [COO name] and [CFO name] that they all three, we’ve been with all 
three so as you said all three very strong characters and as you rightly point they 
have their unique strengths.  I was wondering as the Chairman as well how is it to 
kind of steer this kind of calibre, high calibre people and make sure that there’s no 
air gaps and that everything is running well? 
Well, I think you need as a chairman to know what the state of the business is in and 
when, what the balance is between giving freedom and pulling the brake or giving 
guidance.  And I think in the first years I mean [CEO name] almost had carte blanche 
because you knew if she cannot fix it it is not going to be fixed and [CFO name] had the 
financial skill to deal with it.  So there the managing is from almost, [CEO name], you 
can almost do anything as long as you keep me posted and as long as it doesn’t go against 
the thinking of [CFO name] because the financial restructuring is key.  If [CFO name] 
believes that we are doing something which is detrimental to the company that’s 
overriding, but once that is given you have freedom to run to do.  Inform me, but I’m not 
going to steer you, I’m not going to sit on your chair or I’m not going to give you guidance 
because otherwise the speed of action is of utter importance at this point in time.  At this 
point in time it’s a bit different and we’re going to come to the change from [CEO name] 
to [COO name].  But that’s, there is I think, and why I think ultimately hopefully we’re 
going to be very successful is that you need somebody that has the drive to change and I 
would say spin the wheels.  But then you have to be careful that, you have to make sure 
that the car also moves forward and that you don’t just spin the wheels for the sake of 
spinning the wheels and there comes a moment of time when all of the great concepts 
need to really be put into that car and make the car moving and that’s when execution 
becomes a more important element than the strategic thinking.  And I’m not saying that 
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[CEO name] did not have the power to do the execution and I’m not saying that [COO 
name] does not have the power to do the strategic thinking, but it’s a matter of balance 
and that’s the tilting point that we had last November. 
Did the CEO ever come to you with …  
With? 
…  or with different points? 
Oh, yeah.  Sure.  Sure.  Discussions on how capital tied should we be, how light should 
this company be, discussion on do we need an airline, what kind of a business are we?  
Sure. 
So you were in that, in those things you were quite  
Yeah. 
Kind of a coacher, yeah? 
Yeah.   
A mentor. 
Yeah.  And then, and I think what you do as a chairman is I guess you, but it’s like you 
provide the framework for the painting and then you let the CEO paint.  And depending 
on the capabilities and the development of a CEO you either narrow the frame and you 
say, this is where you can paint or you’re winding and say paint it.  And if your, and I’m 
not going to judge whether that painting is going to be sold at Sotheby’s for a million or 
not.  Ultimately the shareholder is going to do that and we’re going to then measure 
success by how the painting looks like and how much the share price is evolving.  And 
with [CEO name], yeah.  So as a chairman you set the boundaries and you say, we’re not 
going to sell the airline.  We are, and you have other discussions as to what the framework 
is, but it’s a broad framework in which you say, [CEO name], now you paint.   
Did you have, did you set up the succession plan for [COO name]? 
Did I set what?  Suggestion? 
Succession plan.  Did you groom [COO name] to … 
The CEO did.  [CEO name] did.  And it came in two different ways.  One was the UK 
was the one that needed to be turned around.  Scandinavia had always delivered its 100 
million and Germany with [company B] was doing fine as well.  The UK needed to be 
fixed and we all knew if the UK cannot be fixed Company Y is not going to be fixed also 
because the UK is just in the front door of the analyst and of the investment community.  
And when we, when I travelled to Scandinavia and Germany there was a frustration of, 
darn it, why don’t we get bonuses on the group level?  I mean we’re working on, excuse 
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the language, our asses off and then those guys in the UK they all, excuse the language 
again, they all screw it up.  So we said, why don’t you Germans come and do it here?  
And so [COO name] was brought over here and that was a first sign to the Germans as 
to, OK, we mean it, this breaking down the silos.  And [COO name] has been in charge 
of the UK for a while.  And after that [CEO name] suggested that he would become the 
COO and so in November 2013 he became the COO and many people did not see what 
was between the lines, but that was a clear signal as to he is my successor if he proves, 
because then you really had the team of one COO for the whole group, not just little silos, 
but one COO for the whole group and a CFO and a CEO.  And so from November 2013 
on it was a matter of he was going to succeed her at some point in time and the expectation 
was not that it was going to be so soon.  It was probably going to take two years rather 
than one year but there was always also from the Board a bit of a risk as to with [CEO 
name] great performance because she had a stellar performance.  I mean I don’t need to 
tell you the share price was, I was reading through some of my mails and we were jubilant 
when the share price went from 25 to 27p.  That’s a 10% increase, 2p, big deal.  And so 
it went from 15p to 150, so tenfold.  But that also meant from a Board point of view as 
to, oh, make sure that you have a successor in case there is another great company in 
wherever it is that wants to buy [CEO name] away from you.  So there was that side as 
well. 
Many analysts and the press, it was quite a bold move to move [CEO name] so 
quickly. 
Yeah.  It was and I think if you asked them again today they’d probably say it was the 
right move.  But it was a bold move and I’d rather like bold moves than just carrying on 
and I think do it, do it bold, it makes sense, then do it.  And then do it rather earlier than 
later. 
Than later. 
I mean there are so many examples where you say [COO name] is going to succeed [CEO 
name] six months from now.  I mean who is running the company then?  Nobody.  
Because the old CEO everybody says I’m going to ask the question to the new one.  And 
the new one says, oh, but I, and so make it bold.  And it was bold in many ways also 
because of the excellent track record that [CEO name] had, but we felt as a Board and 
also then with [CEO name] that there came when I said that switch from strategic thinking 
and [CEO name] had a lot of outside experts that had helped her in that strategic thinking 
which probably you could not do if you would be a smaller company, one of the 
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advantages of being so big.  But that the strategy was in place and [new CEO name] is 
not changing that strategy.  Yeah, being a bit unbending here and there and over time but 
basically strategy is there.  Now how are we going to execute it?  Where are the pitfalls 
in this industry? And then [new CEO name] became the excellent man to actually do it 
and helped by the organisation and so that’s how it happened.  And then we said we’d 
rather do it at the beginning of a financial year because then you have the element of 
accountability and so this is [new CEO name] year and not halfway through a year 
because then they will say, oh, not me.   
Yeah, this is great.  I was just wondering what was your biggest concern, your 
dilemma because that situation was something that we really had doubts about that 
you were doing the right thing or 
In general or in [Company Y name]? 
In general going this journey. 
It’s the balance between high tech and high touch.  Still not decided.  As to, I think we 
are unique in this combination and it’s the right combination but I mean where do you 
find the balance between that one?  The other one is probably, and that’s then my 
marketing background as to how can we more move towards a more unified brand 
approach because we tend to, I think one of my advantages is that I’m living across the 
Channel and people, if you live in London you think London and so Company Y is the 
world and then you come to Germany and you say, oh, but we have [Company C] and 
you come to Scandinavia and you say it’s called [Company D] and you have [Company 
B] and so how, what’s the speed of which you can unite that and make sure that you have 
one big company going forward?  That’s not a, that’s a challenge.  It’s not something that 
I say, hey, I regret not having done it at all, but it’s a challenge as to how do you manage 
that in terms of, in this whole transformation part it is the importance of finance was I 
guess on 21st November 2011 was 99%.  Today it is probably 25%.  The product offering 
comes in, the technology comes in.  How do you evolve from a 99% financial driven 
company to one where you have the balances of all of the elements. 
Without losing the controls and the discipline? 
Yeah.  And how do you then have the right KPIs because one of the reasons why this 
company went the way it went in 2011 is they did not look at the right KPIs.  It’s not that 
they were losing money it’s just that they didn’t have any money so they were looking at 
profit margin and turnover and there was a thinking as to the bigger, I am the more, I will 
gain but they had forgotten that there was something which is called cash flow that in a 
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low season you probably, you could face a situation where you could pay your suppliers 
or even your employees.  And that element was not measured so it’s what are, and those, 
and KPIs are evolving in a business.  Make sure, and I think that’s where as a board you 
need to have discussions with your key executives as to, if you’re sitting in the cockpit of 
your plane what are the key instruments that you need to be watching to avoid that you 
crash. 
 
You mentioned that, earlier on that there were some positive conflicts between these, 
some of these key individuals.  Can you give me some examples of those and how 
they were resolved or how they worked out? 
Yeah, I don’t want to cite too many examples because then it draws into, but the, I mean 
[CEO name] vision would probably in its more extreme be a, at some, initially though a 
storeless society with massive online booking without an airplane and maybe even 
without a product.  Really the magic intermediate, call it the better [Company X] or 
whatever.  And [COO name] would then say, hey, but if you don’t have a product in this 
kind of a travel world you’re not going to have anything.  You need product.  And that 
brought in the focus of product.  [CFO name] brought in the element of finance in terms 
of, hey, but your airline isn’t all that bad.  It eats a lot of capital but at the same time if we 
are moving into a sale and leaseback it really can bring some capital in there.  So they’re, 
those are examples where you have a discussion and I think [CEO name] was smart 
enough to listen.  I think that’s one of her great qualities that she knew where she was or 
where she is, where her strengths are.  I think she also for those elements relied a lot on 
external advice, particularly McKinsey and maybe a bit too much.  But McKinsey was 
kind of like a second [CEO name], a mirror for her as to, if she would look into McKinsey 
mirror and say would you do that and if the mirror would answer yes then it’s fine.   
Laughter 
That’s exaggerated, but not too much. 
And I guess my other question is so now you’ve got [new CEO name] on the driver’s 
seat and what do you think is the future then? 
The future? 
Future for Company Y? 
The way that we have envisioned it, which is this high tech, high touch.  I think we move 
more in a balanced way of what are the elements and I think now is a time to focus on 
more unique products.  Whether they are proprietary or not is not that much important 
  364 
but that they are unique.  There comes a moment in time when you then say my 
geographical base that I have can I expand it?  And I think our co-operation with 
[Company E] in China is a perfect example of that thinking.  It probably comes a year 
earlier than what we had planned it for because there is the risk that people say, oh, no, I 
don’t have to work that hard any more, the Chinese are going to do it for me.  But I mean 
there comes a time that you become a much more global business, which we’re doing.  
And then the whole discussion as to how capital light do you have to be, do you want to 
be is a continuous one in terms of discussion.  I think the challenge for, that we have now 
is how can you combine the strengths of the organisation from [former CEO name] point 
of view with [new CEO name]?  By that one I mean [former CEO name] was really going 
after everybody.  I mean you had to deliver even before the question was raised almost.  
And so there is a, there was a bit of a risk as to [new CEO name] … ooh, now I can relax 
a bit.  I’m overstating it, but.  And how do you avoid that?  How do you make sure that 
you have continuous drive in your organisation, that you have that there?  And that some 
form of, yeah, complacency does not creep in into the, that you have those continuous 
challenges, which [former CEO name] because she was an outsider and it was, that was 
the reason why I wanted to have an outsider who could shake up the business and you 
could look at it from the outside and say, hey, we need to do things differently.  Now you 
have an insider and you have to avoid that the insider only looks it from the inside and 
that you have some outside thinking there.  And that’s a challenge going forward. 
And do you consider and if so what are the things you think that Company Y 
improved?  Do you consider you are now a much more resilient organisation to face 
future downtrends? 
We’re definitely much more resilient.  I mean from a financial point of view definitely.  
From a product point of view definitely.  From a competitive point of view not yet fully.  
I mean because the risk in this business is that you think you’re moving and you’re 
improving but you’re forgetting that somebody else there is doing the same thing and then 
suddenly you wake up and say, oh.  Right?  And so the competitive challenge is one which 
is going to, I think probably in this kind of a business it’s the more people underestimate 
the challenge of change and how do you cope with that relative change.  So not the change 
of you’re not, not only do you have the change of your own company but the change vis 
a vis your competition.  How do you cope with that relative change? 
It’s interesting the way you put it because in many ways you went through a very 
tumultuous time over the last few years and then it started stabilising, but you want 
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stability and change.  You want to feel safe and feel stable but feel alert and feel you 
are able to change if things change.  So in getting that balance right I suppose it’s 
just what we’ve been discussing really. 
Yeah. 
To maintain the discipline to be able to change, but change is not over. 
Yeah, change is not over. 
It’s a continuous element.  The car in which we are driving looks kind of the way we like 
it to look like, but if you don’t move forward somebody else is going to overtake you. 
Yeah, and the road may change the 
The road changes, yeah. 
The road changes. 
Yeah.  Yeah. 
You have to build systems in the car so you can cope with changes in the roads. 
Laughter 
Yeah.  Sure. 
No, it’s really interesting.  There’s just one last burning question.  I’m conscious of 
time which is so you brought in new people on to your Board, NEDs, what was their 
contribution to all this? 
Oh, they have done, those have been great, yeah, just because they come from the, those, 
all those different angles.  I mean if I take [Director name] she is an excellent chair of 
audit.  She knows that.  She also has a good link with [CFO name].  I mean the difficult 
thing for a board member and non-chairman is how do you keep yourself on top of the 
business without intervening in the business?  And that’s, people always think it’s 
difficult for a chairman but it is I think sometimes even more difficult for a committee 
chair because a chairman can kind of have a helicopter discussion but then when it comes 
to for instance a chair of audit he or she has to really dig into it and so how does he or she 
dig into it without really taking the decisions?  And I think the, particularly for, well, for 
all of the chairs the interaction between the executives and the board chairs is very much 
under estimated.  But I think I now, oddly enough I will tell you the one capability that I 
probably am still looking for is somebody that understands the business.  That sounds 
odd, very odd, but you either have people in this industry that are yesterday’s people that 
know how to run the business of yesterday or you have the [company X´s] who believe 
that the technological model is the future.  But somebody who really understands the 
marriage between high tech, high touch, if you know it let me know.  We have it inside 
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the company but it’s, I’m looking for a challenger from the outside that could say, oh, 
but, hey, have you thought about X, Y or Z?  Now it has to come from different angles. 
That’s again very interesting.  It actually really resonates with my research actually.  
Yeah, because you often, you find yourself in between two worlds and two different 
ways of conducting business, high touch, high tech and you really need people who 
have both brains and that’s very hard to find. 
Yeah. 
It’s hard to find people who can do contradictory things.  We can think about being 
changing and stability and high touch and high tech. 
You know this thing? 
Yes. 
It’s very difficult to do. 
It is.  It is, yes, indeed.  And it’s quite good for us because it is indeed very, something 
that often people either have one brain and they’re either high touch or very high 
tech. 
Yeah, and there’s nothing wrong then with having two individuals on the board, one with 
this one and one with the other one, but ideally you find somebody that has it integrated. 
Can I just ask one other question about the role of the non-executive directors and 
what role they played before or at the early stages of the challenges if you have some 
visibility of that and then more latterly what role they played in supporting the 
transformation? 
Well, you cannot do this transformation if the board does not support it.  I mean if the 
board would have a view as to we don’t need to do this transformation then forget it.  So 
throughout all of this exercise the non-execs have been very supportive of the, yeah, the 
mood and the move.  I think the role of the non-execs also changes over time and it comes 
back to what I call my framework and my, the painting.  When you are in a crisis you 
don’t as a board challenge the execution of how your ship is rescued.  You ask the captain, 
please rescue the ship.  Over time when you are in more normal waters you will then 
challenge the captain and say, are you sure you’re going towards the right direction, what 
are the alternative routes?  And you have much more of a challenging environment.  And 
I think we have gone through that first phase.  It made no sense whatsoever to challenge 
[CEO name] and [CFO name] and [COO name] in the first 12 months as to are you sure 
that you’re going towards the right direction because the answer was leave me alone, I 
want to save the ship.  Once the ship is safe then you start moving it.  And I think we have 
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gone probably from save the ship, decide, I’m now simplifying the thing, but save the 
ship, decide where you want to be, then make sure the ship moves.   
And has the 
That was the final question. 
Laughter 
No, go ahead. 
It’s fascinating though because I mean has the conversation of the NEDs changed or 
is it just their role that changed? 
Both.  Both.  I mean the conversation has changed over time, but the behaviour has 
changed as well. 
And did that happen instinctively or did you co-ordinate that? 
Both.  I think it’s smart board members know when to take distance, when to accelerate, 
when to put a limit, when to challenge, that’s what smart board members do.  Their 
behaviour is also guided by the situation and by the individuals.  Some CEOs have a 
different, and so I think it’s very important when you, when you look for a board member 
at this level you have to assume that everybody has the right IQ.  There are no stupid 
board members.  There are board members that don’t have the right EQ and so finding 
and probing how people interrelate and finding what’s the EQ of a board member is in 
my mind a very important element of your search for a board member.  And I’ve had, I 
remember in my search I know one possible board member that is today a chairman of a 
very international company but that I decided he wouldn’t fit in this culture because his 
EQ is not what is needed in this kind of a phase in this kind of a company.  And yet he’s 
a very excellent chairman in the company that he is the chairman of. 
But it’s both.  It’s both you need different qualities but also the behaviour changes in … 
of where you are.  And the CEO as well.  I mean you challenge [new CEO name] 
differently than you challenge [former CEO name] and you have to find the ways that, 
which, where you have to punch the ball or squeeze the ball in order to have the best 
results.  And that’s different in the UK versus in the rest of the world because you have 
such a different corporate governance structure, which I think is another interesting case 
study but for a different one. 
For another, next year. 
I’ve lived in five different corporate governance structures from the US, the UK, Holland, 
Belgium and France and Germany a bit to the side.  All very different. 
Would you consider one as, not as superior 
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Laughter 
Yeah, obviously. 
Wrong question, right?  Which one, yeah. 
Not superior.  I actually, I can tell you I’m very much aligned with the German and 
the Dutch and the Holland types of governance because I think that has the seeds of 
the future of what we need in terms of governance in this world.  However, do you 
find that German and Dutch have, because I have this hypothesis coming for a 
number of reasons that they are better prepared for crisis. 
Well, that’s now a more philosophical one.  I think you see that the Dutch and the 
Germans, particularly the Dutch, are moving towards the Anglo Saxon model there.  So 
if that’s such a good model why are they moving?  But, and I think the marriage of the 
two would be the ideal.  And what is the ideal of the two?  I think the excellent thing of 
the Dutch and the Germans is the fact that they take more old stakeholders into account, 
employees in Germany particularly, but also in the pure Dutch model it specifically states 
that the board is responsible to stakeholders, not the shareholders.  And that has an 
advantage in terms of crisis because in terms of crisis, I mean one of my statements, for 
better or for wrong, is why are there so much less strikes in Germany than in France and 
why has Germany come out of the crisis so much faster than in Germany than in France?  
It’s because the unions were a part of the Aufsichtsrat in Germany and they are in the 
bath and they feel how cold the water is and whereas in France they’re saying, oh, but it’s 
so nice to be in the bath and the water is warm.  So putting them into the bath leads to a 
different decision and co decision which is what the German and the Dutch model is.  So 
when you are in terms of a crisis that is a much more embracing one.  Where that system 
falls short of is in a fast moving world as we are in today most of the board members are 
not up to date with what’s really happening in the company.  They have board meetings 
but in between the meetings they don’t know.  So whoever puts the board agenda together, 
whoever puts the board documents together decides on what’s happening.  And that’s 
good about the UK system that the board members are much more involved or involved, 
yeah, up to date, knowledgeable about the business.  It starts with the chairman but also 
the, even the non, other non execs know much more about what’s going on in the business 
and so you have, the UK system has the advantage of understanding the businesses better 
and once you are moving forward and once you are driving your car to then ask the right 
questions of are you on the right road.  The unions don’t ask you to, which road you’re 
taking.  When you are getting off the road and falling off the cliff then they are with you.  
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So it’s the combination of the two to me is the better one and so I plead that me coming 
from part of that world helps it. 
Laughter 
No, it does, yeah, absolutely.   
But I think 
That’s again the … brand we’re talking about. 
Yeah, yeah, yeah.  But I’m strong believer in that combination of the two.  So I think the 
UK one may well evolve a bit towards the Dutch and the Dutch has come, evolved 
towards the UK one. 
It’s interesting.  Yeah, we’ve just 30 seconds.  I’ve just a very, very last thing.  Yeah, 
I promise this is really the last one, [chairman name]. 
Well, if you speak for 29 seconds that’s fine. 
Laughter 
One of the things I came out with throughout all these businesses is the fact that 
nobody has the guts to stand up in the board and say there’s an issue and it’s a 
serious one and we need to take action which is rather, you mentioned two of the 
words at speed and right now.  But somehow it builds a sense of nobody wants to 
really stand up and do it.  What do you think is really necessary for those things to 
happen better and more effectively? 
Well, that was a 30 seconds question, so let me give a 30 second answer.  I mean the 
challenge is how do you draw a line, how do you stand up without undermining the CEO?  
And if you, and again if we talk about the US system, the US corporate system, you 
always say yes until you fire him and then suddenly many things were rubbish.  The good 
thing about the UK system and about good UK boards is that they do know a lot about 
the company and that’s where the EQ comes in, that you then have a very good EQ board 
member who sometimes even outside of the board room says you’ve gone too far because 
the risk of doing it in the boardroom is that you denigrate the CEO, you make him or her 
lose face very publicly.  So the best thing is you either let it go via the chairman and that 
somebody, and I’ve had it, that somebody comes to the chairman and says that one was 
over, that’s over the line.  And then in fact you ask the chairman to talk to the CEO and 
say, you crossed the border line.  And it’s on a one on one, and I’ve had it in this company, 
and you then, it’s solved and nobody has lost face and everything continues.  It doesn’t 
mean that you should never have it in the boardroom, no, but you should be careful, you 
should dose it because if you either it becomes a vote of non confidence vis a vis an 
  370 
individual.  Now when you have a topic, and that’s the other thing, the challenge for a 
chairman has to make sure that touchy items become a topic and not an item from the 
CEO.  We have, on the next board meeting we have two what I call topics and everybody 
can there say draw a line or raise a flag because it’s a topic.  It’s different versus if the 
CEO would say, this is what I want to do, because then you have to say no to the CEO or 
yes to the CEO.  But here it’s brought as to this is a topic and everybody just you have a 
guided discussion, but then you can have the lines and then the next board meeting that’s 
what it is. 
Well, from my side I just have to thank you very much. 
Yeah, thank you. 
You’re welcome. 
It’s been very, very helpful. 
So looking forward to what you make of it. 
 
END OF INTERVIEW 
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Appendix 4: NVIVO-10 Coding Structure   
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